

REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

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
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To the memory of Mrs. Selda Jonas

Humanity be our eternal goal. GOETHE, *Maskenzug*

The greatest problem towards whose solution nature compels the human race is the establishment of a universal republic administering right according to law.

KANT, *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte
in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*



Seid um-schlungen, Mil - li - o - nen! Diesen Kuss der ganzen Welt!

BEETHOVEN, *Ninth Symphony*

PREFACE

THE FOLLOWING ESSAYS originated in an endeavor to clarify some of the issues involved in the present world situation. They are here collected in the hope that some readers will find them useful in their own efforts at understanding the situation in which every one of us is involved. Times like these are hard upon man, harder than years of actual warfare. They force us to be wide awake, to respond to radically new problems and situations, and to be responsible for them. History depends, as far as our part in it is concerned, upon clear, consistent thinking and consequent courageous action. The thinking has only begun, although for the last few years the intense discussion of the fundamental issues facing our time has revealed the growing disquiet and anxiety in which we live. The historical and politico-philosophical essays collected in this volume may help some reader to integrate facts, to establish connections and distinctions, to gain a truer perspective from a deeper background; and thus to carry on the discussion with greater clarity. The concluding essay is one voice in this discussion born out of and reflecting the time.

H. K.

Northampton, Mass.

January, 1939

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MOST OF THE ESSAYS collected in this volume have already appeared. I am indebted to the editors and publishers of *The American Scholar*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Political Science Quarterly*, and *Harvard Guardian* for permission to reprint them. Some of them have appeared in the following books and are reprinted here by permission: *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, edited by Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson, New York, The Macmillan Company; *Dictatorship in the Modern World*, edited by Guy Stanton Ford, University of Minnesota Press; *The Soviet Union and World Problems*, edited by Samuel N. Harper, University of Chicago Press; *Before America Decides*, edited by Frank P. Davidson and George S. Viereck, Jr., Harvard University Press; *Contemporary World Politics*, edited by Francis J. Brown, Hodges and Roucek, New York, John Wiley & Sons. All of them have been revised for the present edition.

I wish also to express my appreciation to Miss Virginia Gott for her intelligent and conscientious cooperation in preparing this volume.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	3
BACKGROUND	9
I. MESSIANISM	11
II. NAPOLEON AND THE NEW EUROPE	38
III. NATIONALISM	68
TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE	83
IV. RUSSIAN REVOLUTION	85
V. THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM AND THE SOVIETS	145
VI. COMMUNIST AND FASCIST DICTATORSHIP: A COMPARATIVE STUDY	179
VII. THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM	200
VIII. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE	211
IX. THE TWILIGHT OF NATIONALISM?	230
A NEW NEAR EAST	247
X. THE TURKISH REVOLUTION	249
XI. REVOLUTION IN THE DESERT	278
XII. ZIONISM	299
THE TOTALITARIAN CRISIS	331

POSTSCRIPT, JANUARY 1, 1941	417
SOME RECENT BOOKS	427
INDEX	433

REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

Introduction

A COLLECTION of essays can never attain to the unity of a book. The essays collected in the present volume were written over a period of eight years; they necessarily reflect the changing outlook of the author. The last eight years through which we have passed have been momentous years of a rapid and accelerating development, a turning point in history. As these years unfolded, they brought a deeper understanding of the forces involved. They taught us to evaluate and appreciate the past differently, to see it in a new light. Naturally, but unfortunately, understanding sorely lagged behind the events, incapable, for some time, of grasping the full implications of the new dynamic philosophy moving great nations. The Pact of Munich shook many into awareness of the new forces shaping and destroying humanity. But the Pact of Munich was only a link in a chain of events which started in 1931 and culminated for the first time in the abdication of 1936, the abdication of humanity, decency, and intellectual integrity, in the face of the rape of Ethiopia, the attempt at destruction of liberty in Spain, and the remilitarization of the Rhineland.

“Perhaps in 1966 we shall be looking back sorrowfully to the year 1936, knowing that in that year the

second Thirty Years' War commenced. There is no use in deluding ourselves into thinking that peace prevails." This opinion of an American professor of government, Carl Joachim Friedrich, is concurred in by a British military expert, Captain Liddell Hart. "People who talk of preventing another great war are at least two years out of date. The second great war of the twentieth century began in July 1936, following the encouragement and experience which had been gained by Japan in Manchuria and Italy in Abyssinia in defying the League and developing the new technique of camouflaged war." We are today in the midst of this war which is waged as a totalitarian war, not only with arms, but even more with propaganda befogging the issues and undermining the moral and intellectual integrity of the adversary.

People whose minds are still concentrated upon the War of 1914 and upon the Peace Treaties following the War regard the present events as a simple process of "revision." As if, in 1938, mistakes made in 1918 could be revised by simply going back to the settlement desirable in 1918. Too many things since then have changed; an act wise in 1918 might have disastrous implications twenty years later. The time-lag in many minds is responsible for the naiveté and unpreparedness in face of the growing menace. They fail to see that beneath all the surface clashes it is not a conflict between Germany and France or Germany and the Slavs, between British imperialism and German, Italian, or Japanese imperialism, but one of the

great decisive struggles of human history. We have almost forgotten that all great struggles of history were fundamentally struggles between moral and spiritual forces, struggles of ideas. At present we find the moral foundations of our world, as developed under the influence of Christianity and of rational humanism, questioned and savagely attacked by a new philosophy of man and of his place in history. Japan, Italy, and Germany are leading, in a concerted effort, the struggle on behalf of this new philosophy. It is a revolution of anarchy and egotism against the established order of moral and intellectual values, values only very imperfectly realized in the life of modern civilization but acknowledged as the regulative principle, guide, and restraining discipline. It is a battle being waged with a totalitarian world-embracing victory in mind. War has become in our days as indivisible as peace.

This indivisibility is something entirely new in history, and it is therefore easy to understand why it is not yet fully grasped. In the nineteenth century forces emerged tending to bind mankind into a community of fate; the World War and the succeeding years consummated this process. Today any change of frontiers or regime in Central Europe or in Africa has immediate and far-reaching consequences in Latin America and the Far East. No change today can be regarded as solely an adjustment of local conditions, it must be viewed in relation to forces opposing each other on a world-wide scale.

The first part of this book traces in three essays the background of the present conflicting forces. The French Revolution, itself indebted to the preceding Anglo-Saxon Revolutions, ushered in the age of individualism and nationalism. Napoleon, with whom Hitler and Mussolini are frequently compared, represented the new titanic individualism. This titanic dynamism is transferred today from the individual to national groups, which at the same time stand for the complete reversal of all the achievements which the French Revolution has brought. This new nationalism is different from the liberal nationalism which the Western peoples had developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The nationalism of the French Revolution and of Fascism, the insatiable thirst for expansion of Napoleon and of Hitler, are strikingly similar, and nevertheless fundamentally opposed. In both, older forces, inspired by Messianism, are at work, binding them to hopes and visions almost as old as the memory of man. Messianism, originating with the Jews in antiquity, contained within itself from the beginning an antinomy, two antithetic positions — a fierce racialism (it is an historical irony that Hitler today is leading the German people back to the attitude of primitive Judaism) and a universal brotherhood of equality and liberty. The discussion of Messianism which opens the book will also help in understanding the Jewish problem, which is today, not incidentally, in the forefront.

The second part of the book seeks to analyze the

revolutions and dictatorships which have shaken Europe in the twenty years since the World War. In all of them the forces and movements discussed in the first part of the book are found at play. In a wide arc, from the Ural Mountains to the Pillars of Hercules, from the day Lenin arrived in Russia to the day Hitler marched into Vienna and Franco into Barcelona, the whole of Europe seems to have been undergoing a transformation comparable only to the twenty-six years after 1789. But in all this turmoil the main issue emerges clearly: a conflict between an effort to spread the tendencies of the Western revolutions, and an unprecedented struggle to stop their progress and to reverse the whole trend of Western civilization. This conflict is not confined to Europe. From its world-wide repercussions the author has chosen to discuss in the third part of the book the revolutions and dictatorships of the Near East with which, as a result of an extended residence there, he is more familiar than with corresponding events in the Far East or in Latin America. Revolutions and dictatorships there are different in their character from those in Central and Eastern Europe, nevertheless they partake of the same unrest and face similar problems. The last essay of the third part of the book, the essay on Zionism, has a close geographic connection with the Near East; in its repercussions it is as wide as the Jewish problem, and historically it bears the age-old imprint of Messianism.

BACKGROUND

Genus humanum maxime Deo assimilatur, quando
maxime est unum.

DANTE, *De Monarchia*, Liber I, 8

. . . entraîné par ce grand bruit vivant
que font les pas humains quand ils vont en avant!

VICTOR HUGO, *L'Année Terrible*

I

Messianism

MESSIANISM is primarily the religious belief in the coming of a redeemer who will end the present order of things, either universally or for a single group, and institute a new order of justice and happiness. Under various forms and under various names messianic ideas have sprung up without any apparent interconnection in widely scattered religions. They seem to answer to a universal ingrained longing in humanity for a world free from the imperfections and sufferings connected with this one and to the hope that a personal redeemer, a hero-god, will bring about salvation. As a driving social force, however, messianism has assumed great importance only in Judaism, whence it has gone over into Christianity and Islam. It is in the Jewish doctrine of the Messiah that the doctrine of the coming of a redeemer received its most characteristic development, a development that not only influenced the religious thought of the West but also indirectly inspired most modern secular movements.

Messianism is never mere theoretical speculation about things to come; it is always a living practical force. It is a belief held with religious fervor by oppressed or unfortunate groups (ethnic, social, religious), or by men suffering either from the imper-

12 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

fection of their fellow human beings or from the consciousness of their own inadequacy, that a change will come which will end their sufferings and fill the world with piety and justice. There is always in messianism a non-acceptance of the present order and a sentiment of revolt against things which seem unbearable.

Often messianism was the expression of a narrow group mind. In such cases it meant that to the suffering group alone justice would be done and that for them alone sufferings would end and a new, happy life begin. But even in earlier Judaism messianism had already acquired a wider, more universal, aspect as well as a more spiritual meaning. It meant that the whole of mankind was suffering either from misery and oppression or from moral imperfection and that the Messiah would bring to all mankind justice, deliverance from misery and pain, a blossoming of the life of the spirit, and a reign of brotherhood and peace. Messianism was thus a philosophy of history and a theodicy which explained the ways of God. As such it passed into Christianity and accompanied the struggle of heretical sects and oppressed classes for the realization of their dreams and aspirations; it lent its forms and symbols to the obscure longing of millions; and it ended by being clothed in the garments of the philosophy of the Enlightenment and modern social science, becoming the secular idea of progress, that is to say, a messianism deprived of its religious forms but retaining its religious fervor.

The two aspects of messianic doctrine, the narrow messianism which aims only at a fundamental betterment of a national political situation and the universal messianism which embraces in its salvation the whole of mankind, are often to be found associated, the deliverance of the group being thought of as a vehicle or preliminary condition of universal deliverance. This intermingling of national ambitions and religious concepts, as evolved by the Jews and taken over by most European peoples (particularly those of great and active intellectual and spiritual life), is not without danger for world peace and security. Through the religious element national political hopes become strengthened and deepened into the belief that their fulfillment is an action of divine justice and that the struggles for their realization must be carried on as commands of God. National messianism thus becomes the cradle of an unbridled imperialism: the nation, the chosen vehicle of God's designs, sees in its political triumph the march of God in history. The concept of proletarian revolution also owes much of its driving force to messianism.

The word messiah means in its Hebrew form "the anointed one." Although in the Hebrew Bible the word is never used as a *nomen proprium*, it began to be so used as early as the apocalyptic literature of the second century B.C., and from then on beliefs were crystallized concerning the coming of a particular or personified "anointed one" as a redeemer. To understand these doctrines it is necessary to realize first of

14 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

all that the distinguishing characteristic of the Jewish people since its beginning has always been its consciousness of history, its historical-mindedness. For the Jews, God was not a God of nature but a God of history. Beyond all other peoples the Jews saw in history, in duration and change, the work of one creative force, which fills the constant flow of time with meaning and gives it a direction. From the beginning the Bible is a book of history, and this history has its unity in the underlying plan of God, who will carry it out to the end. The basis of all philosophies of history is to be found in the Bible. To understand the origins of messianism in Judaism, we have to realize the special character of the ancient Jewish people.



There are colorless individuals and colorless peoples without a pronounced way of life; scarcely noticed, they slip ineffectively through life and history. Their participation in the spiritual reality is infinitely small. Again, in other individuals and peoples certain universal human capabilities and characteristics are developed to a high degree, usually at the expense of other traits. Such peoples and individuals act as stimuli to new possibilities and impress their stamp on others. Thus while every people participates in the entire spiritual world of humanity and its richness, in different peoples different characteristics, abilities, and tendencies experience a distinct emphasis.

Not the possession of definite traits defines a people, but the tendency to their accentuation. But, as in all living things, the boundaries are movable; a people is never unchangeably fixed in its characteristics. What are the tendencies which define Judaism?

We can approach an understanding best by comparing them with what are in many ways the diametrically different tendencies of Hellenism. The ancient Greeks were the people of sight, of spatial and plastic sense. Jacob Burckhardt called them the "eye of the world." They knew how to look, and therein lay their historical importance; knowledge and perception formed in them a unity. Their art as well as their philosophy was plastic, space-dominating and space-forming. It is as if they sought to transpose the flowing, temporal, unlimitedly related elements into rest, space, limitation; to give the formless form. In its final expression their philosophy was plastic, their instrument the defining chisel. Plato's ideas are primordial pictures, the world purified of the dross of growth and based on the pure types of Being. For the Greek, the stone with which he built was the symbol of space and perception; for the Jew, the stream into which he dipped was the symbol of time and becoming. The Greek turned everything into form and marble and tended in a supreme effort to eliminate the restlessness of time from the world. He alone was capable of giving the world the instruments of scientific thought, taming the Dionysian overflow of events into the serene majesty of Apollonic order.

The Jew lived in time. He did not see so much as hear. His senses did not encircle the contours, rather were they intent on the inner flow. God's voice came to him again and again, appealed to him. Herein the historians of the Jewish people have seen the meaning of its destiny from the very beginning. The call permits the will of the Jew to brace itself for the all-consuming deed; he is the man of will, of deed. He is, if in rare moments he lives up to the call, the untiring mouthpiece, the unflinching messenger. His experience of God did not permit him, as it did the Greek, to attain to serene contemplation, philosophic vision, and a self-consuming absorption; it called him to the torment of the solitary preacher and leader. In this people God became a voice. The "Hear" sounded again and again. When Elijah perceived God he heard only a still small voice. For that reason the Jew never made a picture of his God. The word, the *logos*, was for the Jew the intermediary between infinity and the individual being, but the vibrating word carries more of infinity in it than the rigid form of a picture. God's *word* is from the beginning the creative force, and the Jewish miracle worker and saint is called in the Jewish legends the "master of the good name," because God's *name* is the greatest mystery and the greatest power. The name and the sound, not the image, conjures and creates.

Sight is the organ of space, hearing the organ of time. The Greek transfigures space, his thoughts are objectified in the multiple dimensions of space, which

at the same time, however, is limited. For him only the defined and the finite is beautiful and perfect. Plato derives the beautiful from the effect of the limited in the illimitable, from measuredness and symmetry; and similarly, Aristotle perceives the beautiful in order and symmetry and the molded. The material strives toward form, finite limitation. Thus for the Greek the most perfect figure is the circle, the most perfect motion the circular, the motion of ether and the heavenly bodies. And just as in the esthetic realm the condition of beauty is the complete harmony of diametrically striving forces in the closed structure of a space of various dimensions, so in the ethical realm the condition of beauty is the condition of a sound mind, the mean in respect of pleasures and pains. In Greek philosophy the Jew Philo is the first who places a higher value on the infinite than on the proportionate finite.

Space is the form of our development into plurality, time binds our development in the stream of unity. The eye creates distance, plurality, and the quietness of contiguity. The Greeks were not only the masters of plastic art but the creators of drama from the chaos of exuberant music. But they lacked, as Jacob Burckhardt says, the solitary song. The psalm, on the other hand, was the most characteristic Jewish poetical form. Even to this day the Jew has remained lyrist, a master in this most formless and most subjective art, closest to the flowing stream, farthest from the stone.

The Jew lived in the realm of time more than in space. Contemporary Jewish philosophers have over-emphasized the basic importance of time. The world as time does not know of separation into a plurality of dimensions, it is one-dimensional; it points to the past, surges toward the future, and overcomes the tension of various directions in the forceful unity of its stream. The world as time is a polar world. It is burdened with the tradition of the past, and the forward-driving urge propels it into the uncertain future. It does not know the balance of those forces which have developed contiguously and harmoniously, itself is force, one-sided and not many-sided, tending toward extremes and avoiding compromises, rushing toward the infinite. This life of tension and of a permanent appeal is bare of the harmony of beauty, of the vision of art which the Greek genius bestowed upon mankind. But the man living in this tension and bearing its burden longs, as scarcely another, for the conquering of this tension, for a unity which is a unification of all opposites and a goal and task for his life. To the Jews God is the One, the unique Being, the executor of unification, the goal of the unification of humanity. In the daily evening prayer we read, "Our God make Thy name *one* and establish Thy kingdom." The unified man and the one God belong together. In the main prayer recited daily by every Jew, found in the fifth book of Moses and emphasized by Jesus as the outstanding word, the unity of God is announced to the people in a solemn

call. And following the call the demand is made that man also should be undivided, unified, complete, and whole; that he should not falter but unite his many contrary talents and tendencies. "With all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might," we read there. God is the reconciliation of multiplicity to unity: man must unite the multifarious tendencies in himself.

The unity of human nature occurs in activity, in the temporal process of the struggle of the human soul, in the exertion of the will, not in the contemplation of knowledge. (The Greeks, on the other hand, never doubted that all men would love virtue if they could contemplate it.) The way of the deed, however, leads through an uninterrupted series of decisions. To decide is the duty, the burden, and the nobility of man. Decision is exertion, courage, and danger. Out of weariness, disinterestedness, inertia, cowardice, one evades any decision, and herein for the Jew lies sin. In fulfillment of the word in Genesis, "You will be like God, knowing good and evil," Deuteronomy says, "Today I put before you blessing and curse, life and good, death and evil. . . ." "Alas that you should be hot or cold," we read in the Revelation of John. The one God demands the indivisible man entirely given over to his task.

Through this instinct for unity the Jews were the first to recognize the unity of history. It may be, as Alexander von Humboldt states in his *Kosmos*, that the Jewish monotheistic view, which always encom-

passes the whole of the universe as a unity guided by a single force, belongs to the cultural elements which have produced, since the Renaissance, the modern view of nature. To Jewish thinkers, however, the important fact was not nature but man and his activity. Man brought unity into the flow of time, meaning into the trickling, running, generating process of events. The Jewish God is not a God of nature but a God of history. When He solemnly proclaims Himself it is as the God of the historical deed: "I am the Lord your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage." The social ethic which God demands is not given as a mere command. It is not rationally but historically grounded. "You shall not oppress the stranger, for you know the heart of the stranger, seeing you were strangers in the land of Egypt." And it is the historical consciousness which binds the generations together. "Only take heed to thyself, and keep thy soul diligently, lest thou forget the things which thine eyes have seen, and lest they depart from thy heart all the days of thy life: but teach them to thy sons and thy sons' sons." "When thy son asketh thee in time to come, saying, what mean the testimonies and the statutes and the judgments which the Lord our God commanded you, then thou shalt say unto thy son, we were Pharaoh's bondmen in Egypt; but the Lord brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand." With this consciousness, history, otherwise a meaningless up-and-down of isolated actions, together with every

action of man, gains meaning and an unsuspected value, a new relation to God. History is the way of God.

But men are called by God to be the vehicles of the process of history. A tremendous responsibility rests on them. The historical consciousness of the Jewish people projected unity into the events of time; the concept of history as a unified process appeared, from the time of Amos, clearer and clearer; the task of man as a moral, acting vehicle was from the sealing of the covenant under Moses a certainty, and attained in the words of the prophets its definite expression; and as the final crown, one goal was recognized in this unified history: God. His way (history) was a way to Him. From time-intuition and historical consciousness, from the demand of the moral deed, rose the messianic longing.

For the Jew the future world is not a beyond but a growth and an approach within time. It is the time of the unification of every man, since, truly unified within himself and with the entire universe of which he is a part, he will be devoted with his whole heart to God, to the unification of all men in a brotherly covenant, to the unification of all nature in peace. Here for the first time the great goal of the final moral perfection of all humanity was presented; an inextinguishable restlessness entered the world and through Christianity spread to many peoples. The goal was given; the kingdom of God, the messianic kingdom of the future. The way to this kingdom was given;

22 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

to do God's will, which means to do justice, to become perfect as He is perfect, to be holy as He is holy and in order that He may be glorified. All men strive toward this kingdom. But the Jews as a people from their first national beginnings — in their apostasy and martyrdom, in their leaders, as well as the many who quietly and unnoticed have struggled and suffered for the glory of His name, that is, who have been called to live for His kingdom — have become the advocates of this struggle, and have borne the heaviest burden of His yoke.

* * *

Jewish messianism did not, like analogous movements elsewhere, arise out of mythological speculations; it sprang from living historical experience and it became eschatological, that is to say, projected into the future, through historical disappointment. The original historical experience was later surrounded by myths and legends, as was also the future state projected by messianism. But at the beginning there was only a recollection of the covenant between God and Israel, the memory of an early theocracy in Israel, when God alone was king and the Israelites, His chosen people, had voluntarily taken upon themselves the yoke of His kingdom. These elements of a unique religious experience, an experience real and historical in its essence even though legendary in its coloring, proved so powerful that they not only settled once for all the history of Israel but domi-

nated the history of many groups and sects for two thousand years. And in however legendary a fashion the future may have been embroidered, its fulfillment was envisaged essentially as a return to the theocracy of the beginning, to the reign of David, the last king upon whom a charismatic commission was laid by God. The messianic future never was in heaven but was always a phase of human history, whose stage was the earth — a transfigured earth sometimes but still the earth, where God alone will be king and life remain a human life, purified and clarified but still human.

Not only does messianism have its roots in the union of national politics with universal religion, in the kingdom of God as it was established by the covenant between God and Israel, but in its teaching for the future it also combines the same elements. It looks forward to the coming of the same kingdom of God which existed in the past — this time, however, in an ultimate form which is never again to be disturbed. The national-political phase of messianism is not prior to or later than the ethico-universal phase. Both are to be found, although with different degrees of dominance, in the same epochs; sometimes both are found mingled in the same men.

In the national-political phase of messianism the Messiah remained a national hero who was to fulfil the old promise given by God and originally fulfilled by God Himself in the wars of Yahweh in the time of Joshua and the judges. The Messiah will again

reinstate the Jewish people in undisturbed possession of Palestine; he will gather the scattered people from all the ends of the world; he will destroy as a great warrior the enemies of Israel; and Israel will reappear in the glory of the strong and powerful reign of David. The salvation which the Messiah brings is a political salvation for the Jews only. But at the same time the people reconstituted in their kingdom will lead a righteous life, piety and justice will prevail, and God's law will be kept. Messianism meant thus throughout the ages "the will to live dominantly and triumphantly as a rehabilitated people in the national home." In this sense messianism has been one of the dominant forces in Jewish history since the weakening of the secular power of the Jewish state. For two thousand years it was the great hope of the Jewish people, the vision and faith which sustained them in their terrible history of persecutions and humiliations. The Jews prayed daily for the coming of messianic salvation; they bore willingly in this hope the heavy yoke of Judaism; and with thousands upon thousands of martyrs they magnified and exalted their God who had promised to restore the nation to its ancient glory and to inaugurate by the joyful regathering of the people into their homeland His kingdom in perpetuity. Thus the Messiah became for Israel in the dark hours of history *Menachem*, the comforter. In the beautiful old benedictions dating from the earliest days of the Pharisaic synagogue and constituting the *Shemoneh 'Esreh* prayer, which is

recited at the three daily services, the fourteenth benediction reads as follows: "And to Jerusalem, Thy city, return in mercy, and dwell therein as Thou hast spoken; rebuild it soon in our days as an everlasting building, and speedily set up therein the throne of David. Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who rebuildest Jerusalem." The next benediction directly prays for the coming of the Messiah, the seed of David: "Speedily cause the offspring of David Thy servant to flourish, and let his horn be exalted by Thy salvation, because we wait for Thy salvation all the day. Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who causest the horn of salvation to flourish."

The hope for deliverance and for the termination of the Diaspora was so strong that from the end of the Hasmonaean dynasty, when the Messiah had to maintain the independence of Israel against the Romans, until the eighteenth century there was a long line of pseudo-messiahs who, believing themselves to be appointed by God, sought to restore the Jews to their ancient kingdom. During the period of Jesus there was a large number of such messiahs in Palestine, and afterward they came forward in many lands and almost in every century; some of them were only of local importance, but some created movements which spread over many countries and unified the Jews in a common hope for a considerable time. The most important pseudo-messiah was the Turkish Jew Shabbethai Zebi (1626-76). The outcome of all these messianic movements was always a deep disillusion-

ment, and their effect on Jewish life was in many ways pernicious. Messianism in this politico-religious form died with the growth of modern rationalism in Judaism; but the hope of two thousand years has remained alive and has taken a secular political form in Zionism, which unites the faith of politico-national messianism with the European doctrine of nationalism.

But side by side with this nationalistic messianism there developed from the very beginning the tradition of universalistic messianism. The nation which has been oppressed and humiliated will not only become free and glorious but it will become a light unto the nations, their guide on the road to God, the teacher of the nations of the earth. This semi-national universalism, which was to find its echo in the nineteenth-century nationalism of many modern nationalists in Russia, Poland, Germany, India, and other countries, is already expounded in Isaiah II. 2, 3: ". . . the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it. . . . For out of Zion shall go forth the law." A further stage in the universalization of messianism is represented by the idea of messianism as ethical and religious salvation for mankind. The kingdom of God is then understood as a universal kingdom of peace and justice, still a kingdom of the earth but metapolitical. In the oldest period the belief was that God Himself would bring about the redemption; the Messiah, if he is mentioned at all, being only His tool. This belief is ex-

pressed in the sublime '*Alenu* prayer, which probably dates from the second century after Christ but which an old tradition claims as being written by Joshua upon his entrance into Canaan: "We therefore hope in Thee, O Lord our God, that we may speedily behold the glory of Thy might, when Thou wilt remove the abominations from the earth . . . when the world shall be perfected under the Kingdom of the Almighty, and all the children of flesh will call upon Thy name, when Thou wilt turn unto Thyself all the wicked of the earth. Let all the inhabitants of the world . . . accept the yoke of Thy Kingdom, and do Thou reign over them speedily, and for ever and ever. For the Kingdom is Thine."

The messianic ideal found its most definite ethico-universalistic concepts in the Hebrew prophets; with many of them the coming kingdom of God meant a universal reign of peace and justice when the great enemies of humanity, fear and misery, will be banned. Messianic time will bring a redress of present misery. The poor and the persecuted become the truly pious. Messiah, who had been a king, now becomes himself a poor outcast, a symbol of human suffering, who ennobles it by his example. He does not use the noble horse but the ass, the despised riding animal of the poor. He becomes the servant of God ('*Ebed Yabveh*'). "He hath no form nor comeliness. . . . He is despised and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief" (Isaiah LIII. 2, 3). Here is a complete revaluation of values. The man who is

28 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

weak, poor, despised, and ugly will bring about the redemption. And in him are exalted all the lowly and despised on earth. Whatever may be the historical explanation of the '*Ebed Yabveh*, a new epoch of world history begins with this notion. An unflagging unrest breaks into the settled order of the social world: in the name of this unrest, of this messianic dream, the despised and the disinherited will raise their banners again and again in their fight for a new social order. Peace and unity, equality and brotherhood, will become the slogans of all utopias and revolutions, the banners of man setting forth to build the kingdom of God on earth.

Very soon the doctrine becomes general that the coming of the Messiah will be accompanied by great suffering and wars. Catastrophes of an unprecedented character, natural, social, political, and moral, will introduce the messianic age, when misery will be at its height because salvation will be close at hand. The Messiah will have precursors who will prepare men for his coming, for the advent of the Messiah is made dependent upon the righteousness of the people. The conviction becomes widespread that by a saintly life one may hasten the arrival of the Messiah. Many sects prepare themselves by ascetic exercises, by communistic brotherhood, and by the fulfillment of the law for the approach of the kingdom. The cry, "Repent, for the end is near," is to be heard again and again through the ages.

Messianic time was pictured in the Bible as a time

of uncommon fertility, prosperity, and longevity (Isaiah xxxii. 15-17; Lxv. 17-23), but in the apocalyptic literature it was pictured in mythological and supranatural colors. The Messiah was exalted beyond human measure and his conception was mixed with Hellenistic and Oriental images.

All these elements of messianic ideas are to be found in the later rabbinical writings. "The conception itself of a Messiah varies so much with individual rabbis and the divergence of opinion with regard to the details is so great that its form remains loose and unlimited" (Julius H. Greenstone). Some of the tannaim "lift themselves through their high ethics and deep piety to such a lofty spiritual plane that everything political becomes inconsequential, and strife and struggle a terrible evil. How could these pious men picture the Messiah as a bloody avenger, as a war hero — they who regarded the use of weapons in and for itself as a weakness?" (Joseph Klausner). They could not accept the idea of the Messiah as someone fighting in God's cause in the manner of a pagan general and could not consider national revenge and independence a good. The last of the tannaim, Jehuda I, even wanted to abolish the fast of the 9th of Ab, the day of Jerusalem's destruction, in order to destroy all memory of Jewish independence. Others, on the contrary, expressed the crudest and most exclusive notions of national supremacy. Many who wished to preserve the Messiah as the prince of peace declared that first a Messiah ben Joseph will come, who will

30 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

fight the battle against Gog and Magog and be killed in the battle, and that then only will Messiah ben David arrive and with him the messianic age.

Various methods were used to calculate the arrival of the Messiah, the numbers seven and forty playing a great role in those speculations. Since God created the world in six days, it was believed that six thousand years in three ages of two thousand years will pass and then will come the universal Sabbath, the seventh millennium. Many rabbis opposed all such calculations as well as all efforts to force the advent of the messianic kingdom through acts of asceticism and similar means. They bade all men to await the coming of the kingdom with patience and piety.

Early Christianity, as expressed in the preaching of Jesus and in the life of His first followers, was pure messianism. Indeed the appellation *Christos*, or Christ, is the identical term by which the Hebrew word *māshiah*, anointed or Messiah, is translated in the Greek Septuagint. Christianity is thus by its very name a form of messianism. Jesus couched His message in terms understood by all the Jews of His time, who were filled with a feverish expectation of the coming of a Messiah. His prayer was "Thy kingdom come." His task was not the foundation of the kingdom but its preparation: He did not consider Himself the Messiah, but the consciousness grew in Him that He would soon return as the Messiah and inaugurate the kingdom of God. He and His followers were certain about the immediateness of the kingdom (Mat-

thew x. 23; xvi. 28; I Corinthians xv. 51, 52; iv. 5; xi. 26; I Thessalonians iv. 15-17; v. 1-3), and His ethical teaching was focused on the short interregnum between the pre-messianic and the new age: it preached not an alleviation but a tremendous aggravation of duties in view of the approach of the kingdom.

As the kingdom did not come, however, and as the church had to maintain itself among the powers of this world, the teaching of the imminence of the messianic kingdom was kept alive only in heretical sects. It is here that there is found an uninterrupted, unofficial stream of truly Christian life keeping alive the original doctrine of Jesus through the ages, often in the face of violent opposition from the church and the state. Many of these sects found an answer to their queries about the Second Advent of Jesus in the apocalyptical literature, in Daniel and particularly in the Revelation of St. John xix. 11 to xxi. 8. The Revelation spoke of a period of one thousand years to pass before the coming of the Messiah and of a New Jerusalem, and this idea gave rise to many millenarian, or chiliastic, sects, who expected the coming of Christ at a certain fixed date and divided history into various ages and periods.

Messianic movements in the churches were of two kinds: one kind aimed only at the spiritual regeneration of the individual Christian, while the other kind (which was more common) developed sectarian groups in conflict with the church and generally also with the state. Of the first kind the most noteworthy

example was that championed by Joachim of Flora (1145-1202), who wished to realize a church of the Holy Spirit and who expected the Messiah to come in 1260. He distinguished the Age of the Father, or of the Old Testament; the Age of the Son, or of the New Testament, which has led to ecclesiastical corruption and secularization; and the Age of the Holy Ghost, or the Sabbath of Humanity, which was to be an age of full freedom of the spirit with all men given over to prayer and song.

The radical sect movements are to be found in all churches, Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Protestant. Like primitive Christianity they were in many cases a protest of the poor, a desire of the disinherited to enter into their own. These sects upheld with rare courage the principle that man owes obedience to God rather than to men, to the written word of God and the inner light rather than to secular or ecclesiastical authorities. They have been the great conscientious objectors of history. They have been persecuted by the churches, tortured, and killed, but their eschatological enthusiasm kindled a fire which has never been extinguished throughout the ages. The oldest of such sects is that of the Bogomiles, which originated in Bulgaria during the tenth century and spread from there to both the east and the west. The Bogomiles had no churches, no priests; they practiced baptism only upon adults and they believed Christ to be the son of God only through grace like other prophets. They were radical social and political reformers who,

like the sects that followed them, fought for human brotherhood, the abolition of private property, and the renunciation of war and of the swearing of oaths to other men. They produced a deep influence on the religious spirit of the masses and created a rich popular literature. Another sect was the Cathari, or universalists, who believed in the salvation of all men and saw in the temporal world Satan's world. They took the Gospel and the Sermon on the Mount literally and seriously, led an anarchist life and shunned the killing of men or animals. Abbé Jean Guiraud says that the Catharistic rites "recall those of the primitive church with a truth and precision the more striking the nearer we go back to the apostolic age. In the bosom of mediaeval society the Catharistic rites were the last witness of a state of things that the regular development of the Catholic cult had enlarged and modified." The Catharistic movement was heavily represented in southern France, where Catharists went under the name of Albigenses and Waldenses.

Among the movements of the Reformation period are found the extreme Hussites under their leader Peter Chelčický, a forerunner of Tolstoy; the Adamites; the Moravians; and in the time of Luther the Anabaptists. The last named, under the leadership of Thomas Münzer, joined in the revolt of the German peasantry against the landlords. They made a memorable attempt to establish the kingdom of God on earth according to the Gospel, a true community of Christian saints in absolute equality and brother-

34 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

hood. "It was easier to burn Anabaptists than to refute their arguments, and contemporary writers were struck with the intrepidity and number of their martyrs. . . . The excesses of John of Leiden cast an unjust stigma on the Baptists, of whom the vast majority were good quiet people who merely carried out in practice the early Christian ideals of which their prosecutors prated" (F. C. Conybeare). Anabaptist sects sprang up all over Europe. They were strictly non-violent: the members had no recourse to arms or to courts; they applied no force to evildoers; they accepted no office and no rank in government. They may be regarded as one of the origins of modern socialist and anarchist movements.

In England the great revolution was deeply influenced by the theocratic ideas of the Bible. The Fifth Monarchy Men, a Puritan sect in the days of Cromwell, believed that after the passing of the Assyrian, Persian, Greek, and Roman monarchies a fifth was at hand, when Christ would return and reign for one thousand years. At about the same date Manasseh ben Israel argued in his letter to the English Parliament that the readmission of Jews into England would hasten the messianic era. There were also many messianic sects in the Greek Orthodox church, such as the Khlysty and the Skoptsy, the latter believing that the Messiah would arrive as soon as there were 144,000 Skoptsy (Revelation xiv. 1). The Molokany and the pacifist Dukhobors may also be mentioned.

Even in the nineteenth century new millenarian sects were founded, like the Christadelphians, who hoped for a world-wide theocracy with Jerusalem as its center, and the Templars, mostly Württemberg pietists, who went to Palestine to await there the Second Coming of Christ. But as a whole messianism assumed in the nineteenth century a new form. The ideals of universal peace, natural and equal rights, an equal distribution of wealth and an economic life in common, grew out of the old theocracy of the kingdom of God; but they took on a secularized, rationalized form. What had once been believed on the authority of God's word became now a subject of social science and philosophy of history. But the old messianic hope and fervor did not die in the new atmosphere. Lessing spoke of the education of mankind toward the messianic kingdom, making messianism the result of an immanent process of history. Ibsen spoke of the "third kingdom," of a new age to come. Both utopian and scientific socialism have carried the spirit of the struggle for the kingdom of God into our time. Often bitterly opposed to the church and to religion, they nevertheless have sometimes been truer to the legacy of prophetic messianism and early Christianity than have the official religious bodies.

Messianism in its narrow politico-nationalist form has also found many disciples amongst the modern nations. The Slavophile writers in Russia, particularly Dostoevsky, have transferred the messianic concepts from Israel to the Russian people. Many of them have

36 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

even seen in the Russian nation the Messiah, the '*Ebed Yabveh*, who is suffering for the sake of all other nations and who will some day be exalted over them. During the time of Poland's national subjection Polish philosophers like Wroński, Towiański, and Cieszkowski, and poets like Mickiewicz, Slowacki, and Krasiński, developed a messianic philosophy of history with Poland as the Messiah of the nations. They saw in the Poles the people chosen by God for bringing about the messianic age as they had formerly been chosen to fight the battles of Christianity against the heathen Turks. With the dominance of nationalistic ideology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries many nationalist thinkers each believed that his own nation was destined through its moral and intellectual predispositions, through the history of its body politic and its spiritual life, to bring about a new order of things and to raise humanity to new ethical standards. The personal Messiah is thus replaced, as it often was in Israel, by a whole nation as Messiah. The nation transcends the limits of a social or political concept; it becomes a holy body sanctified by God; and nationalism is no longer a political loyalty which can be changed according to social circumstances or convictions but has become a religious duty full of responsibility toward God and the redemption. The two main currents of our time — the longing for universal peace and justice, and the narrow, triumphant nationalism reaching out for world dominion — reflect the dual character of messianism. Prophetic Judaism and

early Christianity gave to the world the vision of universal brotherhood and peace, to haunt forever human conscience; the pseudo-messianic "leader" of our time has revived the tribal and fanatic aspect which messianism at times possessed in primitive Judaism.

II

Napoleon and the New Europe

ONE of the outstanding achievements of the French Revolution was the deliverance of the individual from the shackles of tradition. The old hierarchic order of caste and station in life, of guild and *corvée*, gave way to a legally equalitarian society of private initiative, of industrialism and capitalism. The pursuit of happiness, the enjoyment of freedom and property, became the legitimate right of the individual. New horizons opened before his eyes. This birth of a new individualism found its supreme manifestation in Napoleon Buonaparte. In many ways he anticipated the new rising Europe; his thoughts and actions foreshadowed in a gigantic concentration many of the later developments.

Napoleon's importance can not be understood if we consider him solely as one of those military dictators who generally, although not at all necessarily, come to end a period of great transformations and chaotic confusion. Burke had predicted at the beginning of the Revolution that "some general who understands the art of conciliating the soldiery . . . shall draw the eyes of all men upon himself. Armies will obey him on his personal account. But the moment in which that event will happen, the person who really commands the army is your master . . . the

master of your whole Republic." Napoleon's arrival at power was not due primarily to the weariness of social and political upheavals and the desire of the people for peace and order. His task was the consolidation of the newly won rights and interests of the French middle classes, their protection against the return of the old order and against the threat of extremist excesses. His dictatorship concluded and at the same time sanctioned and consummated the Revolution.

His task was not confined to France. She was for him not his native land but his country of adoption. He espoused her because she was the country of the Revolution which, French in origin, had from the beginning a universal scope and appeal. Napoleon's armies carried the seeds of the new intellectual and social order all over Europe and even into the Near East. Like Alexander the Great, the only man in history to whom Napoleon can be compared, he initiated by military exploits a new epoch in human history, "singular among men of action for the imaginative splendors which guided him, and among romantic dreamers for the things he achieved." Both seem mad with personal ambition and at the same time the embodiments and executors of ideas matured in the historical conditions of their time.

Alexander, whom the gods loved, died young, at the age of thirty-three, an age when Napoleon was at the height of his creative powers and at the threshold of his greatest successes. (Only after his thirty-

eighth year were Napoleon's extraordinary mental abilities progressively weakened by his egotistic contempt of all other men, by his untruthfulness and megalomania.) The beginnings of the two men were as different as their ends. Alexander was the descendant of kings. His father had made his kingdom the leading power of Greece and had marked it out clearly for a still greater future. Napoleon was the descendant of lawyers and magistrates living without any great distinction on a small and rather backward island. His astonishing career was wholly his own work — not only unaided by precedent or station in life, but in complete opposition to and disregard of all traditional order and custom.

He was born in Ajaccio, Corsica, in 1769, one year after the Republic of Genoa had sold the island to the French. Thirty-five years later, on the second of December, 1804, he placed the crown of the Empire on his head, as successor to Charlemagne, and was consecrated by Pope Pius VII in the Cathedral of Notre Dame. He destroyed the last remnant of the Middle Ages, the Holy Roman Empire, and married the daughter of the last emperor, a princess of the oldest royal blood of Europe. More powerful than Charlemagne and the emperors of the Middle Ages, he could deport the Pope and deprive him of his domains; and give to his son the proud title of King of Rome. Haunted by the dream of a new Roman Empire, even greater than the old one, he overreached himself. Surrounded by flattering mediocrities and

traitors, endangered by the ambitions his own example had aroused, unaware of the decline of his intellectual and physical powers, he succumbed to a new enemy which he had not foreseen, which he never understood, but which he himself had helped into existence: the people. He had easily shattered and destroyed crowns and dynasties, feudal armies and economics — remainders of the past. But the seeds of the French Revolution, which he carried into Spain and Italy, Germany and Russia, took root; his overbearing and insatiable ambition after 1807, which seemed demoniac to his contemporaries and transformed Europe into a permanent battlefield, aroused the slumbering forces of the peoples. To his inspiration of the *Imperium Romanum*, of Pan-Europa, they opposed the enthusiasm of a newly awakened nationalism — the same force which a few years before had made the armies of the French Revolution and of Napoleon himself irresistible.

Of Napoleon's career only those events need to be mentioned here which were of lasting importance for the history and the social and intellectual movements of the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century, France had ruled a powerful empire in America and India and had lost it to her old enemy, the English. Great Britain under the spell of the furious attacks of Edmund Burke against the French Revolution had become its most determined enemy. Napoleon wished to deal a deadly blow to the power of the British Empire and to wrest from it the control of the sea.

42 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

Himself a Mediterranean by birth, he had his attention centered on that sea which once had been the political and cultural center of the world and had lost all its importance since the sixteenth century. The countries around the Mediterranean — Italy, Spain, Greece, Egypt, Syria — with their ancient and glorious history, had sunk into lethargy and insignificance. The great trade routes of the earth which once had connected Europe and the Orient across the Mediterranean were deserted. Napolon's far-reaching plans in the Mediterranean, his desire to use the ancient intercontinental routes for an attack against the growing British Empire in India, determined his actions in Italy during the campaign of 1796 and 1797 and his expedition to Egypt in 1798.

Since the end of the Renaissance period Italy had been in a stage of cultural and political decay. Napoleon brought with him the beginning of the reawakening of Italy. He introduced the modern institutions of social life created by the French Revolution. The first signs of a new social and political life soon became visible — the beginning of the *risorgimento*, of that movement for unity and liberty which shaped Italian culture and political life in the nineteenth century. Following the precedent of ancient Rome, Napoleon established a Cisalpine Republic, later to be changed and enlarged by him into an Italian Republic and an Italian Kingdom.

Across the Mediterranean from Italy was Egypt, which Caesar had conquered for the Roman Empire.

Napoleon set out in 1798 for Egypt with the intention of driving "the English from all their possessions in the East which he can reach." He pushed on across the desert into Syria and besieged St. Jean d'Acre, which had been the last fortress held by the Crusaders in the Holy Land. His campaigns ended with a complete military failure. Nevertheless, their historical significance was very great. Napoleon recognized the importance of the land route to India and the possibility of striking a blow against British India from the Red Sea or the Persian Gulf. He drew the attention of Great Britain to this fact, thus determining the British policy in the Indian Ocean in the nineteenth century, for the control of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf as the two approaches to India. Napoleon's action anticipated the cutting of the Suez Canal and the rivalries of France and Great Britain in the Near East and of Russia and Great Britain in the Middle East which lasted throughout the nineteenth century. He reopened the Oriental question, which had been closed since the end of the Crusades in the fifteenth century but was to dominate the international relations of Europe from Napoleon down to the World War. It was as a consequence of fighting Napoleon that Great Britain, an Atlantic Power, became the controlling influence in the Mediterranean, occupying in the year 1800 the strategic island of Malta.

Napoleon reintroduced the Near East into world politics. The French army in Egypt brought with it the ideas of the new Europe. This lesson was not en-

tirely lost. Mohammed Ali, the founder of the present dynasty in Egypt, learned it. By introducing some of the elements of the new civilization, he became known as the founder of modern Egypt and the first hope of a regenerated Islam.

Simultaneously with the beginning of the Europeanization of the new Orient came the rediscovery of the ancient East in the wake of Napoleon's campaign. The Rosetta stone, found in 1799, offered with the hieroglyphic, demotic, and Greek versions of its inscription the first clue to the deciphering of the ancient Egyptian hieroglyphics, a problem which was then successfully solved by Jean François Champollion, the founder of Egyptology. The discoveries and reports of the archaeologists and scholars whom Napoleon took with him to Egypt started the great century of excavations which have revealed to us the secrets of ancient times and at least doubled the span of time within our historical knowledge.

Notwithstanding his defeat in Egypt, Napoleon never gave up the idea of attacking Britain in Asia. India was his great goal, the Orient lured him as it had lured Alexander the Great. The destruction of the French fleet by the English Admiral Nelson at Abukir Bay (on the coast of Egypt between Alexandria and Rosetta) in 1798 ended practically his hope of penetrating into India across the Mediterranean. But Napoleon conceived an even more daring and fantastic scheme: to attack India through Persia. Czar Paul I of Russia, as an ally of Napoleon in 1801, sent

General Orlov with 22,500 Don Cossacks and twenty-four cannon to cross the deserts of Turkestan and force his way into India. Fortunately, this force was recalled soon afterwards by Czar Alexander I, who succeeded his murdered father in the same year and changed the direction of Russia's foreign policy; otherwise the troops would have perished in the horrors of unknown and unexplored deserts. After 1805 Persia became the battleground between French influences and British counter efforts. Napoleon's envoy Jaubert reached Teheran in 1806 after much hardship; a Persian ambassador was sent to Paris; and at the end of 1807 a French military mission arrived in Persia to drill and modernize the Persian army. Nevertheless, Napoleon's dreams of a World Empire were defeated by the British in Persia as in Egypt.

More success accompanied his revival of the European Empire of Charlemagne. By his *coup d'état* of Brumaire (November) 1799 he made himself First Consul of the French Republic. He seized supreme power in France not as a tyrant but in conformity with the wishes of the people. He set the example of a new one-man rule, not by tradition or legitimacy, but by individual prominence. His rule was not based on power of precedent or armed force, but on the consent and will of the people, which was considered the real sovereign, delegating its sovereignty to a person embodying the will of the nation and of democracy. A plebiscite, the new instrument of expression of popular will, confirmed the new dignity of Napoleon.

46 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

This form of "democratic autocracy" was perfected in the nineteenth century by Napoleon III, who in his turn became the master and model of men like Mussolini and Hitler.¹

Napoleon had been nominated First Consul for ten years. His powers were extended for life by a plebiscite in August, 1802. The five years of his Consulate, the early thirties of his life, mark the culminating point of his creative and mental powers. His choice of collaborators was most fortunate, his critical faculties were yet unimpaired by his later vainglorious egotism. Much of permanent value was accomplished. The foundations for the political and social structure of modern France were laid. At the same time France brought to many countries the ideas of a higher social life, of a greater happiness, of freedom from ancient and intolerable burdens.

During those years the Concordat put the relations between Church and State, which had formed a focus

¹ Mary d'Agoult wrote after the *coup d'état* of Napoleon III: "Ici nous vivons sous le plus ignominieux des despotismes. On ne peut plus ni écrire ni parler ni respirer. Il n'y a plus ni loi ni droit. Nous sommes tous à la merci du premier délateur venu. Cette lettre ne vous parviendra que si cela plaît à ceux qui la liront. Tout est préparé pour un écrasement européen de la démocratie. Qu'un pareil gouvernement puisse s'établir, cela semble contre nature." Napoleon III taught Mussolini and Hitler much: to pose as savior of the order against social unrest, to arrange plebiscites and to organize the secret police, to become the champion of the most incompatible interests, to appear as the representative of the masses, to build the capital into a magnificent city, to try to weld the whole nation into a single party around its embodiment. But Napoleon III remained fundamentally a liberal, a son of the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, a good European. This split personality — half reactionary politician and half liberal dreamer — was the chief reason for his defeat.

of conflict and controversy throughout the history of Christian Europe, on a new basis. Napoleon completed three other fundamental tasks promised by the Revolution: a new and unified codification of laws, a reorganization of local government, a reconstruction of public education. His work was guided by the ideal of the new centralized national state emerging out of the French Revolution. Local government and education became entirely dependent upon the central executive power. Education was guided by the principle of uniformity of instruction and loyalty to the State. Five new codes of law regulated the whole field of civil, commercial, and penal law and legal procedure. The Code Napoleon, a code of civil laws common to the whole realm as promised in 1791 by the Constituent Assembly, marked an important advance on all preceding codifications. "The Codes preserve the essential conquests of the revolutionary spirit — civil equality, religious toleration, the emancipation of land, public trial, the jury of judgment. Original they were not, but rather a hasty amalgamation of royal and revolutionary legislation, governed by the genius of Napoleon, divining, traversing, and penetrating all complications in order to make law subservient to his rule. But if in France herself the Codes were a symbol of a strict but enlightened despotism, in Germany and Italy they stood for liberty. Here they were the earliest message as well as the most mature embodiment of the new spirit. In a clear and compact shape they presented to Europe

48 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

the main rules which should govern a civilized society.”²

Modernization extended also to the economic life of the country. The Bank of France was founded in 1800 and has since been one of the strongest financial establishments in the world. Napoleon helped the economic recovery of the country by his policy of building roads, improving agriculture, and promoting industry. In all these efforts he showed great energy, intelligent attention to detail, and wise judgment. More and more, however, he was willing to sacrifice liberty to the new idols of the nineteenth century — efficiency and the State. By the creation of the Legion of Honor in May, 1802, he protested against the revolutionary spirit of equality; but the badge of the Legion of Honor was not given in recognition of high rank of birth or of military exploits, like the titles and decorations of the royal courts of Europe, but as a reward of talent wherever it was found.

A *senatus consultum* in May, 1804, decreed that “the government of the Republic is confided to an Emperor who takes the title ‘Emperor of the French.’” A plebiscite confirmed the Empire by an overwhelming majority. The Emperor soon set up a court resembling in its splendors the royal court. The aristocracy was recreated. All this was necessarily artificial. Napoleon as hero of the Revolution had seemed a blazing fire illuminating a new Europe.

² H. A. L. Fisher in *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. ix, chap. vi, p. 179.

Napoleon the Emperor emulated the external grandeur of a Louis XIV with its foundation in legitimacy and in an emotional and intellectual set-up which no longer corresponded to the vision of a new Europe.³

Napoleon as an Emperor still had four years of greatness during which his shadow stretched gigantic over Europe as that of no individual before or after. But he fought less and less for ideas and more and more for himself. This great immersion in his ego and his desire for power finally destroyed him.⁴

Napoleon defeated on December 2, 1805, one year after his coronation, the allied empires of the East, Austria and Russia, in the great battle of Austerlitz, a small town in Austrian Moravia. (In the tumult of this glory the naval battle of Trafalgar in which Nelson strengthened Britain's hold on the seas passed

³ Ludwig van Beethoven had in 1804 finished his Third Symphony, the *Eroica*, to which he had given the name of Buonoparte, the proud name of the revolutionary hero. Just as it was finished, the news arrived in Vienna of Napoleon's assumption of the title of Emperor. Beethoven first wished to destroy the score; then, renamed the symphony in a telling way: *Sinfonia Eroica . . . composta per festeggiare il sovvenire di un grand uomo* (composed to celebrate the memory of a great man). Romain Rolland in his excellent brief study of Beethoven, the first of his three magnificent "heroic" biographies, describes the *Eroica* and the other works of the same period — the "Sonata Appassionata," the "Coriolan," and the "Egmont" — as the first really revolutionary music. The Finale of the *Eroica* repeats the material and the form of Beethoven's musical poem of Prometheus, the first hero of the revolutionary spirit of man.

⁴ "Who could have foreseen that the sage of 1800 would be the madman of 1812? Yet one could have foreseen, remembering that omnipotence carries within itself an incurable malady. In this great career where there is so much to teach soldiers, administrators and politicians, citizens must learn never to deliver their country to a single man." — Adolphe Thiers.

almost unobserved in France and on the continent.) The defeat of Austria and the humiliation of Prussia in 1806 brought the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, a survival of the Middle Ages, to an end. Here as in Italy Napoleon's army destroyed the foundation of a venerable but rotten structure and prepared the soil for a new edifice. Many feudal absurdities and relics were swept away. All the ecclesiastical states in Germany, ruled by bishops, were abolished forever. The number of princes, ruling counts, and free cities was greatly reduced. The left bank of the Rhine and large parts of southern and western Germany came directly under the renovating influence of the French Revolution. New movements began to stir Germany: a new sense of political activity began to rouse its intellectual classes. The movement of enlightenment which had led in England and France to political and social reforms had been in Germany exclusively a cultural movement. Its leaders — Lessing, Kant, Herder — were confined to the field of intellectual or aesthetic life. Now, influenced by the Revolution and wakened by national defeat, the German poets and philosophers began to interest themselves in political events. Under their leadership the new German nationalism was born to inspire a few years later the fight against Napoleon and for Germany's freedom and unity as a modern state.

The crushing defeat of Prussia at Jena in 1806 had shattered the glorious army of Frederick the Great, reputedly the best army of Europe. From the capital

of the conquered enemy Napoleon sent forth his Berlin decree declaring a blockade against England and prohibiting all commerce with her. The continent of Europe should apply "economic sanctions" against the insular empire and under the protection of the blockade should industrialize itself. The economic weapon, used here for the first time on a large scale in the modern sense, proved efficient, but presented from the outset two difficulties: the enforcement on a long coastal line with partly unwilling nations, and the two-edged character of all economic sanctions in a world of growing economic interdependence. Loss and suffering was inflicted not only upon England but also upon the blockading countries. Both those difficulties grew in the coming years.

The year 1807 saw Napoleon involved in a war with Tsar Alexander I. The Russian government wished to enlist the enthusiasm of the people in the war. A proclamation of the Holy Synod was read every Sunday in all churches. It accused Napoleon of being the Antichrist, of having deserted Christianity, of having supported Islam in Egypt, and of having called in Paris (in 1806) a Jewish Sanhedrin to lead the fight of the Jews against Christianity and to be proclaimed as their Messiah. Notwithstanding this religious demagoguery, the Russian army was defeated in June, 1807, near Friedland in Eastern Prussia. Napoleon and Alexander met on a raft in the river Memel or Niemen near the town of Tilsit, where a few days later the peace treaty was concluded. Alex-

ander was deeply impressed by Napoleon's personality, and became his admiring friend. The peace of Tilsit marked the zenith of Napoleon's success.

Weltpolitik in an unprecedented greatness seemed open to Napoleon. In alliance with Alexander he had the whole continent of Europe united against Great Britain and could resume the old plans of an Asiatic Empire.⁵ Now the empires of the West — of Paris and Rome — and of the East — of Moscow, the heir of Byzantium — were united by the friendship of their rulers. By their cooperation a united world seemed possible in which an enlightened and humanitarian policy would bring unity, peace, and happiness to all humanity. The Oriental question was to be solved; Constantinople, the gateway to the Orient, to be opened; the British to be excluded from the Mediterranean.⁶

But in 1808 Napoleon had to turn his attention to Spain in order to enforce the continental blockade and to win the control of the Mediterranean. The Spanish campaign proved a turning point in Napoleon's career. Here he did not meet kings, whom he

⁵ Alexander had been baptized by this name at the wish of his grandmother, Catherine II, who saw in his as well as in his younger brother's name, Constantine, a symbol of Russian imperial aims.

⁶ In his famous letter of February 2, 1808, Napoleon wrote to Alexander: "An army of 50,000 men, Russians, Frenchmen, perhaps a small number of Austrians, operating via Constantinople towards Asia, would hardly have arrived on the Euphrates before it would make England tremble and force her upon her knees before the continent. I am ready in Dalmatia, Your Majesty on the Danube. . . . On the first of May our troops can be in Asia. . . . Threatened in India, driven out from the Levant, the English will break down."

regarded as negligible or contemptible — and the Spanish King was one of the most contemptible — but a new force which some years ago had carried Napoleon himself to power: an aroused people. Great Britain was quick to make use of this opportunity. With her help the popular rising in Spain brought the first disaster to Napoleon.

Once more, in the summer of 1808, Napoleon met Alexander in Erfurt, in Thuringia, amidst a gorgeous gathering of kings, princes, and leaders in the world of thought and art who came to pay homage to the French Emperor. But all this splendor could not outweigh the fact that Alexander, under the influence of the Spanish events and of some Russian advisers, had become hesitant. Was there really a possibility of two empires? Was it not rather his than Napoleon's task to unite Europe and to bring humanity the blessings of peace?

The years after 1807 are years of decline. They show an almost planless building and demolishing in which no clear principle is any more discernible. Napoleon, and with him the world, seemed to realize that the task of ordering the world is too great even for the greatest ruler. One of his chief limitations was his obsession with the idea of the state; he saw everything in its relation to this dominating idea.⁷ He

⁷ Another of his chief limitations was his typically Corsican family sense. A great source of strength for Hitler is his complete dissolution of all ties of family and of all other social ties. Thus he can represent to the Germans every family, every class, every social relation.

never understood the importance of non-political forces outside the state. He did not know that those forces in France had raised him to power and he was not aware that those forces outside of France were now to overthrow him.

After 1808 Napoleon's armies became composed more and more of mercenary soldiers after the model of the eighteenth century; German and other princes sent their regiments to fight in the army of the Emperor, but these soldiers were no longer moved by the missionary zeal of the French Revolution or by the newly kindled fire of French patriotism. The armies fighting against Napoleon, on the other hand — the Spanish, the German, and even the Russian — were driven forward by a new nationalism. A new spirit was making itself felt in Europe. Created by the French Revolution and Napoleon, it now turned against them. The economic life of Prussia was re-organized by Baron vom Stein and Prince Karl August von Hardenberg in accordance with these new ideas. Prussia followed the example of France, but only within definite limits. The economic and social structure was remodeled towards greater efficiency by abolishing serfdom and hereditary subjection of the peasants on the large estates and the guild regulations and other medieval restrictions upon trade in the towns. Equality of taxation and the beginning of municipal self-government were introduced. The educational reform of Wilhelm von Humboldt, culminating in the opening of the University of Berlin

(1809), established the foundation for the patriotic and nationalistic education of the future citizens. An intelligent and skilled capitalist middle class was formed in Prussia. But the reforms were not extended to the political field. They did not change the King's subjects into free citizens. They were the outcome of a truly enlightened and in its way progressive absolutism. They trusted the paternal care of highly trained officials more than the initiative and judgment of independent individuals. They promoted prosperity, they did not encourage liberty. After 1815, with Napoleon's downfall even this spirit of reform came to a standstill and the reactionary traditionalism triumphed.

The liberal nationalism, the spirit of freedom and progress, which had been awakened in Spain and Germany, in Italy and Russia, under the influence of France, was used by the European conservative reaction under British leadership to fight France; not for the purpose of promoting freedom and progress in Europe, but for their suppression. The forces fighting against Napoleon hoped to be able to maintain or to restore the *ancien régime* undisturbed and unchanged in Great Britain and on the continent. Meantime, however, they paid lip service to the hopes animating many of the fighters of the five years from 1808 to 1813. A new Europe seemed to arise from Gibraltar to the Urals. In 1812 Spanish liberals assembled in the Cortes at Cadiz drew up a constitution, which proclaimed the sovereignty of the people,

individual liberty, and legal equality, and remained for many years the liberal model constitution of Europe. Even in the Tsar's Empire a reform movement began under the intelligent guidance of Michael Speranski; new universities were founded, a codification of the Russian law was planned. Great hopes filled the hearts of all the peoples who fought against Napoleon, the "scourge of God."

Economic discomfort following the continental system helped to arouse the spirit against Napoleon. The cheap British manufactures did not reach the continent any more. Their prices and the prices of imports from overseas rose quickly; the export of cereals and of lumber to England ceased;⁸ trade activities diminished; the Russian ruble lost much of its exchange value; the whole economic system was dislocated and time did not suffice to provide new gains for the old losses. The trade volume shrank and the regulations became more and more complicated. Napoleon had no navy strong enough to enforce the continental system which he had started. Moreover, the preferential treatment accorded to France made it even harder for the other continental nations to regard the blockade as a common European cause. In France herself the discontent grew. The dislocation of trade, a bad harvest, the growing number of recruits demanded for the army — all this combined to lower the prestige of Napoleon in his own country.

⁸ At that time Russia exported to England more flax and wood for British ships than wheat as was the case later in the nineteenth century.

The war against Russia in 1812, waged to enforce her loyalty to the continental system and to resume the offensive against Asia, failed. In the two years that followed, Napoleon had several occasions to turn the decision of war in his favor, but his mental and physical forces were not equal any more to the superhuman task of defeating the coalition of Europe against him. The "war of liberation" was proclaimed by Alexander I as the crusade for liberty of the peoples of Europe. Russia, Prussia, and Austria, helped by heavy financial subsidies from Britain, defeated Napoleon in the "battle of the nations" near Leipzig in October, 1813. Three times Napoleon was offered peace on very favorable terms, leaving France with wide frontiers including the Rhine. He chose to fight and until the last he fought against overwhelming odds. On March 31, 1814, the Allies entered Paris, the capital of Napoleon's Empire and of the French Revolution. In April Napoleon left France for the little island of Elba, near his native Corsica, to rule as a sovereign prince over this territory of 140 square miles. It seemed like a tragi-comic ending to the greatest epic of modern times.

The long fight started by Edmund Burke in his *Reflections on the French Revolution* (1790) against the new spirit of France seemed over. Friedrich von Gentz, who had translated the *Reflections* into German (1793), had given German conservatives their intellectual rallying point. Gentz remained in close contact with the London government, which paid

58 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

him large subsidies, and was the center of organizing the resistance of the European courts to Napoleon.⁹ As adviser to Metternich after 1812 and secretary of all the international congresses from Vienna (1814) to Verona (1822) he was the inspirer of the policy of repression of all freedom and liberalism. His friend Adam Müller became the leading thinker of German romantic conservatism. Whereas English and German influence combined in Vienna to prepare the fight against Napoleon and liberty, Alexander I had as associates in St. Petersburg two leading Prussian nationalists, Baron vom Stein and Ernst Moritz Arndt, the ardent propagandist and poet of German nationalism. Their efforts together to "liberate" Europe from tyranny succeeded as far as French tyranny was concerned. They did not succeed in establishing liberty in Europe.

France was the only country which retained after Napoleon's fall the principal achievements and the liberties of the French Revolution, remaining the home of liberty throughout the nineteenth century. With the departure of Napoleon for Elba, the Bourbon Louis XVIII, the brother of King Louis XVI, returned to Paris. He dated his rule from the death of

⁹ Gentz was a fascinating personality, an unscrupulous man of the world, and a brilliant mind. He was a great stylist, and his pen wielded in the years from 1801 to 1812 a tremendous political influence, perhaps the first example of this kind in German lands where up to then there seemed — as was not the case in England and France — no great career open for political publicists rising from the middle class. In the last ten years he tried, clear-sighted but disillusioned and cynical, to "prop up mouldering institutions."

the Dauphin, "Louis XVII," in 1795. The tricolor of the French Revolution was replaced for sixteen years by the royal white flag with the lilies. Nevertheless, Louis XVIII had to recognize the fundamental social and political changes in France accomplished since 1789. There was no genuine restoration in France.

Elsewhere, however, in Great Britain and on the continent, the *ancien régime* tried to restore itself as if nothing had happened. Pope Pius VII returned to Rome and the Papal States were reëstablished. The contemptible Ferdinand VII sat again on the throne of Spain. But "restoration" was not everywhere so simple. A cataclysm had passed over Europe. Wreckage and ruins remained in many spots; land had to be redistributed, opposed claims to be settled. It was decided therefore to call a conference of the Powers in Vienna, where the old system of Europe was to be restored; but the inheritance of the French Revolution — a society of citizens equal before the law, the abolition of religious and of feudal class privileges, the appeal to the nationalism of the people — proved in the long run stronger than the princes and diplomats, their philosophers and publicists, who tried in vain to save the old order.

Not only did the principal achievements of the French Revolution spread through Europe and from Europe to the other continents. Napoleon's personality likewise impressed itself deeply upon European history. He represented and anticipated one of the main trends of the new humanity which was to arise

out of the turmoil of the twenty-five years from 1789 to 1814. On three fields of human life and social action he left his indelible mark: on the art of warfare, on the art of government in the new age of masses and nationalism, and finally on the new image of man emerging from the breakdown of traditional society.

The wars of Napoleon were fundamentally different from those of the eighteenth century. The latter had been wars fought for dynastic interests by mercenaries or by uneducated and uninterested poor peasants. The officers had been aristocrats who frequently bought their commissions for a fixed amount of money. The soldiers had no desire to fight. They were driven to battle by iron discipline and fear of atrocious corporal punishment. The officers regarded themselves as knights and gentlemen and treated the fellow officers of hostile armies with consideration and without animosity. The leading officers frequently changed their allegiance from prince to prince, and successful generals or promising staff officers often received offers of higher salary or more attractive positions from foreign princes. Battles were avoided as far as possible. Wars lasted a long time. The belligerents tried to exhaust the adversary rather than to crush him. The civilian population and the intellectuals were disinterested in the war. They showed no emotions of hatred against the enemy. The people continued their peaceful occupations, and the intellectuals of countries at war maintained close and friendly cultural relations across the frontiers. Wars did not touch

directly the life of the masses or arouse the intellectual and sentimental participation of the educated classes.

This was changed by the French Revolution. The passions of the people were aroused; the soldiers fought for the people's, their own, cause; the officers were united with the soldiers in a common ideal. The educated classes followed with a keen interest the events of the battlefield. The intellectuals, hitherto rather cool to and suspicious of the army, concluded a companionship in arms with the citizens in the army. The fighting forces at the front and the people in the rear now formed a whole. The nation fought for the common cause with all the arms in its possession — physical, moral, and intellectual. Wars did not concern any longer only princes and the ruling classes; they involved the destiny of nations. A new spirit animated the wars. The dignity of voluntary participation kindled a fire of self-sacrifice and devotion as in religious crusades. At the same time it gave a gloomy portent of the coming militarization of the people, of the regimentation of the free spirit in the service of the omnipotent nation.

Napoleon used this new army in a new way. His wars departed from the strategy of wearing the enemy out. They tended to be sharp, short, aggressive. He did not avoid battle, but tried to force as soon as possible a decisive battle upon the enemy. Quick action counted to anticipate the moves of the enemy and to retain the initiative in one's own hand. The mobility of the army was increased, as was its will to strike

62 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

hard and to destroy the enemy. That could only be done with the help of a willing army. This changed attitude on the part of the army was brought about by the altered status of the soldier. The private soldier could hope, by bravery and merit, to become an officer. The career was open to all gifted men. Sons of peasants or of the lower middle classes could become generals. The marshal's baton seemed to many a goal within reach. Class distinctions had been abolished in the armies of the French Revolution.

The new strategy was imitated by other powers, foremost among them Prussia. The army reform of General von Scharnhorst, helped by Count Gneisenau, later Field Marshal, converted the eighteenth-century professional, long-service army into a "national" army after 1807, in which all able-bodied men of the nation had to serve for a short time. They remained for a long number of years available for military service and underwent periodical short terms of training to keep fit.¹⁰ This new army included practically the whole nation in its years of able manhood. The whole nation was educated in the militaristic and patriotic spirit of the army and imbued with the deep-seated devotion to the Fatherland and an all-pervading sense of discipline. The Prussian general, Carl von Clause-

¹⁰ This new system of a short-term conscript army was invented to evade the restriction imposed upon Prussia in the Peace Treaty of Tilsit which compelled Prussia to maintain an army of only 42,000 men. Thus it was possible, without increasing the number of men actually serving at a given time, to train a much larger number, to pass them quickly through the army in peacetime, and to have a very large well-trained potential army ready when it was wanted for war.

witz, director of the military academy of Berlin and later Gneisenau's chief-of-staff, developed in his book "On War"¹¹ the theory and philosophy of the new strategy employed first by Napoleon. He emphasized the necessity of concentrating from the outset all energy upon dealing the enemy a crushing blow and breaking his spirit of resistance. To this end he demanded a thorough preparation in peacetime and the cooperation of all military and civilian forces. The importance of the army for the state and of war for politics was stressed. As it has been put, the democratization of the army brought the danger of the militarization of democracy. With this spirit the Prussian army won the wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870, and its success made it the example for other nations.

As far-reaching as Napoleon's new strategy in war was his new way in government — by democratic dictatorship. He could not invoke old and therefore venerable traditions as the foundation of his power. It was based on the new legislator born in the French Revolution, the sovereign people. He represented the people and could not oppose himself to it. He assumed that he embodied the will of the people. He declared in his Council of State: "My policy is to govern the people as the majority wishes to be governed. That is in my opinion the right way to exercise the sovereignty of the people." He maintained the general suffrage of the people, but the elected body had no power whatsoever. By plebiscites the formal

¹¹ In three volumes, published in 1831, after his death.

last decision rested with the people, but all the power was concentrated in the hands of the strong executive. It was a one-man government based on the consent of the masses. Democratic dictatorship desires the assent of the masses for whom the ancient loyalty of legitimate tradition, working through inertia and passivity, is no longer valid. Their assent has to be gained again and again and to be kept a living and conscious force. But censorship and propaganda do not allow the masses to form an independent opinion. The power and intensity of propaganda have grown immensely since Napoleon's days by the new technical means of the modern age. His personality and success were so great that he could maintain his magic hold on the masses even with the very imperfect means of regimentation of his time. The popular acclaim which he received on his return from Elba for the reign of the one hundred days proves that even the Napoleon of the declining years — the fatigued, betrayed, defeated, cruel egotist — commanded the hearts of his people. Now, however, the tragedy of democratic dictatorship revealed itself to him: that even the superman needs, if he wishes to create something permanent, not only the enthusiastic following of the masses, but their active and intelligent cooperation; not only their blind confidence, but their restraining and guiding advice.

Napoleon was an anticipation of the legend of the superman of the nineteenth century. He had broken all traditions which gave men their place in the world,

often a place unjust and cruelly abused, but a place apparently secure, well-explored, and easily accepted. Man in his station lived in a static system, completely surrounded by men in similar circumstances, helped by all the established patterns of behavior and prejudices to find his way and to make his decisions. Napoleon had broken all that. He was the first solitary man, alone against the whole world, strong only by his own force, relying only upon himself. There seemed no limits set to his march through life and to his decisions except his own daring and his confidence in himself. Napoleon was a free man, leading a life of a tenseness unknown before. The ambitions and the uniqueness of the ego growing and expanding without consideration for others, the greatness of the powerful and overbearing strong man, were first crystallized in his person. After Bismarck's success in 1870 they became the mark of a whole period intoxicated with the desire for power, for expansion; with the adoration of strength, daring, and success; with the scorn for "sentimental" humanitarianism and equalitarianism.

The dazzling picture of the leader of the nation daring to challenge fate like Prometheus, not in order to bring the fire down from heaven to warm all the weaker brethren and to make life easier and happier for them on earth, but for their own glorification and in order to lord it over others — this picture dominated the forthcoming age of the captains of industry, of empire building, and of militant nationalism. The

66 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

dynamic unrest of an unmeasured aspiration, the love for adventure, for a "heroic" fulness of life (at the possible risk of self-destruction, but certainly at the risk of destruction or degradation of the "weaker"), the identification of indomitable strength with goodness, of outward greatness and lordship with worth — these factors became characteristic of the forces leading towards Fascism at the end of the century which began with Napoleon towering like an immense portent of the future.

Napoleon has deepened our knowledge and understanding of the potentialities of man. He realized in his life a new intellectual climate which found its literary expression in titanic romanticism and its political expression in the nationalism of the period which started with Bismarck's victories and, above all, in Fascism. It ought to be pointed out, in justice to Napoleon, who was infinitely greater than all the "titans" of later imagination or reality, that there exists a great difference between the intellectual climate of the beginning of the nineteenth century and that of twentieth-century Fascism.

Napoleon was a rationalist, a child of the eighteenth century and of the French Revolution. Reason is given to all human beings and is identical for all races. The claim of equality for all men and races is based on reason. The later cult of the strong individual or of the superior nation implied a shift from reason to sensations, emotions, and feelings, which in their depth and exaltedness were believed accessible only

to the chosen nation. The romanticism of the first half of the nineteenth century, a highly complex and contradictory literary movement, was strongest in Germany, where it expressed itself in political thought by the first theories of a totalitarian state and by belief in the primacy and divine mission of the German nation. There it united the cult of the individual genius and of the superindividual national genius. But this romanticism remained in the first half of the nineteenth century a visionary theory. Only a century later did it become a living force in history.¹² What had been with Napoleon an inheritance of the cosmopolitan eighteenth century, the goal of a unified and peaceful humanity, of a world order of equal races and men, was later turned into a purely nationalistic demand for conquest or control of one nation over others, into the moral anarchism of an unending struggle of races, and into the degrading teaching of self-flattering racial conceit and of hatred of alien races.

¹² This titanic romanticism never deeply influenced the western nations, England and France, where common sense worked towards a more balanced harmony of individual, nation, and humanity. Carlyle, with his stress upon the power of personality and of moral intuition as embodied in the Teutonic race, his glorification of might as right and of the rule of the strong, tried to transplant German romanticism to England. In France itself the bourgeois sense of order and balance, the eighteenth-century tradition of harmony and the humane, led to a repudiation of Napoleon and the titanic spirit of unbridled ambition and world dominion. His name has no magic spell in France like that of Frederick the Great in Germany. Statues of Napoleon or streets named in honor of him are extremely rare in France. In Germany titanism was revived by the individualistic titanism of Nietzsche, with his will to power, and by the nationalistic titanism of Wagner, with his romantic idealization of racial myths and of pre-Christian barbaric heroism.

III

Nationalism

NATIONALISM has become the dominating factor of a historical epoch which began in continental Europe in 1789 and the end of which is not yet visible. Nationalism was not unknown before the French Revolution. It has its roots deep in the past. The conditions which made possible its emergence at the end of the eighteenth century had been maturing since the Renaissance. Nationalities have existed throughout history as ethnographic material, but the conscious feeling of nationality, the *Nationalbewusstsein*, as the dominating inspiration in the life of a whole people, is entirely modern. Before the French Revolution nationalism did not influence the thought and actions of the masses in an all-pervading way. It was no purposeful will welding together all individuals in a permanent unity of emotions, of will and action.

In the age of nationalism the whole concept of politics and of civilization underwent a profound change. The people identified itself with the state, *its* state. The French Revolution transformed the subjects of the king not only into citizens, but into patriots. The centralized form of government, a necessary prerequisite for the growth of nationalism, was created by the absolute monarchs, the Tudors in

England, Richelieu and Louis XIV in France. The English Revolution in the seventeenth century, with which modern nationalism matured in England, and the French Revolution, continued the work of the absolute monarchs. But they filled the state with a new spirit and gave it a power of cohesion unknown before. Civilization in all its forms, learning, literature, art, was governed before the rise of nationalism by absolute and classical standards. Now it became identified with national civilization, governed by peculiar standards with an emphasis upon national language and national forms of expression. A nationality in the age of nationalism, but only in the age of nationalism, wishes first and foremost to have its own state and its own civilization, and this tendency determines its political, cultural, and economic activities.

Johann Gottfried Herder first emphasized the new gospel that all culture is the expression of a national soul and that men can lead a civilized life only as an integral part of the national group through its peculiar language and culture. Being a son of the eighteenth century and a humanitarian, Herder maintained that in the interest of humanity each national group must strive for its own growth and perfection. He exercised a great influence not only upon German romanticism, but also (especially through the fourth chapter of the sixteenth book of his *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit*) upon the rise of nationalism among the Slav peoples. With the

coming of nationalism the center of cultural gravity shifted from a small educated class, with international connections and leanings, to the people, with its local moorings and folk traditions. Each people wished to learn about its past, its whence and whither, and interpreted its supposed origins and its wishful dreams of the future in the dazzling light of a visionary mission. Nationalism aroused a new interest in history and in the philosophy of history, and the new historians moulded in their turn the guiding ideas of the national development of their peoples.

Of even greater importance than the cultural integration of the masses into the nation was their political integration. The English and the American revolutions had set the example of the struggle for liberty, of the inspiration of a people with a national ideal. But England in the seventeenth century had been on the periphery of Europe, and America was, in the eighteenth century, a far-away colony. The French Revolution, however, took place in the heart of Europe, in the leading and most civilized nation of the continent. Its importance was heightened by the whole intellectual and social development which had occurred since the English Revolution. The French Revolution sent forth a new message into the world: that men, born free and equal, have the right and the power to change existing institutions, to transform this life into one of greater freedom and greater happiness for all. French nationalism, like that in the Anglo-

Saxon countries, manifested itself in a great generous surge towards the future.¹

Under the impact of the French Revolution and of the Napoleonic armies nationalism spread over Europe. The seeds of nationalism and liberalism were planted all over the continent, from Spain to Russia, from Norway to Greece. But at the same time a deep antagonism was aroused against France and against the "French ideas," the "dangerous thought" of the French Revolution. For the Germans and Italians, the awakening of their nationalism meant not only the expulsion of the French armies, but also a conscious effort at cultural self-determination and intellectual reassertion against the all-pervading influence of French liberalism and humanitarianism. In the French Revolution, as in the Anglo-Saxon revolutions, liberalism and nationalism were indissolubly integrated. The background of the American and French revolutions was the century of enlightenment, of rationalism and individualism. Liberty, equality, fraternity, conveyed everywhere a message of universal aim and scope. The stress was laid upon a com-

¹ Hegel, a great conservative, even in his later days characterized the French Revolution as the dawn of a new epoch, although he could not see the lasting consequences of the dawn. "It was a glorious sunrise. . . . A lofty emotion reigned at that time, an enthusiasm of the spirit thrilled the world, as though the real reconciliation between the Divine and the world had finally arrived." (*Philosophie der Geschichte*, 3 Aufl., S. 535 f.) The historian Jacob Burckhardt has succinctly summed up the importance of the French Revolution: "The new decisive element which came into the world with the French Revolution is the will to change and the right to change with the general welfare as a goal" (*Gesamtausgabe*, Bd. 7, S. 431).

mon future for humanity, not upon the divisions which had sundered mankind in the past.

The message of nationalism was received from France, and indirectly from the Anglo-Saxon countries, but it was turned against Western liberalism, especially in Germany. There nationalism was diverted from liberalism and became integrated into political romanticism. As against the enlightened universal rationalism and individualism of France, the dark depth of irrationalism and the peculiar traditional instincts of the communal soul, the *Volksgeist*, were emphasized. Nationalism was stripped of all the implications of a cosmopolitan message; equality and fraternity, as far as they were accepted, were strictly limited to the national community, the *Volksgemeinschaft*; the word "liberty" changed its meaning completely. In the Anglo-Saxon countries and in France it denoted primarily the freedom of the individual against oppressive government, his inalienable rights against authority; in Germany it came to imply national independence and power much more than individual independence. Political romanticism, negligible in its influence in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in France, awakened in other countries a deep interest in the traditions and legends of a far-off past; it developed the strange supposition that the Middle Ages had been a particularly nationalistic epoch; it restricted the historical horizon more and more to a particular nationality and its traditions.²

²It is interesting to note that Hegel, a great rationalist and classi-

Before the French Revolution no political life or parties existed in Germany or in other continental countries. Conservative as well as liberal political thought began only after the French Revolution, under the influence of, or as a reaction against, the ideas of 1789. In France the reforms necessary to create a strong modern state had come after a glorious revolution, backed by the strength of the middle classes and ending forever the influence of the aristocracy in French political and social life. Prussia adopted under the leadership of Baron vom Stein, who hated the French Revolution and explained it by the wickedness of the French people, some of the essential reforms which had created a modern nation in France. But vom Stein and his collaborators intended the reforms for the sake, not of a revolution, but of a counter-revolution; the reforms came not as a result of the will of a victorious free people, but after the crushing defeat of 1806 and the humiliating peace of 1807.

cist, protested against the cultural philosophy of romantic nationalism. He wrote in his *Vorlesungen uber die Aesthetik* (Berlin, 1843, Bd. 3, S. 348-349) about the efforts to revive the medieval German heroic sagas. "The Burgundians, the vengeance of Chriemhilde, the deeds of Siegfried, the whole condition of life, the fate of the whole declining clan, the Nordic spirit, King Etzel, etc., — all that no longer has any kind of living connection with our domestic, civic, and legal life, with our private and public institutions. The history of Christ, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, the Roman law, even the Trojan War, hold much more of the present for us than the adventures of the Nibelungs, which are for the national consciousness a past history, a history completely swept away. To insist upon making something national — a popular bible — of such material is utterly stale and inane." In this respect Goethe and Kant would have entirely agreed with him. National Socialism goes far beyond his worst fears.

There was no strong middle class in Germany to carry the reform to its liberal conclusions, and the Prussian nobility continued to occupy a predominant place in German political life.³

The new temper of a conservative and exclusive nationalism in opposition to the liberal and rational nationalism of Western Europe was inspired largely by the new historiography as it developed in Germany under romantic influence. The Congress of Vienna seemed to mark the definite defeat of the French Revolution and its "dangerous thought." To a superficial observer it seemed that the ideas of 1789 had taken root nowhere outside France; even in France the Bourbons sat again on a throne decorated with the white flag and the royal lilies. Did not the French Revolution fail because of the incompatibility of French institutions with the national character of other peoples? The conclusion was quickly proclaimed that only the organic development of a people out of its own past counted, and that all rational and

³ See Reinhold Aris, *History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789 to 1815* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1936). As liberalism came to Prussia in the wake of defeat and humiliation, so did the contemporary emancipation of the Jews. Both fared badly at the hands of German reaction, from 1815 to 1933, until both were again abolished. The reforms in Prussia were efficient, but they did not touch the spiritual and moral foundations which remained pre-liberal. Franz Schnabel says rightly about their results: "The result was that the Old used the tools and the moulds of the New, that it strengthened itself with them, but repudiated their deeper meaning: all the imperfections . . . of the new Reich, its inability to master the growing difficulties of life, have here their ultimate cause." (*Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, vol. 2, Freiburg i. B., Herder, 1933, p. 372.)

universally applicable reforms and standards were doomed. Romantic historiography not only arrived at the strange conclusion, contradicted by all history, that an outside intervention in the national development was essentially harmful, it produced also an easy "explanation" of all historical events and developments by the mysticism of national spirits or national souls which took care of the "right" evolution of law and constitution, of politics and art. Thus nationalism tended to create an impregnable wall between the nations, and lost entirely the universal message which it had carried under the inspiration of the Anglo-Saxon and French revolutions.⁴

The reaction of the Holy Alliance against liberal Western thought proved futile. The "French ideas" reasserted themselves in the uprisings and revolutions of the early twenties and thirties and finally in 1848, the great year of the "spring of the peoples." Everywhere in Europe, with the exception of Russia, the ideas of the French Revolution, of liberalism and nationalism, awakened the peoples from their political apathy; in Great Britain they forced the aristocracy to accept the reform of the House of Commons; everywhere they brought constitutions and constitutional promises. The people as a whole, for the middle

⁴ See the excellent discussion of romantic historiography in Germany in Ed. Fueter, *Histoire de l'Historiographie Moderne*, translated from the German by Emile Jeanmaire (Paris: Alcan, 1914), pp. 518-535. See also Hans Kohn, *Force or Reason* (Harvard University Press, 1937), pp. 53-55, 121-129; and the chapters relating to German romanticism in G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Longmans, 1913).

classes and the workers fought together, seemed to have defeated the alliance of throne and altar. Everywhere nationalism acted as a revolutionary force, struggled against obsolete conservative governments and institutions. A great generous hope inspired the fighters of 1848, democrats and republicans of different nations, who greeted the dawn of a new day of brotherhood for all liberated peoples. Nationalism seemed to have regained its liberal and cosmopolitan message.

The high hopes were quickly dimmed. Reaction triumphed everywhere. The unification of Italy was not achieved by Mazzini nor according to his principles. The German liberals of Frankfurt-am-Main were unable to assert their authority against the princes of Germany. The German republicans in southwestern Germany, long under the influence of Western liberalism, were defeated by a Prussian army under the later King William I; many were executed, put into prison, or exiled. The unification of Germany and of Italy was not achieved by liberal forces. Italy was united by the opportunist diplomacy of Count Cavour, by the army of the King of Sardinia, but even more by the victories of the French emperor and the Prussian king. But Cavour cooperated wholeheartedly with the Italian liberal middle class and made the people participate in plebiscites. Bismarck achieved the unification of Germany in the teeth of bitter opposition from German middle-class liberalism. The new Germany was not a Germany of the

people, it was a Germany of the princes, achieved by the Prussian army and proclaimed exclusively by the princes after a military victory in the heart of the enemy's country. The new Germany, created out of Bismarck's fight on behalf of king and aristocracy against liberalism and democracy, continued this struggle until the end of the World War, both in her domestic and in her international politics. The unification of both countries had been achieved not as a result of the nationalism of 1848 but as the result of unprincipled *Macht-* and *Realpolitik*.

Nevertheless, it was achieved in the name of nationalism. Bismarck and Cavour, both statesmen towering high above their contemporaries, put nationalism, once a revolutionary, liberal, and anti-governmental force, into the service of their conservative governmental policy. They understood that nationalism, the great force of inspiration to the middle classes in the nineteenth century, could become the best vehicle for the popularization of their policy. To that end they were ready to make certain concessions to the middle classes, to introduce constitutional reforms. Germany received under Prussia's leadership the unexpected gift of general suffrage, but the substance of power remained undiminished in the hands of the monarchy and the aristocracy. The gaining in economic wealth, remained ~~without executive~~ power in political life. In Italy the middle classes and the weakness led to the system of *trasformismo*.

78 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

and its open violence. The Italian masses remained backward, the Italian unification had not solved the agrarian problem as the French Revolution had done. But the middle classes were ready, in the name of nationalism, for a compromise with Bismarck and Cavour and their governmental *Machtpolitik*. They had been frightened by the June revolt of the workers in Paris in 1848. The specter of social unrest, the class struggle proclaimed by Marx in 1849, weakened the bond by which the generous optimism of the revolutionists of 1848 had united the classes and the masses in a great humanitarian effort towards better conditions, better government, peace and solidarity. The defeat of the revolutionary movements of 1848 had disillusioned the middle classes; the success of Cavour and especially of Bismarck converted them to the acceptance of a policy which they had formerly combatted and even hated. Nationalism, which had been a liberal and anti-governmental force, a revolutionary inspiration, became in the sixties an instrument of governmental expansionist policy. German nationalism became the cover for Bismarck's Prussification of Germany; the ideal of free citizenship as the aim of nationalism was replaced by that of national power and prosperity. The success of *Machtpolitik* defeated liberal nationalism.⁵

During the later part of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the present century we find everywhere

⁵ Few Germans at that time saw the consequences. One of the few was Nietzsche, a bitter opponent of the new German Reich and its

the two currents — liberal, progressive, and humanitarian, and romantic, reactionary, and power-politics nationalism. Often we find the two currents intermingling in many different shades of expression. It is interesting to note that reactionary nationalism was given its modern theoretical elucidation in France by thinkers like Charles Maurras and poets like Maurice Barrès. Most of the slogans of Fascist Italy and of National-Socialist Germany derive (frequently without due acknowledgment) from French sources. Even the famous National-Socialist *Blut und Boden* was first expressed by Barrès in his insistence upon *la terre et les morts*. With this return to the most primitive ancestor worship and to the primeval chthonic gods Barrès anticipated the complete domination of the individual by biological forces, the annihilation of individuality. But romantic and reactionary nationalism ⁶

power politics. Another was the poet Georg Herwegh, one of the fighters of 1848, who wrote after 1870 the pessimistic lines:

Das Blut von Wörth, das Blut von Spichern,
Von Mars-la-Tour und Gravelotte,
Einheit und Freiheit soll es sichern?
Einheit und Freiheit? — Grosser Gott!
Ein Amboss unter einem Hammer
Geeinigt soll All-Deutschland stehn!!
Dem Rausche folgt ein Katzenjammer,
Dass euch die Augen übergehn!

Franz Schnabel (*op. cit.*, p. 214) concludes rightly: "It has become of decisive importance for the history of Europe and of Germany that the Germans failed in what both the Italians and the Czechs attained. None of the great leaders of German liberalism developed into a German Cavour or a German Masaryk."

⁶The same is true of the Germanic racial theory, which was developed by a Frenchman, Count Arthur de Gobineau. But it remained without any considerable influence in liberal France, whereas it grew into a basic race idolatry in anti-liberal Germany and Italy.

80 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

remained in France, as in Great Britain, only a curious undercurrent; liberal nationalism, which is proud of its 1789 origin, remained dominant. Three times it had to withstand the concentrated onslaught of the anti-liberal, anti-democratic forces: in the Boulanger crisis, in the Dreyfus Affair, on the fateful February 6, 1934. Every time, liberal nationalism reasserted itself triumphantly. In Germany and in Italy, however, it was defeated. (The struggle between the two Frances, revolutionary France and conservative France, has been fought since 1789 not only on French soil, but throughout the European continent. The French Republic defeated the Imperial Marshal MacMahon; in a very similar situation the Imperial Marshal Hindenburg defeated the German Republic.) The fight against the French Revolution and its two Anglo-Saxon forerunners, against liberalism and democracy, against rationalism and equalitarian humanitarianism, was resumed after the World War.⁷

Fascism and National Socialism set the "ideas of 1914" against the "ideas of 1789." They are a new effort to stem the progress of liberalism, similar to the effort made one hundred years ago by the Holy Alli-

⁷ After the defeat of the year 1848, and its hopes, in which even Pope Pius IX had shared to a certain extent, it was the Catholic Church which in the famous Syllabus and the later legislation of Pope Pius IX announced the determined fight against all the ideas of the eighteenth century and of the French Revolution. But the Catholic Church included in its condemnation also the one product of the French Revolution which the Fascists not only accepted but over-emphasized to its complete distortion—namely, nationalism. The Catholic Church was conservative, but in its true representatives anti-nationalistic and universalistic.

ance. The hatred of the French Revolution, of Western ideas, of liberty and equality, of the rights of individuals, is common to both efforts. But the new effort is incomparably more dangerous, because it makes use, as Bismarck did, of the inspiring force of nationalism, a nationalism divested of every adaptation to, and compromise with, the interests of humanity as a whole, the dignity of the individual irrespective of race or faith, the hope of a lasting peace. The new effort employs, in a way entirely unknown to the statesmen of the period of Metternich, the potentialities of love and hatred dormant in the masses, and misdirects them to an immense egotism, to an uncritical adoration of themselves, to a limitless contempt for everything deemed alien.

This new nationalism would be of devastating moral effect at any time; it is especially dangerous in the period after the World War. In our days, on a shrinking earth, with a growing interdependence of all peoples, a dynamic self-centered nationalism becomes the gravest menace to peace (which it despises) and to the progress of civilization (which it denies). This nationalism looks to the past, wishes to reestablish claims derived from a past often many centuries old. Its dynamism proclaims the victory of self-seeking, self-willing "life" over rational law with its universally applicable standards. The new nationalism threatens chaos at a moment when all efforts should be bent upon the building up of universal order. The new nationalism comes at a time when the changing cir-

cumstances on our earth render an emphasis upon nationalism obsolete. The Holy Alliance glorified feudalism in a period when even in Germany and in Eastern Europe the foundations of feudalism were breaking down and a new social order was irresistibly in the making. Similarly, Fascism is glorifying tribal egotism in a period when a world-community is growing. Seen in this light, Fascism becomes, and prides itself in being, the counter-revolution against, and the denial of, history and humanity.

TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE

I have a conviction that there is a real, and almost imminent danger of England losing immeasurably in all ways, for want of what I must still call ideas, for want of perceiving how the world is going, and must go, and preparing herself accordingly. This conviction haunts me, and at times even overwhelms me with depression.

MATTHEW ARNOLD, 1865

Deutschland, du herrliches, halte dich frei
Standhaft und fest von Deutschtumelei!
Achtest sonst kaum unsern Herrn Jesu Christ,
Weil er in Pommern geboren nicht ist.

MARIE V. EBNER-ESCHENBACH

Il n'y a pas de gouvernement . . . qui demande plus de vigilance et de courage pour être maintenu (que le démocratique). C'est surtout dans cette constitution que le citoyen doit s'armer de force et de constance, et dire chaque jour de sa vie, au fond de son cœur: Malo periculosam libertatem quam quietam servitutem.

ROUSSEAU, *Du Contrat Social*, Livre III, chapitre I

IV

Russian Revolution

THE term Russian Revolution is generally employed with reference to the process of radical change in the social organization, culture, and attitude of mind of the Russian people which began in 1917. This revolution has been shaped by the historical, social, and psychological factors peculiar to Russia. Indeed it should be regarded not as an isolated historical phenomenon but as a stage in a process which has continued since the early eighteenth century. In the reign of Peter the Great an effort was made to Europeanize the political and economic life of the country; a radical attempt considering the structure of European society and the narrow scope of international interdependence two hundred years ago. In a Eurasian country weighted down by intellectual lethargy and by the ritualistic immobility of the Eastern church, the structure of the state — the armed forces, the civil administration, and the courts — was changed to conform to European standards, while trade and industry were artificially stimulated. A discordant element was thus introduced into Russian life, provoking a movement of deep unrest which was to grow in intensity with the passage of time. In the course of the following century Western ideas spread to the aristocracy attached to the new court at St.

Petersburg, while the gentry, the clergy, and the masses remained relatively untouched. Consequently there developed a profound estrangement between state and society, between the government and the people. Peter I, whom the opponents of westernization held responsible for this break in historical continuity, was regarded as the Beast of the Apocalypse. Since the Petrine reforms were necessitated by military and financial exigencies, they resulted in complete subordination of the national life to the needs of the state, above all of its army. Fiscal requirements aggravated the burdens of serfdom, which in the reign of Catherine II approximated outright slavery. The peasantry became more and more discontented, and Pugachov's rebellion (1773-74), which spread throughout southeastern Russia, assumed dangerous proportions, although lack of intelligent leadership doomed it to failure.

In its first stage the revolution in Russia extended only to the state apparatus and the aristocracy; in the second stage, which began with the insurrection of a group of army officers in December, 1825, the pivotal position was occupied by the intelligentsia, a product of the closer intellectual contact with western Europe after the Napoleonic wars. By the latter half of the reign of Alexander I the younger generation of the nobility and of the rising middle class had begun to study the idealistic philosophy of Germany and the writings of the early socialist thinkers of France. Recoiling from the degradation and pettiness of Russian

public life, they yearned for the freedom and intellectual integrity of the West. But they were helpless; the government responded with rigorous repression and the masses remained out of reach. Alienated from the masses and excluded from participation in public affairs, the Russian intelligentsia was left to its own devices, to engage in the everlasting quest for the meaning of "the Russian development, the Russian national idea." Thus there emerged the eternal student and the professional revolutionary, two characteristic Russian types. For the eighteenth-century antagonism between the government and the people, the cleavages between the state, the intelligentsia, and the masses were now substituted.

The development of the Russian intelligentsia was conditioned by its isolation from business and public life and by its psychological make-up. The members of this class, catholic in their interests and sympathies, cherished lofty ideals but remained entirely ignorant of the prosaic aspects of existence; they demanded all or nothing, scorned gradual, concrete achievement, and were prone to fatalistic despair. The movement of the intelligentsia resembled nothing so much as a permanent discussion club, where ecstatic speeches about the magnificent future offered an escape from harsh reality. An outstanding manifestation of this utopianism was the unwarranted idealization of the masses, especially the peasants. This was common both to the westernists, who looked toward Europe for inspiration and guidance, and to the Slavophiles,

who saw in the spiritual and social peculiarities of Russia a substitute, universally valid, for the decaying civilization of the West. The Slavophiles had no more contact with Russian reality than the westernists; their Russia was an apolitical community of love and freedom, a kingdom of God prepared by God's chosen people, the Russians.

Throughout the nineteenth century the rootless idealism of the intelligentsia was challenged only by the nihilists of the 1860's who professed extreme utilitarianism and submitted all matters to the acid test of reason. But the nihilist predisposition to a sober view of reality was soon overwhelmed by the longing of the intelligentsia to end its isolation, to bridge the gulf which separated it from the masses. The movement known as "going to the people" was particularly strong in the 1870's; it failed to attain any concrete results largely because of the distrust and inertia of the masses. In their desperation many of the intelligentsia then turned to terrorism, typically a weapon of the self-sacrificing idealistic individual; but this form of struggle was of slight practical value, for terrorist organizations were undermined by harsh governmental repression and by the corruption inherent in large-scale conspiratorial operations. Whether committed to terrorist action or choosing the slower processes of underground propaganda and education, the Russian intelligentsia persisted in idealizing the peasantry and its communal form of agrarian organization; the latter was viewed as the survival of an early

agrarian communism, a bulwark against the infiltration of western capitalism, and a basis for future socialist organization on the land. *Zemlya i volya* ("Land and liberty"), the slogan of the populists in the late 1870's, was the basis of the subsequent demand for socialization of the land and convocation of a constituent assembly. Such were the planks in the platform of the Socialist Revolutionary party, which dominated the political activity of the intelligentsia from its formal organization in the early years of the twentieth century until November, 1917.

The development of the Russian state during the nineteenth century failed to keep pace with the times. While the governments of Peter I and Catherine II were comparable in their efficiency to those of western Europe, the state under Nicholas I was still a centralized eighteenth-century autocracy, lagging far behind the new states of western Europe which emerged after the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The extent of this lag was revealed in the Crimean War. The backwardness of the largely patriarchal structure of Russia appeared in sharp contrast to the new society of the West, rooted as it was in a dynamic economy and buttressed by a free public opinion. In order to raise the efficiency of the army and the civil administration and to increase the taxable capacity of the country, serfdom was abolished in 1861. But like most post-Petrine reforms this measure was inadequate; it burdened the peasant with heavy annuities and it vested control of the land in the com-

mune, thus hindering the adoption of a progressive agricultural technique. Peasant hostility to the state did not abate; the peasantry did not become prosperous, while the landed nobility decayed. Reforms touching upon every phase of public life were enacted in the decade following emancipation, but they were oriented upon a narrow view of the aims of the state and did not greatly improve the lot of the masses or enhance the initiative and self-reliance of the individual. The best-intentioned reforms lost their effectiveness for lack of suitable persons to fill the new positions in the reorganized administration. After the "era of reforms" public life reached what was probably its lowest ebb; these were "gray days" dominated by a total absence of any sense of social purpose and creative labor. Literature became an indictment of society and of the intolerable hopelessness of middle-class life, especially in the provinces.

While the peasantry distrusted the intelligentsia as an offspring of the hated landowning gentry, it listened to the teachings of dissident religious sects. Those sectarians whose social ideology was molded by a literal interpretation of the Gospel established in the outlying regions pioneer colonies which developed into prosperous communistic settlements. Many more, obeying the letter of the Gospel, abandoned their families and worldly possessions and wandered as "holy tramps" over the immense steppes of Russia, spreading the anarchistic message of a struggle against the state and the church, the servants of the Anti-

christ, the two horns of the Apocalyptic Beast. In the face of these doctrines of spontaneous peasant origin, preached in a language which the peasant could easily understand, the official church, completely devoid of social vision, and its illiterate village priests could offer no impressive resistance. As in seventeenth-century England, religious dissidence operated as a revolutionizing factor, giving voice and form to the discontent caused by ruthless exploitation and extreme poverty. The peasantry was transformed into a revolutionary class with great potentialities if the proper leadership were forthcoming; in its absence peasant risings could easily be localized and suppressed, as were the numerous outbreaks in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The quarter-century preceding 1905 was a period of rapid industrialization and urbanization in Russia. Industry made great advances with the aid of French, Belgian, British, and German capital, and the upper middle class prospered at the expense of the exploited working masses. Yet basically the country remained backward. Neither its social structure nor the production of raw materials was correlated with a high rate of industrialization and urbanization. Agriculture, the major branch of production, continued to stagnate; a large proportion of the agricultural output, drained off by the semi-feudal landowners and the state, was sold abroad to pay for government loans and foreign investments, while the countryside was devastated by recurring famines and the living standards of the

urban masses were kept very low. The Manchurian War of 1904 revealed the inner weaknesses of Russia as mercilessly as the Crimean War had done half a century before. The state was doomed but was kept alive by the inertia and feebleness of the opposition. The only classes which supported the autocratic monarchy were the nobility and the upper clergy, both in an advanced stage of economic and spiritual decay. The Czar's alliance with the nobility had completely estranged the peasant masses, and the policy of Russification pushed the numerous non-Russian nationalities settled within the empire into the camp of the opposition.

By 1905, when Russia entered upon the third stage of the revolution, there were four conflicting groups. On the right, autocracy was supported by the landed nobility and the high clergy, which were represented after 1905 by several reactionary parties. The middle classes, interested in stimulating the capitalistic development of the country, aspired to a more or less liberal constitutional monarchy on the German or the English model. The upper *bourgeoisie* was organized in the Octobrist party with the Czar's manifesto of October 17, 1905,¹ as its platform, while the great mass of merchants, manufacturers, liberal gentry, and bourgeois professionals was mobilized under the banner of the Constitutional Democratic party (Kadets). The political and economic demands of the peasantry

¹ This and all subsequent dates follow the Julian calendar used in Russia until 1918.

and the majority of the intelligentsia, in so far as they could be formulated definitely, were embodied in the program of the Socialist Revolutionary party. At the extreme left there was the industrial proletariat, which by the end of the nineteenth century began to form a distinct class, conscious of its differences from the peasantry and giving pronounced indications of industrial unrest. The views of this class were expressed by the Russian Marxists, who had been active in underground propaganda and organization since the early 1880's. In 1898 they formed the Social Democratic Labor party of Russia, which split in 1903 into a right wing (Menshevik) led by Martov and a left wing (Bolshevik) under Lenin. While the latter demanded a highly centralized party with a small membership of professional revolutionists, Martov favored a loosely organized mass party paralleling the western Social Democrats. The national minorities were represented by numerous political associations, some of which were affiliated with the liberal opposition; most of them, however, were bound by programmatic and personal ties to the revolutionary left.

The revolution of 1905, which followed upon a year of widespread agrarian and industrial unrest, began with the Bloody Sunday of January 9. A mass of unarmed workers, with the clergyman Gapon at their head, marched to the palace to present a petition to the Czar and were fired upon by the troops in an act of wanton cruelty typical of the last phases of Russian autocracy. Peasant uprisings and workers'

political strikes broke out throughout the country, and sections of the army and navy appeared to be infected with the revolutionary virus. But the autocracy did not yield; in a spirit of doubtful wisdom it aroused the anarchic instincts of the masses against the intelligentsia, the cultured classes, and the Jews, and a wave of pogroms swept over Russia. In May the first soviet, or council of workers' deputies, was organized in Ivanovo-Voznesensk, an important center of the textile industry, with a view to directing the city-wide strike. Similar bodies were later formed in a number of other cities. Of these the most important was the St. Petersburg soviet, in which Trotsky was the leading spirit; it was created in October and functioned for two months before its entire membership was arrested. In October a general strike paralyzed the country; and the government finally capitulated, promulgating the Czar's manifesto which promised civil liberties and conferred legislative authority upon the elective Duma conceived originally as a purely advisory assembly.

The October manifesto marked the peak of the 1905 revolution, after which the revolutionary tide receded. The armed insurrection of Moscow workers in December lasted for eight days but was drowned in blood by loyal troops; the middle classes hastened to make their peace with the government, and the latter gradually withdrew its concessions. The powers of the Duma were greatly curtailed; and Prime Minister Witte, who was ready to cooperate with the

liberal bourgeois element, was dismissed. Despite the restrictions upon the suffrage and despite the boycott of the elections to the First Duma by all the socialist groups, the overwhelming majority of both the First and the Second Duma stood in opposition to the government. In 1907, after the dissolution of the Second Duma, which like the First survived only for a few months, the electoral law was changed by the sole authority of the Czar and in violation of the constitution which he had granted; the representation of the peasants, workers, and non-Russian nationalities was sharply reduced.

The 1905 revolution culminated in "a constitutional monarchy under an autocratic czar," but this was not due to the strength of the regime. On the contrary, the latter evidenced all its characteristic weaknesses: stubborn adherence to entirely obsolete forms; tardy and unsuccessful halfway measures adopted under strong pressure to win support and to play one group of opponents against another only to betray both as soon as such a course seemed safe; selection of an incapable personnel for the execution of vital policies. But the enemies of autocracy were united only in their negative attitude to the government; the middle classes dreaded the specter of a social revolution, while the revolutionary movement itself was immature and weakened by the failure to cement an alliance between the peasantry and the urban proletariat.

Although apparently it had failed, the 1905 revolution was in effect a huge dress rehearsal of the out-

break which came a decade later. The experience of 1905-07 served as an inspiration to the masses of workers and peasants and the non-Russian nationalities; it aroused them from their lethargy and taught them lessons which could not easily be forgotten. It created in the soviet a pattern for the future organization of the urban masses and demonstrated the necessity of collaboration between the city worker and the peasant. Furthermore, it widened the gulf between the right and left wings in the revolutionary camp. The right persisted in its belief that the scope of the revolutionary transformation should be restricted to the establishment of a bourgeois democratic republic and blamed the failure of the 1905 revolution in part upon radical extremism which alarmed the middle classes. The left wing, on the other hand, confirmed in its distrust of the middle class, made the union of the proletariat with the land-hungry peasantry a basic element of its ideology.

The post-revolutionary era was marked by severe political reaction. The government, under the premiership of Stolipin for the first five years, was supported by the strong right majorities of the Third Duma (1907-12) and the Fourth Duma (1912-17) in following a policy of repression and of aggressive nationalism both at home and abroad. Where it was not completely exterminated by main force, the revolutionary movement was infested with spies and corrupted by *agents provocateurs* in the pay of the secret police. The numerous non-Russian nationalities, rele-

gated to an inferior rank, underwent a process of forced Russification which frustrated the cultural development and the economic advancement of these peoples. Russian foreign policy was calculated to provide a link between autocracy on the one hand and the *bourgeoisie* and conservative intelligentsia on the other. It was oriented upon amity with western nations, on whose capital markets government and industry depended for loans, and upon expansion in the East. In particular the annexation of Constantinople and the Straits was designed not merely to satisfy the craving for imperial aggrandizement but also to fulfill the old dream of regaining Byzantium, the source of ancient Russian culture and religion. The dumas sought to strengthen the army in order to avoid the humiliating defeats of the past, but, as later events proved, an autocratic and bureaucratic regime which retarded the material advancement and spiritual emancipation of the masses could not prepare the country for the rigors of modern warfare. The peasant and the worker were not imbued with the spirit of self-conscious modern nationalism which would make them willing to bear for long the terrible sacrifices demanded by war. The Russian masses and the subject nationalities were kept outside the orbit of Russian nationalism. The social structure of Russia was top-heavy — a condition which explains the easy susceptibility of Russia to revolutionary upheavals.

The economic structure of Russia was likewise unintegrated and top-heavy. Unlike the western coun-

98 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

tries, Russia did not experience the comparatively slow transition from a handicraft economy through the factory system to full-fledged industrialism. There was consequently little correlation between the base of the Russian economy, which comprised a rather primitive agriculture and peasant handicraft, and the modern industrial giants at the top, which had been built up with the aid of government subsidies and investments of foreign capital. Even considered by itself Russian industrialism was extremely unbalanced. Although railway construction was pushed forward, the transportation system was not sufficiently developed to overcome the separation of the natural reservoirs of fuel and of industrial raw materials. There was moreover a perennial shortage of skilled labor adaptable to modern industrial technique. It can not be denied, however, that Russian industry had made great strides forward. Agriculture benefited from Stolipin's reforms of 1906, which favored the dissolution of land communes and provided for the abolition of the system of scattered and intermixed allotments. The economic freedom thus conferred upon the more prosperous peasant strengthened his position, but the bulk of the peasants appeared in contrast poorer than ever. Grain trade was improved, better credit facilities were provided, and rural co-operation was growing quite rapidly; but many years were required to diffuse the beneficial effects of these developments through the vast mass of the peasantry.

However slow and uneven, the modernization of

Russian economy and the relative prosperity which it enjoyed in the years 1908-14 served to lessen the inertia of the people and to make them more receptive to political and economic education. At the same time the masses became more easily accessible to the intelligentsia. Although some of the latter were driven in despair to the sensuality of *Sanin* or the mystical Slavophilism of *Vekhi*, many of those who persevered found a new outlet for their idealistic devotion to the people in the cooperative movement, in the trade unions tolerated by the government after 1906, and in the workers' sick-benefit societies provided by the law of 1912. Thus, while the leaders of the 1905 revolution were in prison or exile and revolutionary party organizations were destroyed or crippled, new revolutionary forces were slowly being trained in the country. In 1912 the excesses of the government in suppressing the strike in the Lena gold fields aroused widespread indignation. And from 1912 on there was an increasingly large number of strikes, involving in the first seven months of 1914 over a million workers; in these disputes political demands were often more important than purely economic issues.

The World War, which might have diverted growing internal tension into other channels, served only to reveal the corruption and inefficiency of the existing regime. The development of Russian industry and transportation was insufficient to meet the demand for highly mechanized equipment and for the swift movement of large contingents of troops and sup-

plies. The court, isolated from contact with realities, failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation confronting the country. The ministers, selected by a court camarilla which regarded even the overwhelmingly reactionary Duma as a radical body, lacked energy and training for the tasks before them; indeed it was scarcely to be expected that they could develop such qualities when their tenure of office was dependent upon the whim of an autocrat surrounded by court intrigue. Some of them lacked simple honesty and would have been a dangerous burden even in times of peace. The cleavage between state and society, lessened in the years of peaceful prosperity and spanned in the outburst of national feeling which characterized the first months of the war, soon reappeared and grew ever deeper. The mass of the people were subjected to increasing hardships. The war sacrificed millions of men and called for larger and larger supplies of human cannon fodder. The fields and factories were stripped of their trained workers, while the peasant soldiers, inadequately supplied with munitions, longed for home. By the winter of 1916 military defeats, growing economic chaos, and the shortage of foodstuffs in important centers had produced a dangerous instability. The confidence of the upper classes in the high army command, the court, and the ministry, was definitely shaken; and the conviction became widespread that the fatherland was menaced more by internal foes than by the attacking armies.

Russian autocracy collapsed in February, 1917, and within a few months nothing remained of the state built up by such strong and able monarchs as Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great. The personality of Nicholas II, the decadence of the nobility, and the weakness of the upper *bourgeoisie* played their part; but the fundamental cause of the crash was the fact that the Russian political and social system could withstand the pressure of modern civilization no more successfully than could the archaic Ottoman Empire. Russia had not experienced the process of national integration which molded the destinies of all European states after the French Revolution. The poverty and illiteracy of the people and the weakness of the bourgeois class gave the Russian revolution its chance. The mass of Russians were not allowed to share in shaping the destinies of their country and consequently did not develop that sense of responsibility for and loyalty to the whole which characterizes a modern nation. Russia typified not so much a modern national state as a quasi-colonial country exploited by western capitalism with the aid of its own government and upper classes; its antimonarchist revolution was therefore bound to take on the color of an anti-imperialist rebellion. But the revolution led also to the secession of territories settled by non-Russian nationalities; for with regard to these as well as to its Asiatic neighbors Russia had played the part of an imperialist colonizer. For many reasons Russia was the weakest link in the chain of European capitalism and imperialism.

The overthrow of the czarist government initiated the fourth stage of the Russian revolution, which under the conditions then existing proceeded logically and irresistibly to its consummation in the establishment of Soviet rule in October, 1917. The first manifestation of mass action came on February 23 in the form of a demonstration in the principal streets of Petrograd by working-class women who were turned away empty-handed after they had stood in line for many hours to purchase bread. Within two days a spontaneous mass outbreak developed; organized revolutionary leadership was entirely absent, but under conditions of fundamental instability the chaos was bound to increase rapidly. If the government had not been in the hands of the autocrat and his inept ministers it might still have saved the situation, for the time being at least, by far-reaching concessions coupled with energetic action. But the estrangement between the autocracy and the people had reached the point where a *rapprochement* was no longer possible. In a few days, when it became clear that the peasant army was making common cause with the workers, the outcome of the February outbreak was decided.

While the old government was overthrown, there was as yet no leadership capable of setting up a new government. The provisional committee of the Duma, motivated by the desire to assure continuation of the war and stabilization of the social order, implored the autocrat to grant reforms; as the unrest developed it spared no effort to save the monarchy. But the Czar

abdicated in favor of his brother, who hesitated to accept the crown without the consent of a constituent assembly. The Duma committee was thus forced, in order to avert chaos, to undertake the creation of a new government. A workers' and soldiers' soviet after the 1905 pattern was organized under the guidance of the moderate socialist parties. These were not prepared to assume full power; they hastened to assure the Duma committee of their willingness to support a government formed by it.

Thus there came into existence the first Provisional Government, whose authority was quickly recognized by the administrative apparatus of the old regime and by foreign countries. It was headed by Prince Lvov, who was widely known as chairman of the Union of Zemstvos, a vast organization which assisted the government in provisioning the army and caring for its wounded; and it included conservative and liberal representatives of the educated middle classes and one right-wing socialist. The two outstanding personalities in the new set-up were Miliukov and Kerensky. The former, leader of the Kadets and foremost parliamentary critic of the slackness and stupidity of the czarist government in the prosecution of war, apparently believed that the elimination of autocracy would strengthen Russia's will and capacity for war. As minister of foreign affairs he continued to stress the necessity of a decisive victory and of the fulfillment of Russia's historic mission in the annexation of Constantinople and the Straits. Kerensky, a

brilliant young lawyer who had defended the Lena strikers in 1912, a member of the Duma and a vice-president of the Petrograd Soviet, was the only member of the government whom the masses trusted at the outset. But Kerensky's grasp of the situation was no more realistic than that of his colleagues; like the other right-wing socialists, he believed in the existence of a nationally conscious Russian people willing to continue the war and therefore convinced of the necessity of preserving the framework of orderly government inherited from the autocratic regime.

Like many of the liberals and Socialist Revolutionaries, the Provisional Government idealized the Russian masses, their patriotism, and their innate maturity, and shaped its policies to a preconceived pattern of national democratic revolution. Moreover, it was pushed in the wrong direction by the official and unofficial representatives of the Allied countries, who not only failed to understand the trend of events but also were astonishingly devoid of sympathy with the Russian people, regarding Russia merely as a tool to be used in the achievement of their own war aims. For eight months the growing restlessness of the workers and peasants compelled frequent shifts to the left in the composition of the government and in its program, but these came always too late to effect a permanent adjustment. The first such change occurred during the week ending May 6, when the Kadet Miliukov and the Octobrist Guchkov, the two members prominently associated with the policy of

continuation of the war, were replaced by Chernov, leader of the Socialist Revolutionary party and advocate of land socialization, and the Menshevik Tsere-telli, the strongest man in the Petrograd Soviet.

Both in Petrograd and in the provinces, which quickly and spontaneously followed the example of the capital, the Provisional Government had to share its power increasingly with the soviets of workers' and soldiers' deputies. For the masses made the revolution against the wishes of the Duma, from which the Provisional Government issued; and they often preferred the authority of their representatives organized into soviets, considering the latter the guardian of the revolution. At first soviet leadership was in the hands of Mensheviks and right-wing Socialist Revolutionaries, who were ready to cooperate with the government. But these groups could no more control movements from below than could the government itself. In the following months the masses veered rapidly to the left from their original toleration of a defensive war and a bourgeois government with a minority of moderate socialists: the executive committees of the soviets, which reflected this trend, albeit tardily, could moderate its violence and delay its culmination but were powerless to check or reverse it.

While a semblance of order was thus preserved, the situation was fundamentally unstable. In a vast country characteristically lacking an integrating national consciousness the downfall of the only legitimate and

traditional unifying institution, the autocracy, inevitably led to anarchy. The ruling classes of the old order were distrusted and rejected by the masses. The leading bourgeois groups, lacking the authority which the autocracy had enjoyed, were too inefficient or too weak to produce a coherent and devoted élite able to salvage the country from the chaos of war and revolution which was undermining the defective structure of the state. Once the restraint of centuries was removed, "direct action" in industry, on the land, and in the army became the order of the day. The soldiers longed for peace, the peasants coveted the landed estates, and the workers pressed for the control of industry. Any well-knit group under energetic leadership with an understanding of these demands which in seizing power would give some promise of their fulfillment could direct the course of the revolution. Eventually power passed into the hands of the Bolsheviki, the one party which had a clear program and a definite line of action. In conformity with the principles advocated by Lenin since 1903 it was an organization of picked men united by strict discipline. At its head stood Lenin, who combined a fervent faith in the future of a socialist and internationalist society with an astute understanding of the exigencies of the immediate situation and the psychology of the Russian masses.

While the Bolsheviki were maneuvering into a position of leadership, other groups which formerly had been sympathetic to the revolutionary cause turned

against it. In the first month of the upheaval, class distinctions were submerged in a wave of universal jubilation and general fraternization. The bourgeois intellectuals welcomed the revolution as the realization of a seemingly lost hope. The comparative bloodlessness of the change was hailed as evidence of its superiority over the French Revolution and as proof of the nobility of the Russian soul. The future of Russia appeared bright and clear: as the ally of western democracies it was engaged in a war to destroy Prussian militarism and to liberate the enslaved nationalities of central Europe, and as the foremost representative of the Slavic tradition it was fulfilling its mission in the spirit of love. But this dream was ended abruptly; when the revolution passed the point at which they would have liked it to stop, the intellectuals were driven to counter-revolution. It would be unfair to say that they were animated to any decisive extent by the desire for the preservation of their vested interests. To many of them who were brought up to revere revolutionary ideals and who had always longed for a revolution in Russia the turn of events and their reaction to it involved profound personal tragedy. They were frightened by the chaos and cultural barbarism which appeared about them and were horrified by the instincts of the primitive masses, now unleashed. They became sincerely convinced that the old order, despite all its defects, was infinitely preferable to the chaos and ugliness of the rule of Smerdyakov. The Russian intelligentsia remained true

to tradition: once more it recoiled from the realities of life, thereby losing its power to shape them.

The groups of socialist intelligentsia fared little better. The largest among them, organized in the Socialist Revolutionary party, had for nearly half a century fought for the socialization of land and the convocation of a constituent assembly. It now seemed that the work of three generations had borne fruit, for the masses adopted these demands as their own. At the first All Russian Congress of Soviets, in June, 1917, the Socialist Revolutionaries in combination with the Mensheviks still controlled a majority of the delegates. This appeared to be the correct historical moment for the realization of their program, but they delayed action from month to month. The difficulties and problems involved were grave, and the longer they were discussed the more insuperable they seemed. The leaders knew too much and doubted too much; the masses knew nothing but demanded swift action. Chernov appeared to have grasped the situation. He drafted a law for the socialization of agricultural land, but the Allies put all their influence against it, arguing that nothing should be done to divert energy from the successful prosecution of the war. This attitude prevailed in the Provisional Government and sealed its fate: for the Russian masses the revolution took precedence over war.

Kerensky tried to find a middle road between the two but failed in this impossible task and lost the confidence of both the middle classes and the masses.

From March to July he had drawn to himself the hopes and the love of the majority of the people, yet a few months later his power collapsed like that of the Czar in the preceding February. In June Kerensky carried out an extraordinary oratorical campaign which galvanized the army into action, but the offensive collapsed after a fortnight. In early July the government in which he was the most prominent figure suppressed an uprising of Petrograd workers. The insurrection had developed from a spontaneous demonstration against the Kerensky offensive; and although the Bolsheviks considered it premature, they assumed the leadership after its inception. A few days later, on Prince Lvov's resignation, Kerensky became prime minister and in fact dictator of Russia. But the All Russian Conference, convened by the government in Moscow on August 12, revealed the weakness of his position. A fortnight later the attempt at a counter-revolution led by the chief of the army command, General Kornilov, marked the turning point. Although Kerensky, who was Kornilov's immediate superior, was finally forced to take an open stand against the General, Kerensky's vacillation made the ambiguity of his standpoint even more pronounced. The soviets rallied to his support and "saved" the Provisional Government; but the respect of both radicals and conservatives for Kerensky was irretrievably lost, the army became completely disorganized, and the soviets moved farther to the left.

In the meantime Trotsky, who together with the

group of united Social Democrats (Mezhrayontsi) had joined the Bolshevik party in July and was rapidly becoming a most influential figure in the left wing, was elected president of the Petrograd Soviet. Together with Lenin, who had put forward the slogan "All power to the Soviets" immediately upon his arrival in Petrograd early in April, Trotsky insisted, against the advice of other Bolshevik leaders, that the proper time had arrived for the seizure of power on behalf of the soviets. It was Trotsky who created the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and obtained complete control of the garrison and the arms of Petrograd. In October all Russia was aware that a Bolshevik insurrection in the capital was impending. When it occurred on October 25, the Provisional Government was overthrown as easily as the czarist government had been eight months before. But whereas the February rising had been entirely spontaneous and unorganized, in October the masses were led by the Bolshevik party with Lenin at its head. When the government headquarters in the Winter Palace were occupied by a detachment of Kronstadt sailors, the second All Russian Soviet Congress, which convened in Petrograd on the day of the insurrection, declared that all power was now transferred to the soviets of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies. Through their chosen representatives the Russian masses had assumed the government of the country. In the midst of complete chaos a group of men breaking entirely with the past and filled with a fanatical

faith in the future had taken upon itself the gigantic task of creating a new order.

While other parties allowed themselves to be dragged along in the wake of the revolutionary process, Lenin had the courage to accept the dynamics of the revolution and to put the Bolshevik party in the lead. His own views allowed him easily to adopt the demands of the masses and to become their mouth-piece. There were four major problems which determined the unfolding of the revolution: war, land, control of industry, and the status of the non-Russian nationalities. Lenin could sponsor wholeheartedly the demand for an immediate peace. Whereas old revolutionary leaders like Plekhanov and Kropotkin had become war patriots, Lenin had since the outbreak of the war maintained that it was a struggle between two imperialist blocs which the proletariat of each country should endeavor to transform into a civil war against its own *bourgeoisie*. On the issues of workers' control of industry and of the partition of landed estates Lenin had only to follow the trend which had manifested itself in direct action throughout the country. Likewise the problem of the non-Russian nationalities had found a *de facto* solution even before November, 1917; Finland, the Ukraine, the peoples of the Caucasus, the Mohammedans of the lower Volga, Crimea, and central Asia, and the peasant nationalities of the Baltic provinces had set up national governments which declared their autonomy or even complete independence of the Provisional Government. The

bourgeois parties fought against this spontaneous process of devolution; in fact it was the demands of the Ukrainian Rada which precipitated the final break of the Kadets with the Provisional Government. But Lenin, in accord with his internationalist viewpoint, proclaimed the right of all peoples to self-determination and applied this principle not only to the oppressed nationalities in the enemy camp, as the other governments did, but also to those in his own country.

In taking over the government of the former Russian Empire Lenin was supported by the good will of all numerically important elements of the population — the soldiers, the peasants, the workers, and the non-Russian nationalities. The new government set out immediately to fulfill the demands of these groups, invalidating thereby the contention of its opponents that it could not last longer than a few weeks. It proved stronger than the apparently powerful coalitions of czarist generals — who stood for the past — with the Entente or the Central Powers — which represented an element and aspirations incomprehensible to the Russian masses. During the period of civil war and foreign intervention, from 1918 to the close of 1920, the Communist party, as the Bolshevik party renamed itself, was able to consolidate its power in the face of seemingly insurmountable economic and strategic difficulties.

The second Soviet Congress, which established the new government, issued a call to all belligerent nations to open immediate negotiations for a just, democratic

peace. It also promulgated a decree confiscating landlords' estates as well as crown and church lands and placing them under the protection of district soviets and local land committees. This decree legalized the agrarian revolution, which had been in process since early summer. It was not a realization of the Bolshevik program of land nationalization but the fulfillment of the aspirations of the peasants, who had to be won over if the new government was to be established on a firm base. On November 2 a "declaration of the rights of peoples" conferred upon the different nationalities in Russia the right of self-determination and even of separation. Workers' control of industry was authorized on November 14, when it was provided that the shop committees should assume control over production, purchase, and sale of raw materials and products and the finances of all business units employing hired labor.

To secure "all power to the Soviets" it was necessary to prevent the reappearance of dual government through the Constituent Assembly. Although for several decades the intelligentsia had dreamed that a free and happy Russia would issue from the deliberations of a constituent assembly, the latter remained a formal ideal without any content; in typical Russian fashion it was expected to work miracles as a pure idea. When the turn of events in February made possible the convocation of the assembly, the intelligentsia suddenly awoke to the fact that the masses were not prepared for this enormous task of democratic reconstruction

114 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

and postponed elections from month to month. Certain groups moreover wished to delay the assembly until the army was demobilized, on the ground that the settlement of fundamental issues would interfere with the active prosecution of the war. In the first months of the revolution the Bolsheviks pressed for an early convocation of the assembly; even after the demand for Soviet rule had been voiced, they maintained that only a Soviet government could assure the speedy arrangement of free elections. These were provided, however, by the Provisional Government before its demise and were held a fortnight after Soviet accession to power. The Socialist Revolutionary party won a large majority of the seats.

The Constituent Assembly met on January 5, 1918, in an atmosphere of extreme tension. If it had been convened six months earlier it might radically have altered the development of the revolution. Now, however, it was too late. The Bolsheviks declared that the revolution had already recognized the Soviets as the sole government of Russia and that only a dictatorship of workers and peasants could lay the foundations of a socialist society. The popular mind was changing so rapidly in this dynamic revolutionary period that the representatives elected in November no longer reflected the true spirit of the masses. Once more the Socialist Revolutionaries showed that they lived in a world of fictions, for they actually believed that the Soviet government would not dare to attack an assembly which expressed the supreme will of the

people and that the people would rise spontaneously to its defense. They were sorely disappointed. In the early morning of January 6 the Constituent Assembly was dispersed by the military guard without any resistance by the members or by the public. Long a cherished ideal, it had come to an abrupt and undignified end. The prestige of the Bolsheviks was greatly strengthened by this easy victory.

Meanwhile peace negotiations with the Central Powers had been opened at Brest Litovsk on November 19, 1917. The Soviet Congress appealed for an armistice on all fronts and urged a general peace based on the principles of no annexations or indemnities and of national self-determination. The Entente ignored the request for a general armistice and the Central Powers defeated the demand for a democratic peace. When the Germans attempted to cloak annexationist proposals with the phraseology of national liberation, Trotsky, who directed the Russian delegation, forced the issue and broke up the negotiations. But Russia was entirely unprepared for the continuation of war, which daily stiffened Germany's position. As usual Lenin did not flinch; he derided the talk of a "holy war" of revolutionary Russia against imperialist Germany and forced the signing of the peace treaty on February 18, 1918. It involved the loss not only of Poland and the Baltic provinces but also of the Ukraine with its rich agricultural land, vast mineral resources, and important heavy industries. Acceptance of the humiliating treaty was necessary if the revolu-

tion was to be saved. Furthermore, the Bolsheviks were quite certain that the treaty would soon be scrapped, for they expected that the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia would be followed by an international proletarian revolution. Although this hope proved vain, the Germans were compelled a year later to submit at Versailles to a peace treaty which was not only similar to, although much less harsh than, that imposed by them at Brest Litovsk but which abrogated the latter.

In March, 1918, the revolution seemed secure in its achievements. The Soviet government was constituted as the sole government of Russia and its seat was transferred from imperial Petrograd to Moscow, which was more centrally located and always had been closer to the real life of the country. It had rid itself of a foreign menace and was rapidly overcoming such internal resistance as the sabotage of the administrative apparatus taken over from the old government. A period of internal reconstruction was pending. By the end of June, 1918, banks and insurance companies, large-scale industry, mines, water transport, and the few railways formerly operated by private companies had been nationalized; foreign debts incurred by the czarist and provisional governments were repudiated, foreign investments in private industry were confiscated, and foreign trade was declared a monopoly of the state. The cooperation of the professional and technical intelligentsia was sought when it became clear that their skill and experience

were indispensable. But the Soviet government was not allowed to proceed in peace. It was forced to defend a country shattered by war and revolution in a desperate struggle against both external and internal aggression.

Aggression from within was met by the erection of the dictatorship of the Communist party and by the Red terror. The Extraordinary Commission for the Repression of Counter-revolution, Sabotage, and Speculation (Cheka) created in December, 1917, was now given a free hand. The terror was carried out with the utmost ruthlessness, but it began only after the uprising of left Socialist Revolutionaries, the former allies of the Bolsheviks, in July, 1918, the assassination of the president of the Petrograd Cheka, and the attempt by the right-wing Socialist Revolutionary Dora Kaplan to assassinate Lenin at the end of August. In the merciless struggle which ensued the iron discipline of the Communist party proved superior to the terrorist idealism of its adversaries, who once more proved themselves out of touch with the real life of the masses. The Communist party, which suppressed the supreme representative assembly of the country and accepted a humiliating peace for Russia, was considered by the Socialist Revolutionaries as insidious an enemy of the people as the czarist autocracy had been. It was overlooked that whereas the autocracy had been estranged from the people, the Communist party had risen to power by accepting and following their aspirations.

Aggression from the outside, by the armies of White generals and foreign states, served only to strengthen the Soviet government. Russia was practically surrounded by armies of foreign invaders: German and Austrian troops occupied the Ukraine and assisted White armies in the northern Caucasus; a Czech corps of former Austrian war prisoners was operating in the Urals and in Siberia, which was invaded also by Japanese forces; English and French troops established a puppet government in northern Russia; and French warships entered the Black Sea ports of Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson. But the most dangerous enemies of the Soviets were the volunteer army in southern Russia under the command of generals Alekseyev and Kornilov (November, 1917–March, 1918), Denikin (April, 1918–March, 1920) and Wrangel (March–November, 1920), and the Siberian army under Admiral Kolchak (November, 1918–January, 1920), who was proclaimed by the Whites supreme ruler of Russia. For some time the situation of the Moscow government appeared desperate. It was cut off from the regions supplying wheat, meat, coal, and oil, and it had no army or ammunition for defense against foreign troops and the forces of former Russian officers and Cossacks, supplied as these were with technical advice, munitions, and money from abroad. Eventually the Soviets won, for the conflict was not primarily a trial of military strength. Although in several instances the commanders of the White armies arranged at the start for an agree-

ment with right-wing socialists and created a semblance of democratic government, this policy was quickly discarded in favor of military dictatorships which treated the regions under their control as conquered territory. The workers, peasants, and non-Russian nationalities soon realized that government by the Whites meant the return to power of their old masters and gave their sympathies to the Communists. The war was waged with ruthless cruelty on both sides, but on the side of the Whites the ruthlessness was sometimes coupled with a deliberate disregard for human values. Although some of the White volunteers were filled with a patriotic spirit of devotion, the corruption and incompetence of some of the White officers and their civilian underlings in southern Russia and Siberia were as disquieting as the witches' sabbath of the last months of the czarist regime. On the other side, the Red army of workers and peasants created by Trotsky bore witness, by its simplicity and idealistic devotion, to the inner strength of the Soviet cause. The Red army was moved by an overwhelming enthusiasm for the revolution in Russia and in the world. As in 1792, the badly equipped revolutionary amateurs fighting for the freedom of their own country and a new deal for humanity defeated the well-trained professionals of the old order. A new dynamic spirit was born in the formerly apathetic Russian masses.

By the end of 1920 the Soviet power was consolidated both internally and externally. The White

armies were dispersed. The war against Poland was lost after initial conspicuous successes, but on the other hand it had induced nationally-minded groups actively to support the Soviet government. Russia was reconstituted within its old borders, except for the western provinces now organized into independent states — Poland, the Baltic countries, and Finland — which, it may be noted, represented the most Europeanized sections of the old empire. The capitalist powers were forced to give up for the time being their designs upon Russia or the Soviet government. In a war-weary world it was difficult to marshal new troops for the fight against the “Bolshevik pest,” and the political and economic blockade by the border states under Entente guidance eventually collapsed.

The Soviet government on its side had to abandon hope of immediate world revolution. The Communist, or Third, International, founded by Lenin in 1919 as the legitimate successor of the First International, was intended to expedite and direct the world revolution; but it proved ineffective and in the course of the following decade lost much of its early vigor. It was transformed in fact into an instrumentality for the support of the only proletarian state in existence, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Outside Russia, nationalism was much stronger than socialism. The Soviet governments of Hungary and Bavaria were soon overthrown by reactionary dictatorships, Fascism was on its march to power in Italy, while the Social Democratic parties in central Europe col-

laborated with the *bourgeoisie* in strengthening the national states. In western Europe capitalism seemed to be entering upon a new period of post-war stabilization. From a revolutionary standpoint the objective conditions in the Orient seemed more promising. The colonial and semicolonial peoples of the East suffered from political oppression by foreign masters and economic exploitation by western capitalists; their national revolutions could therefore easily be turned into social revolutions. But after 1922 even Asia witnessed a period of comparative stabilization, due in part to the skillful policy of concessions adopted by Great Britain. The great Communist Congress of the eastern nations convoked at Baku in September, 1920, had no successor. Yet Soviet policy in the Orient was of far-reaching importance. The Asiatic peoples, having entered the stage of conscious nationalism after the World War, were no longer confronted by a relentless aggressor against their nationhood and progress; the new Soviet state was a friendly neighbor, encouraging in every conceivable fashion their national and economic independence. The Soviet policy based on the principle of complete equality of all nationalities and races effected a revolution in the relations between the Orient and the Occident. This was not, however, the hoped-for prelude to a Communist world revolution; the "emancipation of the East" benefited the Soviet Union only to the extent that it resulted in weakening western imperialism and capitalism.

External consolidation of the Soviet government was accompanied by a major change in its internal policy. Although it conformed in a general way to Communist doctrine, the system of war communism which obtained in Russia after the middle of 1918 was inaugurated hastily under the pressure of civil war, internal sabotage by capitalists and technicians, and the rapid taking over of industrial plants by the workers. The state or cooperative organizations closely integrated with the state operated under this system virtually all enterprises in industry and trade. Agriculture remained in the hands of the peasants, but cultivation of the soil was compulsory and grain surpluses were requisitioned by the Soviet. While war was raging this system was needed to assure the equipment and provisioning of the army and to prevent starvation in the cities, but it could not be maintained when the danger of external and internal counter-revolution had waned. It was, moreover, a heavy drain upon the capital resources of the nation, already seriously depleted after more than three years of war and revolution. At the end of the civil war the transportation system was in a state of disrepair, the shortage of materials and fuel brought the productivity of industry to a very low ebb, inefficient husbandry reduced crops and livestock and resulted in widespread food shortage which a drought in 1921 transformed into a devastating famine, particularly in the Volga region. Peasant revolts against grain requisitions in 1920 and the mutiny of Kronstadt sailors in March,

1921, revealed the necessity of prompt measures to relieve the desperate economic situation. Once more Lenin's realism came to the rescue; he declared that communism could be built in Russia only after a short breathing spell, which would restore some measure of economic productivity and rehabilitate the political strength of the government. The tenth congress of the Communist party in March, 1921, adopted Lenin's program of a New Economic Policy, the NEP.

Lenin realized that large-scale social and economic transformation in Russia must encounter tremendous obstacles. He saw that the revolution would have to overcome not merely the deliberate opposition of vested interests, which was weaker here than in richer western countries, but also the stronger and more insidious psychological resistance to radical change. Unlike the peoples of the West, the Russians were still bound by tradition and lacking in initiative and efficiency. To build socialism in Russia, to assure a decent standard of living for the masses, it was not sufficient to redistribute wealth or to socialize the means of production. It was essential to raise all branches of production to a higher technical level, to introduce into Russia the modern technology of progressive industrialism. But before the Russian could appreciate the need for an advanced technical civilization and adapt himself to its requirements, a process of drastic reëducation and indoctrination was required. The Communist party could not attempt to impose industrialization from above, as is done in backward coun-

tries by alien interests; if it was to reshape the Russian economy into a foundation suited to a socialist society it had to enlist the cooperation of the masses, to arouse in them a sense of self-respect, to dignify labor for them and through them. The period of the NEP served as a respite also in this respect; it provided an opportunity for the training of the party membership to the new tasks of economic administration and for the preparation of a comprehensive reëducation of the masses.

Perhaps the most important single feature of the NEP was the replacement of the system of requisitions by a fixed grain tax, which in 1924, with the stabilization of the ruble on a gold basis, was commuted into a money tax on agriculture. The peasant was thus set free to dispose of his products in the open market. Small business reverted to private traders, but large-scale industry and the important monopoly of foreign trade remained in the hands of the government. There quickly developed a new class of prosperous peasants (kulaks) and urban middlemen (Nepmen), whose wealth, however, gave them neither political rights nor social standing; moreover they were heavily taxed and closely supervised. In general the danger of a new capitalism was slight. Bourgeois experts were utilized, in so far as they were available, to assist in the economic reëquipment of the country, but they were kept under strict control. Reliance upon the profit motive and the market mechanism was reintroduced even in the nationalized sector of the economy, but

it was kept within narrowly defined bounds. Special emphasis was put upon the *smichka*, the economic link between the industrial proletariat and the peasantry. State factories were charged with the task of supplying at a reasonable cost the industrial products needed by the peasants, and the danger inherent in the excessive disparity between industrial and agricultural prices was combatted.

During the period of the NEP, which lasted from 1921 to 1928, the position of the bureaucracy in the governmental and economic spheres was strengthened and the importance of the party apparatus increased *pari passu*. In these years the Communist party passed through a phase of factional dissension and inner conflict which brought a new emphasis on party discipline and teamwork. The latter was essential in preparation for the rapid reconstruction of a vast and backward country, which would inevitably strain the forces of the party to the utmost. The heroic period of the revolution, the epoch of brilliant improvisation and genial guessing, was over; the industrial period of systematic, carefully planned, construction was pending. As an organization of picked men under iron discipline the Communist party was well equipped to overcome the danger inherent in all parties of revolution and especially in Russian parties — the fatal predilection for interminable abstract discussion and the consequent incapacity for leadership.

Lenin's unique position in the party and in the revolution may be attributed to the fact that he combined

the traits of an organizer and educator with those of a penetrating thinker. Upon his retirement from active participation, and especially after his death in 1924, Trotsky, the brilliant intellectual, the hero of the October insurrection and the civil war, fell heir to Lenin's position as the party's foremost theorist. But during the period of consolidation the party machine had come into its own. At its head stood Stalin, a man devoid of theoretical profundity, incapable of stirring the masses by his eloquence, but energetic and persevering in the practical work of building the party organization. Totally unlike the older type of the Russian revolutionary intellectual, Stalin is not a dreamer with broad cultural interests but a practical man who has his ear close to the ground; he is representative not of the party as it was before 1917 or during the heroic period of the revolution but of the party as it developed after 1924, of the new Soviet intelligentsia. In the struggle for power between Stalin and Trotsky, which marked the second half of the NEP period, the latter was almost always theoretically correct and accurate in interpreting Lenin; but Stalin preserved an equally important aspect of Lenin's heritage in being more skillful in fixing upon the practical needs of the hour. It was a conflict between two generations and two temperaments. Stalin won; his opponents had to submit or suffer expulsion from the party. Under the regime of the "general line" the party had developed into an apparatus governed by the most rigid discipline, an instru-

mentality of action directed by a few men at the top. This characteristic of the party served to give it a commanding position in 1917; it was reënforced and indeed overemphasized as the revolution resumed its stormy march upon the termination of the NEP in 1928.

One of the points at issue in the Trotsky-Stalin controversy was the agricultural policy. As early as 1925 Trotsky had led the left wing in opposition to the party line, insisting on a vigorous policy against the kulaks. He asserted that the kulaks, who rented land and hired outside labor, were becoming the chief source of supply of food for the cities and of grain for export; their economic influence was growing, and the situation was rapidly approaching a point where the fate of the country might have to depend largely upon their willingness to cooperate. The "right deviation," which crystallized somewhat later, feared on the other hand that an attack upon the kulaks and abandonment of the NEP would result in a complete economic breakdown. Stalin maintained a position midway between the two, but in 1929 he adopted Trotsky's agrarian program. Stalin's shift did not, however, effect a reconciliation with Trotsky, for the fundamental ideological difference between the two was much broader than this issue; it had been at the basis of their disagreements on every concrete question of domestic and foreign policy, and there is every likelihood that the divergence will continue. Stated in most general terms it concerns the problem

as to whether socialism can be built in a single country. Trotsky maintains, in accordance with Lenin's position both before and during the revolution, that the establishment of Communist rule in Russia must lead to a world proletarian revolution and that socialism can not be achieved in Russia alone; policies which go contrary to this assumption and count on the persistence of capitalism in the West are bound to lead to a degeneration of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia and to the loss of its effectiveness as the leader of world communism. Stalin, on the other hand, proceeds from the apparently more realistic assumption that there is no hope for a world revolution for the time being, that socialism must therefore first be developed in the Soviet Union, and that the necessary conditions for such development must be created through the industrialization of the country and the collectivization of its agriculture. This policy, it is asserted, accords with the internal economic and educational needs of the Soviet Union; it has an indirect bearing also on the international situation, for the achievement of socialism in Russia would be an effective form of propaganda for Communism.

Stalin's policy was adopted when the NEP was abandoned in 1928. Since that time a direct and relentless drive toward the goal of socialism has been pursued, although compromises, concessions, and temporary retreats are still employed to rectify maladjustments arising from excessive speed. The current aim is the rapid transformation of a backward agrarian

community into a progressive industrial nation. Internally it involves the mobilization of the entire nation under the centralized command of the Communist party operating as the general staff of an army through its own apparatus and the more ramified structure of the totalitarian state. The pace which has been set, conditioned in part by military considerations, leads despite centralized organization to much waste and, in a country poor in accumulated capital, to terrible suffering, which can be borne only by those peoples who are ready to sacrifice the present to the future. In its international aspects the policy of industrialization leads to the emancipation of Russia from economic dependence on the West, upon which it had to rely even after the revolution for the importation of machinery and technical experts available only in exchange against agricultural exports. The aspiration toward economic self-sufficiency has also a political angle; the revolution is to be protected from a possible attack by imperialist powers which would seek to destroy the beginnings of socialism.

The drive toward socialism calls for advance planning in all branches of the economic and cultural life of the country; indeed the post-NEP era has been characterized as the period of planned economy, more accurately, of planned society. Broadly speaking, the advance proceeds along three roads: industry, agriculture, and culture or education. Work on the industrial front will provide the plant necessary for the introduction of a universally high standard of living.

In the first stages it is proposed to establish the conditions essential for the efficient exploitation of the natural resources and to build up the heavy industries supplying the equipment needed in the manufacture of consumers' goods and in agriculture. This campaign is closely bound up with the awakening of the spirit of initiative and self-reliance in the working masses and with their training in technical and managerial skills. On the agrarian front the program involves the introduction of machinery and modern methods of cultivation as well as the substitution of technically efficient collective farming for the primitive and deficient individual farming of the Russian peasant; it is expected to assure not only an increase in the supply of foodstuffs for domestic consumption and of raw materials for industrial expansion but also the establishment of a real community of interest between the workers in city and country, the *smichka* which Lenin insisted upon. Advance on the cultural front is a necessary supplement to the work in the economic sphere, for it is designed to combat illiteracy and traditionalism, to change the habits and ways of life of the masses. Cultural activity is dominated by as strict a discipline as that which controls economic processes. Adult and child are indoctrinated with the new spirit, a boundless enthusiasm for the task of building a classless society and a high efficiency in the performance of concrete tasks. The arts and sciences are mobilized to this end; and cultural treasures, formerly inaccessible to the masses of Russia, are spread before the

new citizens to awaken in them a sense of independence and dignity as active participants in the new society. Religion is fought as an element of reaction, which tends to make men look back to the past rather than forward to the future. But the propaganda of the godless is effective only because the youth in the Soviet Union has a new faith in the possibility of human happiness.

Since the inauguration of comprehensive planning, Soviet development has been controlled by two five-year plans. The first, dating from October 1, 1928, was declared successfully terminated at the end of 1932. In accordance with it much progress was made in the development of heavy industries: the coal industry was modernized, oil output was expanded, the production of electric energy was almost tripled, new blast furnaces, automobile and tractor plants, and machine factories were erected. But the transportation system remained weak, the development of the light industries manufacturing consumers' goods lagged behind, and the population, still suffering from the shortage of many essential articles of consumption, was put under a terrific nervous strain. The excessive speed of industrialization interfered with the proper coordination of the various branches of production, while the lack of technical experience and the ineptness of the bureaucracy resulted in considerable waste. In keeping with Lenin's policy of elastic readjustment, Stalin in 1931 abandoned exclusive reliance "socialist competition" and introduced

bonuses, piecework, and graduated wages to stimulate efficiency and workmanship, stressing also the necessity of greater confidence in experts and more whole-hearted cooperation with them.

During the period of the first Five-Year Plan the changes in agriculture were more drastic than in any other branch of the Soviet economy. These were necessary in view of the inability of agriculture, as carried on under the archaic Russian system, to meet the growing needs of an expanding industrial society, and the development of a class of capitalistically-minded peasants, which represented a potential danger to the state. The World War interrupted the work of consolidating the scattered holdings of peasant families, which was an important feature of Stolipin's reforms. During 1917 the system of communal land tenure with periodic repartitions, which retarded the adoption of more intensive methods of cultivation, was restored throughout Russia. The period of civil war and the early years of the NEP involved considerable retrogression even from the low standards of pre-war agriculture. Since the population increased at a high rate and industry expanded rapidly, it was possible that in the not too distant future there would be a shortage of foodstuffs and organic raw materials. In 1925 the government resumed the work of rearranging intermixed strips of land into solid plots, put credits and machines at the disposal of peasant co-operatives, and sent agricultural experts into the villages. By 1927 agriculture reached the pre-war norm

and the livestock losses incurred in 1921-22, the years of famine, were recouped. But industry could not as yet meet the demand of the peasants for finished goods, and the disparity between industrial and agricultural prices increased to the detriment of the latter. Agricultural output was therefore reduced, and the government, unable to purchase a sufficient quantity of grain, especially for export, resorted once more to requisition at fixed prices. The year 1928-29 was marked by widespread peasant unrest.

In the fall of 1929 the government began a campaign of rapid collectivization of farms. Because of the ruthlessness and inexperience with which it was carried out, the reform provoked considerable resentment. In the spring of 1930 Stalin was compelled to remind overzealous Communists that collective farms could be formed only after due preparation and with the voluntary consent of the prospective members. It was agreed, moreover, that a modified form of collective organization, in which only land, implements, and draft animals were pooled, was preferable to the commune which would socialize all property and provide for common living quarters. The ruthless war against kulaks was continued, but the middle and poor peasants were subjected only to the indirect pressure of tax and credit discrimination in favor of the collectives and of a vast educational campaign. The number of machine-tractor stations, which lease machines in exchange for a share of the crop, was greatly increased, and sections were attached to them

charged with the task of organizing new collectives and reorganizing those which had received a bad start. Poor harvests in 1931 and 1932, sabotage by kulaks who slaughtered their animals, and the preparations for a war which threatened in the Far East brought on a grave crisis in 1932. The prolonged unrest in the Ukraine and in the northern Caucasus was appeased only after large peasant groups were banished to the north and to Siberia; the cities experienced a hard winter. But in 1933 an excellent harvest eased the situation. In the spring of that year the government introduced a fixed grain tax sufficient to provide for its needs; the surplus grain was left to the collectives for distribution to the individual members in proportion to the number of days worked. Such grain might be sold or exchanged against manufactured goods on the free market; the same rule was applied to the products of poultry yards and vegetable gardens held as individual property by the members of collectives. A working compromise was thus reached in 1933-34, assuring the socialization of the countryside — the education of the peasantry in collective and efficient work and its cultural indoctrination — and allowing at the same time a measure of individual profit-making as an incentive.

A similar evolution of the original policy is to be observed in the field of industry. The speed of industrialization which proved so onerous in 1928-32 was moderated under the second Five-Year Plan launched in 1933. The latter laid more stress upon

light industries manufacturing goods for popular consumption in the city and especially in the country. It envisaged a more intensive development of the Asiatic parts of the Soviet Union, less exposed to the attack of the western powers. The sparse and primitive population of these regions is to be raised to the higher levels attained in European Russia, while new railways will tap the potential riches of the soil and the vast forests of northern Siberia and of the steppes of Kazakstan.

Soviet concentration upon the building of socialism in one country affects also the foreign policy of the government. After the defeat suffered by Communism in China at the hands of the nationalist upper class, the attitude of the Soviet Union to Oriental nations, always one of friendship and equality, is no longer colored by expectation of their conversion to Communism. In recent years the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey, which like Russia is passing through a process of Europeanization, have been particularly close. The desire to prevent aggression against Russia, which was early crystallized as an important factor in the western policy of the Soviet, has virtually excluded almost every other aim since the inauguration of planned economy in Russia and particularly since the economic crisis of 1929 with its aggravation of the international situation in Europe. The Soviet government has pursued a very active policy of non-aggression treaties, has advocated total disarmament, and has proposed pacts looking toward

136 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

the complete cessation of all forms of economic aggression. In 1934 the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, and her Foreign Minister Litvinov stressed the willingness of the Soviet Union to cooperate with all peace-loving nations in a system of collective security.²

With the growth of Fascism in Japan and Germany and its avowed design to conquer and destroy the Soviet Union, which found its expression in the conclusion of the Anti-Communist Pact by Germany, Italy, and Japan, the reorientation of the Soviet foreign policy became more accentuated. This reorientation expressed itself also in the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union. Communism, apparently firmly entrenched as the dominating political philosophy in the Soviet Union, was unable to take hold of any other country. To the western nations, which have benefited directly from the French Revolution and its forerunners in the Anglo-Saxon countries, whose economies are industrialized, and whose standards of living and culture are very high, the example of the Russian Revolution had little to offer. Communist parties organized after the pattern and under the guidance of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have been unable to attain a strong foothold in the western world, even in times of great economic stress or of military defeat. This failure can not be explained

² See the excellent discussion of "The Peace Policy of the Soviet Union" by Malbone W. Graham in *The Soviet Union and World Problems*, ed. by S. N. Harper (University of Chicago Press, 1935), pp. 125-215.

on grounds of incompetent leadership. The Communist parties have not awakened to the fact that liberal nationalism and rationalistic individualism are a deep-seated heritage of Western Europe. They have remained a sect essentially foreign to the environment in which they propose to function, and their doctrinaire terminology has carried no conviction. In capitalizing upon their ideological affiliation with the Soviet Union they have overstressed those aspects of the Russian Revolution which are the peculiar product of Russian social and economic history, such as the rapid advance of industrialization in agrarian Russia as compared with the economic crisis in over-industrialized countries, the abolishment of unemployment, the fight against illiteracy, the rapid spread of education. They used their energies in fighting the moderate socialist and liberal bourgeois parties, in "unmasking" and thereby weakening democracy, and in many ways preparing the disillusionment which helped to put Fascism into power.

In the face of Fascist victories after 1933 these Communist parties completely changed their tactics. They cooperated with the moderate socialists and liberal bourgeois parties in creating a "popular front" against the danger of Fascism. The idea of a world revolution receded entirely into the background, the whole terminology changed, the Communist International became inactive. Stalin's emphasis on the need to realize socialism within the Soviet Union, to turn away from attention to other countries, and to

138 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

concentrate upon the internal effort, was necessarily reflected in the policy of Communism outside the Soviet Union. Its influence, never of any considerable weight, waned. Its main importance was negative, that of a "specter haunting Europe," which frightened the ruling classes in the democratic countries and drove many of them to a closer cooperation with the Fascist countries in an effort to isolate the Soviet Union. Under the stress of these maneuvers the system of collective security and the League of Nations broke down, which facilitated the preparations of the Fascist powers for a concerted attack upon the Russian Revolution.

Meanwhile the Russian Revolution in the years 1937 and 1938 passed through a difficult crisis which expressed itself in a "purge" of the Party, of the high army command, and of the economic administration. The feud between Stalin and Trotsky reappeared again, this time on a world-wide basis, splitting everywhere the Communist parties into hostile camps, which concentrated their energies upon a bitter fight against each other. The followers of Trotsky, although in most cases an insignificant minority, retained the original faith in a world revolution, opposed the cooperation with the moderate socialists and liberal bourgeois parties, and founded for their purposes the Fourth International, the activities of which, however, were far from fulfilling even the most modest expectations of its leaders. In the Soviet Union Stalin used alleged Trotskyist plots or leanings as an instrument

for the ruthless extermination of the old leadership of the Communist Party. Public monster trials and a number of less publicized executions removed from the stage all the leading theoreticians and writers of Communism, all the well-known names associated with the first period of the Russian Revolution under Lenin. This complete overhauling of the doctrine and personnel of the Russian Revolution undoubtedly strengthened the position of Stalin and of his policy of concentration upon the Soviet Union alone. At the same time the regime in the Soviet Union took on more and more the character of a personal dictatorship of Stalin. In contradiction to the original communist theory he became something akin to a leader, the embodiment of the Russian Revolution. In the light of this new development the history of the Russian Revolution and all doctrinal manuals were rewritten.

For the execution of this policy Stalin appealed to the young generation which had grown up in the Soviet Union. By many this was regarded as a recrudescence of Russian nationalism. This contention disregards the important fact that the Soviet government is not a Russian government in the former sense of the word; it is a government representing all the various nationalities and ethnic groups within the Union on a footing of equality. It seeks not to promote a particular national or racial culture at the expense of others but to impregnate the masses with a common supra-national culture freely expressed and

developed by each nationality in its own language. In avoiding any discrimination against or any favoring of a particular racial element, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics set an important example in the organization of vast territories inhabited by many nationalities at different stages of social and cultural development. The new patriotism, divested of the earlier world-revolutionary aspirations, is thus fundamentally different from the nationalism of the Fascist countries and from the position which they have mapped out for weaker and more backward nationalities. But this new Soviet patriotism not only brought a new stress upon the recognition of the heroes and cultural achievements of the past, but also certain definite "conservative" tendencies as regards the attitude towards marriage and divorce, abortion and high natality, education and family. During 1938, the one hundred and twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of Field Marshal Kutusov, who had defended Russia in 1812 against the invasion by Napoleon, and the seven hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the famous heroic epic of Russia's feudal past, the story of the expedition of Prince Igor against the Polovtzes, were publicly celebrated as examples of an heroic defense of the fatherland against barbarian invaders. The introduction of a new democratic constitution, on November 25, 1936, pointed in the same direction of a stabilization of the Russian Revolution. "Democratic" elections, held throughout the Soviet Union, were to increase the feeling of active cohesion among the

masses inhabiting the common Fatherland of the workers and peasants.

The Revolution in Russia has not ended, but certain of its results seem to be enduring. In a vast Eurasian country it is accomplishing a change comparable to that which the French Revolution effected in France and initiated for the other nations of continental Europe. It is secularizing a civilization formerly bound by religious traditionalism, and raising the bulk of the population to new levels of cultural and material life. Politically it is building in Russia a state deeply rooted in the consciousness of the masses. Russian autocracy perished because it was neither integrated with the people nor linked to the economic organization of the country; the government of the Soviet Union tries to develop a cohesive society. The Russian Revolution began as a process of Europeanization. The fourth stage of the process designated above as the Russian Revolution was initiated by a generation of émigrés who brought to the easy-going and loosely organized old Russia the discipline of Western intellectualism and the vigor of European activism. At present the process of Europeanization is being pushed forward by a generation which has its roots deep in the Russian soil and which embraces the various nationalities of the Soviet Union. To the third generation of leaders, which will take the helm in the future, life in old Russia will be as little known as that in foreign countries. Thus the Russian Revolution, the Europeanization of Russia, will be continued

as an autonomous process directed entirely by indigenous forces.

The transformation of Russia from a backward country with an illiterate population and a primitive agrarian economy into a progressive state with a cultured population and a modern industrial economy is in keeping with the general trend of the twentieth century. The weakness of old Russia, idealized by the Slavophiles as its peculiar virtue, lay in the fact that from about 1800 it was out of harmony with the rest of Europe. With an increase in international interdependence characteristic of the period of imperialism this comparative isolation could no longer be maintained; the pressure for the effective utilization of natural resources throughout the world was too strong to be resisted. Russia was drawn into the orbit of world economy before 1917, but in a wholly inadequate fashion; its resources were often exploited by and for foreign capital. The revolution of 1917 impelled the Russian people to assume control of this process and to guide it in their own interest. This interpretation of the 1917 revolution, advanced by Hans von Eckardt, makes it appear a Russian variant of a post-war phenomenon characteristic of many countries which like Russia had been virtually semi-colonial dependencies of European powers. Europeanization, which before the World War had been passive, has now become active. Oriental and Latin-American nationalities are taking over European civilization in order to raise the economic and cultural

levels of their own populations and to achieve independence of European masters. At present the Soviet Union, with its emphasis upon industrialization and mass education, is leading in this process.

The Russian Revolution has in many ways influenced the development of the post-war world. Fascism is indebted to Bolshevism for the technique of the totalitarian state, of the one-party government, of the total mobilization of all resources, but Fascism used these new means for an opposite aim. The Russian Revolution stimulated the development of other attitudes: the creation of a new scale of social values under which man's worth is no longer measured by the size of his income; the new dignity of labor; the tendency toward the equalization of the standards of life for various population groups, including the leaders, who remain on a footing of comradeship with the masses; the free access of all to the cultural treasures of the nation. But the main importance of the Russian Revolution is not in its influence and implications abroad, it is in the transformation which it works at home. It would be vain at present to attempt an appraisal of the Russian Revolution. Its ultimate evaluation may depend upon whether or not the present deadening dictatorship is to continue, isolating Russia from the rest of mankind and inhibiting the free intellectual development of the masses, or whether a new generation will lead the new Russia back into the common effort of a progressive and free social democracy. The effects of the French Revolution could

144 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

not clearly be appreciated until long after its apparent end. The effects of the Russian Revolution are operating upon a wider area and upon larger and more diversified masses than those of the French Revolution, and the Russian Revolution is still in progress. It is the particular national expression of a universal process.

The Nationality Problem and the Soviets

WORLD history since the French Revolution has been largely dominated by the principle of nationality and by the nationality policy of the great powers and empires. Nationalism has steadily grown in importance and in intensity in the public life of all peoples during the last one hundred and fifty years. The World War seemed to mark the zenith of this astonishing development, but it appears today to have been not more than a first culmination, and we have witnessed in these last years all over the earth the rise of nationalism in impressiveness and force toward a new climax. But the domination of nationalism has not gone unchallenged. Against the idealization of the nation and the nation-state as the life-giving force and as the determinant of the course of history, Marxian socialism has set the ideal of the international proletariat as the formative force that makes history. Against the national solidarity of the different nations socialism has set the international solidarity of the working class. But whereas the balance between those two forces might have been more or less even at the beginning of our century, with the advance of nationalism during recent years socialism

seems everywhere waning. The only exception is offered by the former Russian Empire, which has become the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There Marxian socialism is in power. How did the Soviet government try to solve the complex nationality problem of the former Russian Empire, and at what settlement have the two great forces of modern political life, nationalism and socialism, arrived?

The founder of Marxian socialism himself was of no immediate help in the solution of this problem. In his genial but one-sided philosophy of history nationalism found no conspicuous place. The nineteenth century, the age of the expanding industrial revolution and of the beginning of mass movements, had in Karl Marx a very perspicacious opponent and an enthusiastic critic. In the midst of an unprecedented economic progress and of quickly improving standards of life, in Victorian England with its complacent and optimistic civilization, Marx directed attention to the elements of dissolution and crisis inherent in triumphant capitalism. At the same time he recognized more clearly than any of his contemporaries the unique significance of the new civilization and its lasting contribution to the progress of mankind. He foresaw what in 1848 had been merely a tendency and what is only now becoming a reality, that the industrial revolution was leading toward an economic and cultural interdependence of all nations and parts of the earth unknown in all previous history. In his *Communist Manifesto* Marx wrote: "The *bourgeoisie* has

through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. . . . In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures there arises a world-literature. The *bourgeoisie*, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations, into civilization. . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois [he should have said "the industrial"] method of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst. . . . In a word, it creates a world after its own image."

This was written many years before industrial civilization entered the confines of the Russian Empire, opened up the secluded Far East, or started the scramble for the exploitation of Africa. It is curious to see how far Marx, whose attention was entirely turned toward economics, underestimated the importance of nationalism and its growth, which is simultaneous and logically connected with the spread of the industrial civilization of the nineteenth century over the earth. The same *Communist Manifesto*

148 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

which predicts the growing uniformity of the conditions in which mankind will live continues: "The national divisions and oppositions between the peoples are disappearing more and more with the development of the *bourgeoisie*, with freedom of trade, the world-market, and the uniformity of industrial production and of the conditions of living which it involves." Subsequent history has proved the fallacy of this prophecy. When Marx goes on to say of the national divisions: "The rule of the proletariat will make them disappear yet more. With the falling away of the opposition between classes in the nation there falls away the hostile attitude between nations," only the future will show how far he is justified. But there can be no doubt that for his own time and for the half-century immediately following Marx underestimated the historical role of nationalism. This incomprehension of its connection with the spread of the industrial revolution and of democracy accounts for the well-known judgments of Marx on the efforts of the Slavs in the Habsburg Empire to achieve national emancipation in 1848, and for his uncritical attitude toward his own emotional German nationalism — a fact which was partly responsible for his estrangement from Bakunin and the latter's instinctive Slav nationalism.

The experience of more than half a century of the progress of the industrial revolution and of the spread of nationalism into Central and Eastern Europe resulted in a reinterpretation of the Marxian attitude

toward nationalism by leading Marxian socialists. In Austria, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer realized that the progress of industrial civilization promoted nationalism by integrating the great masses into the cultural community (*Kulturgemeinschaft*) of the nation. For the primitive ethnic groups of Central and Eastern Europe, and later of the Orient, which had never, or which had not for centuries, participated in making history, the national awakening — or, as Bauer called it, *das Erwachen der geschichtslosen Völker* — under the impact of modern civilization meant at the same time a social awakening. They were aroused out of medieval lethargy into a desire for active participation in government, for education, and for economic progress. This new socialist acknowledgment of the role of nationalism in an industrial society did not remain unchallenged. Karl Kautsky opposed it and maintained against Renner and Bauer the orthodox Marxian viewpoint. ^

Marx had lived to witness the beginning of the struggle of the nationalities of the Austrian monarchy for national and social emancipation. The masses of the nationalities of the Russian Empire, however, began their fight for emancipation only long after his death. Lenin, born fifty-two years later than his master, lived his young years in Simbirsk, Kazan, and Samara on the Volga, in the midst of territories settled by primitive peoples, the Chuvash, the Mordvin, the Mari, the Votyak, the Tatar, most of them unknown even by name in Western Europe, where Marx spent

his whole life. Thus Lenin, living at a later stage of industrial civilization and in an entirely different milieu, could mark in his analysis of the historical reality in two points a very distinct advance compared with the original teaching of Marx. Marx had written in his *Communist Manifesto* that the united action of the proletariat, at least of all civilized countries, is one of the first conditions of its liberation. His attention was focused, naturally enough at that time, entirely upon Western Europe and the so-called civilized nations. The range of vision of the socialists of Western and Central Europe remained as limited as his own, even in the twentieth century.

But meanwhile capitalism, as Marx had foreseen, had entered the age of imperialism. European civilization had begun to spread all over the earth, to affect profoundly the life of the backward nations, and to draw them into its orbit. The victory of Japan over Russia in 1905 and the Russian Revolution of the same year were the first alarms which reached the masses of Asia and the many nationalities living within the Russian Empire, and summoned them to break the sleep of the centuries. The peoples of the East, up to that time an easy prey to the imperialistic penetration by European powers, were stirred by the example of Japan to realize the possibilities of active resistance. The Russian Revolution of 1905 found its echo in the awakening and in the nationalistic unrest all over the East, from the Sahara to the Pacific Ocean, in Egypt, Turkey, Persia, India, and China, in much

the same way as a century earlier the French Revolution had found its echo from the Mediterranean to the Baltic Sea, in Spain, Italy, and Germany.

It is noteworthy that whereas the Russian Revolution of 1905 failed in its main purpose to destroy Russian autocracy and theocracy, autocracy and theocracy were destroyed a short time later by revolutions in Turkey and in China. But the Russian Revolution of 1905 found its echo not only outside the Russian Empire. The far-flung excitement and agitation of the fateful year had also aroused the primitive nationalities in Russia from their lethargy. The revolutionary potentiality of the revolt of the subject nationalities against oppression by the Russian state was added to the revolutionary energy of the land-hunger of the peasant masses. The events of 1905 and the lessons of the succeeding years made Lenin, himself a Eurasian, realize keenly the implications of the new situation created in the twentieth century as the result of imperialism. It had been the great mission of industrial imperialism to bring together civilized and backward peoples in close economic and cultural contact. At the same time Lenin became aware of the importance of nationalism for the awakening of primitive races, and of the obstacles which national and racial oppression puts in the way of the cooperation and advance of the working class.

The theory and practice of Lenin broke down, in the interests of the unity of the working class, the barriers between progressive and backward peoples,

between the exploiting, powerful nations and the colonial races. Russia was in a unique position for this experience. By her geographic situation she was a bridge between Europe and Asia. But she represented a connecting link between the two worlds and the two civilizations even more by her social structure. Compared with Western Europe, Russia was a backward country and in a quasi-colonial dependence upon European capitalism. On the other hand, the Russian state was itself in a position of imperialist exploitation and aggression against the non-Russian nationalities within its borders and against the Turks, Persians, Afghans, Mongols, and Chinese who bordered on Russia to the east and the south. In their racial composition, in their culture, and in their mental attitude the peoples of Russia represented a fusion of European and Asiatic influences. In their present efforts at modernization and industrialization the peoples of Asia and of Russia find themselves in a similar stage of social and economic transition. These circumstances enabled Lenin to understand the historical situation of the backward peoples, to develop a socialist nationality policy which had been missing in Marxism, and to harmonize by dialectic logic the internationalism of the working class with the realities of national differences and of the historical development.

This task was by no means easy. The socialism of the leaders and parties in Western and Central Europe and of the non-Leninist parties in Russia had broken

down when confronted by the difficulty of this task. In any serious conflict between internationalism and nationalism the latter had proved by far the stronger for these socialists. If they belonged to a more progressive or oppressive nation, they always found some justification for the disregard of the claims of more backward or oppressed nationalities. If they belonged to the latter, they concentrated their interest upon the struggle for national liberation in cooperation with the non-proletarian classes of their nationality. No greater hindrance existed for the realization of the social and humanitarian aims of socialism than the practical denial of racial equality and international cooperation, although both were acknowledged in theory. With the growing cultural and economic interdependence of the nations, with the closer and more extended contact between progressive and backward races, with the intensified exploitation of the weaker nationalities, the divergence between the international and humanitarian professions of faith and the actual nationalistic policies of the different socialist parties became more accentuated. Lenin was the first socialist leader to proclaim and to carry through, in a country inhabited by different national and racial groups of different cultural and social levels, and in the relations of that country to weaker or more backward races, the socialist principle of the complete equality of all racial and ethnic groups. He could do it because, although a member of the ruling Russian nationality, he was personally free, or had freed himself, from any emotional

Russian nationalism and from any even unconscious clinging to its vested interests. Therefore, he was prepared to invalidate, not only in theory, but in actual life, all privileges of the Russian nationality, and to abolish all limitations of rights for the non-Russian nationalities within Russia.

Lenin understood to a remarkable degree the feelings engendered in subject or backward nationalities by decades or centuries of oppression. He was well aware of the tenacity of national emotions and prejudices in members of the privileged nations and races. In his simple and direct style he declared in his speech at the eighth congress of the Russian Communist Party in March, 1919: "The Bashkirs distrust the Russians, because the Russians are at a higher level of civilization and have used their civilization to rob the Bashkirs. Consequently in these remote districts the name Russian means 'oppressor' to the Bashkirs. . . . We must take that into account, we must combat it. But that takes a long time. It is not to be got rid of by a decree. We must go to work on this very cautiously. Above all, such a nation as the Russians, who have excited a wild hatred in all other nationalities, must be particularly cautious. We have only just learned to manage better, and so far only a few of us have learned that much."

In conformity with these principles the program of the Russian Communist Party in regard to nationality policy laid down the following rule: "In any case, there is needed on the part of the proletariat of the

former ruling nations a special consideration and sensitiveness for the national feeling of the working masses of the oppressed nationalities, or nations without full rights. Only a policy of this sort can create the conditions for a really sincere and voluntary union of the various national elements of the international proletariat." Immediately after the seizure of power in the autumn of 1917, Lenin announced the nationality policy of the Soviet state in the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia on November 15, 1917. The principles of the Declaration were embodied in Article XIII of the constitution of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, which reads: "All citizens shall be equal before the law, irrespective of race or nationality. In conformity with this principle the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic declares all oppression of national minorities of whatever description and all disabilities whatsoever imposed on them, as well as the establishment or toleration of any direct or indirect special privileges for individual nationalities, to be absolutely incompatible with the fundamental laws of the Republic. The Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic recognizes the right of all its citizens freely to use their native language at congresses, in courts of law, in the schools, in the administrative offices and in public life, and secures them in the full enjoyment of this right." In his nationality policy Lenin found from the start his most important lieutenant in Stalin, who became the head of the People's Commissariat for Nationality Questions.

Stalin as a Georgian belonged to the oppressed nationalities of the Russian Empire, and as a Transcaucasian, from the typical country of embittered national struggles, he was fully conscious of the dangers involved in both the oppression of nationalities and the triumph of nationalism.

The nationality policy initiated by Lenin and by Stalin contrasted fundamentally with the nationality policy of the Russian Empire. Autocracy and nationalism had combined in the old Russian Empire to make the Russian state an instrument of oppression for the more than one hundred different nationalities living within its borders. Though the Russians formed only 43 per cent of the population, Russian was the only official language, the only language of the courts of justice, the government schools, and the administration. The whole apparatus of the state was in the service of the policy of Russification of all the non-Russian populations and their conversion to the state church. It promoted with all the power and influence of an autocratic government the economic and cultural interests of the Russian people at the expense of the non-Russian nationalities. The position of privilege of the Russian element was strictly enforced and steadily maintained in every possible way. Nothing was done for the cultural and economic progress of the backward tribes and nationalities of the Empire. Under a systematic policy of colonization the latter were deprived of their best lands, which were distributed among Russian colonists.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century the desire of the oppressed nationalities to achieve their freedom had steadily grown. The World War, with its general accentuation of nationalism and its slogan of national self-determination for the smaller nations, brought into sharp relief the conflict between Russian chauvinism, which continually fed the flame of nationalism among the oppressed peoples, and the centrifugal tendencies of these peoples. With the crumbling of traditional authority in the revolutionary days of 1917 the complete dismemberment of the Russian Empire threatened to set in. In all the border provinces, and in many other parts of the vast Empire, independent national governments were constituted. Their territorial aspirations conflicted everywhere. A hopeless clash of the excited, vital, and irrational forces of race and nationality, embittered by old memories of oppression and inflamed by the desire for domination, seemed imminent. It was averted because under Lenin's leadership the historic and nationalist Russian Empire was replaced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — a new effort to organize many different nations and nationalities into a federation of peoples enjoying equal rights.

As early as April, 1917, the Bolshevik Party had declared in its resolution on the nationality question: "All nations within Russia must be accorded the right freely to secede and to form independent states. The denial of this right and the failure to adopt measures guaranteeing its practical realization amount to the

support of a policy of conquests and annexations." But the question of the right freely to secede is different from the question of the expediency of the secession of one or another nation at a given moment. This latter question, according to Bolshevik theory and practice, must be determined in each separate case from the point of view of the interests of general development and of the proletarian struggle for socialism. In the interest of this struggle the right of self-determination was conditioned, at least practically, by the exercise of this right in accordance with the socialist ideal and the Soviet model. In any case a complete disintegration of the political and economic unit represented by Russia would have been contrary to the interests of general development. Many of the tribes and nationalities within former Russia are numerically too weak or culturally too backward to be able to form independent progressive states. Their only hope lies in cooperation and guidance. The ethnic boundaries between the different nationalities were difficult or impossible to draw. They frequently lived intermixed and interspersed over wide areas. The constitution of independent national states would in these days of rampant nationalism have led necessarily to a superexcitation of nationalism with its attendant intolerance. A seething caldron of fiery nationalisms would have developed, each nationality trying to lord it over others and to fulfill its manifest destiny, its historic mission born out of traditions and memories of its past.

The experience of the last century has proved that oppressed nationalities turn with great enthusiasm into oppressors of other nationalities or minorities as soon as they acquire their national independence. During the two years of their national independence the peoples of Transcaucasia, the Georgians, the Armenians, and the Turks of Azerbaidjan, were involved in continual bloody fights and wars, and tried to impose their own nationality and language upon the minorities living in their midst. But beyond these manifest dangers of the age of nationalism, the economic progress and the cultural needs of our time demand not the breaking up of larger units but the gathering up of different parts into a whole. Federalism seems the most promising form of harmonizing national differences with the needs and realities of our intellectual and economic world.

According to the census of 1926, the Soviet Union is inhabited by 185 different nationalities and tribes speaking 147 languages. It will be sufficient to name the fourteen most numerous nationalities, each one numbering more than one million souls, to give an idea of the wide racial, cultural, geographic, and religious differences among those nationalities. The strongest are the Russians, forming now 53 per cent of the population of the Union, followed by two other Slav peoples who live to the west of Russia proper — the Ukrainians, forming more than 23 per cent, and the White Russians, forming more than 3 per cent. Then follow the nomadic Kazak-Kirghiz

in the vast steppes between the lower Volga and Central Asia; the Mohammedan Uzbeks in the former Central-Asian emirates of Bokhara and Khiva; the Tatars on the Volga and in the Crimea; the Jews all over Russia, the Ukraine, and White Russia; the Georgians, an Oriental Christian people on the eastern shore of the Black Sea; the two fellow members of the Georgians in the Transcaucasion Federation: the Azerbaidjan Turks, who are highly progressive Mohammedans, and the Christian Armenians; the Mordvins or Volga Finns; the Germans on the lower Volga and in other parts of Russia and of the Ukraine; the Chuvashes west of Kazan, probably of mixed Finnish and Tatar descent, nominally Christians, but clinging to many of the old Shamanistic practices; and the Tadzhiks, an Iranian race, speaking a Persian dialect and living on the slopes of the Pamir Mountains in the center of Asia.

All these peoples form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The old name of the Russian Empire had been replaced by a supranational name in order to avoid the slightest suggestion of any predominance of the majority race. The Union consists of eleven member-states, of which three are predominantly inhabited by European peoples, three others, in Transcaucasia, are inhabited by Asiatic nationalities of an old and relatively high civilization, while the last five member-states, Uzbekistan, the Turkoman Soviet Socialist Republic, Tadzhikistan, the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic and the Kazak Soviet Socialist Re-

public, are inhabited by Asiatic races which until very recently lived in medieval and backward conditions. The new equality between Europe and Asia, between progressive and backward races, is thus mirrored in the composition of the Union. The Central Executive Committee of the Union has eleven chairmen, one for each of the eleven constituent republics. This supreme organ of authority in the Union is therefore under the chairmanship of representatives of the Oriental as well as the Occidental chief nationalities of the former Russian Empire. Besides these member-states, there exist within their boundaries many autonomous republics and autonomous regions, so that the Soviet Union presents a national complex consisting of autonomous units constitutionally interwoven in a multiplicity of ways. The Central Executive Committee of the Union consists of two chambers, of which the second is the Council of Nationalities, the members of which are elected by every autonomous unit of the Union.

This territorial solution is supplemented by very elaborate legislation on national minorities, made necessary by the fact that some peoples do not inhabit any definitely delimited territories, or count only a few thousand members, or, as is generally the case, have members of their group forming a minority in other member-states or autonomous regions. This legislation assures to the minorities their schools and the official employment of their mother tongue. Villages inhabited by the same minority are grouped to-

gether in administrative units in which their national characteristics have full play. The equality of all the languages was established in the same way as the equality of races and nationalities. This is of special importance in view of the fact that since the rise of modern nationalism the national language has become, in states inhabited by several nationalities, an instrument of domination and oppression. The struggle for or against the privileged position of the official language in administration and justice, in school and parliament, is in many modern states the favorite scene of the orgies of nationalism. In the Soviet Union no privilege of a particular language is recognized. Language ceases to be a problem of national power; it becomes again — as it was before the advent of the age of nationalism — a natural element of human intercourse, after having been for over a century an object of passionate struggle for prestige and influence. It loses nothing in this way in cultural value, but a good deal in its emotional political appeal; and the Russian language, now that it is no longer privileged or imposed, can develop by free consent into a *lingua franca* for the multilingual union.

This federal solution makes possible the peaceful cohabitation of several nationalities and maintains the unity of vast territories. There is no doubt but that in a world so distracted as the modern world a further breaking up of existing large units is not to be welcomed. Newly independent nations, even the smallest ones and those that were formerly most op-

pressed, develop immediately all the emotions and paraphernalia of national interests, rights, and honor in which free nations today excel. They tend from the first day of independent existence, as in their earlier wishes and dreams, to expand and to bring to other nationalities the blessing of being incorporated into the new national state. Within a federation, different nationalities can live at peace without fear of oppression or attack from their fellow members in the federation. With the removal of this danger one of the most important factors in arousing emotional nationalism is being removed. Oppression, danger, and fear beget and strengthen nationalism; their weakening weakens nationalism and increases the forces working toward trustful cooperation.

The federation brings to the nationalities of the Union equality and freedom from national oppression. This achievement is facilitated by the fact that the Soviet government is a supranational government and Soviet doctrine believes in the equality of men and races. But the Soviet government does not believe in freedom of thought; it is bound by a strict and rigid faith, and no deviation from its orthodoxy is tolerated. No freedom of thought and no development and propagation of heretic or different systems of thought or faith is allowed to individuals or to the national groups. The nationalities within the Soviet Union are protected against oppression by any other nationality, but some of their members may complain about a form of intellectual oppression which works

164 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

through a most powerful system of indoctrination. Just as in the old Russian Empire all government agencies worked in the interest of the Russian nationalist idea, all government agencies in the Soviet Union work in the interest of a supranational socialist idea. But though it may seem doubtful to some observers whether the present regime affords freedom, there can be no doubt that it grants complete equality to the nationalities of the former Russian Empire. This equality is not confined to juridical recognition, every effort being made to transform it into an actual reality.

The wide differences in the cultural, social, and economic levels of the nationalities of the Soviet Union make the achievement of actual equality a difficult task. But without it there can be no "socialist construction." The Russian national state demanded only the active participation of the Russians. If the Russian autocracy had been allowed to develop into a modern national democracy, the integration of the Russian masses into the state and their participation in the life of the nation would have been promoted and facilitated. The supranational socialist state demands the active participation of all its citizens, irrespective of their nationality or race. To make all those different nationalities active partners in the common Union, it was necessary not only to offer to all of them equal opportunities, but also to prepare them to avail themselves of these opportunities. According to Marxian socialism, the industrial proletariat, reared in the urban civilization of the machine

age, is the bearer of the historic mission of bringing about Communism. In the long years of transition toward Communism, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, the proletariat is the basic and active element in the Soviet state — the proletariat irrespective of race and nationality.

But the large majority of the nationalities and races in Russia had no proletariat, no industry, no cities. They lived in primitive agrarian societies or in nomadic tribes. To make them active partners in the new state, a policy of industrialization and urbanization, of general education and modernization, had to be started to accomplish a complete social, cultural, and economic transformation of the masses among the non-Russian populations. To make equality a reality, the state and party services in the territories inhabited by non-Russians had to be staffed progressively with members of the indigenous population. Only thus could the Soviet state be assured of the active cooperation of the masses among all its peoples. This “rooting” of the government and party machinery in the local population, which must go on for many years before it will be entirely accomplished, demands the raising of the cultural and social level of all peoples of the Union to a common standard. The industrialization of the countryside by collectivization, the settlement of the nomad tribes, the mechanization of farming, even in the outlying districts of the Soviet Union, promote an economic and social transformation which leads to a complete break with

the medieval traditions and customs which had characterized the life of the more backward peoples of Russia.

In this way the nationality policy of the Soviet Union awakened in many of its peoples for the first time a modern national consciousness, which began to replace primitive forms of tribalism or the social order of Oriental civilization. The former government of the Russian Empire had shown no interest in the modernization of the life and culture of these backward nationalities. On the contrary, it had feared to arouse their activity and energy. It had been afraid lest the quickening pace of life which would necessarily result from a penetration by modern civilization would lead to an increased demand for a fuller share of economic and cultural welfare and for higher standards of life. The government of the Czar, which had only scant sympathy for the rise of the cultural and educational level of the Russian peasant and working masses, and which was antagonistic to their more active participation in the political life of the country, preferred naturally to leave the non-Russian nationalities in their primitive and backward stage of evolution. In conformity with its general policy it supported the reactionary and medieval forces among those nationalities. The few and feeble efforts at modernization sponsored by the very tiny group of intellectuals of some of the more vigorous of those backward nationalities were not only not helped by the Russian state, but were looked upon with deep suspicion and fre-

quently were even strongly combatted. This attitude was in complete conformity with the policy of Russification pursued by the Czar's government, as this policy demanded an accentuation of the cultural and social gulf separating the Russian and the other nationalities within the Empire. The Russian nationality, its language, and its official religion had to be maintained in a position to which the other nationalities, religions, and languages had to look up with awe, respect, and even fear. The few strong and progressive individuals among the non-Russian nationalities had only one hope of access to greater social influence, to a higher educational standard, and to a fuller enjoyment of the benefits of modern life; they had to accept the Russian orthodox religion and the Russian language, to desert their own national groups and become assimilated with the ruling nationality. This policy of denationalization of the strongest and most progressive elements of the subject nationalities deprived these nationalities of their prospective leaders on the road of modernization, and of revolt against the oppression practiced by the Russian government.

The new policy of complete modernization of the life of the backward nationalities brought the development of these nationalities into harmony with the general trend of the twentieth century, with the spread of the industrial civilization and of nationalism all over the earth. The nineteenth century of nationalism in Europe.
of Central and Eastern Europe had

of medieval backwardness, and in the name of national self-determination had acquired the right to participate in shaping their several destinies. They had changed a vernacular spoken largely by illiterate peasants into a modern literary language, and had created a widely read literature which dealt with all questions of life and satisfied the emotional demands and the intellectual curiosity of the masses. A system of general and popular education in the national language had stirred the masses to a new understanding of the problems of government, economic organization, and scientific progress, and had determined the desire for a participation in their direction and in the benefits derived from them. Nationalism had transformed the lethargy of a very slow and tradition-bound people accustomed for generations to accept the vicissitudes of life as decreed by fate into the eager aspiration of the masses to order their life according to their best lights, in freedom and with the greatest profit to themselves and to all the members of their national group. In the twentieth century the spirit of nationalism had spread outside Europe into Asia and had stirred even the backward nationalities in the Russian Empire. Their desire for a national awakening had threatened to lead to a permanent conflict with the Russian government before the Russian Revolution put an end to the prevailing tendencies of Russification in the Russian Empire. The Soviet government acted in conformity with the general trend of the time, in not only not impeding the

awakening to national consciousness of the different ethnic and tribal groups and minorities of the former Russian Empire, but in promoting and helping this awakening by many positive and systematic measures.

In the days of the Russian Empire several nationalities and tribes had not possessed any literary language and had not known schools of their own; in many others literature and learning were confined exclusively to matters of religious concern, to a theology of a medieval form, and to the conservation of religious traditions. The Soviet government has from the beginning done everything in its power to promote the development of the vernacular tongues into modern literary languages. The task presented great and far-reaching difficulties. The government had to create in some cases the requisite alphabets and forms of letters. It had in every case to enrich and broaden the literature which had been until that time very slight in quantity and mostly religious in content. There had been no schools in which the mother tongue of the masses of the non-Russian nationalities had been taught, or at least no schools in which modern and scientific subjects had been taught in that language. The Soviet government had to build afresh from the foundation in the field of the national culture of the backward nationalities. It had to train teachers and to provide textbooks for subjects and languages in which none had ever existed before. In an astonishingly short time the whole framework of the medieval or primitive society was done away,

the old traditions and the narrow outlook of the tribe or the village community had disappeared. Women were brought into public life and participated in the new education. The textbooks, which were prepared for use in the schools and in the different attempts to liquidate illiteracy by mass-education of adults, dealt with subjects in science and technology and with all the prerequisites of modern life.

This transformation is a process familiar to us from the history of the spread of nationalism. It is common to all peoples that have been awakened to modern national consciousness and have entered the era of secularization, begun by the Renaissance and the French Revolution. The Soviet government has actively accelerated this process of growing national consciousness among the backward peoples of the Soviet Union. The government tried to do this thoroughly and systematically, although, of course, the lack of trained leaders and workers and the scarcity of important material made themselves as much felt in this field as in other fields of socialist construction. Notwithstanding serious shortcomings, much has been accomplished. Scholars and academics provided for the issue of dictionaries of the modernized literary languages, publishing institutions and libraries helped to spread books, theaters and museums were established, historical and other scientific societies were founded in the territories of the different nationalities to cultivate the national traditions of the masses in artistic expression. The movie and the radio play their part

in the service of building up these different national cultures. In this way there is a reasonable hope that even the backward nationalities will reach in a relatively short time the educational and cultural level of the formerly privileged Russian people, and that all the nationalities of the Soviet Union will be able to enter the modern age as equals and to leave behind them the medieval backwardness in which all of them in varying degrees had lived.

The two main principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet Union are, as we have seen, the complete equality of all the different races and nationalities, and governmental promotion and encouragement of the cultural and economic progress for all of them. The supranational government of the Soviets advances the development of the national cultures of all the peoples living in the Soviet Union. In his political report to the sixteenth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in July, 1930, Stalin could therefore refute the assumption that the period of the building of socialism in the Soviet Union would be a period of the decay and liquidation of national types of culture: "The truth is the exact opposite. In actual fact the period of the building of socialism in the Soviet Union is a period of the flowering of the national cultures, which, while intrinsically socialist, are national in form. With the introduction and speeding up of obligatory school instruction through the national languages, the development of the national cultures must stride forward with fresh energy. The backward

nations can only truly and effectually be associated in the building of socialism on the condition of the development of their national cultures. It is precisely in this that lies the essence of the Leninist policy of assisting and supporting the development of the national cultures of the peoples of the Soviet Union."

The promotion of the national cultures in the Soviet Union, however, does not mean that the Soviet government is promoting nationalism among the peoples of the Soviet Union. Marxian socialism is an international movement and the Soviet government is strictly opposed to nationalism. Socialism assigns to itself a universal mission as once the great world-religions did. In the Declaration on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it is attributed to socialism that it makes it possible "to abolish national oppression root and branch, to create the conditions engendering mutual confidence, and to lay the foundations of a fraternal collaboration of nations," marking a new and decisive step toward uniting the workers of the world into a World Soviet Socialist Republic. While nationalism has proved a disintegrating force in recent history, socialism claims to unify mankind. Nationalism in modern times means much more than a feeling of natural kinship between members of a group on the basis of a common language or common cultural traditions. This feeling had been entirely compatible with the complete devotion and subordination of man's intellectual and emotional life to a universal religion and with the loyalty to a supra-

national or an anational state. Only in very recent times, to use the illuminating words of Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes in his *Essays on Nationalism*, "have whole peoples been systematically indoctrinated with the tenets that every human being owes his first and last duty to his nationality, that nationality is the ideal unit of political organization as well as the actual embodiment of cultural distinction, and that in the final analysis all other human loyalties must be subordinate to loyalty to the national state, that is, to national patriotism. These tenets are the essence of modern nationalism."

Nationalism puts national interests first and foremost. Since according to nationalism it is an inherent right of every nation to be the arbiter of its own national interests and rights and to pursue these interests as it alone deems right, nationalism necessarily must lead to national conflicts and international anarchy. If modern nationalism takes the interests of other nationalities into account, it does so only in the second line and only as far as they do not conflict with what it considers its own interest. This attitude is incompatible with the professed aims of socialism and its urge toward a future united and peaceful humanity and the removal of the differences and conflicts of races and nations. Modern nationalism seems by its very nature incapable of a universal human aim. The Soviet government, with its profession of faith in a supranational order uniting all nations, must therefore fight any exaggerated nationalism.

The government of the Czar supported and promoted Russian nationalism and fought the nationalisms of all the other nationalities living in the Empire. The Soviet government combats exclusive Russian nationalism as much as the exclusive nationalisms of the formerly oppressed nationalities. It fights Russian nationalism even more, because it realizes that on account of its past as the expression of the dominating group it contains a greater threat to the peaceful cohabitation of the different nationalities than do the nationalisms of the minorities. The Soviet government certainly does not oppose Soviet patriotism or a love of the workers' fatherland. This patriotism should not be confused with nationalism. It resembles it in many outward forms; it differs fundamentally in content. Soviet patriotism is certainly not modern nationalism. It is love of the soil and of the landscape which is familiar to man by the work of his life, love of the language which he talks to the persons he loves and in which he receives the treasures of human civilization, love of the successes which he and his fellow workers have achieved by the hard toil of hand and brain in the building up of socialism. But it is not a Russian patriotism, not the nationalistic love of the Russian fatherland or of the country of another political nation. It is love of a land, of a civilization, and of achievements common to the workers of all races and national groups who are united in the common task of building socialism. Uncompromising and intolerant loyalty of all Soviet citizens is as certainly

demanding and as firmly insisted upon as in any nationalistic state. But it is not supreme loyalty to a nation or to the nation-state, but to the Land of the Soviets, which in its present form is considered only a step toward uniting the workers of the whole world into a Socialist World Republic.

Communism realizes and recognizes the multiplicity and variety of peoples, and is well aware of the fact that even after the building up of socialism on a world-wide scale has been completed this multiplicity and variety will endure for a very long period all over the world. Then, in a very distant future, nationalities may disappear. But at the present moment and for a long time to come they are a reality. The age of modern nationalism, which is of relatively recent origin, may pass, as Communism hopes it will. Men may give their supreme loyalty to other ideals than the nation-state. The division of mankind into nationalities may lose in importance and in its emotional appeal, but it will remain. The Soviet government respects the linguistic and cultural differences of peoples; it is most careful to avoid hurting their national susceptibilities, and it knows very well that any sort of national oppression or disregard will only strengthen nationalism and awaken a nationalist reaction.

"It would be stupid," Stalin said, "to suppose that Lenin regarded socialist culture as a nationality-less culture, destitute of any national form." The Soviet government helps to develop these national forms, but it fills them with a supranational proletarian civiliza-

tion which aims to train the masses in the spirit of internationalism. The Soviet government does not seek to Russify the peoples of the Union as the former imperial government did. It tries to train all of them, the Russians and the non-Russians, as partners in the building of international socialism. This training is undertaken with all the resources of the state. But the task is not easy. The national form was approved not for the sake of its intrinsic value, but as the medium of a new culture embracing all humanity. In an age of nationalism, however, the promotion of the national culture and the cultivation of the national languages and of popular traditions in art and literature are bound to strengthen the tendencies toward nationalism and to awaken or to reinforce the nationalistic ambitions of the peoples of the Union.

Nationalism wishes to make the nationality supreme and absolute; socialism wishes not to destroy nationality but to reduce it to the relative and subordinate position it had before the rise of modern political nationalism. All the nationalities and their cultures have to be the servants and instruments of a supra-national idea. The aroused national consciousness of the nationalities in the Soviet Union often revolts against these limitations and demands a more exalted position. It is not satisfied with the role which socialism and the Soviet government concede to it. Out of their reawakened and revived past the nationalities draw an inspiration for a nationalistic future. The education of the masses, and especially of the youth,

in the Soviet Union fights hard against this tendency. Only the popular elements of the existing national cultures, unassociated with the religious or feudal past, are to be retained and interwoven with the new, uniform, socialist culture, the attainment of which is the professed purpose of all education in the Soviet Union. The national cultures are to be national only in form, but socialist in content. The Soviet peoples are trained to an all-pervading sense of class solidarity and to a realization of the interdependence and necessary collaboration of all peoples under a united political and economic leadership. In all the various tongues, the use of which is entirely free, the same doctrine is taught, the same song intoned.

The Soviet government has tried to solve the nationality problem in the former Russian Empire by a federation of completely equal nationalities, in which there can be no more any question of majority or minority nationalities, of privileged or oppressed races. It has tried to give practical effect to this formal equality of rights by bringing, through special and sustained efforts, these backward peoples up to the level of the culturally and economically most advanced races, and by uniting all of them in a common task. But it could try these new ways only because it combined a firm faith in a supranational and universal future for the whole of mankind with a keen and realistic appreciation of the nationalist divisions and distinctions of the present time. It accepted the latter, but only as a framework for its new universal doc-

trine and culture. Whether the new faith will prove strong enough to overcome, in this age of an apparent victory of intense nationalism, the tendencies toward nationalism among the peoples of the Soviet Union, only the future can tell. The nationality policy of the Soviet Union and the struggle between Communism and nationalism which is implied in the whole basic philosophy and world-outlook of the Communists have received only scant attention. In our age of nationalism, however, the nationality policy of the Soviet Union seems a very important development of socialism, and the struggle between nationalism and a supranational idea may be watched for its outcome with justified interest by all students of modern intellectual and social history.

VI

Communist and Fascist Dictatorship: A Comparative Study

DICTATORSHIPS as they developed after the World War in Russia, Italy, and Germany have little in common with traditional forms of despotism and autocracy. Modern dictators exercise a more unlimited power, covering much wider fields of social and personal life, than despots of former ages ever did. But the authority of the despots of old sprang from an entirely different source, and the system of life they represented was based upon an entirely different intellectual and social structure. Their authority and their power were derived from theocratic traditions or from the support of the army, particularly of the generals and officers. In so far as dictatorships were not personal ventures of men of genius or of seekers after power and fortune, they represented the vested interests of castes and classes that had long been in power and in many cases were in decay.

These traditional dictatorships continued even into our own time. The despotic rules of King Alexander in Yugoslavia and of General Primo de Rivera in Spain may serve as examples. Primo de Rivera, who wished to imitate the contemporary dictatorship of Mussolini

and was animated by a sincere desire for modernization, failed partly, perhaps, because he was a lesser personality, but more because his dictatorship depended upon such traditional supports as the church, the army, the monarchy. He belonged by virtue of his birth and his whole career to the ruling classes. Benito Mussolini, on the other hand, is the son of a village blacksmith of internationalist revolutionary and anti-religious opinions; and young Mussolini was an organizer of working-class movements and a revolutionary journalist. In assuming the dictatorship he was helped by king, church, army, and big business, which saw in Mussolini a weapon against socialism, but he did not rely solely or even mainly upon them, but upon a private army of his own, created by him, and directed — at least ostensibly and as many of his followers sincerely believed — against the existing order. A part of the Italian intelligentsia, prepared by the imperialistic nationalism preceding the Tripolitan War and by the irrationalism of *idealismo attuale*, joined Mussolini later and gave his actions the background of a new and messianic “philosophy” of life. Without such a philosophy, and without the new propaganda technique for regimenting mass opinion, modern dictatorships are impossible. Primo de Rivera enjoyed the backing of neither the intelligentsia nor the enthusiastic youth of a rising lower middle class. After having been a dictator for some time he created the *Unión Patriótica* to work “for the realization of ethical ideals in public life” as King Alexander created

a party to work for Yugoslavian unity after having proclaimed himself an autocratic ruler. Both these parties and similar ones, such as the Shaab Party supporting the dictatorship of Ismail Sedky Pasha and King Fuad in Egypt, were artificial, *post factum* creations, uninspired and uninspiring, originating solely from above and without the participation of the masses.

Contemporary dictatorships are led by men who do not belong to the ruling classes and who are proud of the fact. Adolf Hitler, whose father had been the son of a poor little cotter (*eines armen kleinen Häuslers*), did not dress in the uniform of a general; he remained *der Gefreite des Weltkrieges*, the private soldier who had fought the battle of the common man in the trenches of the war. The followers of the leaders belong to rising classes — to the lower middle classes and the wealthier peasantry in Italy and Germany, to the industrial proletariat and the poor rustics in Russia. In the beginning there is always an appeal to their conscious hostility against the ruling classes.

The movements centering around Mussolini and Hitler were, to begin with, emotional and confused uprisings — stimulated by propaganda — of the lower classes and of youth groups of the intelligentsia against “capitalism,” the traditional aristocratic orders, and the powers of big business. These movements brought a new and youthful personnel into part of the administration and replaced many of the old office-holders in the central and local governments with men

from groups and classes that had hitherto generally been excluded from such positions.

True, Mussolini and Hitler have been aided by the financial help of industrialists and big landowners; they have been protected by members of the old aristocracy. They have made their peace by compromise and concessions with the vested interests. They have made use of the established powers; and they have allowed themselves and their movements to be used by them. But it has been often a utilitarian co-operation, full of distrust and misgivings on both sides. There was a common enemy, internationalism and "Marxism," but no common platform. It is an oversimplification to interpret Fascism only from the economic standpoint, as the last stage of decaying monopoly-capitalism.

The aim of dictators like Mussolini and Hitler was not social revolution but personal power through a more powerful integration of the nation, and the means by which they hoped to achieve this was to fuse all classes into a disciplined whole, to make the nation the supreme loyalty of every man, the foundation of his life, the mainspring of his personal and social actions. The people must become a docile and pliable instrument in the hands of the dictator if he was to realize his twofold aims, the maintenance of his own power and the aggrandizement of his nation. Since the older ruling classes possessed experience and training valuable for the conduct of foreign affairs, for the prestige of the army, and for the efficiency of

the complicated system of modern economic life, Mussolini and Hitler had to accept them and to keep them in at least a part of the key positions of the nation. To this end they sacrificed whatever existed of the social aspirations of their followers. Mussolini could do it less dramatically, for the social aspirations of his followers did not form an important part of their emotional make-up. Hitler did it most dramatically by his action of June 30, 1934, though the tension between the old ruling class and the aspirations of the lower classes originally represented by Fascism lasted on in Germany and are apparently not appeased even today. The National Socialist German Working Men's Party, composed largely of members of the lower middle class and the peasantry, considered itself the sole carrier of the political will of the state and called all the opposition emanating from the upper and educated classes "reactionary."

The old type of despot could not exist in the modern world, for the French Revolution brought in its train democracy as a state of mind and made the masses conscious of their right to participate in the direction of their country's fate. Contemporary dictatorships are post-democratic movements. In his article on the "Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," contributed to the *Enciclopedia Italiana* in 1932, Mussolini declares that the Fascist state, "which reposes upon the support of millions of individuals who recognize its authority, are continually conscious of its power, and are ready at once to serve it, is not

the old tyrannical state of the medieval lord, nor has it anything in common with the absolute governments either before or after 1789." The Fascist state reposes "upon broad and popular support." Pre-democratic despots cared little even in public for the support of the masses, which were not yet prepared to demand political rights.

Oswald Spengler has protested vehemently against the post-democratic character of German National Socialism, against its appeal to the masses and its wish to repose upon the support of the masses. In his *Jahre der Entscheidung*, the first part of which appeared in 1933, he expresses his desire for a return to the real despotism of the eighteenth century, to the relationship between the strong leader and the masses as it existed before the French Revolution. Spengler represents the upper classes, their disdain of the masses, their individual intellectualism. He accuses Fascism of merely continuing the democratic mass movements of the nineteenth century, of opposing Communism by the same methods upon which Communism depends. The despot of the future whom Spengler wishes to come is Nietzsche's superman endowed with the Caesarism of a Renaissance *condottiere* or of Napoleon. He would not be the leader of Fascism. "Fascism is a transition. It rose from the urban masses as a mass party, with noisy agitation and mass oratory."¹ Spengler detests popularity and the desire

¹"Auch der Faschismus ist ein Uebergang. Er hat sich von der städtischen Masse her entwickelt als Massenpartei mit lärmender Agitation und Massenreden."

for popularity. He is a strict individualist. All despots are like him individualists, but without his philosophical background. Fascism, however, is anti-individualistic.

Capitalism is the form of economic organization that prevails in an age of individualism. Its aim is the free and unfettered pursuit of individual happiness. The liberal nationalism that accompanied the rise and spread of capitalism was an effort to balance and to harmonize the individualism that was the fruit of eighteenth-century enlightenment with the new group-consciousness of the masses integrated into the nation. In this period of liberal nationalism the state declared the aim of national policy to be the happiness and welfare of the individual citizen. Only in the event of war were the individual and his happiness completely subordinated to the interests of the nation-state, which might even demand the sacrifice of life from its citizens. But war was regarded as an accident in political life, an abnormal manifestation of forces hostile to the life and progress not only of the individual but of the nation.

Fascism, on the other hand, represents a form of nationalism in which the claims and happiness of the individual are entirely subordinated to national prosperity and even more to national aspirations for power. War, with its complete subordination of the individual to the state, now becomes a part, and a very important part, of the normal history of the nation. The nation, transcending the brief limits of

individual life, represents the true and permanent foundation of the life of the individuals, who now become cells in the organic body of the state. In discussing the doctrine of Fascism Mussolini points out that its first article of faith is the glorification of war. "Above all, Fascism believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it." The leading political philosopher of German National Socialism, Carl Schmitt, declares in his *Der Begriff des Politischen*, that war is the ever-present supposition of the political attitude of man.

To an unprecedented extent contemporary dictatorships seek mass support and try to influence the masses and to arouse their enthusiasms. Modern methods of appeal to the imagination have been elaborated. Movement, color, and sound, handled with the consummate skill of the contemporary artist and technician, have been put into the service of propaganda. In discussing propaganda and organization in *Mein Kampf*, Hitler says, "To lead means to be able to arouse the masses."² In this respect Fascism is a continuation of "the stupid nineteenth century," of its sense for mass movements and their dynamic quality, its love of quantity, noise, and acceleration, its desire for gigantic size and stupendous manifestations of power. Though Fascist dictatorships are a new phe-

² "Führen heisst: Massen bewegen können."

nomenon in history and in many respects the very antithesis of the French Revolution and the nineteenth century, they continue and even carry further three of the most important elements of the French Revolution — its secularism, its nationalism, and its mass democracy, all three of which are closely related in ideological origin.

Fascism has rejected all claims and rights of religion. For reasons of political expediency it may conclude a truce or an alliance with organized religion and may concede it a place within the state, but only under the strict supervision of the state. Nationalism, not religion, is the living faith; the national state is absolute, in no way subordinated to the *civitas Dei* or preparing for it, and the powers of the constitution are represented as emanating from the will of the nation. The popular sovereignty of the nation is theoretically maintained in the plebiscites, to which Fascism resorts in order to cloak important decisions of its leaders with a form of popular sanction. Thus the authoritarian corporate Christian state of Austria, although imitating some of the forms and ideas of Italian Fascism, was not a Fascist state. In its constitution of May 1, 1934, it declared itself to be a Christian German federal state in the name of Almighty God, "from whom all laws emanate." The movement led by Engelbert Dollfuss represented the traditions of the Catholic Habsburg monarchy. But Mussolini and Hitler disregarded church and monarchy; in their rise to power they relied on purely

188 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

nationalistic symbols and on appeals awakening in the masses the memory of periods antedating church and monarchy, of the old Roman Empire, and of the martial virtues of pagan Teutons. To apply the term Fascism to those traditional dictatorships and autocracies that are based on the protection of feudal and theocratic or of capitalistic interests is to obscure the real issues involved in the new forms of contemporary dictatorship.

The contemporary dictatorships that can be characterized as mass movements with a distinctive philosophy are the Fascist dictatorships in Italy and Germany and the Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union. Fascism mobilizes the lower middle classes, but it does not identify itself ideologically or politically with their rise. It is nationalistic and militaristic; its totalitarian state aims at the complete integration of all the individuals of a race or a nation into a community which, conscious of its disciplined strength and superiority, regards the expansion of the nation as an essential manifestation of vitality, and regards preparedness for war, military education, and the willing acceptance of the risks that war implies as the noble way of life. It believes in the "immutable, beneficial, and fruitful inequality of mankind," of races and nations.

Communism mobilizes the proletariat and identifies itself ideologically and politically with its rise. It is supranational and cosmopolitan; it believes in the equality of mankind, of races and nations; it aims or

professes to aim at the creation of a society of free individuals living in security and peaceful cooperation.

The two types of dictatorship are directly opposite in their aims and their philosophy of life. They are similar (and different from all other forms of dictatorship) in claiming absoluteness for their philosophy and in their effort to indoctrinate the masses and the youth with the new way of life.

To a certain extent both Communism and Fascism have influenced the aims and methods of most of the dictatorships and many of the political movements that have developed since the World War. Certain hybrid forms have been developed, as in Mexico or in Austria. But it would be a mistake to consider the dictatorship of parties and men in Mexico as Communistic or those in Austria and Poland as Fascist.

The nearest approach to Fascism outside Europe is to be found in the pseudo-Fascist movements in Japan. The Japanese have perhaps developed the strongest consciousness of racial nationality and its superiority. The emperors of Japan descend, according to Japanese official history, in unbroken line from the first human emperor, whose name was Divine War Spirit and who was himself the fifth in direct line of descent from the Heaven Shining Goddess. The intense religious nationalism of the Japanese, their sense of cohesion and of loyalty to the emperor, their faith in the superiority of their race and in its mission, was threatened in its undisputed validity by the introduction of European secular rationalism and

by the precipitate industrial revolution, destroying traditional ties and customs. Fascist societies formed after the World War protested strongly against the foreign influence and the alleged corruption and luxury resulting from it. Evoking an ardent patriotism and the military spirit, they appealed to the people to restore to Japan its ancient simplicity of life and the virtues of self-discipline and loyalty embodied in the *bushido*, the code of honor of the warrior. The emotional unrest found expression in declamations of lofty morality against the corruption of officials and parliaments and against the luxury and influence of plutocracy. Hand in hand with it went the social unrest caused by the grave agrarian crisis and the misery among the lower middle classes, from which the junior officers of the army were recruited. The Fascist movement in Japan, led by these officers, had therefore many elements of true Fascism: a semi-religious nationalism, glorification of the past and insistence upon the mission of a chosen race, faith in the military virtues and in war, and the desire for the social rise of the lower middle classes and the peasantry. But, unlike Fascism in Germany and in Italy, the movement was too strongly bound to the theocratic loyalties of the past — monarchy and church, both of which centered in Japan in the emperor. That is why in Japan the Fascist drive for power, which culminated in the great plot of May 15, 1932, prepared by the Blood Brotherhood League and by the School of Love for the Native Soil, failed.

The old ruling classes proved themselves too strong, as they were necessarily included in the loyalty to the emperor. Prince Saionji, the last of the Elder Statesmen, advised the emperor to form a coalition cabinet. Parliamentary life and the constitution were maintained, the influence of big business combined with that of the higher army and navy command, and political tension relaxed greatly.

It was not until seven years later that Japan approached full-fledged Fascism. This development was promoted by the influence of Germany and Italy, by the growing expansionist fury of the Japanese military class and, under their guidance, of the Japanese people. The Anti-Comintern Pact — the cooperation with Germany and Italy — opened for Japan, as it did for Germany and Italy, unlimited horizons of expansion, of accretion of power, of ultimate world dominion. Under the influence of the great initial successes, in the recognition of the fundamental weakness of the democracies and of the League of Nations, the checks upon the development of Fascism in Japan broke down. Parliament lost all its influence, the economic life of the country became more and more regimented, the intellectual life entirely dominated by the old traditional legends of the Japanese past, the whole national life geared to a permanent and insatiable effort for conquest and domination.

Fascist dictatorships are founded on three principles: the state, authority, and the leader. All three are believed to be permanent, since they are held to

correspond to unalterable elements in human nature. Dictatorship is therefore an essential part of Fascism. Fascism, with its glorification of the nation-state and of the natural inequality of men, is unthinkable without a strong state and a strong leader. Communist dictatorship, on the other hand, is in theory a transitory phenomenon. Its professed aim is the realization of the absolute democracy of the Communist society. Communism means the abolition of the state, the establishment of a world-wide community of free individuals, free not only in the political sense as outlined by the French Revolution and by the Declaration of the Rights of Man but also in the new social sense of freedom from economic exploitation. Communism, which in its optimism believes in the goodness and the perfectibility of human nature, hopes for a society without authoritarian leadership. The messianic expectation of Fascism reposes on the charisma of the individual leader, the superman who by mystic identification embodies and represents the nation; the messianic expectation of Communism reposes on faith in a rational system of social philosophy and in an interpretation of history of which the leader becomes an exponent and an agent. The dictatorship of Fascism is charismatic, nationalistic, and permanent; the dictatorship of Communism is rational, universalistic, and temporary.

Charismatic dictatorships work upon emotions that are bound up with the particular feelings and modes of thought and the historical memories of a nation.

Rational dictatorships appeal to reason to master by study and logical understanding the laws underlying the process of history. This method and the results are of universal applicability. Fascism is intrinsically bound up with the past, and it regards man as unavoidably determined by the past. Communism is concerned entirely with the future, to which it sacrifices not only the past but even the present. Both types of dictatorship are ruthless and without regard for the happiness and freedom of the present individual. His concrete rights here and now must yield to the abstract claims of a future society. Fascism holds this future society to be the nation. But the nation is not only a future society, it already exists; its goal of perfection is never reached, it is a process forever incomplete, and therefore the individual must forever cede to the nation. Communism, however, believes in the future emergence of the free and happy individual. Its future society is professedly one in which there are no classes, states, or nations. Only within the limits of humanity will the individual be free. An undivided and peaceful humanity does not exist now because the free individual does not exist. Both are to be created. If the Communist interpretation of history is right and if Communist dictatorship is successful in achieving its aim, a new man and a new society will be created. In that way it will continue the work of the French Revolution, which in bringing about the rise of the third estate ushered in not only for France but for mankind an age of

political democracy and of nationalism. The Russian Revolution, a social revolution representing the rise of the fourth estate, would usher in not only for Russia but for mankind an age of social democracy and of a world federation.

Up to the present, history shows us only very imperfect realizations of ideals and tendencies. After the French Revolution man and society certainly did not correspond entirely to the image that had inspired the revolutionaries, but nevertheless the revolution has proved a great force, directing the movements of history. Communist dictatorship is a more systematic and coordinated effort than the French Revolution. Herein it is clearly distinguished from the more ephemeral dictatorships of the period before the new age of democracy and rational organization. But at the same time it claims "scientifically" the possibility of a perfect realization of its ideals. It assumes the absolute certainty and confidence of religious or pseudo-religious eschatology. It perpetuates the enthusiasm which, otherwise, is characteristic only of the first months or years of a revolution. It combines a completely secularized organization and pragmatic experimentation, which belong distinctly to the period after the French Revolution, with the absoluteness, unknown to the nineteenth century, of a faith.

In the French Revolution the two ideals of nationalism and of liberalism found their first powerful modern expression. The history of the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries to the close of the World War represents the effort at harmonizing those two categories of political thought, their conflict and their compromise. After the World War the Fascist and Communist dictatorships tried to impose in an absolute form one of those two trends. Fascism accepts and absolutizes nationalism, but it repudiates all the other ideals of the Anglo-Saxon and French revolutions — the freedom and dignity of the individual, the natural rights of man, the belief that men are equal and can be trusted and that therefore every man must participate in the government of his country, the hope for a peaceful and fraternal cohabitation of all nations on earth. Those ideals, which we may call liberalism, are more nearly approximated by the Communist ideal.

The Soviet Union intensifies and spreads tendencies developed by the French and the contemporary industrial revolution. The Communist dictatorship is an organized, planned effort to transform the backward and agrarian Russian Empire with its many primitive nationalities into a modern industrial and urban country. Joseph Stalin, in his report to the seventeenth All Union Communist Party Congress in Moscow in January, 1934, has pointed out that the U.S.S.R. "has become radically transformed; it has discarded the features of backwardness and medievalism. From an agrarian country it has become transformed into an industrial country. From a land of small individual agriculture it has become a land of collective,

196 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

large-scale mechanized agriculture. From an ignorant, illiterate, and uncultured country it has become — or rather it is becoming — a literate and cultured country covered with a network of higher, middle, and elementary schools operating in the languages of the nationalities of the U.S.S.R.”

In this way Communist dictatorship wishes to extend the industrialization, urbanization, and popular education of nineteenth-century Western Europe to regions and races previously untouched by them, and so far may serve as an example of similar tendencies in the backward countries of the Near and Far East and of Latin America. It influenced profoundly the dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal in Turkey. Although his dictatorship and his Republican People's Party were deeply nationalistic, they were not Fascist. His aim was to bring the nineteenth century, regarded by the Fascists as stupid and unheroic, to its consummation; and, as in the Soviet Union, to speed up the traditional tempo of Oriental life in agrarian and backward communities to the rhythm of modern industrial efficiency. In the precipitate and thorough breaking up of old traditions and of medievalism the Turkish dictatorship can be compared only to the Soviet regime. It is imbued with the spirit of secularism and of liberalism, and it recognizes formally the dignity and necessity of parliamentarism and democracy, to which the people must be educated through a dictatorship that emphasizes and scrupulously guards all the traditional external forms of parliamentary

democracy. According to the letter of the constitution, which does not represent the reality but the goal and the tendency, the representatives of the people, elected in a democratic way, are invested with absolute power. Mustafa Kemal, while employing the methods of contemporary dictatorship, aimed at a synthesis of nationalism and liberalism as represented by the progressive states in nineteenth-century Europe.

Soviet dictatorship wishes to realize a socialism which, according to Joseph Stalin, "can only be built up on the basis of a rapid growth of the productive forces of society, on the basis of an abundance of products and goods, on the basis of a well-to-do standard of living for the toilers, and on the basis of the rapid growth of culture. For socialism, Marxian socialism, means not the cutting down of personal requirements but their universal expansion; not the restriction or the abstention from satisfying these requirements but the all-sided and full satisfaction of all the requirements of culturally developed working people." The full satisfaction of individual needs, rights, and liberties, which seems impossible, according to Communism, in a capitalistic society, will be secured in the "socialist society" which the Communist dictatorship professedly wishes to create. This future society is represented as a true democracy with a truly free and active participation of the masses in the government of the country instead of the "crippled democracy" and "pseudo-parliamentarism" which alone, according to Communism, are possible in a capitalistic coun-

try. All the achievements of liberalism, freedom of conscience and thought, of expression and association, equality of all individuals without distinction of race or descent and complete equality of the sexes, equal opportunity for everybody and equal access to the sources of knowledge and science, can, according to Communism, be secured only in the future socialist society. The constitutions of the Soviet Republics that are members of the U.S.S.R. contain all these natural liberal rights of the individual in their first chapters. Whereas the penal law of Fascist states returns to pre-liberal and pre-humanitarian notions, the penal code of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic continues the liberal efforts of the nineteenth century and crowns them by defining crimes as socially dangerous acts against which society must apply measures of social defense "to prevent the commission of further crimes and to adapt the offenders to the conditions of the community life" of society. "Measures of social defense shall not have as their object the infliction of physical suffering or personal humiliation. The question of retaliation or punishment does not arise." In contrast with Fascism, the principles of humanitarianism as developed in the age of rationalism and enlightenment are here accepted in theory, and not ridiculed.

Thus we find that Fascism regards the national or racial state as an end in itself, its totalitarian character a permanent feature, based upon the expectation of a never-ending bitter struggle of nations and races,

a permanent conflict for which all resources, especially all moral and mental resources, must remain mobilized forever. Communism regards the dictatorial state as a tool eventually to be replaced by a society of free and equal individuals. Fascism is strictly exclusive, repudiating and hating forever everything alien. It appeals to emotions linked with the past and seeks to infuse new vigor into the traditional attitudes of the racial group. For it no progress, no future of cooperation between the races, can exist. Communism appeals to science and reason, weakens the bonds of the traditions of the past which have erected barriers between nation and nation, and looks toward a future when all distinctions of the past will be abolished. Communism professes to aim, with the anti-liberal and anti-humanitarian methods of contemporary dictatorship, at the consummation of liberalism and at the realization of complete democracy. It has been characterized as an effort to establish the kingdom of God against God; Fascism denies not only God, but the hope of a kingdom of God. Logically Communism is in a much less fortunate position than Fascism, in which means and ends agree. Fascism claims an anti-liberal and anti-humanitarian dictatorship as an essential and permanent element of its doctrine; its anti-liberal and anti-humanitarian means can achieve an end perfectly in harmony with the means. For Communism the question remains open how far the way followed must influence and shape the end pursued.

VII

The Intellectual Roots of National Socialism

NATIONAL SOCIALISM is not, as sometimes believed in Anglo-Saxon countries, a product of the Treaty of Versailles. The refusal of German national pride to accept the defeat of course helped Hitler in his propaganda, but a similar situation in France half a century ago did not carry into power General Boulanger or Maurice Barrès, whose teachings bear much resemblance to National Socialism. The frustration of all the far-flung annexationist hopes of the World War, which Germany under Hitler's leadership is now on the way toward realizing, and the economic crisis affecting Germany after the artificial boom of the post-inflationary years, were only midwives at the birth of National Socialism; they were useful but not essential. In reality the roots of National Socialism strike infinitely deeper into the German social structure and intellectual tradition.

Seen from the point of view of intellectual history, National Socialism is the child of Prussianism married to Romanticism. These parents were originally not only independent of each other, but in many ways direct opposites. Prussianism was the virile cult of soldierly discipline and strict subordination of the

individual to the State. Romanticism, regarded as a philosophy of life and an interpretation of history and society, had in its origin many feminine traits of character. It was a revolt against discipline on behalf of instinct and desire, it was not a movement of soldiers but of intellectual bohemians. Prussianism and German Romanticism owe their endurance to similar social conditions. From the time of the Renaissance, development in Germany differed from that in Western Europe. While in Great Britain, in the Netherlands, and in France, middle-class merchants and intellectuals were rising to power and molding public opinion, Germany remained an aristocratic country in which the trader and the scribe received scant recognition and remained outside "society." The Prussian nobleman and soldier and the romantic bohemian met in their contempt for the burgher. They transferred their contempt and their opposition from the burgher as a class to the countries where a middle-class civilization had prevailed since the Renaissance. Germany saw itself not only in a political but even more in a cultural and moral fight against "Rome" and the "West." Ulrich von Hutten had taught Germany to regard the struggle between ancient Rome and the Germanic tribes as the beginning of a permanent opposition between Germanism and Westernism. Arminius, who had defeated the Roman legions in the year 9 A.D. and thus had blocked, to the misfortune of Germany and of Europe, the civilizing of the Germanic tribes, became not only a successful

hero but the embodiment of German virtues. Rationalistic humanism, the classical love for form and measure, for clarity and self-limitation, the social and active Christianity of Calvinist countries, were not only regarded as alien to Germanism, but as immoral, as proof of superficiality and levity.

Prussianism was from its beginning strictly authoritarian and collectivist. It originated in the necessity for organizing all the resources of a poor and backward country and of a docile people of partly Slavic origin into an instrument of state power and military conquest. It glorified duty, obedience, sacrifice, the Spartan virtues. It was much more than a government or an army; it was an all-pervading attitude of life. Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, the author of *Das Dritte Reich*, a title which became a slogan, published in 1916 an interpretation of Prussianism which he called *Der Preussische Stil*, and Oswald Spengler's *Preussentum und Sozialismus* appeared in 1919, an appeal to the German youth to see in the state of Frederick the Great and of Bismarck the realization of a German socialism: "Roman in the pride to serve, in the humility to command, demanding not rights from others but duties from oneself, all without exception, without distinction, to fulfill a destiny which they feel within themselves. . . ." ¹

The "spirit of Potsdam" is not nationalist in the

¹ "Römisch im Stolz des Dienens, in der Demut des Befehlens, nicht Rechte von anderen, sondern Pflichten von sich selbst fordernd, alle ohne Ausnahme, ohne Unterschied, ein Schicksal zu erfüllen, das sie in sich fühlen, das sie sind."

modern sense of the word. It does not spring from the people, from the *Volk*, it springs from the state. This state as created by the "soldier-king" Frederick William I and perfected by his son is the conscious embodiment of brute power politics. Its center is the king and his aristocracy, its basis the army, which is regarded also as the greatest educational institution and the spirit of which pervades and permeates the whole life of the community and of every citizen. Frederick the Great wrote in his "Political Testament" of 1752: "Consequently you must be prepared for frequent wars. Consequently the army must be the first order in the state, as it was with the Romans when they conquered the world and lived in the period of their growth." Characteristically this last will is written in French; Frederick II was not interested in German culture; culturally he felt himself a cosmopolitan and a Frenchman, politically a Prussian.

Prussian power achieved the "unification" of Germany in the nineteenth century. Bismarck was no German nationalist; he did not desire the annexation of the Austrian Germans and discouraged the pan-German currents in Austria. The German *Volks-gemeinschaft* meant little to him, the aggrandizement of Prussia's power was his main concern. Under the great Prussian kings and under Bismarck Prussianism was realistic and rationalistic. Its goal was power, but a limited power, controlled by rational and utilitarian considerations. It could therefore be satiated and become static for long periods. It admitted the coexist-

ence of other powers in common tasks. Its great philosopher was Hegel, who constructed a most imposing system of logical interpretation of history and at the same time characterized the people as "that part of the state which does not know its own will." This explains the divided attitude prevailing today in Germany concerning Hegel, whose rational philosophy of the spirit does not take into account the dark instinctive forces of "life and nature."

Romanticism was at first libertarian and individualistic. This individualism, however, had nothing in common with individualism in Great Britain or France. English individualism has its basis in the religious conception of the dignity and equality of all individuals created in the image of God; French individualism, in the rational conception of the equal rights of all men endowed with reason, which is one for the whole of humanity. "Western" individualism is rational and Christian. Romantic individualism in Germany led to an anarchical conception of the "unique" individual and his exceptional rights, to irresponsibility, to the glorification of nature, instinct, the indomitable vitalistic forces, which find their justification in their own strength and exuberance.² This

² Individuality in the classical, rational, Western meaning of the word, which also holds good for Goethe's conception of individuality, and individuality in the romantic and typically German meaning are entirely different. Fritz Strich distinguishes in his *Deutsche Klassik und Romantik* (Munich, 1922, p. 16) the classic interpretation from the romantic by using two different terms, personality and individuality. Personality means "das Urbild des Menschentums, das zeitlose Wesen der menschlichen Gattung in sich zu verwirklichen und sich zum symbolischen Repräsentanten der ewigen Menschheit zu erhöhen"

attitude could not build, as individualism in Western Europe did, a free and ordered society. The individual who had escaped from the fetters of a stagnant and oppressive society into extreme individualism escaped from that untenable position into the security of an organic or mystic whole of which he now became an indissoluble part. Romanticism discovered the *Volk*, not a nation formed by the state and a common historical development, but a "natural" group linked together by a community of feeling, of instincts and attitudes, distinguishing it from all other groups. The anarchical concept of romantic individualism was now transferred from the individual to the folkgroup.

Romantic nationalism is sentimental and irrational. Its center is the *Volk*, something dynamic, "profound," related to the infinite and the absolute, creative in its instinctive ways, in its peculiar intuition, not

("To realize within oneself the idea of mankind, the timeless essence of the human race, and to raise oneself to be the symbolical representative of eternal humanity.") Personality is gladly and willingly subject to standards and to laws universally applicable; in the romantic meaning the individual is a law unto himself, a law valid only for this one unique case. (Fritz Strich, *Dichtung and Zivilisation*, Munich, 1928, p. 35 f.) Fascist nationalism transferred this differentiation from the individual to the group. The rational or liberal concept of nation is entirely compatible with the responsibility and obligation towards human society, with the subordination to principles of a higher order than those of the nation; it is able to renounce and to combat the dark instincts opposed to universal reason. The romantic and Fascist concept of nation means abandonment to individual desires, irresponsibility and license towards the principles of a higher order than those of the individual nation. The Fascist nation ruthlessly suppresses all individuality and personality within the nation, to make the nation itself an absolute individuality in the romantic sense. Cf. Ludwig W. Kahn, *Social Ideals in German Literature, 1770-1830* (New York, 1938).

subject to any general rational laws. National Socialism combined Prussianism and romantic nationalism. Romanticism is an insatiable longing for an all-inclusive totality. National Socialism — this is the fundamental difference between Bismarck's and Hitler's power politics — has therefore no limited goals, it can never become satiated, it will always be driven by its dynamism, even at the risk of self-destruction. But from its combination with Prussianism it gains a hybrid character which makes possible its flexibility, its lack of clarity and definiteness, and its associations with most representative figures of the German past — although frequently only by the falsification or elimination of some of their essential attitudes and thoughts. At the same time National Socialism divested Prussianism and Romanticism of their many religious, rational, and humanistic links with western civilization. Although many leaders of National Socialism are not Prussians, its prevailing attitude and pattern of behavior is distinctly Prussian.³ But the

³ Hence the occupation of Austria by National Socialist Germany in March 1938 did not add the mellow charm and easy wisdom of Austria to Germany, another and richer shade to the multi-colored texture of a freely developing German civilization. Instead, it submerged the last important outpost of a more classical and "western" Germanism in the monotonous uniformity of fierce Prussianism. Chancellor Schuschnigg missed a great chance and weakened his stand against National-Socialist aggression by overemphasizing the German character of Austria, questioned by no one, and underemphasizing the possibility of Austria as a rallying point for a more human, liberal, and rational Germanism, fundamentally opposed to National Socialism but certainly entitled as much as National Socialism to the claim of representing lasting and essential traditions and traits of the German character.

underlying philosophy is romantic, it finds its expression in the untranslatable word *Weltanschauung*.

Weltanschauung is no rational concept. It is rather an intuitive contemplation of the whole. It is not limited, not sharp or clear, and can not be easily defined or clearly perceived. It is all-inclusive, vague, and unfathomably deep. It is dynamic and more of voluntary than of rational origin. The *Weltanschauung* can not be understood by rational thinking; it is the product of the deepest instincts, of the "blood" — not of the individual, but of the racial group. In fact, the individual is not free to choose his *Weltanschauung*. National Socialism does not recognize any freedom of the spirit or of personality; it implies the most outspoken determinism. This determinism is materialistic or naturalistic, it is "scientific"; the biological forces decide irresistibly the thought, the creative faculties, and the fate of men. No similar degradation of individuality and of the spirit has ever held sway over the minds of many millions of Europeans. Never before have the fundamental attitudes of Occidental civilization been so openly repudiated. This *Weltanschauung* excludes all universalism. It cannot be valid outside the racial group; each racial group has necessarily its own and different *Weltanschauung*; but these racial groups are in no way equal: the Germanic, Nordic, or Aryan race is either the most noble or the only creative race. This *Weltanschauung*, the product of the vitalistic forces of the racial group, is totalitarian; it includes everything and pervades everything. The

objectivity of ethics and of human thought, every universal standard of beauty and conduct, are destroyed. Art and science, law and justice, the interpretation of history and the ways of life, economics and education, are only functions of the *Weltanschauung*; the state, the army, the professions, the family, are only its organs. Being totalitarian, the *Weltanschauung* is necessarily exclusive and jealous. It is a religion based upon the certitude of "biological science"; it sanctifies "life" and its demands as forces against which no sanctity of law and no absolute truth can prevail.

This *Weltanschauung* which is proclaimed as the only German one bears clearly the stamp of Schopenhauer, Hegel's great antagonist.⁴ In the same year when Hegel accepted the chair of philosophy at the University of Berlin, from which his rationalist system conquered the whole civilized world, Schopenhauer published "The World as Will and Idea," which remained practically unnoticed for thirty years. In it he denied vehemently the primacy and power of reason and spirit. He proclaimed the primacy of the blind will which forms the real essence of man and life. Reason is no more than an instrument for

⁴ Hegel's importance for Germany and for Fascism is well pointed out by Franz Schnabel (*Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, vol. III, Freiburg i. B.: Herder, 1934, p. 17): "That which was instinctively felt and naively expressed in Machiavelli, now became (with Hegel) dressed and sanctified with philosophical reasoning, so that henceforth conscience was quieted, and force and injustice were no longer felt as such. . . . The State has become an end in itself, . . . all individual ethic is rejected. Christianity and Kant are both denied, religion elevated to become subservient to force."

the desires and interests of the eternally unsatisfied will. Therefore history has no meaning; it is a senseless struggle in which the stronger destroys the weaker.

Although Schopenhauer's philosophy is the basis of all the present-day vitalistic, dynamic, irrationalistic philosophies and *Weltanschauungen*, he was no ancestor of National Socialism. Schopenhauer described the tragedy of life; he did not glorify it. He wished to overcome will, not to be subservient to will and instinct and drive for power. He condemned all vitalism and dynamism, and found redemption, not for a racial group, but universally, in the victory of the spirit over the will. He glorified, not the conquering "hero," but the ascetic saint; Christian (or as he called it, Buddhist) compassion for everything alive, not the triumph of the strong. His philosophy did not serve life, but truth. Two months before Hegel delivered his famous inaugural lecture at the University of Berlin, Schopenhauer ended the preface to the first edition of his chief work with the following words: "But life is short and truth works far and lives long: let us speak the truth." In this point the two great antagonists would have entirely agreed and would have differed fundamentally from National Socialism. National Socialism has its roots undoubtedly in the social structure and the intellectual traditions of Germany, but its *Weltanschauung* is not — in spite of its claims — the eternal and only expression of the German mind. In spite of all the millenary

210 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

claims of Hitler, National Socialism and the German mind are subject to the changes of history and even to the freedom of the spirit, which may assert itself again and again in German men as in men of any other racial group.

VIII

The Individual and the State

THROUGHOUT history we find two fundamental attitudes concerning the relationship between the individual and the state. One attitude puts the state above the individual; the individual depends for the full realization of his faculties upon the state before whose authority he bows and to whose ends he is subservient. The other attitude regards men not as the object, but as the subject of the authority of the state. The state is no end in itself, but a means to the self-realization of the individual, to the transformation of the society of men into a really human society. The first attitude is represented by the authoritarian, the second attitude by the democratic form of state. The difference between these two forms of social philosophy and political organization expresses itself in the way in which the will of the community is fashioned as well as in its contents.

Democracy is based upon two fundamental concepts: the liberty and the equality of individuals. They are the product of a long historical development, of the growth of civilization. Before man recognized the equality and liberty of his fellow men he had to master his primitive instincts by ethics founded on religion and by rational thought. Buddhism, the teachings of the Hebrew prophets and of early Chris-

tianity, the Stoic philosophy in the Græco-Roman world, all these set against the existing forms of dominion and inequality the ideal of the essential equality and spiritual liberty of all human beings. According to Christianity man, every man, has been created in the image of God, every human soul is invested with an inalienable dignity. United in a common descent from Adam and Noah, in a faith in God as a common Father, all men form a potential common brotherhood. The religious foundations of democracy became secularized and rationalized in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Free State movement in Great Britain in the seventeenth century grew out of the Free Church movement with its insistence upon personal inquiry, free discussion, and common deliberation. Descartes and Hugo Grotius laid the rational foundations on which a century later the American and the French revolutions proclaimed the "Bill of Rights" and the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen." The "natural" rights of the individual were proclaimed, not rights granted by "nature," but inherent in the quality of man as a human being, which always implied that he was more than a "natural" being, whether this "more" be intrinsically rooted in religion or reason.

In the nineteenth century democracy seemed destined to become, in "civilized" countries, the generally accepted form of relationship between state and individual; and its influence spread with the progress of civilization from its birthplace in Western Europe all

over the world, penetrating slowly even into Turkey, India, and the Far East. Democracy implied liberty and equality. Liberty was twofold: in its negative sense it protected the rights of the individual against interference by the state; in its positive sense, it gave the individual a share in the legislative process. Both ways built up the autonomy of the individual, or, as Kant called it, his dignity as an end in himself. Man was to be subject to the authority of the state only within strict limits, and he was to participate in the determination of the contents of this authority. Democracy does not express itself only in the form of its laws, but also in their content: they are based upon the frequently tacit but always present assumption of the complete equality of all individuals within the state, irrespective of class or wealth, race or creed. This recognition of the equal rights of one's fellow men creates in democracies a spirit of mutual tolerance. Democracy, being a late product of human civilization and its refinement and having outgrown primitive fanaticism, presupposes for its lasting success a sense of compromise and moderation, a maturity of mind and soul, an objective and just attitude in judging oneself, one's group, and their interests. Therefore, democracy is the most "perfect" and human form of relationship between the individual and his state, but at the same time, the most difficult and the least "natural." Democracy is fundamentally optimistic, believing in the "human" character of men and society, in their perfectibility and educability, but it

must be pessimistic and wise enough to recognize the inevitable shortcomings inherent in the character of men and every form of their organization. Democracy is, therefore, never a lasting final accomplishment, but neither is it a Utopia. It is a permanent growth and struggle for the self-realization of men and humanity. In view of the relatively very short time that democracy has existed as a political form and a social philosophy, its success and its vitality are surprising. At the same time it is little wonder that it has been, since its incipient triumph in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, subjected again and again to violent attacks by the anti-democratic forces and interests.

These forces and interests set against the principle of liberty the principle of authority, against the equality of democracy the fundamental inequality of aristocracy, whether based upon birth or wealth, race or creed. They proclaim generally the priority and superiority of the state over the individual. The state has its own aims, generally the preservation and expansion of the power of a dynasty or a class, a people, a race, or a religious group. The individual serves these aims. The autonomy of the individual is not recognized, he does not share in the process of making law. This anti-democratic position could point to the precedents of history for support. Modern democracy only took definite shape in the American and the French revolutions. In America, a country without a feudal or military past and with vast resources, re-

mote from Europe's age-old suppressions and persecutions, oriented toward the future, democracy could develop without being attacked in its foundation by pre-democratic forces and traditions. In Europe these forces again and again organized in an attack upon the "dangerous thought" of the French Revolution and its consequences, the liberty and equality of all individuals.

The opposition to democracy took different forms in the first half of the nineteenth and in the first half of the twentieth century. One hundred years ago the opposition appeared in what was popularly known as the Holy Alliance; at present it is generally termed Fascism. In spite of far-reaching differences between these two movements, they are united in their repudiation of the basic principles of democracy: liberty and equality of all individuals. After the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, democracy made definite progress everywhere in Europe, first in Western Europe and later on even in Germany and Russia. The classes and the traditions, the power of which antedated the eighteenth century, in a varying degree still kept their dominating influence in Central and Eastern Europe, but they were on the defensive, and practically everywhere constitutions were introduced with guarantees for the liberties of the individual. At the beginning of the twentieth century even Turkey, Persia, and China were on their way towards a modern constitutional regime. The outcome of the World War seemed to mark a great triumph for democracy. The

Peace Congress of Paris realized most of the aspirations of the nineteenth-century democracy. The leading statesmen who met there were no longer, as at the Congress of Vienna and also at the Congress of Paris in 1856 and that of Berlin in 1878, members of the old aristocracy, but members of the new middle class and their progressive, even radical, wings. As the result of the World War the conservative monarchies of the Holy Alliance were gone, republics took their place, democratic constitutions were everywhere introduced, members of socialist and labor parties in many countries occupied for the first time the seat of power, suffrage was made general, women received the vote, the welfare and social progress of the working classes was declared a common concern of humanity: democracy seemed victorious beyond many daring dreams of the nineteenth century.

From the point of view of an historian the question could then have arisen as to whether this triumph of democracy had not come too fast. The relationship between the individual and the state is determined by three factors — the prevailing morale and communal psychology, the social and economic structure of society, and the development of political technique. It is difficult to assign priority to any of these three factors; in reality they are always closely interlinked and interdependent. Democracy cannot be fulfilled and certainly cannot be preserved unless the intellectual, economic, and political development of a community has reached, by a spontaneous struggle and

effort on the part of the people and by a long-lasting training and tradition, a maturity in which the individuals may be trusted to maintain a reasonable balance between individual liberty and social integration. In 1918 only the peoples of Western Europe and Scandinavia, besides the United States, after a struggle and preparation of more than a century, and under favorable social and economic conditions, had reached this stage of development. The populations of the empires of the Romanovs, of the Hohenzollerns and the Habsburgs, and of the Ottoman Sultans were still under the domination of an intellectual, political, and economic order which had only partly yielded to the influences emanating from the British, American, and French revolutions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In Central and Eastern Europe a twofold opposition, that of Communism and Fascism, arose against democracy. Communism and Fascism are fundamentally opposed in their aims, and practically identical in their methods. Communism in its aim is not in conflict with some of the conclusions derived from the principles of the three great Western revolutions. It professes to believe in the ultimate goal of a society of free and equal individuals. But on the march to the supposed or proclaimed goal, the individual, his dignity, and his liberty are entirely crushed and submerged in the exigencies of the state. Thus, with all lip-service recognition to a future "perfect" democracy, the foundation of democracy, the free individ-

218 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

ual, is annihilated. There is, however, in addition to the complete antagonism in the methods used and the evaluations proffered, one fundamental difference between democracy and Communism. Democracy believes in man as man, Communism believes only in man as far as he is a member of the working class. Communism does not deal with the concrete reality of the individual, but the abstraction of the proletariat.

Fascism resembles Communism in its methods. Mussolini and Hitler have learned much in their technique from Lenin. Both Fascism and Communism have tried to reduce the tension between individual liberty and social integration to a minimum. They have tried to do it by practically abolishing individuality and extolling social integration to the utmost. Mussolini has expressed it in his article on "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism" in a characteristic way: "The individual in the Fascist state is not annulled but rather multiplied, just in the same way that the soldier in a regiment is not diminished but rather increased by the number of his comrades." Mussolini fails to understand that it is the meaning of democracy that an individual cannot be multiplied and regimented like a soldier. Therefore he goes on in the same characteristic way: "The Fascist state organizes the nation, but leaves a sufficient margin of liberty to the individual. The latter is deprived of all useless and possibly harmful freedom but retains what is essential; the deciding power in this question cannot be the individual, but the state alone." This

solution makes the individual entirely dependent upon the state. The individual is not more than the state allows him to be. His autonomy and liberty are submerged in the all-powerful state.

The tension between individual liberty and social integration grows with the growing complexity of the modern world. With populations unaccustomed to individual liberty and autonomy, or with a great dead weight of feudal or autocratic traditions or of illiterate and lethargic masses, Communism and Fascism seem to offer a relaxation of the tension, a short cut out of the painful and difficult travail of democracy into an apparent security. Communism tries a short cut to a glorified future and sacrifices the happiness and rights of the present individuals to that future. Fascism escapes into a glorified past, the Roman Empire or the pre-Christian Germans, and tries to mold the present individuals according to a standard which antedates not only the three Western revolutions, but even Christianity.

Communism and Fascism are united in their contempt for "decaying" democracy, in the aggressive exuberance of their "youth," in the vehemence of their language, and in their dislike for compromise and toleration. But Communism is a product of the social philosophy of nineteenth-century Europe; it is not only a political technique, it is a rational system, an attempt at an understanding of the general process of history and society. Fascism is much more of a political technique, without a definite rational philoso-

phy. It is based upon an emotional urge for group power. In Communism even the proletariat has a general function for the whole of humanity. Fascism is concerned exclusively with a particular group, its interests and growth. This group is in the case of Italian Fascism, the state; in the case of German National Socialism, the racial group, or folk. Fascism, different in this respect not only from Communism and democracy, but also from the Holy Alliance, has no universal message, no generous appeal to humanity. As Mussolini said: "Fascism repudiates any universal embrace." Fascism in all its forms is the first great movement in history which denies, on principle and in its methods, the ideas of universal justice, of charity, and of peace.¹ Thus Fascism runs counter not only to democracy but also to all the established foundations of civilization. It is a return to primitive tribal society, but equipped with the weapons of the most modern technique and science. The Fascist leaders and philosophers proclaim openly and defi-

¹ In National Socialist Germany it is frequently claimed that the German "revolution" of today resembles the English Revolution of the seventeenth century. Ernest Barker has rightly shown how unfounded this claim is (*Oliver Cromwell and the English People*, Cambridge University Press, 1937). Cromwell and his Puritan contemporaries cherished a sort of nationalism, but the community for which they cherished this feeling was not decided by blood but by faith. It was a nation by adoption and grace; after the model of the Old Testament, a new Israel. This nationalism runs easily and naturally into internationalism. Cromwell was profoundly an individualist, concerned with the direct relation between God and the individual, fundamentally opposed to uniformity. The interest of the nation was never with him an absolute or ultimate goal. It was subordinated to the interests of universal Christianity and to the liberty of individual faith.

antly the unbridgeable gulf separating them from democracy and all forms of liberal and rational humanism or Christian brotherhood, compassion, and humility.

This return to a primitive or "natural" stage, to a biological materialism as in German National Socialism, or to a glorification of power and strength as in all Fascism, threatens not only peace, but also that refinement of man's conscience, of his awareness of his fellow man's wants and ills, which has grown up slowly and painfully since the eighteenth century. At the same time, however, Fascism may reinvigorate democracy. Democracy, proud of its successes at the beginning of the twentieth century, was steeped in complacency. It took the constitutional liberties of the individual for granted. It forgot that they were of very recent origin, that they had been gained by a hard and enthusiastic fight, and that they needed for their preservation, for their spread and growth, a constant alertness, a permanent revitalization.

Fascism also sometimes claims to be "democratic," because it represents the will of the majority of a nation. But democracy means infinitely more than simply the prevalence of the will of the majority. Democracy expresses itself not only in the form of the laws, but even more in their content and spirit. Democracy protects the individual and minorities against the omnipotent will of the state, whether it be the will of an individual — king or leader — or of a majority of the people. Democracy has developed

222 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

a system of liberty to protect the rights of the individual and of minorities. Freedom of thought and of the expression of opinion, the guarantee of due process of law, and the equality of rights without exception are some of the fundamental safeguards of democracy. These liberties alone, which are denied by Fascism with its ideal of regimentation, allow peaceful adaptation to changing circumstances. But these liberties are only the corollary of a basic attitude without which democracy becomes meaningless. They are founded upon the recognition that every human being is a fellow man, equal to every other in his right to liberty and to the quest for happiness. Only the recognition of such equality makes it possible for democracy to acknowledge reasoning as a better instrument for social justice and readjustment than force. Therefore democracy must be watchful, and can never tolerate any advocacy of intolerance which would destroy the freedom and equality of individuals.

Democracy, from the very time of its inception in the three great Western revolutions, had a universal appeal. Its message was never confined to one class, one nation, or one racial group. It not only tried to determine the relation between the individual and the state, but between individual and individual, between state and state, between man and humanity. There is nothing exclusive in democracy, although it may penetrate only slowly and after many struggles to widening circles of classes and peoples. All the fight-

ers for democracy have identified their cause with that of humanity. As early as the seventeenth century John Milton, in his "Second Defense of the People of England," had the prophetic vision of the all-embracing character of democracy. "Surrounded by congregated multitudes, I now imagine that, from the columns of Hercules to the Indian Ocean, I behold the nations of the earth recovering that liberty which they so long had lost; and that the people of this island are transporting to other countries a plant of more beneficial qualities, and more noble growth, than that which Triptolemus is reported to have carried from region to region; that they are disseminating the blessings of civilization among cities, kingdoms, and nations." Democracy has not always lived up to its own promises. There have been attempts to reserve its blessings to privileged classes or privileged races. But these shortcomings are not surprising; democracy has had barely more than a century in which to develop. Its main task is still ahead: the enlargement of all that it implies, liberty and equality, dignity and happiness for all individuals. It still has to embrace all classes, to provide equal opportunity for all men in every walk and condition of life. Even more difficult will be its enlargement to embrace all peoples, including the most backward, in a cooperative federation of mankind. The founders of the Second French Republic, which for the first time in Europe established universal suffrage, never again to disappear from France, saw in their republic only the beginning

of a Universal Republic.² The greatest artistic expression which democracy has found, the Fourth Movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, culminates in the universal embrace of Schiller's Ode to Joy: "Be embraced, O ye millions! Here's a kiss for all the world."

The nineteenth century was concerned primarily with the relationship between the individual and the state. In Western Europe and in the United States, as well as to the generation of 1848, liberty meant primarily the autonomy of the individual and its protection as against the state. The word liberty received an entirely different connotation in its use in Central Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. Then liberty meant, especially from the time of Bismarck, not the autonomy of the individual

² This universal patriotism was well expressed in the famous "Mar-seillaise de la Paix" which Lamartine wrote in 1841 in answer to Nikolaus Becker's song "Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein":

"Nations, mot pompeux pour dire barbarie,
L'amour s'arrête-t-il où s'arrêtent vos pas?
Déchirez ces drapeaux; une autre voix vous crie:
'L'égoïsme et la haine ont seuls une patrie;
La fraternité n'en a pas!' . . .
Chacun est du climat de son intelligence;
Je suis concitoyen de tout homme qui pense:
La vérité, c'est mon pays!"

Fifteen years later, in his *Cours familier de Littérature*, he wrote: ". . . Peut-être nous a-t-on justement accusé quelquefois de n'avoir pas assez de ce patriotisme de mappemonde qui s'arrête aux frontières, et d'avoir trop de penchant pour ce patriotisme universel ou cosmopolite qui s'honore d'être né homme par le don de Dieu beaucoup plus que d'être né Français par l'effet du hasard. *Homo sum!* voilà ma patrie! Nous l'avons dit dans ces vers qui nous ont été assez reprochés, et que nous ne désavouons pas. . . ."

within the state, but the liberty and power of the nation within the international community. This national liberty threatened to absorb personal liberty. It drew attention to the necessity of establishing not only a democratic life within a nation, but also as between nations.

The twentieth century became concerned with democracy in the international field. Under the impulse of the cosmopolitan rationalism of the eighteenth century and of the French Revolution, Immanuel Kant proclaimed the philosophical necessity of eternal peace and of a cosmopolitan society. In his "Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht," he declares that the greatest problem for the human race is the creation of a world republic, and he recognizes that the solution of the problem of a good national constitution depends upon the solution of the international problem of the relations between nations. During the World War Kant's vision took shape in the proposal for a League of Nations.³

Democracy means the equality of individuals and the protection of the weaker by law. It can easily be understood that the maintenance of these principles, on which alone a real peace can be based, is of vital importance for democracy, not only nationally but also internationally. Democracy implies a very delicate balance between the right of the individual and

³ Woodrow Wilson himself was influenced by Giuseppe Mazzini's democratic and idealistic nationalism which tried to combine national self-determination and independence with the ethical and unitarian tradition dating in Italy from Dante's *De Monarchia*.

the needs of social integration. Under conditions of modern warfare, with their total mobilization of all resources, this balance can not be maintained. War necessarily curtails the functioning of democracy. The principles of an army are fundamentally opposed to the principles of democracy: the latter is based on individual liberty and equality, on discussion, on moderation and charity; the army on authority, discipline, and aggressiveness. Fascist countries model their life according to the example of the army and pride themselves upon the warrior spirit of their populations. Their whole civic life is based upon authority, discipline, and aggressiveness. Fascism is the mightiest organization for war ever conceived, politically, intellectually, and economically. Fascism thrives in an international atmosphere which gives room for the exercise of warlike virtues and of aggressiveness, and it presupposes such an atmosphere. Democracy withers or is endangered in a similar atmosphere. It presupposes an international order on the basis of the complete equality of all nations and races and of the protection of the weaker by a universally applicable law binding upon the community of nations.

With the growing interdependence of all nations and the shrinking of the earth as a result of technical progress, the establishment of international democracy by a league or federation of nations becomes imperative for the preservation and growth of democracy. An international world order, as first outlined in Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations, carries the

universal idea of human solidarity to its logical conclusion. Under present circumstances no nation can remain indifferent to the fate of a fellow nation. An orderly progressive development is only possible when the obligations of law are recognized. Insistence on the right of the stronger, on privileges for the more powerful, better armed, or more "progressive" races, on national self-interest and honor as supreme arbiters, must lead to international chaos. Nationally, in the nineteenth century we left this stage of lawlessness far behind us. Internationally we are still in its midst — but the Fascist nations have receded to this primitive stage even in their domestic affairs. Democracy could feel safe in the nineteenth century; it can no longer in the twentieth.

As Kant and Woodrow Wilson foresaw, the League of Nations must be built upon an acceptance of the principles of democracy. The establishment of a system of international law would secure the protection of the weak as well as the strong, it would create a new sense of security, remove fear and suspicion. The establishment of national law a few centuries ago made civic disarmament possible, the establishment of international law will make national disarmament possible. Then it will be possible to proceed to political and economic readjustments, to a struggle for the rise of the standard of living on a world-wide scale. The ideals of the League of Nations — peace, equality, universalism — are the direct outcome of democracy. As Kant had already fore-

228 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

seen, the League will only be able to function successfully if composed of members recognizing democracy as the true foundation of government. It is essential that the direction of the way be clearly recognized and sincerely acknowledged. The inclusion of members who openly flaunt their opposition to collective security, to equality of all states, to the idea of perpetual peace, and who proclaim their readiness to do everything to block their realization, can scarcely fail to destroy the League of Nations. Without the system of collective security the twentieth century is doomed to result in wars of growing scope and frightfulness. These wars, even the constant threat of such wars, will make it more and more difficult to maintain and spread the foundations of civilized life. The economic problems of today demand as much of an international solution and an international order as the political problems. With the growing complexity of economic life, and with international interdependence an accomplished fact, the maintenance of the balance between individual liberties and social integration depends more and more upon the solution of economic problems on a world-wide scale. This solution can be attempted only under a system of collective security and peaceful cooperation.

The main progress of modern history has proceeded along two lines: the restatement of the relationship between the individual and the state on the basis of individual autonomy and equality; and the growth of

human solidarity. The foundations have been laid by the three great Western revolutions. In the twentieth century even the most distant peoples were drawn into the Great Society. The awakening of dormant masses and races into a common consciousness has rendered the task of democracy infinitely more difficult, its failures and shortcomings infinitely more serious, but at the same time its achievement and struggles infinitely more promising.

IX

The Twilight of Nationalism?

MANY observers have interpreted the present struggle in Spain as a conflict between two supranational ideas, as the beginning of a new era in which the alignment of wars will no longer be that of nation against nation. Is this a true analysis of the importance of the events in Spain? The Civil War which began in Spain in July 1936 undoubtedly marks a turning point in the history of that country. Whatever its immediate results, it will be regarded later as the dawn of a new era for *Spain*. For the Civil War there is in no way a fight between Communism and Fascism. The two Fascist dictators, Mussolini and Hitler, would like us to believe that contemporary history¹ can be interpreted as a conflict between the world-saving heroic force of Fascism and the decaying forces of liberalism and Communism, which they regard as the heinous product of the decomposition of liberalism. Their propaganda aims at representing the forces behind the popular-front government in Spain as Communistic and the forces behind the military junta of General Franco as Fascist. From the opposite side the Com-

¹ It should be pointed out, however, that there seems to be no necessary international hostility between Fascism and Communism. Fascist Italy and Communist Russia remained on very friendly terms down to 1935.

munists tend toward a similar oversimplification. Thus the struggle in Spain appears as a stage in the supposedly world-wide fight between Fascism and Communism, a struggle between two "international," or better, "trans-national" ideas which according to Fascist interpretation today split all nations into two camps with civil war as the necessary outcome of this split. As Fascism supposedly "saved" Italy and Germany from the menace of Communism, so it "saves" Spain today and may "save" France, Czechoslovakia, or the United States tomorrow. The fact that Italian and German troops and Fascist sympathizers from Ireland, Rumania, and other countries form the backbone (outside of Mohammedan tribes from Morocco) of General Franco's army, and that some thousands of Italians, Germans, Frenchmen, Englishmen, Russians, and others of socialistic, Communistic, or democratic sympathies fight for the Spanish government, seems to lend some justification to the theory that in Spain an "international" or "trans-national" war is being fought.

In reality the Civil War in Spain is a stage, and probably the decisive one, in the national development of Spain. The struggle for Spain's modernization started in 1808 under the influence of the French Revolution and in opposition to Napoleon's armies. During the entire nineteenth century the struggle went on, but on the whole, notwithstanding the devotion of a handful of truly patriotic individuals, Old Spain was triumphant over Young Spain down to

1931. Spain remained outside Europe. "The main fact about the land is its inaccessibility. Spain is a castle." With these words Salvador de Madariaga opens his book on Spain. With all the riches of the American colonial empire, with an abundance of iron, copper, coal, and other minerals in the land, with a sober and hardworking common people, Spain remained a backward country, Oriental and medieval, ruled by a lazy and irresponsible feudal class, an inefficient military caste, and an immensely wealthy, unenlightened, and intolerant Church. "It would be difficult to find a country in which clericalism is more rigidly inimical to all reasonable compromise with the *Zeitgeist* than contemporary Spain. The history of the nineteenth century in Spain would have been much quieter and much richer in results had the evolution of the Spanish people taken place in the absence of clericalism and militarism. As it is, the almost chronic civil war, the outward form of that evolution in the nineteenth century, . . . ends in a tacit but efficient treaty of cooperation between clericalism and militarism, so that the arms of the Restoration might well be described as a sword and a cross (considered as a weapon) surmounted by the royal crown."²

The "almost chronic civil war" changed but little the abject poverty of the Spanish masses, their lack of education (the latest census returns of 1930 show that only 47.22 per cent of the population could read

² Madariaga, *Spain* (New York: Scribners, 1930), p. 220.

and write, and probably a large part of these "literate" could read and write in a very limited sense of the word), the suppression of their personality and initiative, the seclusion of women. Young Spain, under the leadership of the "generation of 1898," wished to "Europeanize" Spain, to reorganize production and education, to arouse the people from their lethargy, to create a new solidarity, a living consciousness of the Spanish people. Young Spain was deeply patriotic. Its opposition to Old Spain was not the opposition of internationalism to nationalism, but that of two interpretations of nationalism — a modern, progressive, and liberal interpretation against a backward, clerical, and feudal one. The present Spanish Ambassador to the United States, Fernando de los Rios, said in a speech on November 30, 1936, that "one of the main goals of the founders of the Spanish Republic was to develop in the masses, to their fullest extent, all the potential qualities inherent in the Spaniard. We wanted the masses to turn from mere masses into a conscious people. We wanted them to become conscious of themselves, of their lofty destiny, of their supreme historical mission." Against the liberal, progressive, and European nationalism of Young Spain, which triumphed in the Revolution of 1931 and again in the elections of February, 1936, Old Spain — the militarists, the clericals, the landlords — tried in July 1936 to assert their concept of nationalism.³ The "al-

³ At that time the Spanish government was composed exclusively of bourgeois liberals and included no socialists, Communists, or an-

most chronic civil war" in Spain goes on, a national war, a struggle between two opposite interpretations of Spanish history and destiny, explainable only by the past and by the national character of the different peoples in the Iberian peninsula.

Whatever the immediate outcome of the present civil war may be (in the present situation in Europe it will not depend upon the native forces in Spain — in such a case the victory of the progressive forces would be most probable — but on the general international situation and on the strength of Fascism outside Spain), it will have promoted the cause of modern nationalism in Spain. The Spaniards are known as strong individualists. The nature of the land, with its mountains and vast arid stretches, the lack of communications and of modern education, have fostered a spirit of strict regionalism. Federalism is a natural form for Spain, where the conservative government had tried an inefficient and oppressive centralism. Old Spain represents this centralism, and therefore in the present civil war we find both the Catalans and the Basques siding with the Spanish government. Between those national minorities (with their pride in their own old history, culture, and language, on the basis of which they demand independence or at least a large autonomy) and the Spanish people no community of feeling and sympathy exists. But even the

archists. The Civil War naturally drove the government toward the left in seeking the support of the masses against the forces of the reactionary generals.

different regions of Spain inhabited by Spaniards have not yet been welded into a unity, have never been integrated into a nation in the modern sense of the word, into a conscious community of traditions, thought, emotions, hopes, and interests which awakens in every citizen the feeling of active responsibility for the whole. The Spanish masses are still lethargic. Even in this civil war at its very beginning the outside observer could note with astonishment the small number of Spanish citizens fighting on either side, at the outset even on the side of the government, and the strange indifference shown by some provinces and regions to the fate of others. The longer the civil war lasts the more it will stir the masses out of their lethargy, make them realize the interests at stake, integrate them into a whole, create a Spanish nation by adapting its national psychology to the conditions prevailing in the modern world. The struggle in Spain is not a struggle between Communists and Fascists. There are Communists cooperating with the government of the popular front, but they are a minority when compared with the anarcho-syndicalists, socialists, liberals, Basque and Catalan nationalists. There are Spanish Fascists, the Falange Española, founded by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the son of the former military dictator of Spain, but they are a minority beside the Renovación Española, the Acción Popular, and the Communion Tradicionalista which represents the direct descendants of the Carlist movement of the nineteenth century and regards, after the

death of their "King" Don Jaime, a brother of the former empress Zita, Don Xavier of Bourbon and Parma as the "Regent." Not the fate of Fascism or Communism is being decided in the Spanish Civil War,⁴ but the national future of Spain.

The fact that foreign Fascists and Communists are fighting at present in the Spanish Civil War does not change its character as an eminently national struggle. On the side of the government individual Communists, socialists, and liberals are fighting, expressing thereby their sympathy for the cause of democracy or of socialism — as happened again and again during the nineteenth century. In all the great fights for liberalism and national liberation, in Greece and in Paris, in Italy and in Poland, individual sympathizers fought as volunteers. Many of the ardent nationalists of the nineteenth century were to be found on all the battlefields of liberty. Most of the Germans, Italians, or Frenchmen who serve today in the ranks of the government troops are not fighting an internal or a trans-national war; they are fighting in the tradition of Mazzini's and Garibaldi's Young Europe for a liberal or socialistic Germany, Italy, or France. The interests of the progressive forces within all nations are identical today, as they were in the period of the fight of liberalism against the Holy Alliance.

⁴The fate of Great Britain and France and their democracies against Fascist Germany and Italy is, to a large extent, being decided in Spain, but not by the forces fighting in Spain. The decision is in the hands of diplomats and statesmen in London, Paris, and Washington.

Nor is the official intervention by Mussolini and Hitler for Old Spain anything startling or new. When the two Fascist dictators declare by their official spokesmen that they will never tolerate a Communist regime in Spain⁵ they repeat only what Metternich and his spokesmen said about the non-toleration of a liberal regime in Spain or in Italy.⁶ About one hundred and fifteen years ago the European reaction of throne and altar crushed Young Spain and Young Italy by military intervention in Spain and Naples. Since then Young Spain has grown in strength, has succeeded more and more in winning over the Spanish masses to an active participation in national life. It is doubtful whether European re-

⁵ In reality Germany and Italy fight in Spain for their own nationalistic interests. Both are vitally interested in having in Spain a friendly government depending upon their help, Germany in case of a war against France, Italy in case of a war against France and Great Britain in the Mediterranean. "Ideology" is frequently used as a pretext for purely nationalistic desires for expansion.

⁶ Two remarks by English statesmen of the nineteenth century are not without much interest for the present situation. On April 19, 1837, Palmerston declared that the triumph of reaction in the Spanish Civil War, waged then in the Peninsula, would be a disaster to the ideals which England upheld at home and in Europe: "I will tell them (the honourable gentlemen opposite) that if Don Carlos could succeed in establishing his power in Spain, peace might indeed exist there, for the iron tyranny that would ensue might secure a species of tranquillity; but even if this tranquillity of death were to prevail in Spain, peace would be ruined in the rest of Europe."

In 1873 the abdication of King Amadeo of Spain made it appear possible that Spain would become a Republic. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Lord Odo Russell, wrote then to the British Foreign Secretary about Prince Bismarck's attitude: "The establishment of another Republic in Europe will be looked upon as a dangerous example to Germany by her rulers, and doubly so if by enjoying the cordial sympathy of liberal England and France, Republican Spain appears to add to the moral influence of France and her allies."

238 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

action will be as successful this time in checking progress for a long period as it was a century ago. The Civil War will incorporate Spain into Europe, into the modern world.

The historical process of the last hundred years can be conveniently summed up as pan-nationalism. During this century, all over the world, nationalism became the dominating force, politically, culturally, and economically. The masses were everywhere integrated into the nation, schools trained them to participate in the cultural, economic reconstruction in the economic, life. This process, which started in Western Europe, has spread during recent decades to the countries around the Mediterranean, to Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. It is nearing its conclusion in our own day. By its completion it creates a paradoxical situation. The peoples of the earth are beginning to build their political, cultural, and economic life on similar foundations of nationalism, of popular education, of economic reconstruction. Modern schools, industrialization, the emancipation of women, have penetrated everywhere. Since the World War motor cars and airplanes have everywhere destroyed seclusion and isolation, have revolutionized age-old notions of space and time. Moving pictures and wireless have afforded the technical means for making cultural interdependence even stronger than economic interdependence. But at the same time every people awakened to nationalism has

begun to stress and to overstress its selfhood, its political independence, its cultural particularities, its economic autarchy; patriotic emotions have become the most potent factor in arousing popular opinion. Pan-nationalism has led not only to a cultural and economic interdependence of all the peoples but at the same time to their more conscious and embittered antagonism. Pan-nationalism glorifies nationalism everywhere, but in completing its triumphal march around the earth it creates conditions which make the national framework incongruous with a new reality of interdependence. This absurd situation is at the bottom of our present political, economic, and cultural crisis.

This is today not merely a European problem. It seems obsolete to think today of an isolated Europe. Since the World War, communications, not only in the field of locomotion but also in the field of ideas, have entirely changed the picture. The regional and continental framework will quickly become as obsolete as the national. With all due regard to geographic and historical differences, it can safely be stated that China is fighting today the same battle as Spain. Everywhere, and not only in Europe, nationalism is today the dominating force molding human destiny. In many "backward" countries nationalism struggles today to gain its appropriate form of self-expression in politics, economics, and cultural life. This is the case in Spain as well as in China or Mexico. The forces of battle, and not only in Europe, are still marshaled along national lines.

Nationalism still rules supreme. Will it rule for long? It seems today at the climax of its historical development. It has penetrated all countries and all continents. It has aroused ever-growing numbers of formerly non-nationalistic or non-active masses into active nationalism. It seems to have established its dominion over all lands and over all seas. With the populations of the Fascist countries, Italy and Germany, nationalism has become almost a frenzy and a fury. The nation has there become the supreme sovereign, not only in politics and economics but in all matters spiritual and intellectual. Truth and justice, science and religion, have become completely subservient to the nation, sharp swords in the struggle to achieve aspirations of domination and power. Humanity seems lost and abandoned without hope to a world gone mad with nationalism.

But nationalism did not always determine the battle lines of mankind. Nationalities are very old and so is national feeling, pride in one's group, dislike of the foreigner. This national feeling does not, however, constitute nationalism. It is one of the many sentiments which, intermingled with many others and frequently obliterated by stronger ones, can be found throughout the short space of five thousand years of human history of which we have some adequate knowledge. But until very recently this sentiment was never exclusive, dominating, or supreme. Up to the eighteenth century it was confined to certain individuals and to certain brief periods, it did not drive

men to war, nor did it set up for men the normative rules for, and pretend to be the only source of, their cultural life, their political organization, their economic activity. Only in the last two centuries has nationalism become exclusive, commanding the supreme loyalty of men above all their other loyalties, proclaiming the "truth," formerly entirely unknown, of the nation as the only "natural" and "organic" basis for political organization, the source and inspiration of spiritual and intellectual life, the center of economic activity. The process of pan-nationalism is succeeding today in making the creed of nationalism the most universally accepted creed of mankind.

Nationalism entered upon its domination only a comparatively short time ago. To a thoughtful observer, however, its day seems nearing its end — despite its apparent triumph or perhaps on account of this triumph. The new state of economic and cultural interdependence, created with terrifying speed in the last twenty years, renders nationalism obsolete, demands a new political and economic world order. This development is still much too young and much too rapid to be understood or accepted by public opinion. It seems in complete contradiction to the beliefs of the latter half of the nineteenth century, which still prevail. It does not yet influence political life. It may, in a not distant future.

Again and again in history we find that in a period of quickly changing reality, when the objective conditions for the survival of a political idea or a com-

munal psychology disappear, this political idea receives increasing emphasis. It seems as though in a last effort of self-assertion the idea which had dominated preceding generations would almost overreach itself, would find its most extreme and sometimes even most sublime expression in a generation which still clings to the idea but lives under circumstances that undermine its very base. At the beginning of the fifth century, when the splendor of Rome had been shattered by the onslaught of the barbarian hordes, when Alaric had besieged and sacked the Eternal City, when the universalism of Roman law and order was quickly dissolving, the poet Rutilius Claudius expressed once again, in a dithyrambic poem, the glory that had been, that still was Rome's. "*Urbem fecisti quod prius orbis erat.*" The unique greatness of the past lived once more before the longing eyes of a generation which felt the earth trembling under its feet. Similarly we find in the thirteenth century, when the medieval order of Church and Empire was breaking up forever and new forces were rising in the territorial states, in the trading and manufacturing cities, in secular poetry and science, the theories of the universal dominion of Pope and of Emperor reasserted in a way far more intransigent and triumphant than in the times of their real life and power. Then, in the late but violent afterglow of the imperial concept, Dante wrote his *De Monarchia*, the immortal swan-song of the dying universalism, and rapturously greeted Henry VII, who crossed the Alps in the hope of realizing what

must have remained, in the changed circumstances, an unreal idea. Again, religious fanaticism has rarely been so strong as in the seventeenth century, when religious exaltation produced some of its finest flowerings, yet religious intolerance triumphed in religious wars and persecutions. To later generations this extreme intensity appears like a last effort to perpetuate an idea doomed by the march of history: communal psychology began to change at the end of the seventeenth century, the "*crise de la conscience européenne*," described and analyzed in a masterly way by Professor Paul Hazard, was under way, and in the eighteenth century religious wars seemed as obsolete as national wars may seem in the twenty-first.

Many contemporary observers maintain that we are entering a period of religious wars and fanaticism. This statement cannot imply more than a comparison. It means that we find today a fanaticism, an intolerance, a permanence of war clouds similar to those of the seventeenth century. Moreover, as the seventeenth century was one of violent afterglow from the era of religion (of political, dominant, "totalitarian" religion of course),⁷ may not the twentieth century be marked by a violent afterglow from the era of political, dominant, "totalitarian" nationalism?

⁷ As religion did not disappear with the era of religion but became non-political, less dominant, relative, so national sentiment will outlive the era of the absolute domination of nationalism. National sentiment may then become personal and apolitical as religion has become. The element of coercion and power will disappear, and there will then be as few accusations of treason or lack of patriotism as there are today of heresy or apostasy.

Today Fascism appears, not (as most Marxists believe) as the last stage of decaying capitalism, but as the last and therefore most violent, most triumphant, most exaggerated stage of nationalism. At a time when all the aspects of a fast-changing reality around us point toward the insufficiency of nationalism and provincial-mindedness, nationalism once more wishes to reassert itself in an even more forceful, all-comprehensive, and exclusive way. It wishes to perpetuate the national battle lines, to transform every nation into a vast permanent armed camp. It denies any new future, it looks consistently to the past, it preaches the unchangeability of races, of human nature, of history; it wishes without any compromise to immobilize us in the mold of the past. It puts the *Volksgeist* above the *Zeitgeist*, it denies the new spirit of the times and preaches the eternity of the racial spirit.

In this discrepancy between a changing reality, a new *Zeitgeist*, and the violent reassertion of the continuing order of the past we may find the deepest roots of our present world-wide crisis. We see today a nationalism still rooted in the past but ready to compromise with the new spirit of the time — a liberal, forward-looking nationalism. It is represented by that France which dates back to the French Revolution, and by the Anglo-Saxon countries — especially the United States, where the remnants of the feudal age have not persisted as in Great Britain. This liberal nationalism looks forward to a growing diminution of nationalism, to a peaceful international order. In

such countries the consciousness of a new order is growing, an order no longer based upon national self-interest and aggrandizement but upon the political, economic, and cultural interaction of all peoples, upon a new reassertion of Man in a cooperative society of humanity.

In this dawn of a new epoch Fascism, with its emphasis upon nationalism and upon the past, looms as the greatest danger, for it hinders the necessary organization of a world society. In the transitional period in which we live (as mankind lived in transitional periods in the fifth, thirteenth, and seventeenth centuries) the Civil War in Spain is more than a struggle between two interpretations of Spanish nationalism and Spanish destiny. It is a struggle between a nationalism which regards itself as part of a forward movement toward diminished nationalism and a nationalism which considers itself and its foundation upon the past as eternal. Liberalism and socialism know that the exclusive nationalism of our period is a product of a historical development which had its origin in the intellectual, social, and economic conditions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and may, with changing conditions, disappear. Fascism believes an exclusive and dominant nationalism eternal, history a struggle of races or nations, the inequality of races and men permanent and beneficial, and an international peaceful order a heinous dream. For this reason liberals, socialists, and Fascists all over the world are interested in the outcome of the Civil

War in Spain. It is an important stage in the worldwide struggle between progressive and reactionary forces, a part of the great effort of mankind to adapt the intellectual and social order to the changing circumstances of a new era, which will resume the march towards greater liberty, equality, and humanity.

A NEW NEAR EAST

There is only one civilization and that is the patrimony
of the great human family.

ABDULLAH DJEVDET, *Idjtihad*, March 1, 1929

The Turkish Revolution

THE Turkish Revolution is part of a world-wide process which consists of the adoption and adaptation of forms of life and production which were first developed among the intellectual classes and the rising *bourgeoisie* in certain western European countries. These new forms of thought, life, and production can be, very roughly and approximately, summarized as rationalism, individualism, and industrialism. Their dynamic force undermined and revolutionized the intellectual attitude, the social life, and the economic structure of the Occidental countries. Modern civilization, as we may call the new ways of life and production arising in the eighteenth century, spread from the classes and countries where it originated to other countries and classes. Wherever it penetrated, it destroyed the traditional structure of society. This expansion was immanent in its very nature.

The countries and classes which had first experienced modern civilization wished to reserve its advantages for themselves and to base their strength and their claim to superiority upon the exclusive possession of those advantages, but by its appeal to reason, individuality, and progress, instead of to traditions and precedent, this civilization had from the

beginning a universal scope and meaning for all classes and nations. Its diffusion from certain classes and localities in western Europe to all the classes in every part of the earth was an uneven process. Even today in western Europe there are individuals, groups, localities, and ways of life less integrated than others into modern civilization. But the process of integration gives to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries an unmistakable stamp.

Today modern civilization, which the white man and the *bourgeoisie* successfully exploited for their own purposes for a long time, has spread to the masses and to non-white countries. Such twentieth-century phenomena as the "revolt of the masses" and the "revolt of the East" originate in the penetration of modern civilization to the masses and to Oriental countries. They create part of the crisis in which mankind today finds itself. They demand a readjustment to this unprecedented expansion. Notwithstanding the difficulties involved, this expansion is not to be regretted. It is unavoidable; it represents the triumph and fulfillment of modern civilization.

Since it originated in western Europe and spread from there, we may call the transformation going on today all over Asia and northern Africa a process of Europeanization or Westernization, although strictly speaking it is a phase of adoption and adaptation of modern civilization similar to that of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in European and American countries. The forms of adaptation vary

from country to country and from class to class. As in European nations, all kinds and degrees of transition and fusion, of the traditional and the modern, can be observed. Much in the tempo of the process depends upon the government: it is fastest where national governments promote it; it is slowest where colonial governments try to impede its development. This effort at retardation is rarely consciously undertaken except by Fascist governments which deny the universality of civilization and reject its foundations in rationalism, individualism, and equality of men and races. Although with others we sometimes find the belief that modern civilization is reserved for, or beneficial to, certain races and classes only (such convictions and interpretations generally coincide with the real or supposed interests of the ruling classes or imperial peoples), nevertheless the universal scope of civilization and the humanitarian appeal are recognized, and they force, even against the will sometimes of the ruling group, their transmission to other races and classes. Thus today in all countries of Asia and northern Africa the process of Europeanization goes on with similar manifestations and consequences.

Since the World War, the Europeanization of the Orient has been characterized by three traits which have intensified and extended the process to a degree entirely unknown before 1919. The first of these is the penetration of European ideas and ways of life from a narrow stratum of upper middle gentsia to the broad masses of the people.

is the realization that modernization of the political and intellectual life of the country and equality with European nations are entirely impossible without a thorough reorganization of economic life, an increase in production, and, with it, a much higher level of life for the native masses. The third is the ready acceptance of modern civilization, not only because there is danger of extinction without it, but also because its potentialities for higher cultural and economic standards of life are recognized. These new trends demand a concentration of all the intellectual and moral resources of the Oriental nations in an effort to transform the traditional social and economic order. It is accompanied by the awakening of the masses from their age-old lethargy; it creates new problems for education, for agriculture, for labor — problems which are not very different from those which many European nations faced a century ago.

Thus we find in all the Oriental countries today stages of transition similar to those through which Europe passed in the nineteenth century — the growth of industrialism, the emergence of the individual from the traditional restraints of family and clan, the urbanization of the countryside, the spread of modern education, the transformation of religion under the impact of rationalism. The same process is going on throughout the Soviet Union with its mixture of European and Oriental races, in those parts of Europe, like Spain, which during recent centuries have remained outside the general European development, and in

Latin America. The transformation is everywhere still far from complete. An analysis of the process in one country is valid, in its main trends and conclusions, for all the other countries.

Of all the Oriental countries, Turkey has traveled farthest in the direction of a complete modernization of her national life.¹ Here, as in the Soviet Union, modernization has not been confined to an introduction of modern industrialism and technique; it has penetrated into the everyday routines of life and permeated the intellectual climate of the population. The Turkish Revolution started in 1923. It is linked up with the name of Kamal Atatürk, who died on November 10, 1938.



The Treaty of Lausanne was signed July 23, 1923. A few months later, on October 29, 1923, the Grand National Assembly at Ankara proclaimed Turkey a republic, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha was elected its

¹ The great problem of Japan, it seems to me, arises from the lag between the highly modern industrial and technical equipment on the one hand, and the prevalent pre-modern social and intellectual attitudes on the other hand. In the Western world the intellectual transformation preceded the industrial one; rationalism opened the way for modern economic enterprise and social organization. In Japan an effort was made to preserve as far as possible the old intellectual and social order, equipping it only with the devices of modern technique. The future will reveal whether Japan can maintain such a system in times of crisis, or whether it will be forced to proceed to a thoroughgoing modernization and readjustment of the mental and social attitude underlying its present life. The problem of industrialization is an extremely complex one and can not be separated from the all-pervading transformation of the whole social and intellectual life of a country.

first President. These two events marked the end of one epoch and the beginning of another in the history of Turkey, indeed in the history of the entire Near East. The Treaty of Lausanne delimited Turkey's boundaries and determined her place among the nations; the constitutional changes of the following October transformed the country's internal organization.

Mustafa Kemal's appointment as President was the external symbol of these new developments. The capacities of this born leader — full of energy, sure of his aims, without scruples — were favored by the general trend of the times, so that he was able to bring about a complete change in the structure of the state, its laws, and its cultural and economic life. The same tendencies are at work everywhere in the East today; but in Turkey it has been possible to carry them into effect more thoroughly than elsewhere. For in Turkey the soil had been prepared by the persistent efforts of a small group of the native intelligentsia for fifty years, whereas, up to the beginning of the twentieth century, the other countries of western Asia can hardly be said to have been deeply touched by western influence. Turkey's victorious campaign against Greece, an ally of the Entente Powers, and the tearing-up of the Treaty of Sèvres put the Turkish masses in a state of mind which made radical changes in the structure of the national life possible. For they not only had attained to a political liberty such as they had never known before, but

with it they had also gained a new self-confidence and an implicit trust in the man who had been their leader during the war of liberation and who now set himself the task of modernizing the nation.

Mustafa Kemal's dictatorship is fundamentally different from Fascist dictatorships. It came into being about the same time as Mussolini's; both men were produced by Mediterranean culture, and both, Mussolini especially in the case of southern Italy and of the Italian islands, worked for a fast modernization of their countries, to supplant the traditional tempo of life of backward agrarian countries by the rhythm of modern industry. In both cases we find a vigorous concentration of all national energy in the form of an intensified nationalism which, conscious though it is of a great past, is full of dissatisfaction with the history of more recent times, when the countries in question were from many points of view mere picturesque museum pieces. But the dictatorship established by Mustafa Kemal is based upon liberal principles, upon the ideas of progress of the nineteenth century. It recognizes the fundamental equality of all before the law, it preserves as faithfully as possible the due process of law and the character of a constitutional state. Liberalism and democracy are not despised or scorned, they are the goal of education. Not only is the constitution radically democratic, but this democratic form is jealously preserved. Whereas Fascist dictatorships destroy the foundations of liberalism, Mustafa Kemal's dictatorship tried to educate a

people to democratic liberalism, a people in no way accustomed to or prepared for it. Mustafa Kemal remained human, even with all the shortcomings of human beings. He never erected himself into a semi-divine superman. As he died, the transition to his successor could happen with the most perfect and natural smoothness. He had not destroyed, by an anarchistic super-egotism, the foundations of the objective and civilized existence of a state. His Republican People's Party never developed a mysticism; it remained a rational, secular movement, after the example of the liberalism of the Third French Republic.

The statute of Mustafa Kemal's party dates from 1923. It is imbued with the spirit of secularism and liberalism which is making such headway today in all the countries of the East, fulfilling everywhere the same task it did in Europe a century and a half ago, the task of overcoming the darkness of the religious and feudal Middle Ages. The first article of this statute reads: "The goal of the party is government by the people and for the people, together with the elevation of Turkey to the status of a modern state." The other articles demand complete separation of religion and politics, social reorganization on the basis of modern civilization and the empirical and positive sciences, equal rights without exception for all citizens, and the abolition of all privileges on the part of any callings, groups, or individuals. Stress is also laid on the importance of Turkey's participation in cultural tasks and on equal rights for women.

According to the Constitution, all legislative and executive power is vested in a Grand National Assembly, chosen by the people. By a majority vote the National Assembly elects one of its members to be President; the ministers are chosen from the National Assembly and are responsible to it; it decides upon war and peace and upon all treaties with other nations, and it can also decree its own dissolution. The President, it is true, has the right to veto any laws passed by the National Assembly; but if a law is then passed a second time, his veto is thereby overridden. Thus, according to the letter of the Constitution, the representatives of the people are invested with absolute power.

By means of a clever scheme, however, the President, while constitutionally without undue influence, becomes for the time being the real power. The Chamber is understood to represent not merely the will of the people, but the completely unified will of the people. All representatives belong to the Republican People's Party, whose President, according to its statute, was Mustafa Kemal. He also appoints the Vice-President and the General Secretary of the party. The three together form the Presidial Council, which designates the candidates for the parliamentary elections. The decisions of the Presidial Council are absolutely binding on all members of the party. It also elects the twelve party inspectors, who are responsible for the organization of the party throughout the state. The Republican People's Party has its or-

ganization in every locality. Thus the popularly elected Grand National Assembly, ruling the country with absolute power, is the source of all laws and of all actions of the government; the Republican People's Party in its turn rules the Grand National Assembly; while the President rules the Republican People's Party. The entire power of the state is vested in him alone. Although therefore democracy did not function under Mustafa Kemal as it would in a country with old democratic traditions, nevertheless the democratic constitution remained a vital force which at any given moment could grow from form into substance as the process of education continued. The discussions in the Grand National Assembly were conducted with the liberty and seriousness of parliaments in the true sense of the word, and thus a body of well-informed future leaders could be trained.

In internal affairs, Mustafa Kemal's policy rests on the three principles of nationalism, secularism, and industrialism. These ideas were not new in Turkey in 1923. Up to 1908, the Ottoman Empire constituted a supranational unit, held together by religious and dynastic bonds. In those days the head of the dynasty — that is, the Sultan — was at the same time the religious head of all Mohammedans — that is, the Khalif. The idea of the Empire rested on the fact that its subjects were Mohammedan, quite irrespective of their nationality and language. Abdul Hamid II, the last great ruler of the Osman dynasty, which in past cen-

turies produced a number of powerful leaders, made one last attempt to preserve Islam as the foundation of the state against the inroads of the modern age. But the rule of the Sultan-Khalif, founded on a medieval idea of a religious empire, was an anachronism amid modern nations and under modern economic conditions, and was kept alive temporarily only by the selfish interests and the mutual jealousies of the European Powers. Abdul Hamid's romantic and reactionary policy of shutting Turkey away from modern influences was in the long run unable to prevent the entrance of new political ideas and forces. Under their onrush the five-hundred-year-old empire rapidly broke up.

The new leaders who now came to power — the Committee for Union and Progress, or Young Turks — were dominated, like Mustafa Kemal, by the modern political ideas of the West. Their ideal was the secular state of the people, as embodied in a nation united by common civilization, language, and historic ideals. In this way they came into conflict with Pan-Islamism and the religious foundations of the Empire, and also with its other inhabitants, both Mohammedan and non-Mohammedan. They strove to replace the religious Pan-Islamism by another conception, based on race and language, Pan-Turanianism. This, it was planned, would become the rallying-cry for the Turkish peoples of the Caucasus, southeastern Russia, and Central Asia to unite under the leadership of the Osman Turks. Enver Pasha, who fell in August 1922

while fighting against the Soviet army after being proclaimed Emir of Turkistan, was trying to save at least the old Turanian homeland out of the remnants of the shattered Pan-Turanian dream and the chaos of the World War.

The Young Turks had vainly endeavored to realize the idea of a modern national state amid the confusion of a dying empire, torn by national and religious tensions and incessantly threatened by superior enemies from without. After the World War, Mustafa Kemal took that idea up again under far more favorable conditions and put it into execution. He saw why the ideal of the Ottoman state was untenable, and why the ideal of the Turanian race could not be realized. In a realistic spirit he restricted himself to the Anatolian motherland of the Turkish people and decided to give his undivided attention to the Anatolian peasant, who had hitherto been carrying the burden of the idea of empire without any compensation. Notwithstanding the cruel way in which Mustafa Pasha in the summer of 1926 settled accounts with the former leaders of the Committee for Union and Progress, in order to eliminate any possible opposition to his personal leadership — the sort of leadership which leaves no room for partners — his conduct of the internal affairs of Turkey since the World War has been only a continuation of the same guiding principles which the Young Turks had observed fifteen years before.

But the Young Turks had lost the Balkan Wars

and the World War; they had become the grave-diggers of the Empire, and it seemed as if, thanks to them, the Turkish name were destined to disappear from the theater of history. Mustafa Kemal, on the contrary, was the victorious leader in the national war of independence, and the Turkey of his creation was the only one among the states vanquished in the World War which was able to replace the dictated and coercive peace by a favorable peace treaty concluded as between equals. To this statement must be added that this peace treaty created for the first time a Turkey which fulfilled all the prerequisites for a modern national state. Foreign control and interference with the sovereignty of the state, which (as in other eastern countries) had hitherto blocked all progress, were now things of the past. From the national and religious point of view, Turkey had become an almost homogeneous state. The Christian minorities hardly existed any longer. As late as 1923, there were a million and a half Greeks living in Asia Minor. They belonged to the original inhabitants of the country, and their towns and villages in Ionia and in the Pontus prided themselves on their connections with the centers of the old Hellenic culture on the eastern shores of the Aegean Sea. Like the Armenians, they have left their mark on the modern economic life of the country, thanks to their intellectual versatility, their industrial energy, and their commercial gifts. By the compulsory exchange which began on May 1, 1923, all these Greeks were transported to Greece

proper, and in return about half a million Mohammedans were transferred to Turkey. In this way the Pan-Hellenic dream of resuscitating the ancient Greece around the Aegean basin, a dream which had suffered a great set-back by the military defeat of 1922, was now definitely robbed of any possibility of future realization. The Armenian problem had already been solved in an even more radical way, and by sinister methods.

Today there are neither Greeks nor Armenians left in Asia Minor; the only national minority still existing is composed of the Mohammedan Kurds, in number about 1,200,000. Mustafa Kemal made an effort to solve their problem by trying to make Turks of them. He pressed his action with cruel determination. In sanguinary fights his incomparably superior army succeeded in quelling the repeated risings of the Kurds, who cherish their liberty; and for the time being their rebellious spirit has been broken. There was no room for national minorities in the Europeanized national state which Mustafa Kemal created; but this state remained a modern state, recognizing and guaranteeing equal rights for all its inhabitants.

Nationalism goes hand in hand with secularization. Once the national state is regarded as the highest form of organization, religion is deprived of a considerable share of its former controlling influence both in public and in private life. The citizen of the state becomes of greater importance than the co-religionist. But

while secularization thus implies a far-reaching restriction of the social sphere of Islamic influence, it does not imply the end of Islam any more than enlightenment and rationalism implied the end of religion in Europe. The organization of the state and the administration of law and education, hitherto subordinated to the religious authority, are now emancipated and secularized. From these cardinal principles, which underlie all that is happening in the East today, Mustafa Kemal drew the logical consequences. Within a few years the modern, secular, national state has been established by rapid steps. On March 3, 1924, the Caliphate was abolished for the reason that there was no room for it "in a national state." Mustafa Kemal delivered a speech on that occasion in which he proclaimed "the deliverance of politics from religious prejudices." The Ministry for Religious Affairs was abrogated; all mosque schools were declared closed; the ecclesiastical courts, whose jurisdiction was based on canon law, were abolished. This paved the way for the complete secularization of the administration of justice and of education. Two years later, the monasteries of the dervishes, which had played an important part in the religious life of the Turkish nation, were closed. At the same time, new regulations were issued concerning the official attire and duties of the clergy, and the Mohammedan chronology was replaced by the European calendar. In 1926, the law of the western nations was adopted in its most modern form. This constituted the most significant

step in the modernization of Turkish life. Turkish family law, which had hitherto been regulated by medieval canonical precepts, was now established on a uniform basis in accordance with Swiss law. It was but the natural outcome of all these innovations that on April 10, 1928, Islam ceased to be the established religion of the state. This, however, did not yet end the process of modernization. In 1935 Sunday was made the official weekly day of rest, and all Turks have been obliged to adopt family names, after the European way. Mustafa Kemal thus became Kamal Atatürk.

This secularization went hand in hand with the nationalization of religion — in other words, the permeation of Islam, which rested historically on Arabian foundations and was essentially supranational, with the spirit of the national Turkish culture. Turkish culture had been religious and humanistic, resting on Islamic and on national Arabian and Persian foundations. The classical Islamic literatures of the Arabians and Persians provided the matter for the instruction of the educated Turks, whose language was liberally interspersed with Arabic and Persian words and phrases. It was one of the aims of Turkish nationalism to make the language more popular and to divest it of its classic and religious associations. In 1929 instruction in the Arabic and Persian languages was abolished in the higher schools and replaced by the teaching of modern European languages. At the same time, a Turkish Linguistic Council was estab-

lished at Ankara and charged with the publication of a dictionary and a grammar in which all words borrowed from the Persian and Arabic languages were to be replaced, so far as possible, by Turkish words. The Koran, the fundamental code of Islam, originally written in the Arabic language, had already been translated into Turkish, but it was on January 22, 1932, during prayers in a mosque at Istanbul, that *suras* from the Koran were recited for the first time in a Turkish translation. A few days later, at the conclusion of Ramadan, the month of fast, when the mosque of St. Sophia was crowded with worshipers, the Koran and the prayers were chanted in Turkish by the most renowned cantors, and this service was broadcast by radio to all Turkish towns, where receiver sets had been installed in the mosques. Some resistance surged up once more in orthodox circles against this consummation of the process of nationalization and secularization; but it was promptly suppressed.

General education and the emancipation of women are usually proclaimed as two principal aims of a nationalist movement. In both directions the new Turkey is making great progress. Notwithstanding the lack of teachers, textbooks, and financial resources, the government has put its whole strength into the fight against illiteracy. Special attention is being given to primary education, hitherto sadly neglected, to the education of women, and to training in handicrafts, industries, and agriculture. The university system was

completely reorganized, new colleges were opened. The expulsion of Jewish professors from German universities in 1933 gave Turkey the opportunity to select eminent teachers for her colleges of arts and science, of medicine, law, and agriculture. In the schools stress is being laid on the importance of the new national spirit; foreign and missionary schools which are still in existence have to pay the same regard to the authority of the state as they would in any European country. The adoption of Latin characters and writing in 1928 might at first glance seem a merely external matter, like the introduction of European dress and headgear. As a matter of fact, however, these are but external symbols of an internal transformation of great significance. It is as if in a stuffy room the windows were suddenly thrown open. The entire nation is learning, counting Mustafa Kemal its foremost teacher, and the transformation witnessed during the past years in all domains of life, and above all in the status of women, is astounding. Women are now to be seen everywhere as officials and teachers. In 1934 the Turkish Republic granted women the right to vote and to be elected to the Grand National Assembly. The Assembly, elected in 1935, counted seventeen women among its three hundred and ninety-nine members. Relations between men and women have undergone a complete transformation, thanks to the new forms of social intercourse, to coeducation, and to the commingling of the two sexes in society and in sports. Sometimes it might seem that this movement is

spending itself in externals, or that Ankara confounds undesirable habits of western life with its real substance, with its achievements through centuries of intellectual effort. But even though the change may sometimes be too rapid and too violent there can be no doubt that Turkish life has been taken hold of by new dynamic forces. A feeling of liberation, an onward-pressing energy, buoy up the new Turkish nation. The chief deficiencies are a lack of searching self-criticism (which after all is not unknown among many older nations either) and, in sharp contrast to the former attitude of self-depreciation towards Europe, an excessive self-esteem which sometimes is apt to confound appearance with reality, but which for all that is easily to be explained by the rapid progress which has been made and by the joy of the people over seeing success crown their efforts.

The Turkish Republic has produced its own theory, or perhaps it would be more correct to say its own legend, regarding the past of the Turkish race, and it has seen to it that this is taught in the Turkish schools. Turkish civilization is declared the oldest in the world. The Hittites and their powerful ancient empire as regarded as ancestors of the present-day Turk. As the Hittites are supposed by their migrations and conquests to have spread civilization over the earth, all civilization is deeply indebted to the Turks. This too is a mere youthful imitation of other nations. Turkey is taking pride in her own past. In the 1923 program of the Republican People's Party,

268 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

to which reference has already been made, we read: "Although our party wants to keep pace with all other modern nations in the path of progress and development and in the cultivation of international relations and intercourse, it is at the same time determined to preserve the individual character of Turkish society and its essentially independent personality." To provide for the education of the Turkish people in this new spirit, an organization was founded in 1912, with the aim "to recreate national life through the youth of both sexes on the basis of a new national culture and in accordance with the ideas of western civilization." In 1931 this organization was amalgamated with the Republican People's Party, and in 1932 it was transformed into a new association named "The House of the People." This "House" was intended to become, in each town throughout Turkey, the center of all efforts devoted to the education of the people. Its task comprises both Europeanization and nationalization. All the various "Houses" (in which alcoholic drinks and card games are prohibited) are to include departments for language and literature, fine arts, theater, sport, social aid, work in the villages, popular educational courses, and bureaus dealing with libraries, museums, and exhibitions. The influence of educational centers of this sort is apt to be much greater than legislative measures.

Similar tendencies are in evidence in the economic field. Hitherto Turkey had been a quasi-colonial country. It was dominated by foreign capitalism.

This foreign capitalism was protected by special privileges; it thwarted progress and played into the hands of a corrupt domestic administration by concession-hunting of the most scandalous description. Mustafa Kemal's victory has made it possible to liberate the country from these conditions and to transform it into a state whose citizens are opening up the national resources of production in the interest of the nation. For this purpose they first had to do all those things which the European nations had done many decades before. The railroad system and other traffic arteries had to be developed so as to facilitate exchange between the individual provinces as well as intercourse between the interior and the seacoast. In the domain of shipping, banking, and commerce, foreign control had to be eliminated, so as to transfer the conduct of business into Turkish hands. Agriculture had to be modernized; intensive cultivation of the soil had to be fostered. Domestic industry had to be called into being, in order to make Turkey more independent of the importation of foreign industrial products. A five-year plan for the industrialization of the country was established and Turkish engineers and workers trained for its execution.

It was in the nature of things that the state should take a very prominent and active part in this transformation of the country's economic life. For in such times of transition, when the spirit of economic initiative and technical discipline is still to be awakened among the people, only the state has at its command

the necessary capital and possibilities of organization. Foreign corporations doing business in Turkey must have Turks among their members, and they have to employ Turkish citizens and use the Turkish language. The important shipping trade along the Turkish coast has been reserved for Turkish vessels, with the result that in the port of Istanbul the Turkish flag, which until quite recently had been seldom seen, has since 1929 been the one most in evidence. The mileage of the railway system amounted in 1923 to about 1440 miles; by May 1931 it had risen to over 3820 miles. Further extensive construction now under way will have the result that within a short time the whole of Anatolia will be traversed by two trunk lines, running from west to east and connected by numerous branch lines with each other as well as with the three seacoasts. At the same time a circular line is being constructed on the high plateau in the interior, with lines radiating in all directions.

In her endeavors to nationalize her economic life Turkey has not hesitated to create difficulties for foreigners and foreign corporations. Indeed, the defensive measures of the new Turkish nationalism often assume economic forms which are harsh and undesirable. It should not be forgotten, however, that in this respect too the West has been the teacher of the East, and that the latter has only been persuaded by bitter experience to relinquish its former passivity and to replace it by a new attitude which fills the West with astonishment and sometimes calls forth censure.

The old *laissez-faire* has given way to a new spirit of independence, a new desire for self-respect and self-reliance. The European can no longer count on that preferential treatment and spirit of submission which he used to meet with at every step even as late as twenty-five years ago. But it is from the West that the East has learned this new will to self-assertion; and it is by means which are in use in the West that the East is now striving to liberate itself from the domination of the more advanced nations.

All sorts of attempts are being made to induce the Turkish masses to acquire capital and purchase domestic products. In April 1929 a demonstration took place in the University of Istanbul in favor of using the products of national industries. This was followed by exhibitions at Istanbul and at Ankara. At the beginning of the Mohammedan month of fast, Ramadan, in the year 1930, there were displayed on all mosques of Istanbul electric transparencies containing the injunction: "Waste is sin! Buy home products!" At the end of 1929, an Association for National Economy and Saving was founded at Ankara under the chairmanship of the President of the Grand National Assembly, and in the following year a "Week of National Saving" was observed for the first time. The proclamation by which it was instituted contained the following passages: "Citizens! In the past it was regarded as dishonorable to use Turkish products; in the past it was also regarded as dishonorable to call a Turk a Turk." In this way the

self-confidence of the new nationalism is pervading all spheres of public and economic life.

Just as Mustafa Kemal's domestic policy was inspired by the wish to build up and preserve national independence, so was his foreign policy. Before the World War, the Ottoman Empire, a mere pawn in the hands of the western Powers, endeavored to turn their mutual antagonisms to advantage, if only to prolong its own existence by a few years. But since the Peace of Lausanne, Turkey has been following a policy aiming consciously at peace, neutrality, and friendship with all nations. What she needs most is a breathing-space in which to modernize the state and reorganize its economic life. A close friendship unites Turkey with the Soviet Union. It was the attitude of the Soviet Union which during the difficult years between the Peace of Sèvres and the Peace of Lausanne made it possible for Turkey to show Europe a bold front; and it was the Soviet Union's action in renouncing the old Russian capitulations and concessions in Turkey which prepared the way for the country's political and economic regeneration. The Soviet Union felt that its fight against western imperialism was being furthered by the national revolutions in the Near East, which were supplanting antiquated and corrupt monarchies, dependent on western imperialism, with young and emancipated regimes. This in no way implied any community of ideas nor is to be taken as showing that Communistic doctrines have made any headway in Turkey. It is

interesting to note that a country like Turkey, co-operating most closely in the field of foreign policy with the Soviet Union, remained of all countries the freest from any Communist propaganda or any attempt at Communistic interference with her internal affairs.

As early as March 16, 1921, Mustafa Kemal concluded a treaty with Soviet Russia, in the preamble of which we read: "The two parties to this treaty hereby affirm that, in their struggle for liberation, the peoples of the East are at one with the working population of Russia fighting for a new social order. They emphatically proclaim the right of the peoples of the East to liberty and independence and a form of government in accordance with their own desires." But Turkey's politics have not been taken in tow by Moscow. After achieving her complete independence, and while fully preserving it, Turkey means to observe neutrality between the Soviet Union and the western Powers. Without damaging her friendship toward the Soviet Union, she also means to keep open all ways leading to the West. It was in this understanding that she joined the League of Nations in July 1932.

Influenced by the Soviet Union, a similar community of interests also brought together three states of western Asia — Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. The first step was taken in the treaty signed in Moscow on March 1, 1921, by Turkey and Afghanistan. Even in this earliest treaty Afghanistan speaks of Turkey as having set an example for the national

liberation of the peoples of the East. Since then, the economic and cultural reorganization of Turkey has been recognized as an example to be followed by Persia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. With Iraq, Turkey's neighbor on the south, friendly and cordial relations have likewise at last been established. Up to 1926 a struggle was in process between Turkey, on the one hand, and Great Britain and the Arabian state of Iraq, on the other, for the possession of Mosul. This district, largely inhabited by Kurds, contains rich oil reserves and forms a strategic point of the first order. In 1926 the controversy was determined by arbitration, the Council of the League of Nations deciding in favor of Iraq. Turkey readily gave in. The result was that the satisfactory relations already established with other successor states of the Ottoman Empire were extended also to Iraq. That country (which is conscious today of being the outpost of the Pan-Arabic idea and the guardian of Arabian unity and independence) with Turkey, Persia, and the new Arabia which is still in process of development, may one day form a common front in the Middle East. In 1937 a Near Eastern Pact was completed which united Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. This does not imply an alliance, but rather the acknowledgment of mutual obligations of friendship based on similar convictions concerning the right of the peoples of the East to independence. Economic cooperation may follow.

After Turkey had been successful in transforming

into friendship her traditional enmity toward Russia, her northeastern neighbor, she turned her attention toward removing, under even more difficult circumstances, the tension existing between herself and Greece, her neighbor across the Aegean. For nine centuries Turkey and Greece had fought bitterly for the heritage of Eastern Rome. This old antagonism had been exacerbated and fresh resentment had been awakened by the Greek advance in Anatolia in 1919-22, with the cruelties attending it on both sides, as well as by the widespread misery brought about by the compulsory exchange of populations in 1923. In spite of this, Mustafa Kemal in 1930 succeeded in removing existing differences and in concluding treaties of friendship with Venizelos. The cordial reception of the Greek statesman at Ankara in the autumn of 1930 marked an outstanding achievement of statesmanship, one which constitutes a real landmark in the history of our times.

The establishment of friendly relations between Turkey and Greece is in a way the consummation of the peaceful European policy which was Mustafa Kemal's aim for the last fifteen years of his life. It is true, of course, that since the war Turkey has become primarily an Asiatic power. But she has not yet entirely ceased to be European, even though only a small portion of her territory now lies on the European side of the Straits — those Straits which remain of such cardinal importance for the fate of eastern Europe, and which, after having been demilitarized

276 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

by the Peace Treaty of Lausanne, were again put under Turkish full military sovereignty as the result of the Conference of Montreux in 1936. As a European power Turkey worked for the establishment of a community of interests among the Balkan states. This entente, similar to that which Turkey had created in western Asia, was to ensure peace in the Balkans and to eliminate the influence of the Great Powers. This Balkan Pact was completed in 1934. Thus Turkey has succeeded, in her foreign affairs as well as in her internal policy, in Europe as in Asia, in her intellectual life as well as in her economic structure, in liquidating the past and in erecting a completely new structure.

Enough has been said to show that the years during which the new Turkey has been in existence under Mustafa Kemal's leadership have been filled with an almost incredible activity in every field. The entire East is in process of transition from one cultural stage to another. It is a process which deeply affects all categories of social and intellectual life; it works great changes in human beings and in their habits and ideas. Turkey is in the forefront of the movement. It goes without saying that such periods of transition have their disadvantages and drawbacks. It may well be that the peoples undergoing a transformation like that in process in the East today do not grasp the real nature of western humanism or the intellectual foundations of science and scientific investigation; they may merely adopt out of the material things of western

life what happens to suit their purposes. But, after all, the mixture of phenomena of decay with those of progress is characteristic of the transitional process. That process is always double-faced. It is not to be arrested by any regret or by romantic longing for the past. Those who live in these times harbor a deep resentment against their own immediate past, when they used to feel despised by Europe, when they were exploited and humbled. They are determined to make a complete break with that "shameful" epoch and to strike out along new roads. They will take full advantage of the lessons received from Europe; but the knowledge thus gained will be used for their own protection against the European Powers.

Mustafa Kemal was himself a product of this period of transition. In him were embodied, as in all great men of history outside the tragic sphere, both the superior energy and statesmanship of the born leader and those objective forces which are at work in any given period of history, and which mold it quite apart from the influence of personalities. The new Turkey is the work of Mustafa Kemal. But that he was able to achieve it is due entirely to the fact that he knew how to give constructive direction to progressive forces and tendencies which for a quarter of a century had been striving to manifest themselves in the life of the East, and that without pause or hesitation or scruple he pressed them forward to fulfillment, never disregarding the foundations of orderly and rational progress upon which alone a lasting structure can be built.

XI

Revolution in the Desert

MOHAMMED brought to the Arabian tribes of the desert, who had lived till then in a state of permanent feud and primitive paganism, the blessings of unity, political order, and enlightenment. Under his leadership and that of his immediate successors, and under the impulse of a religious ideal, the Arabs of the desert for a short time held a position of the highest importance in the world's political arena. But the great Empire founded by Mohammed's successors grew much too rapidly and became much too vast for Arab cohesive and constructive forces. Very soon the Arabian peninsula — after having established a permanent ascendancy for the Arab language and civilization outside Arabia proper — relapsed into its primitive chaotic disorganization. Only after many centuries was it again awakened, this time by the religious impulse of Wahhabism, a puritan reform movement of the eighteenth century which originated in the Nejd in Central Arabia. The severe simplicity of the Wahhabis constituted a return to the original Arabic Islam and its nomadic warrior spirit.

Today, a scion of the princely family which embraced and propagated Wahhabism, Abdul Azis ibn Abdur Rahman, better known by the name of his family, Ibn Saud, has taken upon himself the task of

organizing a stable and orderly government in Arabia and of transforming the unruly and illiterate nomads of the desert into citizens. He is striving, and with success, to divert the religious enthusiasm of his followers into modern social activity. Arabia has not only to organize, but also to enter the complex civilization which, having originated about two hundred years ago in western Europe, is now on the way to becoming universal since the World War. At the beginning of the World War, Ibn Saud was still the Sheikh of Nejd, one of the major sheikhs of Central Arabia but not more than that, unknown to and without any importance for the outside world or even the Arab world as a whole. Twenty years later, he was the undisputed lord over a strongly organized, united, and cautiously but firmly modernized Arabia. The history of those twenty years was no accident: long ago Ibn Saud conceived the scheme of a united Arab empire under his leadership, and the stage of fulfillment he has now reached represents for him only a transition to further achievements.

In 1914 four important Arab noble families could be considered as possible competitors for the hegemony of Arabia: the Hashimite Sherifs of Mecca; the Ibn Rashids in the northern part of the peninsula, with Hail as their capital; the Ibn Sauds in the Nejd; and the Imam of Yemen, who had successfully upheld his claims against the Turkish overlord. The first seeds of a new creed, of Arab nationalism in the modern sense, had just reached the secluded regions

of Arabia and had stirred new thoughts and ambitions in the hearts of its princes. During many centuries Arabia had been a mere geographical name. In the nineteenth century a contest for the control of this vast territory set in between Great Britain, for whom it meant an important link on the road to India, and the Ottoman Empire, which, with its social and intellectual structure based on Islam, considered the possession of the Holy Places of Islam as the foremost title to its glory.

But Arabia itself had had no history and no consciousness of a common national destiny. Tribes fought against tribes, princes against princes — an up-and-down of individual and unrelated facts, meaningless except for the motives of momentary personal or tribal gains, without any general idea or ideal. Only in the twentieth century did things begin to change. The Arab princes began to act in the name of Arab nationalism; in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire the forceful Turkish nationalism of the Young Turks evoked the national consciousness of the Arabs; frequent revolts followed, secret societies were formed, and the coöperation of the different princes and local leaders was sought. Ibn Saud, who had returned at the beginning of the century from exile as a very young man, first strove to reëstablish the rule of his family in Nejd, the birthplace of Wahhabism, which had been conquered by the Ibn Rashids, and to rekindle the ardor of the puritan and militant faith of Wahhabism. But soon he turned to wider aims: to

unite Arabia as it had been at the beginning of the nineteenth century under his Wahhabi ancestors. In 1913 he took possession of the Turkish province of El Hasa, a coast strip at the Persian Gulf; by this conquest he entered the orbit of immediate British interests and in the following year a British officer was dispatched to open negotiations with him. At that moment the World War broke out: its two important results, as far as Arabia is concerned, were on the one hand the elimination of Turkish rule from Arabia and the establishment of British control or influence over the land route to India, on the other hand the definite and unexpectedly strong crystallization of Arab national sentiment and consciousness. The Hashimite Sherif of Mecca, Hussein ibn Ali, had raised Arab national aspirations for freedom and unity from a world of dreams and hopes into the realm of political and diplomatic reality. His newly formed kingdom of the Hejaz was invited to sign the peace treaty of Versailles and to enter the League of Nations. He did not do it because the peace treaty had left Arab hopes unfulfilled and crippled.

Hussein ibn Ali, more than thirty years older than Ibn Saud, was a romantic conservative, full of the ancient wisdom and learning of the East and endowed with the rich imagination which mistakes rhetoric and dreams for reality. A direct descendant of the Prophet and head of the nobility of the Holy City, he wished to reestablish the old glory of his race, faith, and family by becoming King of the Arabs and Khalif of all

Mohammedans. His fiery nationalism had induced him during the World War to rise against his overlord, the Ottoman Sultan, and his imagination led him to believe the vague promises of his wartime allies to whom the Arab army rendered conspicuous services by conquering Trans-Jordan and Syria. Notwithstanding his disillusionment, he seemed in 1924 to have reached a new climax of his power. After the deposition of the last Turkish Khalif he proclaimed himself Khalif; his son Abdallah, an ambitious man of the old-time Oriental type, had become Ameer of Trans-Jordan; his younger brother Feisal, of a different type and equally outstanding by his character and intelligence, was King of Iraq, and negotiations were going on between Hussein and Great Britain about the formation of an Arab Federation, including Hejaz, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. But the same year marked the end of King Hussein's rule and ambitions. The British were glad to get rid of an ally who had become importunate in his insistence upon their showing good faith; and Ibn Saud seized the opportunity to prove that he and not Hussein was the real leader and statesman of Arabia. The year 1924 was a decisive year in the history of Arabia. It marked the beginning of a new epoch: the active reëntry of the desert peninsula into world history, the effort of the nomad to adapt himself to the conditions of modern life and civilized society.

Before 1924 Ibn Saud had accomplished two important steps forward on his way: he had united

Central Arabia by his victory over the Ibn Rashids, who became virtual prisoners at his court, and he had introduced the most important reform ever undertaken in the desert: the settling of the nomad Arabs around the wells of the desert. His aim was to improve the economic and cultural situation of the nomad and to make possible a stable government, a permanent governmental structure. From time immemorial the desert nomads had lived in the greatest poverty and illiteracy, in continuous insecurity and want. The transition from nomad to settled life means, however poor the condition of the settled Arab may seem to a Western observer, a distinct gain in security and in wealth. It makes it possible to bring him education and the elements of civilization in the proper sense of the word, the fundamentals of civic life. The settled colonies were founded around wells and springs, the soil was irrigated, the elements of agriculture taught; in the midst a mosque was built, the center of religious and social life and teaching. The higher Islamic law, the Sheria, replaced the primitive tribal law. The nomad had always been Moslem in name more than in fact; his whole life was dominated by superstition and pre-Moslem traditions. The mosque became now a cultural center, imbuing the audiences with the spirit of a loyalty higher than that to the tribe. These settled colonies became the backbone of Ibn Saud's army and the pivots of a stable government. Since time immemorial the desert had known only the passing power of personal leadership; the settled colonies

could assure for the first time an objective and lasting order beyond tribal allegiance. The very foundations of nomad Arab society were radically transformed.

In the autumn of 1924 Ibn Saud's army moved against the Hejaz. His followers were chiefly driven by two traditional motives: the desire for booty and the religious fanaticism of the Wahhabi puritans against the Holy Cities with their relative luxury, corruption, and deviation from the original faith. In this way their attitude resembled that of Protestant zealots of the seventeenth century against the Pope and Rome. Ibn Saud's aims and motives were different, but his great sense of statesmanship revealed itself again and again in his ability to make use of different situations and motives and at the same time to control and direct them. His victory proved easy enough, notwithstanding the opinion of European experts who (with the exception of H. St. J. B. Philby, war-time British envoy at Ibn Saud's capital) did not yet see in Ibn Saud the future Lord of Arabia. Within a few weeks Taif, the beautiful summer residence of the Meccan aristocracy, was taken, and then Mecca itself. In Taif the traditional massacre and looting followed. Ibn Saud was not present, but as soon as he arrived an immediate stop was put to all excesses of that kind, and since then his nomad troops have behaved in an exemplary manner. Ibn Saud knew enough even to make his followers refrain from attacking what they considered unholy places and customs in Mecca. King Hussein abdicated in favor of

his oldest son, Ali, and went into exile at Cyprus, where he lived almost forgotten for more than five years. Ali succeeded in holding Medina and Jidda (the port of Mecca) for more than a year, but the Wahhabis entered Jidda on December 16, 1925. Then Ibn Saud became the undisputed ruler of Hejaz, and in Mecca, on January 8, 1926, added to his title of Sultan of Nejd that of King of Hejaz. A year later he changed his title to King of Hejaz and of Nejd and its dependencies.

King Ibn Saud's dominions now reached from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. The rival dynasties of the Ibn Rashids and the Hashimites ruled no more on the peninsula. To establish his complete hegemony there remained only one potential rival, the Imam Yehya of Yemen. In the cities in the Hejaz the Wahhabis had found a much more highly developed urban civilization, in contact with all the centers of Mohammedan life; in the port of Jidda foreign consuls and merchants were established. A new outlook opened before Ibn Saud, and through his strong personality and his understanding of the essential currents of contemporary history a new Arabia was born. Before the Wahhabis had set out to capture Mecca a congress of the Ikhwan, the Wahhabi brotherhood, had justified the conquest by an appeal to the Arab nation, explaining Ibn Saud's desire to attain and to secure the complete freedom and unity of all Arab lands. But at the same time he had appealed to pan-Islamic sentiments and to the interest of

all the faithful to have the Holy Places administered in an exemplary way. This appeal had brought him the support of the leaders of Indian Islam.

As soon as he was firmly established in the Hejaz, Ibn Saud convoked a Pan-Islamic Conference, which assembled in Mecca in June 1926. In his declarations at the Conference he justified his attack against King Hussein by his wish to purify the cradle of Islam from all the iniquities and corruption of Hashimite rule. At the beginning of his expedition against the Hejaz, he had declared himself an agent of Islam to deliver the Holy Land from oppression and to leave it to the Mohammedans to decide about the future fate of the country. But, the conquest once accomplished, the situation had changed. Ibn Saud had become King of the Hejaz and was ordering its administration in accordance with his own ideas. He expected from the Pan-Islamic Conference only advice and help in facilitating and improving the pilgrim traffic in the Holy Land. The Conference, based on misunderstanding, ended without definite result. Originally intended to be the first of consecutive yearly conferences, it was never repeated. The Indian Moslems left it dissatisfied. Ibn Saud is a pious Moslem, but he is far from being narrow-minded and fanatic, and the dominant idea of his life never was Pan-Islamism; from the beginning he has been an ardent Arab nationalist. It was therefore easy for him after the failure of the Pan-Islamic Conference to devote all his attention to the problems of his king-

dom and of the Arab nation as a whole. In his intention the Conference had to serve only one purpose: to strengthen the position of Arabia as the cradle of the faith and to encourage pilgrimage, the main source of the economic life of the Hejaz. He had expected financial assistance for the construction of railways in the Hejaz to connect Mecca with Medina and both cities with their ports, the towns of Jidda and Yanbo; and political assistance against Great Britain to force it to return to the Hejaz the district of Maan and Aqaba (which Britain had annexed in 1925 to Trans-Jordan) and to restore the Hejaz railway which connected Medina with Damascus. But all these hopes remained unfulfilled. Ibn Saud became convinced that he had to rely only upon his own forces and those of the Arabs, however poor and backward they might be. His future task was set before him: to build a modern Arab nation.

Ibn Saud's easiest task, comparatively speaking, was the diplomatic consolidation of his new position. For the first time two Wahhabi princes left the peninsula, Ibn Saud's oldest son, Saud, to visit Egypt, and his second son, Feisal, to visit England, Holland, and France. The first Great Power to recognize the new kingdom was the Soviet Union; the recognition was in accordance with her traditional Eastern policy. Other states followed, and the consulates at Jidda were raised to the dignity of legations. Ibn Saud's relations with Great Britain were regulated by the Treaty of Jidda, concluded in May 1927 between Sir

Gilbert Clayton as British envoy and Ibn Saud's son, Feisal. By this treaty the complete independence of Ibn Saud's dominion in all external and internal matters was recognized. Great Britain also raised the embargo on the supply of arms and ammunition through the Red Sea which had existed up to then and had been partly responsible for the military weakness of King Hussein of Hejaz. All the relations of Ibn Saud with the outer world were concentrated in Mecca and Jidda, where his son Feisal acted as viceroy and governor of the Hejaz. Modern forms of life and festivals entirely unknown in the desert developed under the growing impact of Western civilization. The anniversary of Ibn Saud's accession to the throne of Hejaz was solemnly celebrated every year by a military parade followed by a banquet. In the year 1933 Ibn Saud abolished the dual kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd and gave it a new name: Saudi Arabia; he intends it to become the cradle of future united Arabia. But much more difficult than this outward consolidation proved the inner consolidation of the vast kingdom which stretched across the whole of Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.

Ibn Saud's greatest achievement consisted in bringing peace and security to the desert. Within a few months he had established complete order among the unruly tribes of the Hejaz. All over the desert feuds and robbery ceased. That meant not merely the success of the magic spell exercised by the King's strong personality. The nomad society of the desert is in a

state of transformation. The economic existence of the nomad was until recently based chiefly on two sources: on the booty taken from caravans and hostile tribes, and on the income derived from the breeding and selling of animals, especially camels. The first source of income is being destroyed by ordered government; the second is being curtailed and slowly destroyed by the intrusion of mechanical civilization and means of transport, by the replacement of the camel by the motor car. Only a short time ago the nomad could resist any efforts of ordered government as an equal; armies were not his superiors in armament and equipment and were certainly his inferiors in mobility and adaptability to the ways of desert warfare. Government today has at its disposal wireless and airplanes and other devices against which the nomad is powerless. On the other hand, the introduction of modern technical innovations makes possible for the first time the imposition of stable and permanent government. The motor car since the World War has conquered every part of the earth. In 1924 there were in the Hejaz only three automobiles, all owned by the government. Ibn Saud introduced automobiles to facilitate the pilgrim traffic, and after a few years there were 1500 in the Hejaz. But the motor car did not stop there — it penetrated into the interior and crossed the peninsula from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. The royal procession traveled in automobiles from Mecca to Riyadh, Ibn Saud's original capital in the Nejd. A motor-car road

is now being surveyed by the Iraqi and the Saudi governments between Baghdad and Mecca to convey the pilgrims from India and Persia by this new quick way to the Holy Places. The Egyptian Misr airline carries pilgrims from Egypt within a few hours to Jidda, so that the whole pilgrimage which formerly took many weeks can be accomplished with the help of airplane and car in three days. In all probability in a few years there will be regular air connections between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iraq.

By introducing modern technical elements Ibn Saud tried to create new bases of economic life for the nomad and at the same time to stabilize and perpetuate his government. But for the same reasons his orthodox Wahhabi followers revolted against the reforms. These zealots of the desert had helped Ibn Saud build up his empire, they had fought for the puritan primitiveness of the desert and their desert faith, they hated cars, wireless, and airplanes as inventions of the devil, as anti-religious witchcraft not foreseen by Mohammed and his companions. They were afraid of the new form of government which Ibn Saud wished to introduce with the help of modern machinery and which meant to them the end of the liberty and life of the desert as it had existed since time immemorial and as they had trusted it would go on forever. Ibn Saud took the precaution of having the Ulemas of the Nejd, the learned men of the faith, assembled in Riyadh and having them declare the new machines compatible with and allowed by Islam. But the old

warriors, Ibn Saud's most faithful companions in the time of his rise to power, could not reconcile themselves to the new spirit. Ibn Saud understood that the principles of desert Wahhabism which had helped him to build his empire were in no way sufficient to consolidate and to rule that empire. Necessarily, the men who in the time of the conquest played the leading role had to be relegated to second place in the time of construction. The unrest created by this situation lasted for about three years. Ibn Saud showed here one of his most conspicuous virtues — patience and forbearance, a wise magnanimity and an astonishing lack of savagery unlike many other great national leaders of our time. Again and again he tried to win over his opponents, led by Feisal ud Dawish; until finally he defeated them in a decisive battle in the Batin valley at the close of 1930. His rule had weathered successfully its most difficult trial. It was much easier for him to master a second revolt two years later, instigated from the outside and swept from Trans-Jordan and the Sinai peninsula into the northern Hejaz. All hopes put by Ibn Saud's enemies on the disintegration of his kingdom by the old methods of the desert proved vain; his administration was different from any Arabia had known, and stronger.

Under Ibn Saud's guidance, the new wave of Wahhabi conquest is changing the nature of Wahhabism. Wahhabism is becoming flexible and adaptable to modern conditions. Ibn Saud teaches his Wahhabis

moderation alike toward non-Wahhabi Moslems and non-Moslems. He has shown that he understands different levels of civilization and their requirements by separating the administration of the Hejaz from the administration of the much more primitive Nejd. He has given a constitution to the Hejaz. He has laid the bases of modern education, has invited Arabs from the more progressive parts of the Arab lands to fill important posts in his administration, and has sent students from his lands to study abroad. He conducts negotiations with foreign capitalists, preferably Moslem capitalists, for the opening of a state bank, for the construction of railways, for the granting of concessions for the exploitation of the mineral resources of his country, for the supply of electric power outside the two or three cities which possess it already. The pilgrim traffic has been put on a wholly different footing; extortions have ceased; prices are fixed for all services; good drinking water is provided; hospitals have been erected and hotels created. In 1924 the Hejaz still lived the traditional life of the ages with its slow flow and its sweet charm, with its easiness, corruption, and disorder. In the next ten years all was changed. And these ten years were only a beginning, undertaken against all the odds and obstacles presented by the terrible poverty of the desert and the backwardness of its inhabitants. Once the foundations were laid, progress could become quicker. The second decade opened in the spring of 1934 by a new proof of Ibn Saud's outstanding statesmanship and

military ability, given in his war against the Imam Yehya of Yemen.

From the beginning of his career Ibn Saud wished to achieve the independence and unity of all Arab lands. He realized — as today all Arab leaders do — that the poverty and backwardness of the Arabs can be overcome only by a pooling of all their strength and resources in a common effort towards progress and liberty. The peninsula can not be modernized and brought to a higher standard of life without the aid of the more civilized Arab regions on the Mediterranean coast, which also form the gateway for contact and exchange between Arabia and Europe. On the other hand, the Arabian desert alone preserves the real strength of the Arab race and will continue to supply the moral backbone and the political leadership of the united movement. The situation is very similar to that presented in the first part of the last century to Italian patriots: a partition of Italy between different dynasties and outside imperialist Powers, and a great divergence in the cultural and economic levels of the different parts of the country.

Ibn Saud's nationalism has kept clear of all the pathetic rhetoric often characteristic of Oriental nationalism, which replaces strength and work by lyric sentimentality. In this respect he much resembles the other great king whom the Arab race has produced since the World War, King Feisal of Iraq, who like Ibn Saud was a son of the desert. Both were *Realpolitiker*, in the good sense of the word, who, in

entirely different surroundings, had the European ability of working patiently, step by step, for the attainment of a far-off goal. There existed between the two dynasties a natural rivalry for the Arab leadership. Ibn Saud's victory over King Hussein has settled the question as far as the peninsula is concerned; but for those Arab lands which were mandated territories of the "A" category, the wise policy of King Feisal (which in 1932 achieved the complete independence of Iraq as a member of the League of Nations) made Baghdad the center of all hopes. Even since King Feisal's premature death the Arabs of Syria, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq have continued to look upon Feisal's young son and successor, King Ghazi, as the rallying point of the northern Arabs, who at a later date and by ways unknown at present will unite with themselves the Arabs of the peninsula.

Since establishing his hegemony over the peninsula, King Ibn Saud has pursued a policy aiming at the achievement of Arab union by a federation of Arab lands and princes under his leadership. In February 1930 he met King Feisal, and this meeting was soon followed by a treaty of friendship. It was more difficult to establish friendly relations with the ambitious Ameer Abdallah of Trans-Jordan, but even in this case a treaty of friendship was signed in 1932. The important land of Asir south of the Hejaz was incorporated into Saudi Arabia in 1930, after being a protectorate for four years. The possession of Asir made Ibn Saud an immediate neighbor of the Imam Yehya,

the King of Yemen. Yemen, the *Arabia Felix* of the Romans, is the most fertile and most densely populated part of the peninsula, the winds of the Indian Ocean providing abundant rains. Imam Yehya is the head of a Shiite sect, the Zaidis, a most secluded and fanatical sect, hated and considered heretics by the Sunnis. The Imam is held a saint by his followers and rules as a theocrat. He is a powerful personality, but a medieval man, full of distrust of everybody and of all innovations, a fanatical Moslem, and ambitious to extend the frontiers of his kingdom all over southern Arabia. For many years he followed with misgivings Ibn Saud's ascent to power. It was only because of Ibn Saud's forbearance that no clash between the two rulers occurred.

Imam Yehya claimed a number of frontier districts between Yemen and Saudi Arabia and supported the revolt of their inhabitants against Ibn Saud. After long negotiations, Ibn Saud was forced in the spring of 1934 to direct his army to reoccupy those parts of his kingdom which the Imam had occupied. Some European observers have wished to explain the armed conflict as a conflict between British and Italian policy in Arabia. They saw in Ibn Saud a British ally and in the Imam an Italian. There do actually exist treaties of friendship between Great Britain and Ibn Saud, and since September 1926 between Italy and Yemen; but no direct influence is exerted by Great Britain on Ibn Saud's policy, and the treaty of friendship between Italy and Yemen has in no way justified the

hopes which Italy may perhaps have put in it. Italian influence and trade have not penetrated into Yemen and the rivalry between the two rulers is in no way caused or fostered by the rivalry of the two European states.

The Imam had taken great care to reorganize his army with the help of Turkish officers and to supply it with modern equipment and arms. But the short war between Ibn Saud and the Yemen proved sufficiently that in the generally backward state of the Yemen and under its theocratic ruler an army cannot be imbued with the spirit to make it a match for Ibn Saud's warriors. In an astonishingly quick time Ibn Saud's troops under the command of his sons occupied both the disputed highlands and the coastal plain of the Yemen, and became masters of Hodeida, the most important port of Yemen. Ibn Saud's officials and police arrived a few days after the capture of the city, and the new administration worked smoothly. The way to Sanaa, the Imam's capital high up in the mountains, was now open for Ibn Saud's further victorious advance.

The whole Arab world had followed with the greatest attention the war between the two Arab princes. The World Moslem Congress of Jerusalem, which after its session in December 1931 had elected a permanent executive committee, sent a delegation to Mecca to help bring about peace. The president of the delegation was the Mufti of Jerusalem, Mohammed Ameen el Hussein, the president of the Supreme

Moslem Council of Palestine; the other members were Mohammed Ali Allubah Pasha, a former minister of Egypt, Ameer Shekib Arslan, the chief of the Syrian delegation at Geneva, and Hashim Bey el Attasi, the foremost nationalist leader of Syria. The dispatch of this very representative delegation to the belligerents was a new departure in Arab politics and bore witness to the feeling of solidarity and unity in all Arab lands. In June 1934 peace was concluded at Taif, the famous oasis and summer resort near Mecca. Ibn Saud renounced all his conquests of undisputed Yemeni territory. The treaty was meant to strengthen Arab unity. It was therefore called in the preamble a "treaty of Moslem and Arab brotherhood, to promote the unity of the Arab nation, to enhance its position, and to maintain its dignity and independence." Both parties declared "that their nations are one and agree to consider each other's interests as their own." The foreign policy of the two kingdoms would be brought into line and harmonized so that the two countries would act as one in foreign affairs. Practically, this meant a protectorate over the Yemen by Ibn Saud, the stronger and much more progressive partner. To emphasize the Pan-Arab importance and intention of the treaty it was published simultaneously in the capitals of the two belligerents, Mecca and Sanaa, and in two other important centers of Arab political life, Damascus and Cairo.

The desire expressed in the treaty, "to form a united front against any attack on the Arabian peninsula,"

marks a distinct progress in Arab national consciousness, one that a dozen years ago would have seemed almost incredible. Only a few years ago both sides, the Wahhabis and the Zaidis, were regarded as moved only by the strongest sort of sectarian spirit and as alien to any broad national notions; now the tribal and sectarian spirit has given way to a new consciousness. This is largely Ibn Saud's work. The peace treaty of Taif of June 1934 marked the definite entrance of Arabia into a new epoch of its modern history, a history which had begun ten years before with the capture of Taif by Ibn Saud's desert warriors.

XII

Zionism

ZIONISM is the Jewish national movement which aims at the reëstablishment of Palestine as a Jewish nation-state. It is a movement unique in history, unique as the situation of the Jewish people and as that of the tiny land on the shores of the Mediterranean. The implications of Zionism are far-reaching in time and space. All the historical traditions of Judaism, reaching back thousands of years, and the future hopes of many of the Jews in their world-wide dispersion, are centered upon Palestine. As the cradle of the religious experience of Western humanity, the hills of that small country have stood as the setting for scenes familiar and endeared to more hundreds of millions throughout the centuries than any other spot on earth. The Arab people who have inhabited and tilled the land since the early Middle Ages regard it as a most important part of their patrimony, which they defend with all the fervor of a newly awakened patriotism. Thus Palestine, fraught with history and fascinating the historical imagination as no other country does, has become the scene of most violent and tragic conflicts, embittered by national and religious emotions. Like all the neighboring countries of the Near East, it is being torn out of its long and quiet seclusion, thrown into the maelstrom of modernization, under-

going the transformation of a new and vigorous nationalism.

But in the case of Palestine this process is made infinitely more complex by the aspirations of Zionism. The Palestinian problem is unique in its complexity among all the nationalist and imperialist conflicts at a time which is certainly richer in these conflicts than any preceding era of history, unique also in its tragic implications, which grow more and more so with the unprecedented catastrophe inflicted upon central European Jewry and with the rapid awakening of the Arab masses to full national consciousness, clinging to their fatherland and the preservation of its Arabian character.

Zionism originated in the latter part of the nineteenth century among the Jews of eastern and central Europe. Although the organized political form of Zionism, strictly speaking, had its beginnings in central Europe, the intellectual and spiritual background as well as the support of the movement came from the Jews of eastern Europe, who, even at the beginning of the twentieth century, were not yet legally emancipated and continued to live under special restrictions in a situation reminiscent of the medieval ghetto. Living in compact masses, shut off from the possibility of assimilation and of a free participation in the general intellectual and political life of the Russian Empire, preserving therefore their own language and institutions, they offered fertile soil for the growth of a Jewish national movement. As with other national

movements in central and eastern Europe, the intellectual milieu for its development had been provided by two opposite elements, religious reformation and romanticism on the one hand, rational enlightenment on the other hand. Chassidism, a pietistic and mystical religious movement, growing up in the second half of the eighteenth century among the poor and uneducated Jewry of Carpathian villages, proclaimed the value of the uneducated, intellectually untrained masses as against the upper classes of merchants and scholars. It broke the rigid traditionalism of the established social order and the dead weight of scholasticism. It acted as a democratic force in raising the self-esteem of the lower classes. At the same time, the Haskalah, or Jewish Enlightenment movement, originated in the larger cities of central Europe among the upper classes. Touched by the new spirit of the eighteenth century in western Europe, it helped to break down the traditional orthodox structure of Jewish society and to "open up a window towards Europe." It opened the way to secular learning, to participation in the general movement of European ideas, and to new careers. Very slowly it spread in the nineteenth century to the thin upper strata of eastern European Jewry. Both movements loosened the rigid traditionalism of the past, brought about the awakening of individualism, and prepared the modernization of Judaism in the nineteenth century, a new progressive activity in all fields of social and cultural life, and the birth of a modern Jewish literature.

Although Zionism is a modern nationalist movement, it may be viewed as a continuation of the age-old longing of the Jews for a restoration to their homeland, from which Zionism drew its enthusiasm and religious fervor. The Jews had been one of the few peoples in antiquity possessed of a strong racial and national consciousness. After the destruction of the comparatively short-lived Jewish state in Palestine the intense national feeling of the Jews survived with undiminished fervor for nearly two thousand years. It dominated their daily prayers, their philosophical and juridical teaching, and their poetry. In almost every century of the exile messianic leaders arose to gather the Jews from the ends of the earth and to redeem the land of Israel. National and religious life formed an indissoluble unity in Judaism; both culminated in one hope, the return to Zion.

This political ideal, however, in medieval fashion had been expressed in religious terms, and its realization made dependent upon the will and grace of God. Zionism represents in modern form a continuation of this deep-rooted feeling of national consciousness among the Jews. It makes its appeal to the uninterrupted and powerful consciousness of a living connection with the past among the masses of eastern European Jewry. Zionism as a political and secular movement arose among the secularized Jewish intelligentsia of central Europe as a reaction to economic and political factors, but it quickly became the form into which was cast the medieval religious Zionist

fervor of the eastern European and Oriental Jews. The terrible economic poverty, social misery, and political humiliation among many parts of Jewry strengthened the romantic impulse toward Zionism. On the other hand, Zionism was not the only form of modern Jewish nationalism. Other types of Jewish nationalists accepted the dispersion as a basic and irreversible fact of Jewish history. They did not look upon the two thousand years as an irrelevant development, a cause for shame, but recognized in the lack of territorial concentration and of governmental power the possibilities of a higher and humanly more progressive form of organization. They even looked with suspicion upon the romantic traits of Zionism. But these currents of Diaspora nationalism never exercised as powerful an attraction as did Zionistic nationalism. They lacked the power of appeal which Zionism drew from the whole Jewish past and from its promise of a fulfillment of the messianic longing for the reestablishment of the splendor of the kingdom of David.

The large majority of the Jews in western and central Europe, however, remained indifferent to Zionism and to Jewish national aspirations in general. They regarded themselves as an integral part of the national community in the midst of which they lived and the national and human aspirations and traditions of which they deeply loved and fully shared. As for the Jewish problem, they saw its solution in the realization of political emancipation for the Jews in the various

European countries and the assimilation of the Jews into the social, political, and cultural life of their respective countries. But in the eastern and central European countries, where the political emancipation of the Jews had not been carried through, or had been carried through only partially and reluctantly, assimilation offered a solution at best only in individual cases. The movement of Europeanization and assimilation did not reach the great masses of Jews, and their own racial consciousness was in most cases too strong to allow assimilation. The Jewish masses desired the continuation of Judaism as a corporate body. Outside the Jewish mass settlements the success of continued assimilation was questioned on account of the influx of Jews from these settlements to the large urban centers of more progressive countries, where they found the liberty and cultural atmosphere conducive to higher standards of life. Racial aversion, existing in a particularly pronounced form in Germany, and economic competition against the successful rise of the Jews in commerce and the professions led to recurring tides of antisemitism, which acted as a bar to assimilation and reawakened racial consciousness even in some assimilated Jews. The relative failure of assimilation, which had had much too little time to bear fruit, led some assimilated central European Jews to Zionism and to a *rapprochement* with eastern European Jewry, which had not been touched by assimilation.

Modern political Zionism began with the rediscov-

ery by the Jewish individual of his membership in the Jewish people and of the unity of the Jewish people. It represented an effort to normalize an apparently abnormal national situation by territorial concentration. By assimilation the Jews had tried individually to escape the heavy yoke of the Jewish fate, to become "normal" like all other people around them; as assimilation seemed to fail, Zionism seemed to offer another escape whereby the Jews, not individually but as a corporate body, were to become "normal" like all other nations.

The general European scene was favorable to such a development. In the first third of the nineteenth century the dominant elements had been liberal individualism, the fight against traditionalism, and the belief in humanitarianism; the second third (about 1848-78) was dominated by nationalism, the tendency to liberate and to unite nationalities as corporate bodies; the third period (about 1878-1914) by the expanding tendencies of imperialism and colonization. The impact of the modern theories of nationalism made itself felt among the Jews only comparatively late. Whereas assimilation had been influenced by the European ideas of the first third of the nineteenth century, Zionism belongs almost wholly to the last third of the nineteenth century. In 1862 appeared the first important plea for modern Jewish nationalism, *Rom und Jerusalem* by Moses Hess. The motivating force in the Zionism of Hess was the desire to maintain Jewish values.

His Zionism was based on the desire to reanimate the creative genius of Israel in the interests of mankind and of the final fulfillment of the messianic promises of the French Revolution.

Hess remained a solitary forerunner, but in the beginning of the 1880's more organized forms of Zionism appeared in Russia. At that time a wave of pogroms swept over Russia, and the reactionary regime instituted by Pobedonostsev after the somewhat more liberal rule of Alexander II seemed to destroy the hope for an emancipation of the Jews. At the same time enlightenment and modern capitalism forced their way into Russia and dissolved the foundations of traditional Jewish social and cultural life, filling the hearts of leading Jews with anxiety about the future of Judaism. It was an age of transition, socially, economically, and culturally. Europeanization had set in irresistibly among the younger generation, though the traditionalism of the ghetto continued to dominate Jewish life. The Haskalah, under the influence of German literature and philosophy, especially of Friedrich Schiller, had introduced into Hebrew literature modern forms of thought and feeling. Historical novels and poems depicting the life of Biblical times, such as Abraham Mapu's *Abavat Zion* (The Love of Zion, 1853), stirred the hearts of the youth in the orthodox Talmudist schools. Some young people started to study Russian and secular sciences and were touched by the nationalism and romanticism of the Russian literature of the time. The new railways

brought the small Jewish towns into contact with the larger cities, and a mass movement of emigration began to the United States and to western Europe. Modern nationalist, liberal, and socialist theories took hold of the Jewish intelligentsia, and a literary renaissance set in similar to those at the beginning of all modern national movements. The spoken language of the Jewish masses, Yiddish, became a literary language in which works of popular science, essays, poetry, novels, and dramas were produced. The old scholastic language, Hebrew, was revived by romantic nationalism, gained a new power of expression, and became again a living tongue. The Hebrew movement, like the Gaelic movement, proved the vitality of Jewish nationalism and its connection with the past.

In 1882 an assimilated Jewish physician in Odessa, Leon Pinsker, published in German an appeal to his western European brethren, which he called *Auto-emancipation!*, to save the Jewish people from persecution and the misery of dispersion. He maintained that the Jewish people had to rely only upon its own forces and its own historic will and could not expect help from governments or from the progress of civilization. It was an appeal to national self-consciousness, activity, and self-help. It applied the ideas of European secularism and the tendencies of the nineteenth century to the Jewish people and declared the necessity of concentrating the Jews territorially, in Palestine or elsewhere. Pinsker was free from religious as well

as national romanticism — he was entirely secularized; but his appeal found no echo among the western European Jewry to which it was addressed. Only in Russia a small group gathered around him, partly students, partly older men of the more orthodox and traditional type, for whom the modern national movement was a direct continuation of the two thousand years of longing for the ancient homeland. The movement took the name of Chovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion); some scores of young people, known as the Bilu, left Russia to start Jewish agricultural colonies in the wilderness of Palestine. Untrained and without sufficient resources, they were soon faced by bankruptcy, but were saved by the intervention of Baron Edmond de Rothschild of Paris. A committee was formed in Odessa under Pinsker's presidency to promote the settlement of Jewish agriculturists and artisans in Palestine, and a conference was convoked at Kattowitz in 1884 to organize the movement. But the Chovevei Zion remained a small, insignificant, and hardly noticed movement. The settlers continued dependent on philanthropic aid and, against the will of Pinsker, they retained the lower-middle-class methods and narrow-minded psychology of the Russian village. The movement, however, laid the foundations of practical Jewish colonization in Palestine.

At the same time it offered the opportunity for the constructive criticism of Ahad Ha-am (Asher Ginsberg), the first and most important attempt at a theory of Jewish nationalism and at a fusion of

modern nationalism with traditional Zionism. Ahad Ha-am considered as utopian the claims of Zionism as a solution of the Jewish problem by the concentration of the Jewish masses in Palestine. He was the first fully to realize the fundamental and unsurmountable obstacles offered by the tiny size of the country and, above all, by the fact that it was inhabited by a considerable native population. Palestine, however, he thought, offered the possibility for a Jewish cultural center, by the slow and methodic upbuilding of a selective community of Jewish agriculturists, artisans, students, and scholars, who would lead their lives on the basis of a rejuvenated Hebrew culture in the spirit of the ancient prophets. Zionism, he declared, was not and could never become a quantitative solution of the problem of Jewry nor a remedy against persecution or antisemitism. It could only be a qualitative solution for the regeneration of Judaism and the reintegration of the Jews into a living Jewish civilization, which would give them new inner forces of resistance and life. It would constitute a cultural unity of the dispersed Jewry with its spiritual center in Palestine, from which influences would radiate into all corners of the Diaspora. A new love of Judaism and of Zion would be awakened in the hearts of the Jews, and this true "love of Zion" would again strengthen the center in Palestine. But, according to Ahad Ha-am, the cultural center in Palestine could fulfill its function only by being built out of disinterested love and on the basis of the ethics of the prophets.

Ahad Ha-am's Zionism was never adopted by any considerable group, as it did not pretend to offer a solution of the economic and political Jewish problems. But his insistence on the necessity of Hebrew culture permeated first the eastern European Zionists, then after 1905 the whole Zionist movement; and only by that element was the movement turned into a complete modern national movement, conscious of its cultural link with its historic past and embracing all aspects of life.

A new impetus was given to Zionism by Theodor Herzl, who raised it out of the narrow limits of philanthropy and the petty bourgeois ghetto and molded it into a political movement of general European significance. Herzl was aroused to a keen consciousness of the gravity of the Jewish problem by the widespread antisemitism manifested during the Dreyfus case. He declared assimilation most desirable but, in view of antisemitism, impossible of realization. Against their own wishes the Jews were forced by pressure from outside to form a nation. As a nation they could lead a happy and dignified life only by normalizing their existence through concentration in one territory. Without knowing it, Herzl resumed the work of Pinsker; but he did it not from Odessa but from Paris and Vienna, with the vigor of a born leader of men. With the publication of his pamphlet *Der Judenstaat* in 1896, in which he developed his ideas of political Zionism, he became the indefatigable propagandist of this idea.

Herzl's Zionism was barren with respect to traditional Jewish values. He had no knowledge of Jewish history and culture nor of the problems of eastern European Jewry. Receiving its impetus from anti-semitism, his Zionism did not strive to regenerate the creative forces of Judaism, but to provide for those who could not be or did not wish to be assimilated a home where they could lead a happy and free, but in no way a specifically Jewish, life. He did not consider Palestine as the necessary place for the Jewish homeland and never contemplated the rebirth of Hebrew as the Jewish national language. Even in his novel *Altneuland*, in a way his last will and testament to the movement, he described the future life of the Jews in Palestine as a continuation of the life of liberal assimilated central European Jewry.

His Zionism was purely political, without Jewish content; but because of his detachment from Judaism and his Europeanization Herzl was able to give to Zionism a modern form and establish it as a democratic political movement. He convoked the first Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897, which drew up a constitution for the Zionist movement. The congress, which met first annually and after 1901 every second year, consisted of delegates elected by the members of the organization through general and direct suffrage. This congress became the supreme legislative body and elected larger and smaller executive committees, which were responsible to the congress. In every town of the Diaspora local organizations were cre-

ated, which were united in each country into a federation. Besides these federations several other non-territorial federations called *Sonderverbände*, such as the Mizrachi, or strictly religious Zionists, and the Labour Zionists (Poale Zion and Hapoel Hazair), came to be recognized within the world Zionist organization. Thus Zionism was organized as an inter-territorial, modern, democratic nationalist movement, the first organization of its kind in Jewish history. It claimed to represent the Jewish people on the march to its goal of nationhood; its president claimed to speak on behalf of the newly organized Jewish democracy in all countries of the Diaspora, although only a very small minority of the Jews were organized in the Zionist movement. But it was the only democratically and interterritorially organized part of Jewry, active and young.

The creation of the Zionist organization was Herzl's great achievement. Until his death the center of the movement was under his presidency in Vienna. After his death in 1904 it was moved to Germany, where it remained until 1920, when it was removed to London, the seat of the mandatory government over Palestine. With the growth of Zionist colonization in Palestine the headquarters were partly moved to Jerusalem. Until the World War Austrian and German Jews led the movement, but its mass strength came from Russia. After the World War the leadership passed to Jews of Russian origin living in London or Palestine (the presidents were Chaim Weizmann

and Nahum Sokolow), the financial and economic strength of the movement came from Jews in the United States, the masses of its adherents from Poland, and its backbone from the growing settlement in Palestine. Sociologically it remained a movement of the smaller middle class led by a sprinkling of academic intelligentsia.

During Herzl's lifetime the struggle between his more modern and western European Zionism and the traditional Zionism of the eastern European Jews filled the history of the movement. After his death a compromise was worked out, which constituted Zionism as a national movement uniting the masses, bound by traditionalism, under a modern leadership. The Zionist organization developed an active propaganda by orators and pamphlets, created its own newspapers in different languages and its own financial instruments, and gave an impetus to what was called a "Jewish renaissance" in letters and the arts. The ideal of Herzl had been a modern secular movement, his ideas being those of the progressive freethinking *bourgeoisie* of the end of the nineteenth century. The Zionist organization declared itself neutral in matters of religion; it united strictly orthodox, moderately traditional, indifferent, and radically freethinking Jews; but the insistence of the religious groups upon stricter observance of the Jewish religious precepts caused sharp conflicts from time to time.

The Zionist Congress of Basel in 1897 had declared as the aim of Zionism the creation and international

guaranty of a home for the Jewish people in Palestine. Herzl negotiated with the Sultan and with different European governments; but, lacking the support of Jewish influential circles in western Europe, he did not succeed in getting more than cautious declarations of sympathy, except in Great Britain, where he was offered in 1903 the African territory of Uganda for the settlement of Jews as an autonomous community within the British Empire. Herzl was inclined to accept this as at least a temporary solution of the Jewish problem, but the majority of Russian Zionists insisted in their nationalistic orthodoxy upon Palestine as the only homeland of the Jews. The Zionist Congress declined the British offer, and a group under the leadership of Israel Zangwill, who for political and geographical reasons did not consider the small and populated Palestine fit to become a Jewish state, split off under the name of Territorialists to search for a territory for Jewish settlement.

The Russian events of 1905 changed the situation within the Zionist organization. The Russian revolution had aroused a revolutionary and nationalistic enthusiasm among the youth of Russia and her non-Russian nationalities. The failure of the revolution, the disillusionment in regard to Jewish emancipation in eastern Europe, the wave of pogroms, and the repressive measures of reaction led many young Jews into Zionism. Again as in 1882, but now in growing numbers, young men and women set out for Palestine to live there as the pioneers of the Jewish nationalist

movement. They were filled with the ideal of a regeneration of Jewish life and labor on the soil of Palestine. There had been Jewish farmers in Palestine since 1882, but they had worked with Arab labor; now Jews came to work the fields with their own hands. They declared that only by doing all the work themselves could they make Palestine *Erez Israel*, the land of Israel. They were influenced by the often romantic theories of the Russian Social Revolutionaries and their idealization of the peasant and the laborer. One of the most important of their leaders was A. D. Gordon, who like Tolstoy preached the return to simplicity of life and the healing forces of nature. Organized as the Hapoel Hazair (the Young Worker), an anti-Marxian, strictly nationalist labor movement, they started to create communal agricultural settlements similar to the early socialist communities and fought against the employment of "foreign" (Arab) labor. Outside Palestine, a Marxian but strongly nationalist labor movement, calling itself Poale Zion (the Workers of Zion), under the leadership of Ber Boruchov, gained influence among many Jewish workers. According to Boruchov, socialism offered no solution to the Jewish problem so long as the Jews were not constituted as a nation with a normal economic structure and a strong working-class basis. Only within an independent national community could the class struggle fulfill its normal function.

At the same time Jewish life in Palestine had ex-

316 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

panded; Hebrew became the language of the youth, modern Hebrew schools were created, and slowly the nucleus of a genuine national community began to emerge. This growing reality in Palestine and despair of the possibility of diplomatic successes strengthened in the Zionist organization the "practical" tendencies of colonizing activities. The period from 1905 to 1914 was an epoch without outward achievement but with a relatively strong intellectual life and manifold cultural activities for Zionism.

The World War marked a decisive turn in Zionism. Herzl's expectations were realized, and the movement was internationally recognized. The Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, expressed in a letter of the British foreign secretary to Lord Rothschild the sympathy of the British government with the project of establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine. Although this intentionally vague promise fell short of the expectations of the Zionists, who had asked for the reconstitution of Palestine as *the* Jewish national home, it nevertheless aroused enthusiastic hopes among Zionists. The Balfour Declaration was endorsed by the principal Allied Powers, and through its acceptance by the Conference of San Remo and its inclusion in the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) it became an integral part of British imperial policy in the Near and Middle East. At the same time the situation of the Jews had changed in eastern Europe. The White armies during the civil wars following the Russian Revolution had perpetrated pogroms in the Ukraine

worse than those of 1905; and the creation or enlargement of many new nation-states in eastern and central Europe had, notwithstanding political emancipation, adversely affected the economic and social position of the Jews. With the doors closed by the restrictions upon immigration in the United States and other countries after the war, Palestine loomed up as a haven of refuge.

Post-war Zionism has been characterized by a growing concentration upon Palestine, with a simultaneous decline in the world Zionist movement, especially in its cultural activity. The growing power of the Jews in Palestine and the intensity of their cultural and social life have attracted the attention and the sympathy of wide circles of Diaspora Jewry, as well as of many non-Jewish observers. The Zionist organization tried to win the support of wealthy non-Zionist Jews, especially in the United States, and in August 1929 the enlarged Jewish Agency was formed, under the leadership of the president of the Zionist organization, to unite representatives of that organization and of non-Zionist groups. Although the cooperation of the non-Zionists did not equal expectations, and the Jewish Agency remained predominantly a Zionist body, considerable Jewish capital was invested in Palestine, especially after 1932.

This increase in investment and the concurrent increase in immigration were due mainly to factors in the general eastern and central European situation: to world economic instability, to the advent to power

of the extremely antisemitic National Socialism in Germany, with the ensuing Jewish exodus from Germany, and to the increase of acute poverty and the destruction of middle-class existence among the Jews in Poland. Before the World War, Zionism had been an idealistic and ideological national movement; since the Balfour Declaration it has become more and more closely identified with the realities of the political, economic, and social problems of Palestinian Jewry.

Jewish colonization in Palestine after the World War can be divided into three distinct periods. During the period from 1920 to 1925 there was an influx of enthusiastic post-war youth, known as the *chaluzim* or pioneers, from central and eastern Europe. This was an idealistic movement with strong socialistic beliefs; it resulted in the creation of a great number of agricultural workers' settlements, with a preponderance of communal settlements, known as *kvuzoth*. This period terminated in 1924-25 with a strong influx of Polish middle-class elements into Tel Aviv, the new Jewish town near Jaffa, and led to the rapid development of urban colonization and of modern industry, particularly of the building trades, bringing with it the creation of an urban Jewish working class. During the period from 1926 to 1931 there was a long crisis accompanied by emigration and unemployment, which, however, permitted an organic consolidation and a strengthening of the existing Jewish economic structure in the towns and agricultural settlements. During this period American in-

fluence, which emphasized industrial development and sound business practice, found expression in a number of relatively powerful financial institutions. In 1932 a new boom started, through the influx of many immigrants from Poland and Germany together with Jewish capital in search of security and investment. A rapid growth of the Jewish urban colonization in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem, of building activity and industrial expansion, set in.

The number of Jews in Palestine has increased rapidly. It amounted in October 1922 (official census) to 83,794 out of a total of 757,182 inhabitants; in November 1931 (official census), to 175,006 out of a total of 1,035,154 inhabitants; in June 1938 (estimate), to 402,000 out of a total of 1,415,000 inhabitants. The Jewish urban population has grown faster than the agricultural population, which by the middle of 1934 could be estimated at about 25 per cent of the whole Jewish population of the country, whereas about 70 per cent of the Arab population lived in rural communities. The Jews, although a minority of about 30 per cent, because of their higher standards of civilization exert a leading influence in the economic, social, and cultural life of Palestine.

They have built, through their own initiative, a complete school system, with Hebrew as the language of instruction, embracing all grades from nursery school to university. Practically all children receive instruction, a surprisingly high percentage going up to secondary schools. The most modern

methods are used, and special emphasis is given to agricultural and technical training. The Hebrew University, beautifully situated on Mount Scopus, near Jerusalem, overlooking the Old City to the west, the Judean desert down to the Dead Sea in the east, was founded in 1925 and has fast developed into a growing center of learning.

Nor are the economic successes of the Zionists less conspicuous. By their efforts the character of those parts of the country where they have settled has been entirely changed. In about fifteen years one hundred agricultural settlements have been founded, marshes drained, malaria and other diseases stamped out. Thinly populated areas, extremely backward in methods of production, have been converted into flourishing, thickly populated districts where the land is worked according to the latest methods. Tel Aviv, which thirty years ago was a barren sand dune, has grown into a modern, thriving city of about one hundred fifty thousand inhabitants. On the rocks surrounding the walled Old City of Jerusalem new suburbs have sprung up, embodying the latest advancements in town planning, without destroying the magnificent panorama of the sacred city and its awe-inspiring setting. This rapid progress has not stopped even during the years of trouble since 1936. In Tel Aviv a new port has been built, the beginning of Jewish maritime activity. Industry has been consolidated, agricultural settlement expanded.

Thus the colonizing achievements of Zionism have

proved the quality of Jews as hardy pioneers under most difficult and trying circumstances — a quality surprising to many — and have revealed their great organizing and constructive capacity, even as peasants and agrarian laborers. The intellectual life of the relatively small community of a few hundred thousand Jews in Palestine — theater, concerts, arts, publishing, and adult education — equals in intensity and quality that of any progressive European group of comparable size. On the fields of Palestine and in the workshops of her towns a new, vigorous youth is at work, whose bearing makes it difficult to believe that these young people are only one generation removed from the ghettos of eastern Europe.

But the post-War period has revealed also unexpected implications in the realization of the Zionist ideal in the Palestinian actuality. In the midst of their startling successes, some Zionists — not always well informed — have come to regard the Palestinian Arabs and their problems as of only secondary importance and Palestine as exclusively the country of the “manifest destiny” of the Jewish people. Some Jewish and non-Jewish observers, fascinated by the historical appeal of the land and by the desire for a large-scale solution of the “Jewish problem,” have not always taken into full account two factors inherent in the situation: the limited absorptive capacity of the country, which is very small, with only few fertile districts and no important natural resources, and the existence of a relatively very large Arab

population, which since the beginning of the World War has become strongly conscious of its national aspirations.

The mandatory government of Great Britain took these two factors into consideration in its interpretation of the vague Balfour Declaration. From the beginning the British government refused to accept the idea of a Jewish state or commonwealth. The first British High Commissioner in Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, himself a devoted Zionist, declared on June 3, 1921, that the Balfour Declaration meant that some Jews should come to Palestine, within the limits set by the number and interests of the present inhabitants, and help by their means and efforts to develop the country in the interest of all the inhabitants. Although the worthiness and loftiness of the ideals of Zionism and the national aspirations of millions of Jews were fully acknowledged, it was maintained that "the degree to which Jewish national aspirations can be fulfilled in Palestine is conditioned by the rights of the present inhabitants." The mandate of the League of Nations for Palestine of July 24, 1922, was restricted in its application by an authoritative interpretation contained in the White Paper on British policy of June 3, 1922, which was officially accepted by the Zionist organization.

Meanwhile, the Arabs, bitterly resenting the mandate imposed upon them against their will and "against the spirit of Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant," and deeply apprehensive of the growing

number and economic preponderance of the Zionists, protested again and again against the mandate and Zionism. Their protests unheeded, during the years from 1920 to 1933 they rose four times in revolt. They were afraid of becoming a minority in their own country and of being ousted from the more fertile areas. They demanded the stoppage of immigration, the prohibition of land sales to protect the Arab farmer, and, above all, the institution of a native government, the introduction of democracy and popular sovereignty. Their demands were of no avail. The country continued to be governed by a colonial bureaucracy without any participation of the population. A proposal to create a legislative assembly was shelved after strong Zionist protests. British experts who were sent to Palestine after 1929 to report on the economic possibilities of land settlement and development declared that at the present stage agricultural Palestine did not afford possibilities for a large settlement without endangering the prospects of the native population, especially in view of the fact that the greatest part of the most fertile and economically important lands, such as the maritime plain, the bay of Haifa, and the valley of Esdraelon, had already passed into Jewish hands. The experts proposed a number of protective measures for the Arabs, but, in view of the opposition they aroused, most of them were never enacted.

The Zionist organization criticized the findings of the experts and strongly protested against the restric-

tive explanation of the Balfour Declaration and the practice of the mandatory government of curtailing Jewish immigration into Palestine. The political aim of Zionism remained: the reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth, Palestine to comprise not only the territory west of the Jordan but also the purely Arab Transjordan, which according to engagements of Great Britain to her Arab allies in the World War had been constituted as an Arab principality. Two different currents developed, however, with regard to the realization of this aim. One group, led by Dr. Chaim Weizmann and the Zionist Labour party, worked for close cooperation with Great Britain, for a realistic acceptance of whatever could be attained, coupled with permanent pressure upon Great Britain for a more generous and vigorous fulfillment of the Zionist hopes. They believed in the patient upbuilding of a stronger economic and social Zionist position in Palestine, trusting that this would in itself prove powerful enough to mold political realities and at some not-too-remote time to bring the Jewish state into being. The other group, led by the Revisionists, who were influenced by Fascist ideology, openly opposed the cautious policy of Great Britain and demanded the immediate institution of a political regime which would anticipate the future Jewish state and thus accelerate its coming. At the same time, the extreme nationalism in the central and eastern European states influenced the Jewish youth in those countries from which the

emigration to Palestine was being mainly recruited. A third, very small group of Zionist intellectuals, called Brith Shalom, or Peace Covenant, displayed some activity from 1925 to 1931; they recognized the extreme gravity of the moral and political problems presented to Zionism by its attitude toward the Arabs of Palestine and their aspirations and wished a reorientation of Zionism in the light of the teachings of Ahad Ha-am. They opposed the extreme nationalism of the Revisionists and criticized the politics of the Zionist Labour federation, which insisted upon 100 per cent Jewish labor in all Jewish enterprises, public and private.

The political antagonism between the two peoples in Palestine was deepened by the differences in their cultural and social outlook. By their very high standards of education and modern efficiency, their ardent nationalism with its spirit of sacrifice, discipline, and exclusiveness in political and economic life, their devoted energy, their wealth and excellent organization, the Palestinian Jews have created a social and economic situation in which the Arab population, greatly impoverished for centuries, uneducated and backward, cannot compete. The great differences in standards of living and education accentuate the tension between the two races, especially since the Jewish industries and commercial enterprises have not tried to invite participation of Arab capital and labor.

In April 1936 the long-smoldering discontent of the Arabs again broke into an open revolution, which

was to last this time for almost three years. In August the British government appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into the causes of the grave disturbances and to make recommendations for their removal and for the prevention of their recurrence. On the strength of the report of the Royal Commission, in July 1937 the British government came to the conclusion that there was an irreconcilable conflict between the aspirations of Jews and Arabs in Palestine, and that a scheme of partition of the country into an Arab and a Jewish state, as recommended by the Commission, represented the best and most hopeful solution of the deadlock. The Arabs protested vehemently against the partition of Palestine. They continued their fight with renewed strength. The British government took energetic measures to put the revolt down. In October 1937 the Arab national committees in Palestine were outlawed, the Arab political leaders exiled or put into concentration camps, military courts established, many executions carried out, and troops concentrated to put an end to the uprising. These measures only exasperated the Arabs. Racial hostility and violence in Palestine grew to an unprecedented extreme. A Palestine Partition Commission, sent by the British government in 1938 to recommend the boundaries for the proposed states and to examine the questions involved, came to the conclusion that partition was impracticable. Meanwhile the larger part of the country had passed under the control of the Arab revolutionary national forces, which had estab-

lished their own government, administration, and courts of justice. Only at the end of 1938 could the British troops reconquer the country. The government decided, then, to call for February 1939 a meeting of Arabs and Zionists in London, to confer with them regarding future policy, including the question of immigration into Palestine. By this time the long struggle of the Palestinian Arabs had aroused deep sympathy in the neighboring Arab countries and had become of utmost importance in cementing the rapidly growing feeling of unity among all the Arabs. The governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq have frequently interceded on behalf of their "Palestinian brethren." The British government, recognizing that Palestine is a common concern of the whole Arab people, invited not only representatives of the Palestinian Arabs but also of all the Arab states to confer on the future of Palestine.

On the other hand, the situation of the Jews in Palestine has recently become the concern of increasingly vast circles outside Palestine. The year 1938 has been the most disastrous year in modern Jewish history. The deprivation of the most primitive civic and human rights, the spoliation of all their fortune, the denial of all means for earning a living, violent abuse and the danger of massacre, have put the Jews in central Europe in a position worse than that of any other people in modern times. Even in their own long history of suffering and persecution nothing has ever equaled their present plight, as

regards the numbers involved and the systematic cruelty of the means employed. Under these circumstances immigration of great numbers of Jews into Palestine appeared to many more urgent than ever. At the beginning of 1939 the whole tragedy of the Palestinian situation revealed itself in all its far-reaching implications.

Zionism, less than half a century ago no more than a vague dream of the masses in eastern Europe, without leadership, without organization, and without any recognition, can look back upon startling successes. In 1897 Theodor Herzl created the Zionist organization, twenty years later the Balfour Declaration brought official recognition to the movement, and by the end of another twenty years Zionism had become an undisputed reality, a factor of great importance in the Near East and in the political world. The national hope of the Jews during the two thousand years of their dispersion has, since the deterioration of their situation in central Europe, again become the hope and refuge of many. It has rekindled the fire of Jewish nationalism in the heart of many an assimilated Jew, has taught Jews a new pride in their history and a new consciousness of their destiny. Zionism has also created for the Jewish people — which in its dispersion had never known any form of central organization or any attempt at concerted counsel or action — its first organization, although only in a rudimentary form, since even today the Zionist congresses represent only a minority of the Jewish people. It has revived

Jewish intellectual life and opened up new outlets for creative expression. And for many hundred thousands of persecuted and impoverished people it has held out the hope of escape from misery and oppression to a free, happy, and dignified life.

Very recent events have invested Zionism with a new importance. In periods of crisis and transition all problems grow more intense and acute; the Jewish problem is never an isolated problem, it follows the general trend. In the past few years the future and destiny of civilization have become problematic and subject to violent attacks: a revaluation of all moral values is being preached, age-old primitive beliefs are being revived and presented as the last word of wisdom. In this general restlessness and upheaval peace seems far away, farthest away for Israel. With some of the nations of Europe fascinated by the idea of a return to their own distant past, convinced that races and their destinies do not change, that history holds them spellbound for ever, it is no wonder that many Jews try to renew their ties with the past of two thousand years ago, a period which was the epoch of their creative greatness and of unexampled importance for the religious life of Western mankind. At a time of recrudescence of messianic nationalism, of a new emphasis upon racial consciousness, the attempt at a nationalistic solution of the Jewish problem seems natural. But in a world in which the foundations of Judeo-Christian ethics — the dignity of every individual as created in the image of God, the common descent and

destiny of all men, the universality and objectivity of law and truth, charity and humility as rules of conduct — are vehemently and contemptuously attacked by Fascism, in a world of militant nationalism and exclusive racialism, there is no hope for the solution of the Jewish problem, nor of any other problem. The hope of Israel cannot be dissociated from the hope of humanity: no isolated solution or liberation is possible today for any one people or any one problem. More intimately, more painfully than ever the Jewish problem is bound together with that of all mankind.

THE TOTALITARIAN CRISIS

Think, for example, of a Mohammed who had once become firmly convinced that he was one of the extraordinary natures who are called to guide the obscure and common folk of earth, and to whom, in consequence of this first presupposition, all his whims, however meager and limited they may really be, must necessarily appear to be great, exalted, and inspiring ideas because they are his own, while everything that opposes them must seem obscure, common folk, enemies of their own weal, evil-minded, and hateful. Such a man, in order to justify this self-conceit to himself as a divine vocation, and entirely absorbed in this thought, must stake everything upon it, nor can he rest until he has trampled under foot all that will not think as highly of him as he does himself, or until his own belief in his divine mission is reflected from the whole contemporary world.

I shall not say what would be his fortunes in case a spiritual vision that is true and clear within itself should actually come against him on the field of battle, but he certainly wins from those limited gamblers, for he hazards everything against those who do not so hazard; no spirit inspires them, but he is altogether inspired by a fanatical spirit — that of his mighty and powerful self-conceit.

FICHTE, *Addresses to the German Nation*,
8th Address.

The Totalitarian Crisis

I

THE international crisis of the thirties is neither a mere continuation of the imperialist struggles of the later nineteenth century, nor the consequence of the peace treaties following the World War. The Treaty of Versailles and the weakening of Germany are not the root of all evil; the strength of Germany in 1914 did not bring peace, nor did a treaty of Versailles precede the first World War. It was the outcome of two factors, the international anarchy of sovereign states and the menace which the vaguely defined and tactlessly heralded German bid for world hegemony seemed to imply. A second world war could only be averted by the firm foundation of an international order. The Peace Treaty of Versailles contained, for the first time in history, the promise of such an order. This promise was sabotaged from the beginning. Today, when it has broken down, we find ourselves again on the eve of a new world war. But the anarchy is infinitely graver today than it was at the end of the last century. For a new philosophy, unknown and even unsuspected in the nineteenth century, dominates today the minds of many peoples and denies that unity of civilization and of human aspirations which in all the international anarchy of the late nineteenth century preserved a

common basis for understanding. The conflicts of today represent not only rivalries over trade and territory, they are struggles for the victory or survival of two different ways of life, two different conceptions of man and history.

The system of sovereign states, as it had grown up in Europe since the Renaissance, each one the supreme judge of its own actions and pursuing only its own interests, necessarily produced a permanent state of potential warfare. The principle of the balance of power had maintained a precarious equilibrium, founded partly upon the close ties which united the dynasties and aristocracies of all countries in a pre-nationalistic time. The French Revolution, with its vision of a new order based upon the liberty of the peoples and the equality of all individuals, destroyed this precarious balance of dynastic power. Napoleon followed the revolutionary vision of a universal order on progressive and rational principles, even though he later betrayed it, only to proclaim it again in the solitary years of his captivity. His defeat seemed to restore the old anarchy of the balance of power, but twenty-five years of incessant warfare had evoked a religious enthusiasm for a humanity pacified by the application of principles of Christianity to the life of the nations. The Holy Alliance, a document signed by the three eastern monarchs as the representatives of the three branches of Christianity and consisting, in accordance with the number of the Holy Trinity, of three articles, was the expression of this longing.

It declared that the principles of Christianity, far from being applicable exclusively to private life, should control the resolutions of the princes. "Considering themselves all as members of one and the same Christian nation, the three allied princes looking on themselves merely as delegated by Providence to govern three branches of one family, confess that the Christian world, of which they and their people form a part, has in reality no other sovereign than Him to whom alone power really belongs."

The Holy Alliance proclaimed the two principles which alone can secure peace: the application of universal ethical standards to the conduct of nations and the unity of all nations under a higher sovereignty. But it proclaimed those principles in the spirit of a confused and reactionary mysticism; it exalted the conservative East against the French ideas of liberal nationalism and of equalitarian individualism.

This first step towards the recognition of the unity and solidarity of all nations remained a futile paper declaration with no sincere will backing it. Its ghost became the shield of all reactionaries and a nightmare for the peoples of Europe. It failed ignominiously because it looked toward the past, which it romantically glorified and which was entirely out of step with the real intellectual and social forces of the time. It recognized the princes as the sole representatives of the people. It acted as if there had been no French Revolution. Above all, it did not go beyond pious generalities, it contained no sanctions, and, trusting to

the Law of God, did not provide for the administration of this Law among the nations. Thus it was no more than an alliance of princes in opposition to the hopes and forces moving the peoples in the first half of the nineteenth century. By creating a feeling of brotherly solidarity among the princes it managed to keep the peace of Europe until it was finally destroyed by Bismarck, who made the principles of strict national self-interest and disregard for ethical law in international affairs the basis of his policy, and thereby of the whole European polity. But even as late as 1860 his fatherly friend, the conservative Prussian general Leopold von Gerlach, warned him in the spirit of the preceding generation against his anti-Austrian *Realpolitik*: "You cannot and you should not repudiate the principles of the Holy Alliance; they are nothing else than that authority is derived from God and that, therefore, the princes should rule as servants commissioned by God."

In this decade of the sixties Europe seemed definitely set for the dawn of a better day. The liberal movement had regained its full vigor after the defeat of 1849; the new industrialism increased the potentialities of man, raised the standard of living of the masses, seemed by its success to assure social peace. A great age of liberal reforms was starting everywhere. England was on the eve of the great administration of Gladstone; in France the Empire was entering its liberal era; in Italy liberalism and nationalism seemed to be establishing a new order; Austria was on the

road to sweeping constitutional reforms; Russia had abolished serfdom and the intelligentsia saw a regenerated Russia rising in the reforms of Alexander II; the United States was forging a nation free of slavery; Spain was preparing for the short and troubled day of her first republic: an immense hope inspired humanity, this time not in the enthusiasm of revolutionary fire but in the slow constructive activity of constitutional progress and social reform. This march of liberalism was stopped in one European country only — in Germany, where the genius of Bismarck defeated the still groping forces of the middle class. There the new productive resources came under the control of a class “which resisted the social and political changes which, logically, they implied.” The defeat of liberalism in one of the most capable, efficient, and disciplined nations of Europe — the rise of Bismarck, Prussia, and Germany, as the champions in the fight against liberalism and against the heritage of the Anglo-Saxon and French Revolutions — reinforced the habits of thought and scale of values against which the new Europe had risen in the first part of the nineteenth century. “Such a ‘return of the past’ was a European calamity on a scale so vast that its meaning could not be realized at the time.”¹

The victory of Bismarck and of Prussia in Germany was not only disastrous for Europe, but above all for Germany. “In more than one respect German

¹ E. L. Woodward, *The Age of Reform 1815-1870* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), p. 608.

policy was wrecked by Bismarck's heritage. It became Germany's curse because the Germans wanted to walk in his footsteps and there was none great enough to do it. His policy was one of 'blood and iron,' and for fifty years this policy of violence and of violent means has been engraved as a gospel of diplomatic art on the mind of every German high-school student. But Bismarck could not bequeath to the German people his ingenious skill, his prudence and caution in the use of his violent means."²

Bismarck had forged Germany into a state based upon the cult of itself, of force and efficiency, disregarding "humanitarian sentimentalism" and moral considerations. "Ideals other than state power had little hold on Bismarck; this was his strength, and his weakness." It became only a weakness once his masterful restraint was gone. It was Bismarck's greatness that he could control the demonic strength which he represented. But he aroused popular forces the dynamism of which could be disregarded as long as he directed Germany's destinies, but which could not be easily bridled once he was gone.³ His successors used his methods, but their goal was no longer stability and security, but growth and expansion.⁴

² Ottokar Czernin, *Im Weltkrieg* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1919), pp. 21f.

³ E. Malcolm Carroll, *Germany and the Great Powers, 1866-1914* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938), pp. 337-341. The quotation from the *Grenzboten* is *ibidem*, p. 80.

⁴ See, for this and the following, Raymond James Sontag, *Germany and England, Background of Conflict 1848-1898* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1938), pp. 233f., 313-341, 45-90. It is interesting to note Bismarck's attitude towards English statesmen. "Contempt for British

This new demand for growth was deepened by the conviction of many Germans that they were a people different from other nations, that not reason, common to all men, but history, the perennial battleground of nations for space and power, was the guiding star of destiny.⁵ The Germans felt themselves not only different, but also misunderstood. A leading liberal weekly, *Die Grenzboten*, said during the Franco-Prussian war: "It is easier to accept the smooth superficiality of French civilization in spite of its inner corruption than to appreciate properly the depth of the German spirit. This war has shown that in essentials Germany can never hope to be understood by other peoples than those of German blood."

2

The World War began as a struggle among the European powers for the maintenance or expansion of their position. With the exception of Italy and

statesmen he did feel intensely. For ten years he played on their convictions and aversions, their ignorance and their false assumptions, with uniform success. Each time his trickery became obvious he relied on English military weakness to prevent hostile action, and on the gullibility of the London government for the possibility of renewed deception; each time England acted as he had foretold. He did not even attempt to hide his contempt. . . . By exposing the weakness of liberal England, he was making more difficult the revival of German liberalism." Germany's attitude towards England is not very different under Hitler from that under Bismarck, and the English attitude towards Germany, as discussed on pp. 82f., resembles that in 1938.

⁵ The great German historians from Ranke to Treitschke fostered the belief in growth as the law of national life. It is noteworthy that whereas history became the leading science and the guiding principle in nineteenth-century Germany, prehistory takes this place in National-Socialist Germany.

Japan, all nations started the war, not for expansion, but for self-defense; the German soldiers fought, in common with their fellow soldiers, for the protection of the fatherland. To this common attitude the other peoples, as the war proceeded, added a more universal and generous vision of peace and international order, a vision based upon the liberal tradition of the Western Revolutions. With the progress of the war this difference became more accentuated. Germany, hoping for a quick victory, concentrated all her energies on military strategy. In keeping with recent Prussian tradition, she neglected moral considerations. By 1917 Germany had fallen completely under the dictatorship of the military headquarters; against Ludendorff's authority not only the civilian government but even the Emperor was helpless. In the allied countries civilians ruled who represented the most liberal and progressive forces of their generation, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, old fighters for liberty, for social reform, for justice and humanity. The Russian revolution had ended autocracy and that Slavophile tendency which resembled German political romanticism and historiography; the vast Eurasian plains seemed ready to enter the comity of liberal nations which had achieved their democracy through successful revolution. The allied peoples were animated by the great hope that a new order would emerge from the cauldron of suffering. In November 1918 their unprecedented efforts seemed to bear fruit. The German military command had to ac-

knowledge the defeat of the German army, only half a year after it had imposed the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, revealing the whole extent of the expansionist aims of Germany and her ruthless exploitation of a defeated enemy. But the new order the Allied peoples had hoped for was not to come.

It was a great tragedy that the Allied peoples could not sustain the tremendous moral effort of the last years of the war, once the peace seemed secure. Compared with the sacrifices of life and goods which the war had necessitated, the sacrifice which was necessary to build a peace according to the high hopes seemed slight. To evolve an international order which would make democracy safe against aggression and which would establish peace on a permanent basis, the high idealism animating the last years of the war, the faith in humanity, had to be maintained. Instead, however, the idealistic faith collapsed as soon as victory seemed won. At a moment when it was of utmost urgency to remain united and to think internationally, the Allied powers started to quarrel among themselves, to work one against the other, and to think on exclusively national grounds. It seemed as if Americans, Englishmen, Frenchmen, felt a secret shame at having allowed themselves to be swayed for a short time by a lofty idealistic vision which was in substance nothing but the logical outcome of the very foundations upon which the liberal democracies were built. A period of "debunking" set in, the ideals of liberalism and democracy were "unmasked" as pre-

tentious and hollow, as rhetorical pretexts for national egotism and economic interests. The Americans were the most fully disillusioned in their faith in democracy and international solidarity because it had soared highest among them. The others followed suit; they had to come down from lesser heights to what they considered earth.

On this earth Great Britain and Italy obtained complete satisfaction of all their legitimate aspirations. Italy saw the dreams of the *Risorgimento* crowned by success beyond hope. The old enemy, the Habsburg Empire, was destroyed; the last Italian-speaking provinces of Austria were liberated; in addition Italy received territories inhabited by many hundreds of thousands of southern Slavs and Germans, to give her security forever against any encroachments on her territory from the "hereditary enemy." Great Britain, besides the complete destruction of the German fleet, which could not be rebuilt secretly as was the territorial army, realized her two great imperial dreams — the East African Empire from Cairo to Capetown, and the road to India across the Near and Middle East. France, with her devastated territory, with her stationary population faced by fast-growing numbers in neighboring countries, with her profoundly pacifist peasantry, demanded security and reparation. She was given neither.

Two fundamental causes, although of very different importance, were at the root of the situation which led to the World War. By far the lesser cause, but

much magnified and overemphasized at the time, was Prussian militarism — not the existence of a strong German army, but the attitude of mind which gave the army a dominant position in the scale of values.⁶ By far the more important cause, realized only by a few men, was the international anarchy, the sovereignty of the nations, to which masses and statesmen everywhere tenaciously and emphatically clung — in the United States and the Allied countries no less than in Germany. These causes continue today unchecked. The effort made in the peace treaties to eradicate them proved futile.

The German military headquarters which had ruled

⁶ The war-guilt question in the usual sense of the word seems of little importance. Bethmann-Hollweg was certainly for peace; few Germans, if any, desired a world war; what many desired was a victorious war. Hitler in his *Mein Kampf* (English translation, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York, 1939, pp. 209ff.) says about the feelings of the German people in 1914: "If at that time the Viennese government had given the ultimatum another, milder wording, this would not have changed anything in the situation except perhaps the fact that the government itself would have been swept away by the indignation of the people. Because, in the eyes of the great masses, the tone of the ultimatum was much too considerate and in no way too brutal or even too far-reaching. Those who today try to deny this are either forgetful empty-heads or quite deliberately cheats and liars."

"The fight of the year 1914 was certainly not forced upon the masses, good God! but desired by the entire people itself. . . ."

"To me personally those hours appeared like the redemption from the annoying moods of my youth. Therefore I am not ashamed today to say that, overwhelmed by impassionate enthusiasm, I had fallen on my knees and thanked Heaven out of my overflowing heart that it had granted me the good fortune of being allowed to live in these times."

The American historians annotating that edition remark in their note: "Accordingly one reaches this interesting conclusion: it seems impossible to hold the German government of 1914 solely responsible for the declaration of war, but the head of the German government of 1938 has gone on record in this book as wishing that his predecessor had assumed that responsibility."

Germany as long as there was hope for a German victory, and had assumed the function of the civilian government, abdicated this function as soon as it became clear that Germany had been defeated in the field beyond repair. It was a civilian government, and not, as it should have been, the military command, which had to negotiate the armistice. Thus the army threw the responsibility upon the civilian government. As the Allies did not insist upon an unconditional surrender, the army command could soon proclaim that the German army had never been defeated. This version of the case was officially confirmed by the Social Democratic President Ebert, who on December 11, 1918 greeted the German troops marching into Berlin in full military display with the proud words that they were returning undefeated from the battlefield. Germany had lost the war; but since the enemies had not defeated the army, the cause for defeat was sought elsewhere; thus the Social Democrats helped to build the legend of the stab in the back and to restore the prestige of the German army. The spirit of Prussian militarism was not broken; it remained the rallying point of the German desire for revenge. Very many of the Germans never accepted the defeat. It was not the Peace Treaty which they rejected, but the defeat itself. The counter forces of liberalism in Germany proved, once more, too weak. German rearmament started immediately after the war. The German Republic did very little to spread the ideal of democracy; it did much to encourage the idea of

revenge, of a new expansion, and to foster the military spirit in Germany. Instead of searching for Germany's share in the responsibility for the war, all efforts were concentrated on whitewashing the imperial regime and on attributing to the enemies all the miseries from which the defeated country suffered.

On these foundations a German republic could not last long. Its first popularly elected president was the old Marshal Hindenburg, the symbol of the Prussian army. At his second election he had become the representative no longer of the German nationalists but of the German socialists and democrats. His ideas had not changed; on the contrary, with advancing age he clung more tenaciously to the traditions and ideals which had dominated his early youth. But the position of the socialists and democrats in Germany had fundamentally changed; German liberalism had had to take refuge in the shadow of Hindenburg. The German Republic survived this paradoxical situation for less than a year. In the garrison church of Potsdam, Prussian militarism celebrated a triumphant rebirth. Something new, however, was born with it: a national socialism, infinitely more dynamic and self-centered than Hohenzollern feudalism had ever been.

More serious was the failure to establish, after the war, an international order based upon a League of Nations. Within such an order the survival of Prussian militarism would have been of little importance. With the safety of democracy assured on the international plane, Germany and other nations of Central

and Eastern Europe would have evolved slowly in the direction of democracy. The most far-sighted pacifist, Norman Angell, published in 1917 a book called *The Political Conditions of Allied Success*, in which he pointed out the essential condition for making the world safe for democracy: "The survival of the Western democracies, in so far as that is a matter of the effective use of their force, depends upon their capacity to use it as a unit, during the War and after. That unity we have not attained, even for the purposes of the War, because we have refused to recognize its necessary conditions — a kind and degree of democratic internationalism to which current political ideas and feelings are hostile; an internationalism which is not necessary to the enemy, but is to us. He can in some measure ignore it. We cannot. His unity, in so far as it rests upon moral factors, can be based upon the old nationalist conceptions; our unity depends upon a revision of them, an enlargement into an internationalism.

"The greatest obstacles to a permanent association of nations by which the security of each shall be made to rest upon the strength of the whole are disbelief in its feasibility and our subjection to the traditions of national sovereignty and independence. Were it generally believed in, and desired, it would be not only feasible but inevitable. Return to the old relationships after the War will sooner or later doom the democratic nations, however powerful each may be individually, to subjugation in detail by a group, inferior

in power but superior in material unity — a unity which autocracy achieves at the cost of freedom and human worth.”

The prophecy of Norman Angell came true. Once the strain of war was removed, each nation thought only of itself, returned to isolation to look only after its own interests. The first nation to desert the new ideal of collective security was the United States. Under the influence of purely domestic party politics, the United States contributed to destroying the victory achieved to make the world safe for democracy.⁷ The Peace Treaty of Versailles was certainly not a perfect peace treaty, but it brought for the first time in history the forces of democracy everywhere to the fore, and proposed to build a system of international solidarity which would have ended everywhere the possibility of militarism. As against these generous hopes the defects of the treaty became relatively unimportant; there was a well-founded hope that, within the new order, they would lose more and more of their influence. But the Peace Treaty of Versailles depended for its execution on the participation of the United States in the League of Nations and in the councils of the nations dealing with the problems of reparations and of the still undetermined frontiers. The Treaty of Versailles had been designed for such a condition. The defection of the United States vitiated the Peace Treaty.

Not less disastrous was the rivalry between

⁷ See the excellent book by Denna Frank Flenington, *The United States and the League of Nations*, New York, 1920.

Britain and France which started the moment the war was over. "One of the most constant traditions of British diplomacy is that an alliance loses its validity as soon as common victory has been achieved."⁸ It was in the line of Great Britain's traditional policy that she immediately tried to break any potential French hegemony on the European continent and supported Germany and even German rearmament against France. French hegemony was more an illusion than a reality. France had neither the material power and the numbers to support such a hegemony to any dangerous point, nor — with the deep pacifist sentiment prevailing among the French people — the will to impose and to maintain such a hegemony when seriously challenged. France demanded security, not hegemony. French military circles believed that the Rhine frontier was needed for French security. They gave this demand up in exchange for treaties of assistance with the United States and Great Britain, in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against France by Germany. The Treaty

States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920 (New York: Putnam, 1932).

⁸ Harold Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925* (London: Constable, 1934), p. 192. Clemenceau and Lloyd George wrote on April 23, 1919: "The hope that sustained us in the perilous years of war was that victory would bring with it not merely the defeat of Germany, but the final discredit of the ideals in which Germany had placed her trust. On the other hand, Germany . . . felt sure that the union of her enemies would never survive their triumph. She based her schemes no longer on the conquest of Europe, but on its political and perhaps also on its social disintegration." (D. Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939, II, 545.)

of Versailles and these two pacts of assistance were signed simultaneously, but these two pacts never became valid. History would have taken another course if the United States had not repudiated the pledge of assistance. Great Britain's promise was conditional upon America's ratification. When Great Britain gave the promise finally in 1938 it came much too late to avert the disastrous consequences of the original default. The other promise which France received to satisfy her demand for security, the demilitarization of the Rhineland, was embodied in the Pact of Locarno under the guarantee of Great Britain. As the Rhineland was remilitarized by Germany, France had not the necessary strong will to force Germany to observe the treaty; nor did Great Britain make any move to honor her pledge. German propaganda in the United States and Great Britain had succeeded in isolating France completely and in obscuring all the issues left by the World War. Thus the fruit of victory never ripened for France.

More disastrous was the fact that the peoples in the United States, in Great Britain, and in France, on whom the hope of liberalism and democracy rested, were seized after the War by a feeling of bitter disillusionment, a disillusionment for which they tried to find the causes in economics, in sociology, in diplomatic archives, but for which they alone were responsible. The watchwords glorified in 1917-1918, the defense of universal rights and moral issues, were ridiculed; nothing seemed to count but the defense of

national self-interest. Later on the same people asked whether they were "expected to fight" for the Ethiopians, the Chinese, or the Czechs. They did not understand that their own fate and that of Western civilization was being decided on these distant battlefields, that to stand up for the Manchurians or the Ethiopians would have meant not to fight at all, but to eliminate the risk of war. But people were tired and distrustful of democracy, human solidarity, and "high-sounding" moral issues. In this growing disillusionment and chaos many comforted themselves with the thought that the will to peace was overwhelmingly strong in all nations. But the will to peace is useless without intelligent awareness of how peace can be achieved. At present all peoples demand peace and pursue at the same time policies of isolation, of provincial-mindedness, of economic nationalism, and of armament which must lead to war. It is almost a miracle that in this confusion the great achievement of the peace treaties, the League of Nations, actually did grow into a bright light which attracted so many hopeful eyes to the shores of Lake Geneva. The American dream of ever-widening horizons of peace, liberty, and happiness was left to strike root in the heart of the Old World without American support.

3

The League of Nations was the boldest innovation ever conceived in the relations between nations. It was the logical culmination of three developments:

of the medieval *respublica Christiana* in a secularized and inclusive form, of the universal message contained in the liberalism of the three Western revolutions, and of the growth, as the result of discoveries and technical advance, of a mankind united, for the first time in history, by common economics and civilization. Men had been accustomed to think in concepts of national interest. Now they were asked for the first time to think in concepts of human solidarity, to regard events happening in faraway parts of the earth as of direct concern to them. It is easily understandable that such a process of rethinking demands a long period of growth and strenuous efforts at re-education. But the League of Nations, the outcome of the liberalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was not given an opportunity to grow. After the World War new attitudes developed which expressed a new feeling of life, fundamentally opposed to the ways of liberalism.

The first of these philosophies, Communism, helped to undermine the moral foundations on which alone a new society could have been built — not because of its principles, which essentially were not opposed to the principles upon which the League of Nations was based, but because of its glorification of force as the way of solving problems, the unrestrained violence of its language, and its interpretation of life as a naked struggle of interests. In the certainty of possessing the only absolute truth, the Communists attacked indiscriminately and venomously everything which did

not entirely agree with their doctrine or even with its changing interpretations. Conservatives, Social Democrats, liberals, pacifists, imperialists — all seemed to them equally wrong and harmful. They eagerly denounced all liberal and democratic ideals as ideological pretexts for economic or political ambitions. Their cynicism as well as their economic interpretation spread far beyond Communist circles. It weakened the faith in democracy and in liberal ideals and prepared for the victorious march of Fascism. It became an important factor in the post-war disillusionment, and seemed to offer a “scientific” interpretation for the shortcomings of the war and of the peace treaties. German propaganda against the peace treaties and against the principles of democracy and liberalism was powerfully helped by the Communists, and was surprisingly successful in the democratic victor nations.

Communism was not a product of the peace treaties of Versailles; nor was Fascism or National Socialism. Fascism arose in one of the victor nations; the first open attack against the League of Nations and the system of security came from another victor nation. Fascism prides itself on being the implacable enemy of liberalism, of pacifism, of any international order based upon the equality of all peoples. It is not only opposed to the present forms of liberalism and of the League of Nations but to their very principles. It is the first open revolt against the discipline of Christianity and the humanist rationalism which form the

basis of modern Western civilization.⁹ It is a protest of the supposed super-nation and supermen against the equalitarian tendencies of the French Revolution and its effort to establish a rational order for the common man and his rights. It is a revolt on the part of self-centered dynamic forces against absolute standards of law and reason, and carries therefore a fundamentally anarchist element in itself which will never tolerate any stable order. International law is rejected for the necessities and desires of the super-nation, which alone determines their extent. International anarchy is raised as never before in history from a fact to a principle. With every individual nation a law unto itself, the rational order of the League of Nations must fall. Fascism regards a system of collective security with implacable hostility.

Christianity and Western rationalism believed in the dignity of each individual and in the fundamental equality of all men. They believed in the perfectibility of men; and modern civilization in the last centuries looked toward the future convinced of a progress, though slow, in which all men and all races

⁹ The editors of the annotated translation of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939, p. 969) quote the following passage from Pidder Lüng's *Nationalsozialismus*: "Every effort made towards cementing international ties, or bringing about international understanding and unification always takes its rise in individuals whose feelings are degenerate and rootless in a folkish sense, regardless of whether their motives are idealistic or economic. There is no international solidarity among plants, and there is none among animals. There is also none among men who found their notions on the laws of nature. The idea of 'humanity' is an abstraction which cannot be translated into practical life."

would participate. Fascism believes in the permanent and unchangeable nature of man, dominated by his primitive and primordial instincts. It looks backward to the past of the race, and denies that men today should or could act differently from the way they acted many centuries ago. Whereas each individual is to Fascism only an indissoluble and undistinguishable part of the nation, the nation itself has an individuality completely unlike any other, and therefore has its own rights based upon its uniqueness and strength. There is no hope of, nor any desire for, a common humanity, even in the distant future. Fascism sacrifices the individual and humanity entirely to its only absolute value, the nation or the race.

Fascism is not only the glorification of power without moral restraint, but also of the insatiable will without rational limitations. It is a misunderstanding of tragic consequence to believe that Fascist powers are out for definite objects, territories or economic concessions. They have no definite, limited objects; they are totalitarian in the sense that they reach out for the infinite, that they do not recognize any limit set by the rights or interests of others or by the ethical laws developed as a protection of the "weak" and easily disregarded by the strong. Fascism does not represent the continuation of nineteenth-century power-politics or of the struggle for territories and markets. It is an entirely new element in the life of the nations, a product of the moral disintegration of our age and of the new mass technique. It is not to be

identified with any one nation. It is a deeply nationalistic movement; nevertheless it carries with it a message to all nations. It is a symptom of the disease of our nationalist world. No nation is necessarily Fascist; no nation is entirely immune against Fascism. It grows faster in a soil where intellectual and social conditions or a more advanced moral disintegration facilitate its accession to power. But even in Italy and in Germany the coming of Fascism was in no way inevitable. There were situations again and again when more resoluteness or intelligence on the part of the non-Fascist parties and leaders could have easily stopped the victorious march of Fascism. Fascism was promoted by certain conservative forces which, without deeper understanding of the character of Fascism, saw in it a tool for their fight against socialism and unrest, and hoped to be able to control Fascism once they had helped it into power. They had soon to learn that Fascism was not to be controlled by them but they were to be subjected to the relentless drive of Fascism. Fascism in Italy in 1922, Fascism in Germany in 1933, represented a minority of the people. Once in power, by their system of merciless terror and all-controlling organization, they could impress their stamp upon the whole nation. Fascism remained of relatively little importance for mankind as long as it was in power only in Italy. But when the strongest, richest, best organized, and most efficient nation of the European continent succumbed to it, as the result of the intrigue of a small *Junker* clique with a Fascist

leader — when the immense industrial efficiency, intellectual skill, and economic resources of the German people were at the disposal of Fascism — Fascism, joined then by Japan, grew more and more radical and became the great challenge to all hopes for a more peaceful and more humane world.

4

The World War was waged to make the world safe for democracy. There is no greater proof of the success of anti-democratic propaganda by the Communists and by Germany than the fact that many laugh today at this purpose, which filled the hearts of millions of men with high hopes. Yet despite the faltering development of democracy, the world has become more democratic. From the turmoil of the World War the nations have emerged more democratic than they were before. Everywhere democratic republics have been created, constitutions written, the rights of minorities recognized, suffrage extended, women granted equality, new codes of social and humanitarian legislation drawn up, workers admitted to a share in the control of government and industry. Democracy has become stronger even in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and has made immense progress in many of the smaller states in Central and Southeastern Europe, and among the vast nations all over Asia. All this has been the result of the victory of the Allies, of the program for which they stood with growing clarity as the war progressed. That these gains did not endure

everywhere, that they seem threatened today even in places where they had existed before the World War, is the consequence of the fatal short-sightedness which did not recognize that on the shrinking earth of today, with the interdependence of all nations as it emerged surprisingly fast after the World War, democracy cannot exist any longer as a framework for a national order based upon individual liberty and equality and the protection of law, but that it must be supplemented by an international framework, as first designed in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In the autumn of 1916 the British Foreign Office submitted a Memorandum to the Prime Minister regarding the future peace settlement. There they proposed the creation of a League of Nations. "We are under no illusion," they wrote, "that such an instrument will become really effective until nations have learned to subordinate their personal and individual ambitions and dreams for the benefit of the community of nations. We have witnessed such a process in individual states with the development of what we call a civilized condition of things, but this process has been of slow growth, and we shall have to exercise considerable patience in watching and promoting a similar development among the nations of the world. This consideration brings up the question of whether it will be possible to secure the adhesion of the United States of America. . . . There are signs in America that the more thinking people there are awakening to the fact that in the modern condition of things Amer-

ica can no longer cling to her position of splendid isolation. If America could be persuaded to associate itself to such a League of Nations, a weight and influence might be secured for its decisions that would materially promote the object for which it had been created.”¹⁰

Whereas in 1919 most people expected the triumphant progress of democracy, since the conquest of Germany by Fascism many observers doubt the survival of democracy. But it is not the strength of Communism or Fascism which threatens the survival of democracy; that it continues governed by the nation-centered and isolationist view — which was natural and possible in the nineteenth century — is its main weakness. Fascist propagandists draw a picture according to which mankind has to choose between Communism and Fascism, with liberal democracy definitely decaying and doomed. This Fascist propaganda is insidiously influencing the thinking in the democracies themselves. In reality there are no indications that either Communism or Fascism is spreading by its own strength or appeal. About fifteen years ago Communism hoped to sweep victoriously over Europe and Asia; many then dreaded its approaching world-wide victory. Since then, Communism under Stalin has resigned itself to its establishment in one country. The fear of its spread has died down except with some people who use this fear for the further-

¹⁰ David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), vol. 1, pp. 21f.

ance of their own ends. Today, with the successes of Fascism in Germany and in the international field, Fascism feels a confidence in its world-wide victory similar to that which Communism felt before. But the prospects are as small for a Fascist victory as they are for the spread of Communism. Both develop only where historical conditions favor them. But historical conditions depend not only, not even mainly, upon social and economic factors. They depend also, and perhaps chiefly, upon the moral strength of democracy, upon the strength of individual independence and of a feeling for the dignity of every individual.

Democracy is not the product of legal minds who draw up a constitution, nor the result of the lonely thinking of some philosophers who conceive an ideal code for the behavior of man. Democracy undoubtedly at one time found its first conceptual expression in the writings of philosophers and was at some later time put down in the normative frame of a constitution, but between these two events a long time had to pass during which the principles of democracy — from the realm of thought entering the realm of impulses, of habits, of tradition — filtered down, to agitate and to permeate the brains and hearts of the people. Democracy demands a long period of application in the manifold ways of daily life, public and private, in local government and in the administration of justice, in the churches and in the school system. Otherwise even the best constitution will not implant democracy firmly in a people. It has nowhere been established

without a long and bitter struggle against feudal traditions and vested interests, and this struggle does not cease even after victory. New and changing conditions demand the adoption of new forms; new obstacles have to be overcome, new problems to be solved. Once firmly established, however, democracy finds in its own momentum sufficient resources and new devices for change and adaptation. For democracy is a way of life and thought, a habitual mode of reaction, of response on the part of individuals and of the community as a whole to the challenges which time thrusts out.

The establishment of Communism and Fascism and their direct propaganda nowhere destroyed democracy. Since Fascism's conquest of power in Germany, with its much-heralded victorious march onward, democracy has done much more than hold its own in all democratic countries. After 1933, in the Scandinavian countries and Finland the labor element became more prominent with every election; and in all these Nordic countries the governments today represent that combination of moderate socialism and progressive bourgeois liberalism which is especially abhorrent to the National Socialists as the expression of "Western" or "Jewish" mentality. In France the elections of 1936 brought a great victory to the same elements, organized there in the Popular Front. The Fascist groups in England, in France, in Holland, in Scandinavia, and in Belgium, whose rise was acclaimed with so much hope and fear in 1934, after five years have

now practically dwindled out of existence. The claim of Fascism to unique ability to solve the economic and governmental problems of the modern nation became as manifestly false as similar claims proffered formerly by Communism. Economic recovery went ahead faster in some democratic countries than in the Fascist states; the standard of life of the workers and of the middle classes was maintained or improved in democracies and definitely lowered in the Fascist countries. The economic insufficiency of Fascism became as obvious as its destructive influence upon law and morality. A free and enlightened public opinion may render government decisions more difficult, but in the long run it will make them wiser. Above all, the blighting and stupefying effect of Fascism on the thinking of the people became convincingly clear. The immense majority of the people in democracies became convinced, the more they learned about Communism and Fascism, of the superiority of liberal democracy.

Everywhere the democratic sentiment is stronger than it was in 1914, is slowly but surely striking root. This has been the case even in the many new countries without any democratic tradition which have grown up under most difficult conditions since the World War in Central and Southeastern Europe. In all of them a rising peasant democracy has had to struggle against the authoritarian inclinations of kings, generals, and politicians. Fascism has nowhere been able to gather momentum by its own strength. In

February 1939 the Yugoslav democracy asserted itself against the pro-Fascist tendencies of Premier Milan Stoyadinovich with astonishing ease. In Poland a large part of the intelligentsia, the whole peasant movement, and the relatively strong Social Democratic party stand out firmly for democracy and can point to electoral victories in the year 1938. This trend toward self-assertion of democracy has made itself felt, and to a surprising degree, even among the many hundreds of millions of awakening masses in Asia. In India the Indian National Congress, representing the large majority of the people of India, is a socially and politically progressive movement akin to the popular front movements in Western Europe; and in unmistakable form it has expressed its sympathies with all the democracies attacked by Fascism. The Kuomintang in China has developed in a similar direction. There is no question but that mankind has become definitely more democratic since the World War.

The alleged strength of Communism or Fascism does not endanger the survival of democracy; the threat to democracy arises from the international situation; for the democracies are still refusing to face the changing realities and continue to think in terms of the national isolation of the nineteenth century. Today the great task before the democratic countries is the same as that which faced them in 1919, the firm establishment of an international order. The failure to fulfill this in 1919, from the start wrecked the effort

to make the world safe for democracy. Since then the need has grown even more urgent. The danger which Communism offered to an international order was relatively slight; it came into existence in a vast but backward country, backward economically as well as educationally, completely ruined by the World War and civil war, and weakened, at least for a long time, by the crudeness of its social experiments. When Fascism was confined to Italy, it represented similarly no real threat to international order and peace. But Fascism in one of the most powerful, richest, and most progressive countries of the world presents an entirely different picture, and the danger is increased and made real by the close, world-wide cooperation of a Fascist International, led by Germany, Japan, and Italy, to make the world safe for aggression. The formation of this anti-league has been made possible only by the progressive weakening and finally the breakdown of the democratic League of Nations.

5

In 1924 a bright ray of hope penetrated the clouds of international tension which had gathered in 1923. In France, after a short interlude, the traditional pacifist and reformist attitude of the French electoral masses had reasserted itself, and a Radical Socialist government under Herriot had come into power. The Ruhr occupation was liquidated, the reparation problem tackled in a conciliatory spirit, and a sincere approach made toward Germany. At the same time the

first Labor Government under Ramsay MacDonald was in power in Great Britain. The common efforts of these two governments resulted in the Geneva Protocol, an attempt to make the League of Nations a living reality. But the Conservative Government which succeeded the first Labor Cabinet in the fall of 1924 repudiated the Protocol. Most members of the Conservative Government had no confidence in the League of Nations. They continued to adhere to the well-tried diplomatic and military usages of the nineteenth century, to a policy centered upon British interests, and were full of distrust and dislike for all the new-fangled slogans of international solidarity, of protection for the weaker, and of obligations assumed on principle for future eventualities. To take a bold and definite stand on principle, instead of dealing with each situation as it arose, and then in the light of its relations to the British interests of the moment, went against the grain of the whole British tradition.

The British Conservatives came again into power in the fall of 1931. Unfortunately this date coincided with the first act of overt aggression against the integrity and independence of one of the members of the League of Nations. This act did not come from Germany, nor had it the slightest relation to the issues of the Peace Treaty of Versailles. It started a policy on the part of the British Government which it has pursued persistently since: to help the aggressor against the victim and thus to weaken the League of Nations. When Japan occupied Chinese Manchuria in the fall

of 1931, Great Britain prevented the League of Nations from coming to the help of China, although the United States was ready to cooperate with Great Britain and with the League of Nations in stopping Japan. The Republican Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, had proposed joint action: "The British non-joinder obviously killed the possibility of any such demarche," Mr. Stimson wrote later. "My plan was therefore blocked. . . . For several days I was deeply discouraged at my inability to carry out the cooperative plan which we had suggested. I seemed doomed to inaction, while a great tragedy was following its predestined course."¹¹

The policy of siding with the aggressor against the victim was followed by the British Government after 1935, in spite of the fact that it had been elected on a solemn pledge to uphold the League of Nations. Instead of fulfilling that pledge it resorted to the principle of intervention by non-intervention, the refusal to distinguish between good and evil, between the aggressor and the victim, even where there could be no doubt about who was the aggressor. Non-intervention was applied in the embargo on arms which was clapped down with the majesty of complete impartiality upon Japan and China; in its conse-

¹¹ Henry L. Stimson, *The Far Eastern Crisis* (New York: Harper, 1936), p. 165. Sir John Simon, the chief British delegate, spoke so warmly for the Japanese case on December 7, 1932, that the Japanese delegate thanked him heartily for having said in half an hour, in a few well-chosen phrases, what the Japanese delegate had been trying to say in bad English for the last ten days.

quences it helped Japan, the aggressor, which was amply supplied with arms, and penalized the victim, which had followed the policy of disarmament and had not armed sufficiently. The same policy was followed in Ethiopia, in Spain, and later in China proper. In none of these cases did there exist an alternative between war and peace. Diplomatic pressure with an economic threat in the background, exercised by the United States and Great Britain, would have resulted in Japan's withdrawal from Manchuria, and would have stopped that dangerous precedent to the events of 1936. But neither was there in 1936 any danger of the destruction of English cities with the consequent ruin of Western civilization. On the contrary, the essential elements of Western civilization could then have been saved at relatively very little cost if the governments had had the will to do it, and if the people had clearly understood the real issues involved. It was not the choice between peace and war which dictated the decisions from 1931 to 1938, but a persistent policy which rested upon two main considerations.

One of these was the opinion that Fascist imperialism was the same as nineteenth-century bourgeois imperialism, that Fascist nations wished to expand to gain definite and limited objectives — relief for population pressure, economic outlets, or raw materials — and that therefore at a not-very-distant future they would become satiated and would settle down. That even this alleged satiation could be reached only at the expense

of weaker races put into bondage did not trouble the consciences of many. This opinion, however, is based upon a complete misunderstanding of the new mentality, which is not seeking the relief of over-population — the high-pressure propaganda for a higher birth rate and for the return of immigrants to the home land, the boast about the disappearance of unemployment and about the lack of labor forces contradict the validity of this pretext — nor even trade, but rather that accretion of power and prestige which is an irrational urge, which cannot be grasped by the bourgeois or merchant mentality of Western nations, as the Fascists themselves disdainfully point out.

The other was the deep-seated distrust of many conservatives in all lands toward any progressive movements which might endanger the delicate balance of the present social system. Men of the nineteenth century, they feared the new danger besetting, in the twentieth century, a social and economic order which had given at the end of the nineteenth century to the progressive civilized nations a level of well-being never attained before. In the Russian Revolution, in the rise of socialist and labor parties to power, in the unrest of the masses, they saw danger symptoms, and they welcomed all "conservative" forces which seemed to establish or guarantee "order."¹² The con-

¹² They misunderstood the "revolutionary" nature of Fascism as completely as had the conservative elements in Italy and Germany, which had helped Fascism into power in these countries. Fascism employed in its international conquests the same methods which it had employed so successfully in its national policies. It is interesting to

368 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

servatives see the need of "discipline" for the masses. As such a disciplinarian, conservative, and constructive force appeared Japan, to reestablish order in disorganized, chaotic China, stamp out the seeds of unrest, and organize the country for international trade. Similarly, Italy's intervention in Spain was to bring greater stability and tranquility to this sorely tried country; Germany should be given a free hand to put the "Balkanized" Central and Central-Eastern Europe into some needed order and guarantee there that peace which would allow other nations to pursue undisturbed their own interests. Thus not only the ruling classes of Japan, Italy, and Germany would be satisfied and given some fields for the exercise of their somewhat primitive ideas of virtue, but also the spread of Communist influence or social innovations and popular mass movements could be forestalled. For this reason the conservatives persistently supported the Fascist governments of Japan, Italy, Germany, and Spain, and sacrificed to this policy of order and appeasement Manchuria, Ethiopia, Locarno, Spain, China, Austria, Czechoslovakia, the League of Nations, and the hope of establishing an international order which would keep the world safe for democracy. Therein they found the support of conservative circles all over Europe, and of many isolationists in the United States. But this policy was based upon a funda-

note that in April 1917 Germany sent Lenin to Russia to destroy Russia, unafraid of social consequences, whereas today the powers spare their enemies out of fear of revolution.

mental misunderstanding of the new forces which with Fascism have entered the twentieth century. This policy of order and appeasement destroys the foundation of order and peace. The occupation of China by Japan increased the disorder in the Far East, and the Pact of Munich made the insecurity in Central Europe greater. Every successive weakening of the League of Nations and its principles puts peace farther off and establishes that insecurity in which we live today and which may at any moment produce a war.

Japan was not satisfied with Manchuria. A few years passed, and she stretched out her hands in quick succession for Mongolia, North China, Central China, South China; and having now occupied the island of Hainan she is ready to strike farther south into French Indo-China, British Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, as well as farther north against the Soviet Union. Italy was not satisfied with Ethiopia, in spite of all the benevolent predictions of Western diplomats and economists. Mussolini had contemplated an Italian-Spanish alliance with Primo de Rivera. After 1931 he tried to undermine the Spanish Republic, but only after the conquest of Ethiopia did he dare to send his triumphant legions into Spain. He waited only for the complete conquest of Spain to raise his demands for Tunisia and Corsica, strategic stepping stones to the contemplated control of the whole Mediterranean and all its shores. No saturation point can be reached, no standstill can be perceived; because for the Fascist

state non-growth means decay, a static situation means death, life is dynamic expansion — always understood in a physical, materialist, spatial sense. Germany was not satisfied with the remilitarization of the Rhineland, nor with the destruction of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, nor with the incorporation of Austria and the Sudetenland; she will not be satisfied with a vast colonial empire stretching beyond the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Each conquest is but a link in a plan which encircles the earth, a new strategic position to facilitate further conquest. Herein Germany, Italy, Spain, and Japan cooperate in the most perfect manner: their plans cover all the continents and all the oceans. The thought of the Fascists is never limited to definite objects; it is world-wide; it is totalitarian. The mission of the German race is clearly envisaged by Hitler. "We all of us foresee that in a distant future mankind will be faced with problems for whose solution only a supreme race as the master nation, supported by the means and possibilities of the whole globe, will be called." "If the German nation had achieved in its historical development that herd-like unity possessed by other nations [here Chancellor Hitler errs; no civilized nation possesses a herd-like unity, but Chancellor Hitler tries to create this unity among the Germans and so to prepare them for what he regards their destiny] then the German Reich would be today master of the globe." It is the triumphant song of a new and world-conquering force which rings through the words of the Hitler youth,

"Today Germany is ours, and tomorrow the whole world." ¹³

This long successive abandonment of the principle of the League of Nations led to the Pact of Munich. It was not an isolated event, and can never be judged on the merits of the situation at the end of September 1938. For this situation was the product of a persistent long-range policy which had its origin in the refusal to accept the League of Nations, and in the isolationist sentiment which continued to dominate the democratic countries.

6

About the Pact of Munich much has been said; there is no need to add any further comments.¹⁴ The

¹³ "Heute gehört uns Deutschland, und morgen die ganze Welt." See Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (München: Eher, 1933), II, 422, 437f., 475, 782. The National Socialist state will see to it that "it will have, by a suitable education of the youth, in the future a generation mature for the ultimate and greatest decisions on this globe. The nation which will first take this road will be victorious." "A state which . . . devotes itself to the cultivation of its best racial elements must one day become the master of the globe."

This vague expansive mysticism dominates even the young Spanish Fascism. There we find among the younger generation nurtured in General Franco's revolt all the same contempt for democracy and liberalism which are defined as seeds for Communism and the wish to reconquer the vast empire of the Hispanidad, which embraces all the lands once dominated, in the age of Philip II, by the Iberian peoples and civilization, and to organize them again into a great unity of defense and conquest, not so much against Communism as against the disintegrating and degrading influence of Anglo-Saxon liberalism, Protestantism, and commercialism.

¹⁴ I tried to appraise the significance of the Pact of Munich in a preface which I wrote on October 6, 1938 to the third edition of *Force or Reason* (Harvard University Press, 1938). British imperialist opinion was well expressed in an editorial, "The Crisis and the Future," in the London quarterly *The Round Table*, December 1938; a charac-

Pact of Munich has been recognized by many as a peace as sinister as that of Brest-Litovsk; but the worst of this peace is that it was never kept. It belongs to the many pacts and promises entered into by the Fascist powers, and broken as soon as they were made. The Pact of Munich professed the principle of self-determination in detaching those parts from Czechoslovakia which were inhabited by foreign minorities, and in leaving Czechoslovakia within its ethnic frontiers a more homogeneous and therefore stronger state, truly independent and developing according to its own spirit and tradition.

The execution of the Pact of Munich stands as an example of what the Fascist peace policy implies. The National Socialists demanded for the Germans self-determination and equality. These words, intended to win over liberal opinion, were never and could never be used in the sense understood by liberals. For self-determination and equality are fundamentally liberal concepts; they are a concrete part of the whole

teristic reaction about France in Marcel Thiry's "Lettre de Belgique," *Nouvelle Revue Française*, of December 1938, pp. 1069-74; the reactions of smaller European nations are best summed up in a memorable letter by Mr. C. J. Hambro, President of the Norwegian Storting, in the *New York Times*, October 23, 1938. Two good American articles on "The New Order in Europe" were published in the December issue of *Harper's Magazine*: "The Road to Munich," by Willson Woodside, and "The Road from Munich," by Elmer Davis. A most remarkable but little-noticed article was "Czechoslovakian Adventure," by Captain R. G. Coulson, a British observation officer in Czechoslovakia, in *The Quarterly Review*, No. 539, January 1939, pp. 130-144. It gives an accurate and poignant description of the behavior of the German troops occupying Czechoslovakia. Captain Coulson's remarks on page 144 are a fitting epilogue to the spirit of the Pact of Munich.

system of liberty and individualism, indissolubly linked up with the traditions of the great Western revolutions, which the Fascists so vehemently combat. The Fascist regime denies self-determination and equality except for certain privileged groups. But self-determination and equality are meaningless if not universally applied. The enemies of liberalism should not be allowed to claim and use the instruments and principles of liberalism whenever it fits into their plans of ruthless destruction of liberalism. In claiming self-determination, the National Socialists mean self-determination for National Socialist Germans and for nobody else. When they claim equality for the Germans, they deny it to others. What they really mean is not equality, but privileges, the position due to the master race on account of its superior force.

The execution of the Pact of Munich was only one instance of the closed mind of the National Socialists, who are unable to understand the meaning of reciprocity. They try to terrify and bully into submission, but if the adversary is not subservient, then the National Socialists cry aggression. They consider it their right to vilify and offend with a vehemence unknown before; but when others respond in a similar, although much more subdued fashion, they consider it a blasphemous crime and a provocation to hatred and warfare. Having committed more political murders than any other movement, they regard any political crime against themselves as an unheard-of outrage. The treatment of prisoners in National-Socialist con-

centration camps has become a sadistic science, yet they lament most vehemently about much milder forms of concentration camps in Austria or in other countries.¹⁵ They complain about the base treatment of German minorities, having maltreated their own in a way unknown in any other country. But they complain about the treatment of German minorities only if it fits into their scheme of power politics. Thus little is heard at present about the freedom of the German minorities in Poland or in Italy, but they complained most bitterly about the treatment of the minorities in Czechoslovakia, which though not at all ideal was "a light shining in the darkness of East-European national oppressions and vendettas."¹⁶ The National Socialists believe that being a German implies the right to everything. Certainly they do not recognize the equality of other nations; nor any law universally applicable to all.

On October 28, 1938, Lord Runciman wrote to the Federal Council of Protestant Churches in Czechoslovakia: "I believe that if peace continues a happy, free Czech nation can continue in the center of Europe — faithful to its own traditions and its best ideals."

¹⁵ Hitler in his *Mein Kampf* (1933), II, 639, says about the Weimar Republic: "In der übergrossen Sorge, die Republik vor ihren eigenen Bürgern durch Paragraphen und Zuchthaus zu schützen, liegt die vernichtendste Kritik und Herabsetzung der gesamten Institution selbst." (In the extreme endeavor of the Republic to protect itself against its own citizens by paragraphs and prisons, lies the most condemning criticism and degradation of the whole institution.) Complaints about the oppression in the Weimar Republic sound rather strange coming from the head of the National Socialist state. True, to protect his dictatorship, he proceeds even without paragraphs.

¹⁶ *Survey of International Affairs*, written by Professor Arnold J. Toynbee, 1933 (Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 197.

By that time it should have become clear even to Lord Runciman that there was no such prospect. The international commission to which the execution of the Munich Pact had been entrusted had simply registered all the wishes of the German government, going far beyond the Pact of Munich. No protest was raised. Mr. Chamberlain abandoned his own product of which he had been so proud, the Pact of Munich, without any effort to save it or even to demonstrate his indignation at its having been broken. The Czechs not only lost the territories inhabited by the German minority; they lost their independence; they were allowed to live on in sufferance as long as they abjured all the democratic traditions, all the liberal spirit of their own nationalism, and accepted all the commands emanating from the National Socialists. They have much less of independence today than they had in the Habsburg monarchy. They have not even achieved a homogeneous state. The tiny German minority which still had to be left at the behest of Chancellor Hitler within Czechoslovakia claimed again to form a National Socialist state within the state, and to control the destiny and the ways of life of the Czech majority. Thus Czechoslovakia not only lost in the name of self-determination and homogeneity her independence and her right to self-determination, but also preserved the German minority problem in all its implications as if she had never ceded the whole territory demanded by Germany.¹⁷

¹⁷ The National Socialist attitude was well expressed in an article which Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, the governor of Austria, published in the German press in Czechoslovakia. Nations such as the Czechs,

All the sacrifices which the Czechs made in their acceptance of the Pact of Munich have been in vain. The promised guarantees for their present frontiers and their independence have not been honored. It likewise did not help them that, at the demand of Germany, they established a pro-Fascist and most reactionary government. Germany completely disregarded Czech independence and self-determination, made them economically and politically subservient to Germany, and reduced their army to a status worse than that of the German army after 1919. Thus the National Socialist claim of self-determination represents a complete travesty. The "liberal" propagandists for National Socialism who were responsible for the Pact of Munich are even more to be blamed for their utter

which are "enclosed within the space inhabited by eighty million Germans," or which are being attracted (!) to Germany, he said, must recognize that they must live according to the laws of the Germans, who are all National Socialists and whose leader is Adolf Hitler. He asked the Czechs to realize the unyielding rigidity of the Führer's will, otherwise he threatened the Czechs with a conflict in which every Czech town would be reduced to a heap of ruins. (*New York Times*, January 18, 1939.) The German minority under the leadership of Ernst Kundt put forward exorbitant demands in a harsh and intolerant manner for the control of the Czech state. An article by Ernst Kundt under the title "Vor ganz grossen Aufgaben" (*Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, January 11, 1939) contains the following sentence about the position of the German minority in Czechoslovakia after the Pact of Munich: "Das deutsche Element in diesem Raum fühlt sich auch nicht mehr als Minderheit, sondern als unentbehrlicher Träger einer grossen Mission besonderer Art, die ihm durch das Abkommen von München erneut auferlegt ist." (The German element in this area no longer feels itself as a minority, but as the indispensable bearer of a great mission of a particular nature which has been imposed upon it again by the Pact of Munich.) That is certainly an interpretation of the Pact of Munich which even Lord Runciman may not entirely approve of.

silence at the way in which this pact was scrapped. Some of them may realize today what a German victory would have meant in 1918, and what it will mean after 1938. So far only the Czechs have experienced its full implications. The National Socialist policy reserves the same fate to all the peoples which are not strong enough to defend themselves or are abandoned in short-sighted egotism by all other states, to face alone the subjection to National Socialist power-politics. They will be reduced to the position meted out to the Czechs and to the Slovaks.

7

The Covenant of the League of Nations would have allowed, in an order guaranteeing peace and security to all, the gradual working out of peaceful changes. The League, by breaking down more and more the barriers between nations in the economic, political, and cultural fields, by establishing greater and more trustful cooperation, would eventually have remedied the grievances of weaker or lesser-endowed states. All the many and far-reaching concessions made by the victors in the fifteen years following the peace treaties could not and did not compensate for the lack of a definite legal process to implement the adjustments to be made in the international field. The League could have provided this.

Fascist propagandists in liberal countries plead that Japan, Italy, and Germany in their expansion are only following the example of Great Britain and of France

in the nineteenth century; that they are "have nots" trying to become "haves." These assertions deny one fundamental principle of liberalism, the belief in progress. For the Fascist mind progress does not exist, man being inescapably subject to biological determinism, and society unchangeable: man has always been a rapacious animal of prey; history has always been an incessant struggle of races and nations in which the stronger survives and imposes his law upon the weaker. German National Socialist papers, in all earnestness, answered British reproaches about the expulsion of the Jews from Germany in 1938 by pointing out that England had expelled the Jews in 1290. That times have changed since, that many things, currently done and accepted a few centuries ago, are not so today, is disregarded by the Fascists. Imperial expansion may have been acceptable before the World War. It does not necessarily follow that it should be acceptable for ever. But even more important is the fundamental difference between the imperialism of the liberal powers and that of Fascist nations. The difference is not one of form as between a more mellow, older imperialism, and a cruder, younger imperialism which will mellow with the years. The imperialism of the nineteenth century, of the liberal powers, is based upon the fundamental assumption of the equality of all men and races, on the majesty of law and the law's protection for everybody, the respect for human dignity in every individual. Liberal imperialism very rarely lived up to its own fundamental faith, but it could not help

spreading liberal ideas, conveying them to the natives, acknowledging its duty to educate the natives towards greater human liberty and equality. Liberal imperialism grows by necessity less and less oppressive. The French have built their colonial empire upon the principle of equality between white and colored citizens: no color bar exists; the French try to assimilate the natives, to see them potential Frenchmen, potentially completely equal with white Frenchmen. One of the vice-presidents of the Chamber of Deputies in 1939 is a Negro deputy from an African colony. The whole scorn and fury of the Fascists, from Hitler's *Mein Kampf* down to the smallest Italian newspapers, is poured upon the French for this very reason.

There is less of this feeling of equality in British colonies. It is there replaced by a conscious effort at educating the natives towards self-government. It is sometimes said that the British fought for the self-determination of the smaller nations only in the enemy states. But the British have, since the World War, given to a growing degree the right of self-determination and of self-government to the Irish, to the Egyptians, to the Iraqis, to the Indians; everywhere the British government tries to maintain standards of law, liberty, and equality which have brought to many native peoples for the first time an understanding of the fundamental principles of Western civilization. Imperialism has been an oppressive exploiter and at times ruthless and cruel, but liberal imperialism is forced by the immanent logic of its fundamental faith

to have a bad conscience about it, to try, although often reluctantly and half-heartedly, to right wrongs. Liberalism has a universal message, and therefore its own dynamics compel its extension to subject races and lower classes. Fascist imperialism, however, disbelieves in the equality of men and races, scorns all humanitarian concepts and feelings, cannot educate the subject races even half-heartedly to liberty and equality and individual dignity. It repudiates wholeheartedly assimilation of subject races as well as their education to self-government.

The problem before us is to lessen imperialism, not to increase it. Therefore any proposal to give colonies to Japan, Italy, or Germany is from the liberal, pacifist point of view fundamentally wrong. The effort should be towards more self-government, towards more equality in the colonies, not towards less. The interests which are to be taken into account first and foremost are not the interests of the so-called imperialist "have nots," but of the real "have nots," the native population in the colonies, the Negroes, the Ethiopians, the Koreans. It is strange to hear so many pacifists and liberals complaining about the injustice done to Japan, to Italy, or to Germany by depriving them or rather by not offering them the possibility of ruling subject races in the Fascist way. Neither imperial Japan nor a country as rich and progressive as Germany is a "have not." Lithuanians and Bulgarians, Chinese and Indians, Koreans and Arabs, Mexicans and Negroes, are the real "have nots." It is

not the plight of the "have nots" which appeals to many pacifists and liberals; it is the mailed fist of those who have and who demand more. Nobody will plead for the maintenance of the *status quo*. Neither in domestic nor in international affairs have we reached an ideal state. There is a long road yet to travel, and many changes have yet to come. But in national as in international affairs the *status quo* should be changed only for greater liberty, more humanity, justice for the weak and disinherited. We cannot buy peace by increasing bondage, inhumanity, and injustice. It may be too much to expect liberals and pacifists to demand for the Ethiopians and Koreans the self-government granted to Filipinos and Egyptians, but certainly a demand for the extension of Japanese rule over Chinese, Italian rule over Arabs, or German rule over Slavs and Negroes will not increase liberty, humanity, and justice.

Nor is it more reasonable to plead that the Japanese should establish the "new order" in Eastern Asia or Germany dominate all Central and Eastern Europe because the time demands the integration of larger territorial units. The need is certainly growing in our time for more and more international cooperation, for greater unity. But these integrations will only be a step forward if they establish a federation of equal peoples. The Japanese watchword, "Asia for the Asiatics," means in reality the complete subjection of the "lower" Asiatic races to the imperial order of Japan. In the same way the National Socialists feel an

unbounded contempt for the Slavonic peoples, whom they regard as only fit to be ruled by the Germanic master race. Not less is their contempt for all weak peoples, including the not yet incorporated Germanic "dwarf peoples" (*Zwergvölker*) like the Swiss, the Dutch, and the Danes.¹⁸

Many of the arguments advanced for a policy of appeasement by concessions to the Fascist powers are based upon a complete disregard of the moral issues involved. The policy of isolation and self-interest has helped to destroy the moral foundation upon which a League of Nations could have been built, which alone could have resisted the Fascist aggression in the intellectual and spiritual field. The policy of the British Conservative Government threatens to destroy the spiritual foundations upon which English greatness has been built and which has made the British empire — in spite of all its human and much-too-human shortcomings — on the whole an inspiration and a blessing to humanity. France has been a light to Europe, a torchbearer from which in the eighteenth century and again from the July Revolution in 1830

¹⁸ A remarkable book by Christoph Steding, *Das Reich und die Krankheit der europäischen Kultur* (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1938), edited after the death of the author by the leading National Socialist historian Walter Frank, illuminates the National Socialist attitude towards "neutral" states, especially Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Denmark. As long as they will not be entirely subordinated to and coordinated with the Reich, they will be, according to the author, the pioneers of Bolshevism. "Karl Barth, und die in seinen Bereich gehörenden Geister wie C. G. Jung und Burckhardt, van der Velde und Huizinga und Bachofen sind die Schrittmacher der Bewegung, die als die Selbstvernichtung des Bürgertums zu fassen ist" (p. 73).

to the final victory in the Dreyfus affair, the hope of a more civilized humanity, of greater justice and liberty, radiated to all the other nations. The policy of M. Bonnet, refusing to recognize the moral issues, caring only for French interest, not only reverses the tradition of recent French history, but plays into the hands of the Fascist powers by accepting their moral standards.

It was the greatness of Great Britain and France, it is the greatness of the United States, that since the three great Western revolutions they have stood for universal ideas, that they have carried a generous message full of promise for all. When they were most true to themselves they stood for more than their rights, for more than only a readiness to fight when their own interests were involved. It is the great strength of the Fascist movement that it does not disregard its own fundamental principles but lives according to them, whereas the democracies often display a contempt and disregard for their own moral and spiritual foundations and desert those who fight their battles.

From 1931 to 1939 the Fascist powers followed a long-range policy of aggression with great determination and concentrated effort. The liberals hoped the whole time that peace, justice, and liberalism would triumph without any exertion on the part of the democracies. Liberals and pacifists who wished well to Ethiopia, to China, to Spain, comforted themselves with the thought that it would be impossible for the

Italians to conquer the Ethiopians, who had been denied arms by Great Britain and France, that the Japanese would break down before they could conquer China, that General Franco and his allies would never quell Spanish liberty. Many apparently good reasons were eagerly adduced — the difficult orographic and climatic conditions of Ethiopia and the memory of Italy's defeat in 1896, the financial weakness of Japan, the dissensions in General Franco's camp — as an excuse by the liberals for doing nothing to promote their own professed aims. At the same time the others were acting. It was easily overlooked that Fascism mobilizes quite differently from the old imperialism. Thus the Ethiopian expedition by Signor Mussolini had been carefully planned for years and could not be compared with the haphazardly undertaken expedition under Crispi. The Italians in Spain asserted triumphantly that they would stay until Spain was Fascist, whereas the democracies remained as outside spectators or, as in the case of the official Swiss policy, supported General Franco in every way. Instead of helping China in conformity with the League of Nations Covenant, with the interests of democracy and humanity, and with her own interests, France obeyed Japan's demand and closed to the Chinese government Indo-Chinese territory as a base for the passage of supplies. As a result, two months later Japan seized the strategically important island of Hainan, in violation of the Franco-Japanese treaty of 1907, in spite of solemn warning by Great Britain and France

that a seizure of Hainan would find them ready to act together. There as everywhere else concessions were interpreted only as signs of weakness and led to further aggressive actions on the part of the Fascist powers. They acted, and their determination to act gave them naturally an immense preponderance over the democracies. This preponderance made itself felt in the Mediterranean as well as in Africa, in the Far East as well as in Latin America. The inaction of the democracies, their late awakening to the implications of what was going on, their facile optimism, put upon so many fair hopes the tragic word "too late." The democracies preferred to count upon the weaknesses of their adversaries instead of their own strength, to hope for a disintegration of the united front of the enemy, instead of cooperating among themselves. They preferred to remain passive, to maintain a negative position, they forgot that strength lies in a positive faith.

Nor will armaments save the democracies and liberal civilization. At each turning point in the international situation, from March 16, 1935 to September 29, 1938, the only answer which the democracies found was to speed the process of rearmament. Armament may be useful if it is in the service of a clear and far-sighted policy, governed by a democratic ideal of international law. Otherwise it becomes an excuse for the lack of a policy, the easiest escape for a refusal to face the situation. Armament does not consist only of arms, but even more of moral and strategic posi-

tions. When these are lightheartedly sacrificed, armaments have to be increased beyond any real need. The loss of the strategic position of the Bohemian Mountains, of the Pyrenees, of the Spanish seashore and islands, the loss of moral prestige involved, can be made up by additional armaments only with the greatest difficulty. After the Pact of Munich the armament of Great Britain and France, of Switzerland and the Netherlands, and of the United States, was forced to an unprecedented pace. The British Conservative Government, having been in power since 1931 and having spent large sums upon rearmament, pleaded a lack of sufficient armaments in the fall of 1938. A similar plea on the part of a Labor Government would have aroused in all Conservative circles violent accusations of lack of patriotism and of sabotage of national defense. All the present armament increase would be superfluous if the democracies were not arming each for himself, if they would pool their resources and their armaments, thus easing the burden upon each one of them and at the same time giving them much greater security than any individual armament can give. There is no security outside cooperation on the basis of firm adherence to international law.

8

Fascism's war on democracy is fought not so much on military and economic as on moral grounds. It is a unique effort to undermine the moral and intellectual integrity of mankind. Fascism has destroyed the in-

tellectual vigor, the critical sense, and the moral discernment of two peoples, the Italians and the Germans, who possessed so great a cultural past and who had attained such lofty achievements in thought and art. This was accomplished by a travesty of leadership. Great national leaders throughout the times have been severe critics of their people, calling them to repent and to mend their ways. In Biblical times, as today, the masses liked to listen to "leaders" and advisers who flattered their instincts and their feeling of self-righteousness. But these men have been called by the Bible false prophets, and their words have been forgotten, whereas the violent reproaches and censures of the true prophets, their diatribes against the predatory instincts and self-indulgent inclinations of the people, have been reverently preserved as an example of what true national leadership implies. Fascist leaders, however, in childish exaggeration, glorify the innate genius and greatness of their peoples. This unceasing, uncritical, and vociferous self-adulation dulls all critical and moral sense and leads to a complete falsification of all standards. The reading of representative newspapers and periodicals from National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy will leave the reader with an immense feeling of sadness and depression about the constant distortion of truth, the coarse vulgarity of feeling and language, the one-sided perspective in which everything is presented, always to the praise of everything native and to the vilification of everything alien. In liberal countries sometimes

statements almost as silly and as degrading may be heard, but there they can be contradicted. No contradiction is possible in Fascist countries; no discussion is heard, only the screaming monologue repeating the same primitive chant of self-glorification. For Chancellor Hitler the German race is the highest race, the only bearer of civilization. What a sentiment of pride must swell the heart of the masses educated by Fascism when they read of themselves as "durch die Güte des Allmächtigen dieser Erde geschenktes höchstes Menschentum"! ¹⁹

This view leads to a most dangerous psychosis, under which the Fascist nations live: the delusion that all the evils which they suffer are due to their enemies, never to their own faults; that they are white angels, innocent and persecuted by the forces of darkness. From the dizzy heights to which fulsome flattery has raised the unfortunate super-race, it necessarily views any disagreement with its august opinions, any resistance to its desires and urges, as a crime of which only

¹⁹ The highest human species given by the grace of the Almighty to this earth. (*Mein Kampf*, II, 439.) See also p. 476. On p. 421 it is said that human civilization is indissolubly linked on this earth with the existence of the Aryan, whose disappearance would bring back to this earth the darkness of an uncivilized age. The most abominable crime therefore is the killing of a member of this superior race by a member of an inferior race. "Whoever dares to lay hands upon the highest image of the Lord, commits a sacrilege against the benign creator of this miracle and is an accomplice in the expulsion from Paradise." Similar blasphemous ranking of every racial comrade may have been heard occasionally in other races, but was never taken seriously and could always be laughed out of existence. Now it cannot even be disputed in a scholarly way in Germany without danger of life. It has become the authoritative creed of a nation of eighty millions.

sub-human beings, not caring for the nobility of the human race, are capable.

Therefore Fascism, especially in its National Socialist form, has developed an aggressiveness unknown to any previous political philosophy, an aggressiveness based not upon a spiritual faith but upon the biological or zoological fact of race which determines once for ever the outlook, the reactions, and the position of men. This aggressiveness is not bound by any limits. It envisages the whole earth as its field of action. It is a most disastrous mistake to identify Fascist imperialism with the pre-war imperialism of militaristic and conservative empires like Germany or Russia. What was true in the nineteenth century, that democracies and autocracies could live together and even cooperate, is no longer true today. The Russian Empire stayed within its boundaries. In spite of some Slavophile romanticism which dreamt of saving the world by imposing the ways of love and brotherhood of the Czar's regime and of the Orthodox Church, there was never a serious effort undertaken to spread the thoughts of Uvarov or of Pobedonostsev throughout the world. Russian autocracy felt itself strictly bound by international law. Its ruthlessness was a domestic affair. Fascism sees as its mission not only to conquer some new territory for the Fascist empire, but to convert the whole of mankind to its world outlook. It knows itself as the complete reversal of the whole trend of human civilization, as the implacable enemy of Christianity, liberalism, democracy, pacifism, and

socialism. Its aim is to destroy them and to establish its own world-wide dominion over the mind of man. In this warfare it uses, above all other means, that of undermining the democracies from within, of interfering permanently in all non-Fascist countries, of trying to divide them, to destroy faith in liberalism and democracy. It was Chancellor Hitler's ingenious contribution to Fascism to recognize antisemitism as the most powerful weapon for world-wide destruction of liberal democracy and of Christianity. It is a most important part of the fight of National Socialism against human civilization.

Hitler was fortunate in finding in Germany a deep-seated antisemitic tradition. Emancipation of the German Jews came in the wake of the victorious armies of the French Revolution and was therefore repudiated by the German intellectuals and the ruling class, as pertaining to liberalism, to alien Western thought, as not up to the standards of German profundity and originality. Only in the second half of the nineteenth century did constitutional reforms bring with them the emancipation of the Jews, and then it remained limited in practice. The Jews were excluded from those positions which were regarded as worthy of a true German, from the career of a government official or an officer. The Jews were admitted to the occupations not considered socially respectable (*standesgemäß*) by the Germans, and to those where they had to perform pioneer functions, such as journalism,

banking, and trade.²⁰ In Germany alone the natural feeling of strangeness towards minorities became a systematic philosophy of antisemitism. The vehement antisemitism of the present National Socialist movement can be matched by many of the pamphlets which were published in Germany in the first half of the nineteenth century against the emancipation of the Jews, a literature to which nothing in any other language, including the Russian, can even in the least be compared. Thus Hitler found in Germany a fertile soil for the propagation of his antisemitic gospel. It became the most powerful weapon in his propaganda; as he succeeded in convincing the German masses that the Jews were the source of all their misfortunes, and with this opiate to carry through his plans of conquering and dominating Germany, so he now seeks to convince mankind that the root of all troubles and dangers ahead of them is not their own shortcomings and weaknesses, not the Fascist menace, but the Jews.

This use of antisemitism is fully in accord with the methods of propaganda which Hitler has set forth in *Mein Kampf* with great sincerity and pride. According to him, "all propaganda must be popular in tone, and must keep its intellectual level to the capacity of the least intelligent of those at whom it is directed. . . . The slighter its scientific ballast, and the more exclusively it considers the emotions of the masses,

²⁰ In the Western middle-class nations the position was fundamentally different. There business and journalism were regarded with highest esteem, in fact in higher esteem than feudal occupations. Therefore the Jews did not play a decisive or even important role in these fields.

the more complete the success. Success after all is the best proof of the soundness or unsoundness of propaganda. . . .

"It is the task of propaganda not, for instance, to assay the various causes, but to emphasize exclusively the one cause it represents. It must not objectively explore any truth that favors the other side, and then present it to the masses with doctrinaire honesty, but must perpetually labor for its own truths. . . . Propaganda must limit itself to saying a very little, and this little it must keep forever repeating. Perseverance, here as so often in this world, is the first and most important prerequisite for success. . . .

"The purpose of propaganda is . . . to convince the masses. But they are so slow-moving that it is always some time before they are ready even to take notice of a thing, and only thousandfold repetition of the simplest ideas will finally stick in their minds. Any variations employed must never change the substance of the propaganda, but must always say the same thing in conclusion. . . . It is astonishing then to discover the enormous, scarcely comprehensible results which such perseverance leads to."

These are Hitler's own precepts for propaganda, a description of the methods which he himself follows and which he recommends. In another passage he speaks of the propaganda of the enemy, but what he says there can be better applied to his own propaganda and explains some of its success. "They were acting on the true principle that the greatness of the lie is always a certain factor in being believed; at the bot-

tom of their heart the great masses of the people are more likely to be misled than to be consciously and deliberately bad, and in the primitive simplicity of their minds they are more easily victimized by a large than by a small lie, since they sometimes tell petty lies themselves, but would be ashamed to tell too great ones. An untruth of that sort would never come into their heads, and they cannot believe possible so vast an impudence in infamous distortion on the part of others. Even after being enlightened they will long continue to doubt and waver, and will still believe there must be some truth behind it somewhere. For this reason some part of even the boldest lie is sure to stick — a fact which all the great liars in this world know only too well and make base use of.”

But the deepest secret of his method of propaganda and leadership he revealed when he said: “The art of truly great popular leaders in all ages has consisted chiefly in not distracting the attention of a people, but concentrating always on a single adversary. The more unified the object of the people’s will to fight, the greater will be the magnetic attraction of the movement, and the more tremendous its impact. It is part of a great leader’s genius to make even widely separated adversaries appear as if they belonged to but one category, because among weakly and undecided characters the recognition of various enemies all too easily marks the beginning of doubt of one’s own rightness.”²¹

²¹ *Mein Kampf*, vol. 1, pp. 197–203, 252f., 129 (translation, New York: Stackpole Sons, 1939, pp. 180–185, 228, 122).

As such a common denominator the Jews offered themselves. No rational discussion of the subject is possible. Since the Germans were the Race, the embodiment of the absolute good, the Jews were the anti-Race, the embodiment of the absolute evil. They represented everything which, fundamentally or at a given moment, appeared to the Germans as bad or obnoxious: capitalism and communism, liberalism and democracy, pacifism and international solidarity. The most contradictory movements, if they happened to stand in the way of National Socialist aspirations, were lumped together as Jewish. All "Aryans" who incurred the displeasure of the National Socialists on account of their liberalism or of their patriotic resistance to National Socialist plans of aggression, were branded as Jews or tools of world Jewry. Under the shield of their mystic antisemitism the National Socialists carry on their relentless war against liberalism, against Christianity, against any moral or spiritual force which might resist their bid for world domination.

The human qualities of the Jews remain beside the point. The trite truth that among the Jews as among all other peoples there is good and bad is irrelevant in the face of the emotional and mystical frenzy of National Socialist antisemitism. Some liberal apologists for National Socialist Germany try to explain those features which even they do not condone by the fact that during fifteen years the German people lived under certain restrictions and privations. Jews

could plead, in explanation, if they did possess more disagreeable features than other peoples, a unique experience of two thousand years of the worst persecutions and humiliations, of a life in permanent insecurity. Hated and segregated, excluded from all agricultural and artisan occupations, confined to the disreputable but needed business in money, abandoned to all the whims and predatory instincts of princes and masses alike: it is only because of the unique strength which the Jews were able to draw from the Bible and religion that they emerged from this millenary ordeal of being hunted and massacred as human as they did.

Ich selber lieb es nicht, dies Volk, doch weiss ich,
Was sie verunziert, es ist unser Werk;
Wir lähmen sie und grollen, wenn sie hinken.

In these words which he puts into the mouth of King Alphons in his *Jüdin von Toledo*, Grillparzer expresses an obvious truth which could be repeated by many Christians today: "I do not like this people, but I know that it is our work which has disfigured them; we lame them but resent it when they limp." But the question is not one of sympathy for or liking of the Jews. The Jews are a minority everywhere, and certain aversions against minorities are always noticeable. Protestant Americans disliked or distrusted Catholics. Many English and Scotch felt an antipathy toward the Irish. The Armenians were despised by the Turks. But in all these cases the minority status

of the groups in question is confined to certain countries only; the Jews, a minority everywhere, are everywhere subject to the attitude towards minorities. The memory of their history and of their minority status makes the Jews frequently oversensitive, and tends to increase the tension. Nevertheless the assimilation of the Jews has made astonishing progress in a very short time.

The emancipation of the Jews in most European countries was not accomplished until about the middle of the nineteenth century. In the Russian Empire and in Rumania it happened only during the World War. Thus the time for assimilation had been in even the most propitious cases barely more than two or three generations. The forces of history and tradition on both sides were very strong, but with the growth of liberalism, with the march towards a common future, the walls of the past began to crumble. Assimilation was the natural, progressive outcome of liberalism; it would have continued if not hindered by a conscious and artificial policy of dissimulation. The tremendous and violent effort which the National Socialists have to make in promoting dissimulation is the best proof of the successful trend towards assimilation. The exaggerated emphasis which Fascist nationalism puts upon tradition and the past, upon group instincts and aversion to everything alien, easily turns into antisemitism. For, in spite of their assimilation and of their fervent patriotism, many Jews even today keep a more detached and rational mind and

bear witness by their existence to that truth of international solidarity which is at the root of Christianity and of liberalism alike. In some Jews, certainly not in all of them, by no means only in Jews, the thirst for justice, the sympathy with the poor and disinherited survive, which have made the Prophets and the Psalms the standing protest and reproach against the complacency and self-indulgence of the nations of this earth. With a sweeping generalization the Jews have been called the non-conformist people of history. Where the principle of liberty is sacrificed to conformity, the Jews must suffer.

The war of extermination which the National Socialists wage against the Jews is a war against liberalism and against Christianity. It is ridiculous to accuse the Jews of anti-Germanism. The German Jews loved Germany and were as deeply steeped in German culture as any other Germans. The German landscape, German music, German rhymes, filled their souls; German ideals were theirs; wherever they went they acted as German propagandists. For many Jews outside Germany, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, Germany was the spiritual home as Paris is for Latin Americans. They had been educated upon Schiller and Kant, and they preserved the legacy of great German thinkers and poets most faithfully. In a similar way Jews in Hungary and in Italy have been most fervent patriots. Many Jews were sincere and enthusiastic Fascists, and Mussolini recognized their worth and their contributions. Anti-Fascist Italian

friends have bitterly complained to me about the pro-Fascist sympathies of many Jews within and outside Italy; the Italian Fascist press since 1938 vehemently attacks Jews in Italy and elsewhere as implacable anti-Fascists. The actions and sympathies of individual Jews are attributed to a fictitious Jewish community as a whole. The Jew easily becomes the symbol of all that which is repudiated. For the German nationalists the Jews are akin to Western thought and represent as the French do that rationalism which is a danger to German profundity. For Charles Maurras, the Jews and the Germans represent the chaotic element of irrational enthusiasm which endangers the rational order and the social stability of the Franco-Latin civilization; for him Jerusalem and Wittenberg harbored kindred evil spirits.

The National Socialist war against the Jews is a war against the equality of all men, against the dignity of the individual, against human brotherhood. Antisemitism is the most potent weapon in the fight against the majesty of absolute standards and of law universally applicable. Once these are destroyed the way is open to complete moral and legal anarchy. It is strange that the massacres of November 1938 stirred liberal and Christian conscience more than the discriminating antisemitic legislation of April 1933. But massacres may be a deplorable and horrifying incident; they do not necessarily strike at the root. How little democracy and liberalism meant in Germany can be seen from the fact stated by a leading American his-

torian ²² that whereas a majority of the Germans disapproved of the massacres in November 1938, probably 90 per cent of the people approved of the first antisemitic measure on April 7, 1933. But the massacres were only the consequence of what happened in April 1933. The *Rechtsstaat* is based upon the equality of all citizens before the law. The antisemitic legislation welcomed by most Germans was the entering wedge which destroyed constitutionalism and liberties in Germany. Under their loss not only the Jews are suffering. The unspeakable coarseness of language and the unbelievable cruelty of mind used against the Jews have opened the gates to a barbarism engulfing German youth.²³ The attacks upon Jewish private property and Jewish houses of worship can be directed at any moment against property and religion in general. The brutality which the National Socialists exercise against helpless Jews may be turned against other peoples as well should they once fall helpless into the hands of National Socialism.

Antisemitism flatters the Jews by tremendously overestimating their world importance. National Socialism attributes to them liberalism and democracy, Christianity and the League of Nations. Thus their defense does not become the defense of one relatively

²² Sidney B. Fay in *Events*, January 1939.

²³ Worse than incidental massacres is the cold-blooded determination to exterminate the Jews by starvation and the incessant vehemence of abuse and debasement to which the Jews are exposed. The article in *Das Schwarze Korps*, November 24, 1938, which has become famous abroad, is only one example of what started in April 1933 backed by the full power of the government.

small group; it is not a Jewish question; it is a question of liberalism and democracy, a Christian question. How can the National Socialists tolerate, not a fictitious Christianity of their own making, but the Jewish Bible which again and again stresses tolerance and equality for the alien and the stranger, the Christianity of the Gospels and of the Epistles of Paul, and the Christianity which in its whole liturgy is saturated with the words and spirit of Jewish religious feeling? How can they allow the young Germans to read, "For I could wish that myself were separated from Christ for the benefit of my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh, who are Israelites; to whom pertaineth the adoption and the glory and the covenants and the giving of the law and the service of God and the promises; whose are the fathers, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, God blessed for ever." (Rom. ix. 3-5.) A leading Protestant theologian of today warns: "If that should happen which is now manifestly arranged and already being executed: the 'physical extermination' of the people of Israel, the burning of the Synagogues and the scrolls of the Law, the turning into a horror of the 'Jewish God' and the 'Jewish Bible' as the quintessence of all that which should be an abomination to the German — then that, that alone shows that the Christian Church is being attacked at her roots and the attempt is being made to deaden her. Can anyone close his ears to all the indescribable misery which, brought about by the antisemitic plague, is crying to heaven at this very

moment in all German lands? But how could these shrill sounds not pierce the ears of us Christians in face of what this misery and wickedness essentially mean? What would we have been, what are we anyway, without Israel? He who spurns and persecutes the Jew is spurning and persecuting Him who died for the sins of the Jews, and only thus and thereby for our sins. He who is a fundamental enemy of the Jews thereby becomes, even though he be an angel of Light, a fundamental enemy of Jesus Christ. Antisemitism is sin against the Holy Ghost. For antisemitism means the denial of the Grace of God. National Socialism, however, finds its life in and by antisemitism. Where is Jesus Christ in the tribulation, if He is not here? What signs must still occur if this one sign does not tell the Church that she has absolutely nothing, nothing at all to do with National Socialism . . . and must all along the line oppose it with a determined No?" ²⁴

9

Antisemitism strikes at the roots of democracy and liberalism. The racial principle is a powerful weapon for the disintegration of those states at which Fascism wishes to strike. The application of the racial principle would cause the dissolution not only of all the

²⁴ Karl Barth, *Die Kirche und die politische Frage von heute* (Zollikon: Evangelische Buchhandlung, 1939), p. 32f. Persecution of religion in National Socialist Germany is different from that in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union openly repudiates God, but it tolerates religious services in their unadulterated purity; the National Socialists try to make the Church subservient to the state, to put the Cross into the service of the Swastika. In the Soviet Union all religions, Greek

states east and southeast of Germany, but also of France and the United States, nations built not on racial ties but integrated around an idea or a spiritual principle which, in the case of the United States as well as France, has shown tremendous power of assimilating diverse racial elements. Any emphasis upon racial descent, upon the widely varied past of the different groups, any strengthening of their ties with their racial stock abroad, undermines Americanism, the process of assimilation and integration for a common future based upon the American tradition of individual liberty and equality. National Socialism spreads the racial principle to all the countries which come under its sway. Italy, where this principle was entirely unknown, accepted it in 1938. She made far-reaching applications in the decrees for the purity of the Italian race issued by the Minister of the Interior on January 21, 1939. According to this decree those Italians who were born in territories ethnically Italian but which do not belong to Italy were not to be considered as foreigners, although not possessing Italian citizenship. Nor are those of Italian race considered foreigners even though they may have acquired foreign nationality. Thus the race takes precedence over citizenship, and the Fascist states can claim their racial

Orthodox, Mohammedan, Jewish, Roman Catholic, are treated alike as obsolete and useless, but left in their autonomy. On Christianity and the totalitarian states see also the thoughtful and provocative book by John Macmurray, Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Logic in the University of London, *The Clue to History* (New York: Harper, 1939).

comrades wherever they live, and, at any given moment, racial allegiance may exercise an appeal stronger than that of citizenship.

Men of German, Italian, Spanish, and Japanese descent are being organized in all countries as spearheads for the penetration of Fascist ideas, but even more for the disintegration and weakening of the power of resistance of democracies to the combined aggression of the Fascist states, should the Fascist states think that the time for conquest has come.²⁵ In his article on the doctrine of Fascism in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* Mussolini declared that the Fascist state is based upon growth and development which makes itself felt abroad. It is at least virtual expansion. "Così può adeguarsi alla natura dell'umana volontà, che nel suo sviluppo non conosce barriere, e che si realizza provando la propria infinità." ("Thus it can be compared to the nature of the human will which does not know any limits to its development, and which realizes itself in testing its own limitlessness.") That declaration of limitless expansion, or rather of an expansion which will go in every direction until it finds limits set to it by superior force, was published in 1932. Since then the alliance

²⁵ "It may be noted that, in making this claim to exercise a world-wide police-power, the 'Triangle' went far farther than the League, which never sought to put a constraint upon states save in the single eventuality of their committing aggression against their neighbours — whereas the 'Triangle' Powers, who in one breath were denouncing the League for its insufferable meddlesomeness, were in the next breath arrogating to themselves a title to interfere, at their own discretion and manu militari, in their neighbours' internal affairs." (Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1937*, Oxford University Press, 1938, vol. 1, p. 38f.)

of Italy with Germany, Spain, and Japan and the acceptance of the racial principle have transformed this dynamism from a hesitant theory into a proud and well-planned bid for world domination.

The totalitarian crisis in which mankind finds itself today is caused by the new phenomenon, fundamentally different from any pre-war imperialism, of a bid for totalitarian world domination. But even the united forces of Italy, Japan, and Germany would be much too weak to conquer the world and to impose upon all nations the yoke of National Socialism if they were not supported, often unwittingly, by liberals, pacifists, and isolationists in the democratic countries who speak of legitimate aspirations of the "have nots" and liken Fascism to pre-war imperialism. In their conquests the Fascist powers have invariably followed one definite scheme, which has worked so well because their principal thesis was believed and eagerly propagated by liberal sympathizers and isolationists in Great Britain, France, and the United States. Whereas any democratic propaganda in Fascist countries is entirely impossible, free scope has been given not only to direct Fascist propaganda but to the much more dangerous indirect Fascist propaganda in democratic countries. It was sufficient for the Fascists, by various methods, to convince some men in the democracies that after all the Fascists do not think of conquest, that their word can be trusted, that they are guardians of order, and these men thus convinced could use all their influence to make Fascist preparation for aggression possible.

Whoever demanded resistance to Fascist aggression, who on the strength of Fascist literature itself did not believe in the pacifism of Chancellor Hitler or Signor Mussolini, was declared by the Fascists to be a war-monger, a Jew, or a Red, and this evaluation was not only pronounced by the Fascists but accepted with great eagerness by their liberal supporters and the isolationists. Thus the moral powers of democratic resistance were undermined from within, a facile optimism was preached, the declarations of the leaders of the Fascist states were accepted at their face value. The Fascist powers developed a world policy of close cooperation and mutual support among themselves, but they shouted aggression when a similar cooperation and close alliance of the democratic nations was proposed. The suggestion of a cooperation between the United States and the European democracies was branded as a Jewish Bolshevik plot of interference by outside countries in European affairs, but a cooperation of Germany and Italy with non-European Japan was accepted as an element conducive to the Fascist peace of Europe.

The isolationist policy of the democracies allowed the Fascist powers one success after the other, and these successes are nothing but a very modest beginning. The Fascist powers proceed step by step, trusting that each step will take the world by surprise, that it will be regarded as an isolated event, maybe as a last event, and that it will be deemed of not sufficient importance to awake a concerted resistance on the

part of the democracies. By this procedure the Fascist powers not only continuously expand their sphere of dominion and their resources for the coming war, not only morally weaken the democracies, but are enabled to point out at home the weakness and inferiority of the democracies. Each success in foreign policy was a new step in strengthening the prestige of the Fascist rulers in their respective countries, in proving to their subjects the decay of democracy, in destroying the hope of throwing off the Fascist yoke and the grip of militarism from the Italian, Japanese, and German peoples. Each successive success made the Fascists more audacious, radicalized the movement, removed from its path all the conservative obstacles which still subsisted from pre-Fascist Italy, Germany, and Japan. After each success the Fascists, with the logic of their dynamism, proceeded rapidly not towards appeasement but towards new acts of aggression and destruction at home and abroad. All the landmarks which human civilization has put up in its century-old struggle are being swept away. The dams are being broken, and broken by the lack of intellectual and moral integrity in those who should have been the guardians of the dams, and who will be carried away by the rising flood. The demons of nature are let loose; they ride jubilantly on the crest of the flood towards a totalitarian *Götterdämmerung*.

As Fascism conquers one country after the other, the fellow nations of the victims stand by and, to the satisfaction of the Fascist aggressors, keep strict neu-

trality. This is fundamentally an immoral, not merely an unwise, attitude; for it refuses to distinguish between good and evil, it acquiesces in the evil, and necessarily leads to a dulling of the moral sense. Inevitably it implies taking the side of the stronger aggressor. As long as neutrality makes the world safe for aggression, wars and conquests will go on in fast succession until they will involve all nations. There is no peace possible save as an indivisible peace. The first step towards peace and a new feeling of security would be a close cooperation of all democratic and peace-loving nations. The temper of the people in France, in the United States, in Great Britain, is a definite guarantee that no preventive or aggressive war will be undertaken by them. A close cooperation of the democracies under a bold and intelligent leadership would assure peace and end the danger of war. Then, and only then, armaments could be reduced and all reasonable grievances adjusted. A cooperation on behalf of peace would be only the beginning. The democratic nations would have to learn to cooperate not only for common defense, but also economically and culturally. The old prejudices of nineteenth-century national sovereignty, the concentration on national self-interest, would slowly have to die, so that at the end, to use the words of Professor George Catlin, instead of a free assembly of sovereign nations a sovereign assembly of free nations would emerge. The democratic nations — and the cooperation must in the beginning be strictly confined to states which

acknowledge in principle the idea of constitutional law — have the power to establish such a league. Should such a strong league exist, bent upon international cooperation, upon world-wide economic, political, and cultural compacts, it will draw within its orbit, as time goes on, even the Fascist nations. It will free the genius of the German and the Italian peoples from the incubus of Fascist power policies and restore them to their rightful place in the comity of nations. A strong democracy will convince the Fascist nations of its vitality. Today the democratic nations have still the power to save peace. The question is, whether they have the will.

For ultimately the issue is, as all issues are, a moral and spiritual one. The superiority of the Fascist nations today is not accidental. They are more progressive than the democracies because they have learned to realize that the earth has become one as never before in history, that the destiny of all peoples is closely interlinked, that each position and each move must be viewed in its world-wide context. They take their own ideas seriously. They know that what is going on in the world today is a spiritual conflict, an ideological war. They proclaim it openly. But they reserve to themselves the right of standing up for ideas, they forbid the democracies, under penalty of being called war-mongers, Jews, or Reds, to believe in their own spiritual values and to wage from their own end the ideological war which Fascism forces upon mankind. The Fascists dread nothing more than a moral

reawakening of the democracies and their courageous stand for their own ideals. But the democracies, sapped by pro-Fascist propaganda, blinded by their own short-sighted prejudices, unable to understand the new dynamism of Fascism, lag behind the time and leave the leadership to the Fascist powers.

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Merc anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.

Surely some revelation is at hand.

— *William Butler Yeats*

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In the present situation we must pay a price for peace which the peoples are not yet ready to pay, that of close cooperation. We must secure peace for all, to secure peace for ourselves. The decision before us is whether to stand up with all humanity, or to go down with all humanity. In this effort to establish peace on firm foundations and to save Western civilization, the United States cannot exclude itself, for moral reasons as well as for the sake of its own survival in peace and liberty.

Former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson, in a letter to the *New York Times* of March 7, 1939, outlined a foreign policy for the United States which takes into account the great changes of the last decade.

It seems to me that it maps out the road which the United States must follow to safeguard her own security and liberty and to build up world peace:

I believe that our foreign policy cannot with safety be geographically limited to a defense of this hemisphere or of our own continental boundaries. On the contrary, I think that if we should stand idly by without protest or action until Britain, France, and China are either conquered or forced to make terms with militaristic aggressors, our own hemisphere might become economically so affected and militarily so endangered that it would be neither a safe nor happy place to live in, for a people with American ideals of life.

One very common objection to such an affirmative policy of our government is in substance that we are needlessly irritating and antagonizing nations with whom otherwise we might safely live in peace and that we are meddling with what really does not concern us. These critics say that democracies have lived in the same world with autocracies before; therefore they should be able to do so now. I think that the fundamental error involved in this objection is an imperfect appreciation of the basic aims and methods of the so-called Fascist governments, by which term I mean the three nations united by the so-called Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis. . . . Even now it is hardly appreciated what a complete reversal of the whole trend of European civilization they represent. If all that modern Fascism meant were a system under which a nation voluntarily submitted itself to an autocratic ruler and under him was willing to live quietly and at peace with its neighbors, we might agree that it was a domestic matter which concerned that nation alone.

But it is becoming every day more clear that Fascism . . . is a radical attempt to reverse entirely the long evolution

out of which our democracies of Europe and America have grown, and that it constitutes probably the most serious attack on their underlying principles which those principles have ever met.

We know now that the inhabitants of those countries from childhood up, by means of meticulous and absolute government control and by the skillful use of modern engines and methods of mass propaganda, are being taught to reject freedom; to scorn the principles of government by discussion and persuasion instead of force, and to despise the neighboring nations which practice such principles. We now know that those Fascist nations have created a skillful technique for foreign aggression and that they are in fact girded under virtual martial law for threats and, if necessary, for acts of force upon their neighbors. . . . It is now clear that we are confronted with serious danger which will exist until the liberal movement regains its faith, its courage and its momentum, and until the people of the Fascist nations themselves become convinced of the futility of their systems and compel the necessary changes. . . . What we are discussing now is the prospect of preventing such a general war from actually breaking out. That is an entirely different matter. Even if they are impervious to moral reasons, these aggressive Fascist nations understand very well the possible dangers as well as the possible advantages of force, and they may be deterred from beginning a war by timely and vigorous warning of the dangers which they will thereby certainly incur. Even more important, peaceful nations may be encouraged not to make surrenders which will ultimately endanger our safety, if they now receive from us in advance encouragement and actual assistance which it lies within our power to give them.

No one realizes more strongly than I do the uniquely secure position, geographically as well as in the possession of vital resources, which the United States occupies today. . . .

412 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

But the question now is: Having these unique and powerful advantages, how shall we use them? Shall we bury our heads in the sands of isolationism and timidly await the time when our security shall be lessened and perhaps destroyed by the growing success of lawlessness around us? Or shall we use our present strength and security from attack to throw our weight into the vacillating scales in favor of law and order and freedom? . . . It is far from inconceivable that a threatened or devastated France or Britain or Holland might be forced to cede to a Fascist nation some of its possessions in the Western Hemisphere or in the Orient or make commitments to that nation which would be even more dangerous to our safety. Would our position be bettered by idly waiting for that to occur?

There is a flood of reaction and violence overrunning the world today. Our faith is that this is temporary; that the . . . progress in freedom and in the humanities will be resumed. In the meanwhile and until the present violence has spent its force that flood must be held back from overwhelming us. During that interval each liberty-loving nation which stands confident in its own strength and freedom is a strong point of defense. But that defense is not complete unless there is created among all such nations the fullest sympathy and encouragement as well as a readiness to assist to an extent proportionate to the danger.

What I have written may explain why I am unalterably opposed to the doctrine preached in many quarters that our government and our people must treat the nations on both sides of this great issue with perfect impartiality. . . .

I am opposed to such doctrine because I am confident that we are confronting an organized attack upon the very basis of our civilization and because I know that this civilization was only achieved by the development of what we call law and the humanities; by the respect for justice and fair play to all men; by the principle of the sovereignty of reason

rather than force and by the Christian principle of the equal value of all human personalities.

Such a civilization can only be preserved if we keep alive in our people their faith in these underlying principles. And I see no surer way of destroying their faith than by teaching them that in such a conflict as is now going on in the world neither they nor their government shall discriminate between right and wrong, between an aggressor and his victim, between an upholder of law and a violator thereof.

How can we expect to keep alive in our citizens the principles which have produced our civilization and upon the continuance of which rests the hope of a future rule of law and justice in the international world, if we now sacrifice those principles to a motive of timid expediency and a desire to make the present easier at the expense of both the safety and the moral character of the future? . . .

It is in the hands of the peoples of the United States, of Great Britain and of France, to save peace and democracy. The smaller nations now trembling for their survival, the Australians and the Dutch, the Scandinavians and the Swiss, the Southern Slavs and the Turks, will gladly follow in their lead. A new hope will animate mankind, filling the hearts not only of men of the free nations but also of all the many Italians and Germans who have not ceased to pray that the Fascist prediction of the incurable decay, pusillanimity, and egotism of democracy will be proved untrue. They know that Fascism is a colossus on feet of clay, that it lives and thrives on the lack of intellectual sanity and moral integrity in the democracies, that the issue is not one of armaments and resources, but one of throwing off cherished prejudices, of a

414 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

courageous effort to face new and unexpected realities, of the determination to sacrifice for one's own ideals when they are challenged and threatened. Fascism owes its victories to men like Chamberlain, Flandin, Bonnet, and Stoyadinovich, to all the liberal propagandists for National Socialist Germany who pretend to see in the present totalitarian crisis nothing but a fight between two imperialisms, a young buccaneer and a retired and now well-behaved pirate. They obscure deliberately all the moral issues, they preach a facile optimism and a living faith in the words and promises of Hitler and Mussolini, they call every true analysis of Fascist aims war-mongering or incitement to hate. They, and not Fascism or Communism, are the grave-diggers of democracy.

There are many today who in utter disgust at Chamberlain and Bonnet refuse to cooperate with Great Britain and France. They forget that democracy in the United States is in no way better than that in Great Britain or France, that there are isolationists and liberal propagandists for National Socialist Germany probably as numerous and probably as insidious in the United States as there are in the European democracies. Great Britain and France have abandoned, to their own undoing, Ethiopia, Spain, and Czechoslovakia. But the record of the United States has not been much better. Large parts of the American people have shown no clearer understanding of the issues involved. And it would be a tragic, and this time probably fatal, repetition if America to its own un-

doing should abandon Great Britain and France. The proposal to confine the help of the United States to the American continents not only is strategically a dangerous illusion (for should the British, French, and Dutch lands in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans be under Fascist influence, how could the United States defend the American continents?), but the argument sounds rather strange, in view of the situation in Latin America, that France and Great Britain are imperfect democracies and should therefore be abandoned to their just fate. It is the deepest meaning of the great transformation of social life, which began with the first World War and the consequences of which we are yet very far from realizing — a transformation which expresses itself in all the revolutions and changes which have shaken mankind for the last twenty-five years — that the crisis is a totalitarian one, not only in the sense that all aspects of human life, moral, intellectual, political, and economic, are closely interwoven in its texture, but that no nation and no group on earth can escape its impact and can evade the responsibility for its solution. For the first time in history all problems become common to mankind. The Fascists and the Communists have grasped this new situation; therein lies their strength. They are products of this crisis, and therefore understand it. The crisis can be overcome only by the reassertion of the moral values of that civilization which is threatened by the crisis, a reassertion which presupposes clear recognition of the new situation in which they

416 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

have to stand the test. It is an entirely new and deeply frightening certitude that there is no longer any escape in isolation. It is no longer possible in a terrifying world to withdraw like *Candide* and to cultivate our own garden. The totalitarian crisis burdens everyone, everywhere, with an unprecedented responsibility; it is easily understood that the peoples refuse to shoulder it. But as great as the fear and the danger is the hope; for the first time the possibility dawns of establishing peace and liberty, not for ourselves, but for mankind. We cannot save ourselves first; in the totalitarian crisis we all stand or fall together.

POSTSCRIPT

January 1, 1941

THE SECOND WORLD WAR has entered its seventeenth month. Actually it started in 1936; its causes and issues were clearly discernible by then. German propaganda tries to isolate the war which broke out on September 1, 1939, from preceding events, and to prove it a British war against Germany. It forgets conveniently that whatever may be the judgment upon the wisdom of the policy of Mr. Chamberlain and his colleagues, no government has ever tried so eagerly to avoid war and to appease National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy as the British government did in the years from 1936 to 1939. The British and the French cabinets connived at an interpretation of the Pact of Munich entirely favorable to the most fantastic claims of Germany and disastrous for the independence of that remnant of Czechoslovakia whose undisturbed sovereignty and growth it feigned to guarantee. On March 9, 1939, the British government informed the press that the international situation was better than it had been for a long time, and that a disarmament conference might be called before the end of the year. At the same time, British industrialists visited Germany under the patronage of the British government, to arrive at an understanding about economic coöperation between the two coun-

418 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

tries. In that situation, in which official Great Britain was entirely set for peace and good will with Germany and Italy, the sudden military occupation of the Czech lands by Chancellor Hitler in the middle of March, 1939, came as a shock. It marked a turning point in British official policy.

The National Socialist government then abandoned overtly its aim to unify all Germans in a greater Reich, a policy viewed with sincere sympathy by many Englishmen. Although these aims were of a dangerously fluid nature, lending themselves to unlimited interpretations and acting as a disintegrating factor for nations built on history and civilization instead of on the purity of blood, they seemed more limited than the new doctrine of a *Lebensraum* which has no discernible boundaries and which grows with every new success. Faced with an apparent threat to all international relations and peaceful development, the British government, much too late, tried to adopt the principle of collective security, and gave on March 31, 1939, an assurance of support to Poland against any aggression. It is noteworthy that the Polish government which found itself threatened by Germany in the spring of 1939 was one which in many ways had fulfilled Hitler's wishes concerning foreign governments desirous of living at peace with National Socialist Germany. Neither democracy nor Judaism had any influence in Warsaw; Poland had a government which was pro-fascist, anti-democratic, anti-Communistic and anti-Semitic. Its foreign minister, Colonel Beck,

had whole-heartedly coöperated with National Socialist Germany in undermining the League of Nations and in spurning all efforts at collective security.

On January 26, 1934, a ten-year pact of friendship and non-aggression had been concluded between Germany and Poland. Five years later, on January 30, 1939, Chancellor Hitler declared in a speech before the German Reichstag: "We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be any difference of opinion today among the true friends of peace with regard to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which brought such relief, had not been entered into five years ago. In signing it, this great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his people just as great a service as the leaders of the National Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled months of the past year the friendship between Germany and Poland was one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe." And at the height of the Czechoslovak crisis, on September 26, 1938, Chancellor Hitler declared in a speech in the Berlin Sportpalast that while democracies were bloodthirsty war agitators, non-democratic Poland had come to an agreement with National Socialist Germany which "for ten years in the first instance entirely removed the danger of a conflict. We are all convinced that this agreement will bring

lasting pacification. A way for understanding has been found; and it will be ever further extended."

The case of Poland proves that the policy of appeasement, of falling in line with National Socialist anti-Semitism and contempt for democracy, will not save any country from being attacked by Germany. The case of Norway, the Netherlands, and Belgium proves that a policy of isolation, neutrality and building up democracy at home will not save any country from being attacked by Germany. Appeasement and isolation, on the contrary, invite attack. For this war is not a war between nations, but a world-wide attempt to impose what is being called a "new order." This new order, with its uncompromising hostility to democracy, to individual liberty and to human equality, is not a revolution in the sense that it will bring, as did the French Revolution, a newer and better concept of man's position in society and of man's growth to full mental and moral maturity. In all democracies there are some who regard democracy as something obsolete, some "overworked abstraction," who greet enthusiastically the new gospel riding on the wave of the future and promising mankind an age of efficiency and prosperity. In reality, democracy is a very young movement in history. As a message of individual freedom, of the equality of all men, of their right and ability to think for themselves, to act on their own responsibility and to seek happiness in their own way, democracy was first proclaimed in seventeenth-century England, became effective through the American and French revolu-

tions in the eighteenth century, and spread slowly in the nineteenth century. It brought entirely new and daring concepts of man, liberated him from the age-old yoke of authoritarianism and from the division of men into masters and serfs with immutable barriers separating them, awakened the masses from their perennial lethargy and apathy. It has been a call to the greatest adventure in human society; far from being obsolete, it has never yet been fully tried. The so-called new order, the wave of the future, is nothing but a counter-revolution against the principles of the Anglo-Saxon and French revolutions, a conscious effort to lead mankind backward to authoritarianism, to the inequality of men, to the denial of the right of the individual to use his reason in freedom. That this age-old primitive attitude, this resurgence of a barbarism which we had hoped was obsolete, is being greeted as something new, when it equips itself with the tools of modern technique, is one of the saddest symptoms of the confusion of this time.

The new order in Europe and the new order in the Far East have been merged into one by the progress of the war in 1940. The *Lebensraum* gave way to a wider conception, that of hemispheres and large continents organized and ruled by the most virile — meaning the most aggressive and best armed — nation. But once the British Isles and China were conquered, the new order of the continents would give way quickly to the conception of a new world order, which looms as the great vision behind all the words and proclamations of the German and Japanese leaders and their

followers. Immense fascist armed camps are on the march. Social revolution and disintegration are one of their weapons, especially because they believe their own nations immune. Nationalism they deprecate in all other nations, while they make it the soul and backbone of their own; they preach to all other peoples the blessings of peace and submission, while they extol the glories of war and the virtues of struggle and conquest to their own. The vision before them is a world ruled by the few master races, a hard and pitiless elite of men of the highest courage and greatest physical ability, armed to the teeth and ruling vast masses of disarmed populations to whom their dominion brings "peace" and "security." Spengler expressed this vision: "Man becomes a plant again, adhering to the soil, dumb and enduring. The timeless village, the 'eternal' peasant reappear, begetting children and burying seed in Mother Earth, a busy and frugal multitude, over whom the tempest of the soldier-emperors blows and passes. They live from hand to mouth, with a small and petty happiness, and endure. Masses are trampled on in the conflicts of the conquerors who contend for the power and spoil of this world, but the survivors fill the gaps with primitive fertility and suffer on." It is the resurgence of the age-old apathy of the man with the hoe, as Edwin Markham has described him:

"The emptiness of ages in his face,
And on his back the burden of the world.

Who made him dead to rapture and despair,
A thing that grieves not and that never hopes,
Stolid and stunned, a brother to the ox?
Whose was the hand that slanted back his brow?
Whose breath blew out the light within his brain?"

and this situation, as now created in Poland through National Socialist conquest, is being called a *new* order.

The defeatism of democracy in the face of the great counter-revolution, the humble acceptance of the "inevitability" of the return to pristine levels of individual and social life, are the most effective weapons in the hands of the counter-revolutionaries, whose most important strategy is that of terror and confusion. France succumbed to it. That the English people were able to shake off fear and uncertainty in the last minute allows us to hope that the new, true revolution may be accomplished in a victorious England. A few months of a fighting democracy in England have proven the immense vitality and efficiency of democracy. Had the English and the Americans awakened from the slumber of appeasement and the complacency of isolation a few years earlier, few would speak of the efficiency of fascism and the inefficiency of democracy. Modern industrial efficiency arose in the democratic nations, not in authoritarian states. National Socialist Germany is highly efficient not because it is fascist but because it is German. At the end of 1940 English democracy and Greek love of liberty were able to check fascist forces far

424 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

superior in numbers and equipment which for eighteen years had prepared for this war.

As unfounded as the claim of greater fascist efficiency is that of superior numbers by which the counter-revolution hopes to spread fear and paralyze democracy. The Chinese are now waging for the fourth year a successful war of resistance against the superior military machine of Japan. They and hundreds of millions throughout Asia and Africa, Europe and Latin America, will coöperate enthusiastically in the defense of the liberty of man and the equality of all, if the right leadership be forthcoming. They will be eager to follow a courageous call, not for an abandonment of democracy, but for its fuller realization. The present war is not one between nations or races; it is a war between different concepts of man: the revolutionary concept of democracy, and the counter-revolutionary concept which denies liberty and equality and reëstablishes old forms of serfdom. Whatever the governments of the nations do, individual Germans and Italians are to be found on the side of the revolution, and individual Anglo-Saxons and men of every race on the side of the counter-revolution. For it is not the blood which decides and which fixes the station of men according to birth or to authority, as the old dispensation believes; it is the spirit whose freedom and universalism the new dispensation of democracy has taught us to recognize.

SOME RECENT BOOKS

SOME RECENT BOOKS

THE SUBJECTS covered in this volume are so varied that an adequate bibliography within a limited space cannot even be attempted. Readers are referred, for the subjects treated, to the bibliographies in my articles on Messianism, Russian Revolution, and Zionism in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, and in my books, *A History of Nationalism in the East* (London: Routledge, 1929); *Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East* (London: Routledge, 1932); and *Western Civilization in the Near East* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1936). The best recent scholarly study on Napoleon is George Lefebvre, *Napoleon* (Paris: Alcan, 1935). For *A Bibliographical Introduction to Nationalism* we are indebted to Koppel S. Pinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1935). I have included here only a very short list of the most recent books, especially useful for a better understanding of the problems involved in the present crisis. The reader will find many other titles in the bibliography at the end of my *Not By Arms Alone* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940).

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428 REVOLUTIONS AND DICTATORSHIPS

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INDEX

- Abdallah ibn Hussein, 282, 294
 Abdul Azis ibn Abdur Rahman,
 see Ibn Saud
 Abdul Hamid II, 258f.
 Abukir Bay, Battle of, 44
 Afghanistan, 273f.
 Agrarian problems, 91, 98, 108,
 113, 130, 132ff., 190
 Ahad Ha-am, 308ff., 325
 Alexander the Great, 39, 44
 Alexander I, Czar of Russia, 86,
 45, 51f., 57f.
 Alexander II, Czar of Russia, 306,
 337
 Alexander of Yugoslavia, 179f.
 American Revolution, 70ff., 212,
 214, 351, 383
 Anabaptists, 33f.
 Angell, Norman, 346
 Anti-Comintern Pact, 5, 136, 191,
 356, 363, 370, 403f., 410
 Antisemitism, 304, 309f., 317f., 327,
 390ff., 394ff., 398ff.
 Appeasement, policy of, 368f., 382,
 406, 418
 Arabia, 278ff., 288, 295
 Arabs, 274, 280ff., 287, 293f., 299,
 321ff.
 Aristocracy, 90, 92, 201, 203, 214,
 216
 Armaments, 350, 385f., 420
 Armenians, 261
 Arminius, 201
 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 58
 Aryanism, 388
 Assimilation, 300, 303ff., 310, 379,
 396, 402
 Atatürk, Kamal, *see* Mustafa
 Kemal
 Austerlitz, Battle of, 49
 Austria, 187, 189, 203, 206, 342, 370
 Authoritarianism, 191ff., 202, 211,
 214
 Balance of Power, 334
 Balfour Declaration, 316, 318, 322,
 324
 Balkan Pact, 276
 Barrès, Maurice, 79, 200
 Barth, Karl, 382, 401
 Basques, 234
 Bauer, Otto, 149
 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 49, 224
 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald
 von, 343
 Bismarck, Otto, Prince, 65f., 76ff.,
 81, 202f., 206, 224, 237, 336ff.
 Bogomiles, 32
 Bolsheviks, 93, 106ff., 112, 157, 382.
 See also Communist Party
 Bonnet, Georges, 383, 414
 Boruchow, Ber, 315
 Boulanger Affair, 80, 200
 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 115, 341,
 372
 British Empire, 40, 379f., 382
 Buddhism, 209, 211
 Burckhardt, Jacob, 15, 17, 71, 382
 Burke, Edmund, 38, 57
 Calvinism, 202
 Capitalism, 38, 121, 150, 181, 185,
 244
 Carlyle, Thomas, 67
 Catalans, 234
 Cathari, 33
 Catherine II, 52, 86, 89
 Catholic Church, 80
 Cavour, Camillo, Count, 76
 Chamberlain, Neville, 375, 414,
 417f.
 Chassidism, 301

- Cheka, 117
 Chelčický, Peter, 33
 China, 150f., 239, 362, 365f.
 Chosen people, *see* Messianism
 Chovevei Zion, 308
 Christianity, 5, 11f., 21, 30-35, 208, 212, 220f., 335, 351, 389f., 394, 400f.
 Class struggle, 78
 Classicism, 204
 Clausewitz, Karl von, 63
 Clemenceau, Georges, 340, 348
 Clericalism, 232
 Collective Security, 228, 353, 357, 386, 407
 Colonial problem, 380f.
 Committee for Union and Progress, *see* Young Turks
 Communism, 135f., 175, 188ff., 192ff., 217ff., 230, 272f., 351ff., 358ff., 362f., 371
 Communist International, 120, 136
 Communist Party, 112, 117, 125, 129, 154
 Constantinople, 52, 97, 103, 275
 Cosmopolitanism, *see* Universalism
 Counter Revolution, 107. *See also* Fascism
 Crimean War, 89, 92
 Cromwell, Oliver, 220
 Czechoslovakia, 231, 368, 372ff., 417ff.
 Dante Alighieri, 225, 242
 Democracy, 148, 192, 211ff., 221ff., 225, 236, 255, 346f., 350, 356, 358ff., 361ff., 383, 407, 413
 Descartes, René, 212
 Determinism, 207, 221
 Dictator, dictatorship, 114, 119, 139, 143, 165, 179ff., 192ff., 255, 340
 Disarmament, 227, 407
 Disillusionment, after World War, 341, 349f., 352
 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 187
 Dreyfus Affair, 80, 310, 383
 Dynamism, 206f.
 Ebert, Friedrich, 344
 Egypt, 41-43, 150, 290, 327, 379
 Eighteenth Century, 66, 71, 212, 301
 English Revolution, 69-72, 212, 220, 351, 383
 Enlightenment, 12, 71, 198, 301, 306
 Enver Pasha, 259
 Equality, equalitarian attitude, 38, 65f., 163ff., 188, 195, 198, 204, 211f., 352, 373, 378f., 398
 Ethiopia, events of 1935-1936, 3, 366, 380
 Europeanization of the Orient, 44, 250ff., 268, 304. *See also* Modernization
 Fascism, 66, 79f., 82, 120, 137, 143, 181ff., 188ff., 191ff., 205, 215, 218ff., 226f., 230ff., 237, 244ff., 330, 352ff., 358ff., 369ff., 378ff., 383, 386f., 389ff., 404ff., 410f., 413ff.
 Falangists, 235
 Feisal ibn Hussein, 282, 293f.
 Feudalism, 232, 337, 390
 Five Year Plan, 131, 269
 France, 41, 46, 58f., 72, 74, 79, 86, 201, 223, 231, 244, 342, 348f., 363, 382f., 402; French hegemony, 348, 360; French imperialism, 379
 Franco, Francisco, 230f., 371, 384
 Frankfurt am Main, 76
 Frederick the Great, 50, 67, 202f.
 Frederick William I, 203
 French Revolution, 6, 38f., 41, 47, 50, 54, 58f., 66, 68-71, 73, 80, 89, 101, 141, 170, 183, 193, 212, 231, 334, 390

- Friedrich, Carl Joachim, 4
 Fuad, King of Egypt, 181
 Gapon, Father, 93
 Gentz, Friedrich von, 57f.
 German Republic, 344f., 374
 Germany, 50, 55, 67, 72f., 76, 82, 86, 115, 200, 204, 206, 209, 237, 333, 337ff., 340f., 343ff., 348, 355f., 360, 363, 368, 370, 387, 390ff., 397
 Ghazi bin Feisal, 294
 Ginsberg, Asher, *see* Ahad Ha-am
 Gladstone, William Ewart, 336
 Gneisenau, August Wilhelm, Count, 62
 Gobineau, Count Arthur de, 79
 Goethe, Wolfgang von, 73, 204
 Gordon, Arron David, 315
 Great Britain, 49, 51f., 59, 75, 121, 201, 204, 212, 274, 280, 287, 295, 314, 338f., 342, 348f., 364
 Greece, 71, 254, 261f., 275
 Grillparzer, Franz, 395
 Grotius, Hugo, 212
 Guchkov, A. I., 104
 Haifa, 319, 323
 Hardenberg, Karl August, Prince, 54
 Haskalah, 301, 306
 Haves and have-nots, 378ff., 404
 Hebrew language, 307, 309, 316, 319
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 71ff., 204, 208f.
 Hejaz, 281, 285, 287f.
 Hellenism, 15-17
 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 50, 69
 Heroic attitude, 66
 Herriot, Edouard, 363
 Herwegh, Georg, 79
 Herzl, Theodor, 310ff., 328
 Hess, Moses, 305f.
 Hindenburg, Paul von, 80, 345
 Hitler, Adolf, 6, 46, 181ff., 186, 200, 206, 210, 218, 230, 339, 343, 353, 370, 388, 390; his propaganda technique, 391ff.
 Holy Alliance, 75, 80, 82, 215, 220, 236, 334ff.
 Humanitarianism, 65, 71, 198, 380
 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 54
 Hussein ibn Ali, 281f., 284
 Hutten, Ulrich von, 201
 Ibn Saud, 278ff., 285ff., 292ff.
 Ibsen, Henrik, 35
 Imperial idea, 52f., 67
 Imperialism, 13, 101, 111, 142, 150, 300, 366f., 378ff., 389, 404
 India, 41, 43f., 52, 150, 213, 281, 342, 362, 379
 Indian National Congress, 362
 Individual Rights, 81, 198, 212
 Individualism, 38, 65, 71, 185, 193, 195, 204f., 207, 211ff., 218, 252, 301, 353
 Indivisibility of Peace, 5
 Industrialism, industrialization, 38, 51, 91, 98, 123, 130, 134, 146, 167, 190, 195, 238, 252, 269, 336
 Iraq, 274, 282, 290, 294, 327, 379
 Irrationalism, 72, 205, 208f., 367
 Isaiah, 26, 29
 Islam, 11, 51, 259, 263ff., 278
 Isolationism, 346, 350, 362, 368, 371, 382, 404f., 412ff.
 Italy, 41, 50, 55, 76ff., 180, 225, 295, 342, 355, 363, 387, 397, 402; aggression in Abyssinia, 4, 369, 384; aggression in Tripoli, 180
 Japan, 150, 189ff., 253, 363, 368, 381; aggression in Manchuria, 4, 364ff., 369, 384
 Jerusalem, 296, 319f.
 Jesus, 25, 30, 400f.
 Jewish question, 51, 304, 321, 329f., 394, 398ff.
 Jews, 94, 300ff., 390ff., 395f.; emancipation of, 74, 314, 390, 396
 Judaism, 6, 11-30, 211, 299, 309

- Kadets, party in Russia, 92, 103
 Kant, Immanuel, 50, 73, 208, 213, 225, 227, 397
 Kautsky, Karl, 149
 Kerensky, Alexander, 103ff., 108-110
 Khalifate, 258, 263, 281f.
 Kolchak, Alexander, 118
 Korea, 380
 Kornilov, Laurus G., 109, 118
 Kropotkin, Peter, Prince, 111
 Kulak, 124, 127, 133f.
 Kundt, Ernst, 376
 Kuomintang, 362
 Kurds, 262, 274

 Lamartine, Alphonse Marie Louis de, 224
 Latin America, 196, 238, 253, 385, 415
 Lausanne, 253f., 272
 Leadership, 65, 191ff., 387; Messianic, 192; Charismatic, 192f.
 League of Nations, 4, 136, 225ff., 273f., 341, 345, 350ff., 357, 363, 364ff., 368, 371, 377, 382, 407f.
 Leipzig, Battle of, 57
 Lenin, Nikolay (Vladimir Ilich Ulianov), 7, 93, 106ff., 110ff., 117ff., 140ff., 155ff., 175, 368; succession to, 125ff.
 Liberalism, 71f., 74, 76, 194f., 245, 255, 336f., 340, 344, 351, 358, 360, 371, 378, 390, 394
 Liberty, 72, 78, 211, 213, 222, 224
 Liddell Hart, B. H., 4
 Life, glorification of, 208
 Litvinov, Maksim, 136
 Lloyd George, David, 340, 348
 Locarno, 349, 368
 Ludendorff, Erich von, 340
 Lvov, Prince, 103, 109

 MacDonald, James Ramsay, 364
 MacMahon, M. E. P. M. de, 80
 Madariaga, Salvador de, 232

 Malta, 43
 Manchuria, *see* Japan
 Mandate system, 294, 322
 Mapu, Abraham, 306
 Marx, Karl, 78, 146f., 149f.
 Marxian Socialism, 145f., 152, 164, 182, 197, 315
 Masaryk, Thomas G., 79
 Maurras, Charles, 79, 398
 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 76, 225, 236
 Mecca, 279, 281, 284, 287, 296
 Mediterranean, 41, 44, 52, 237, 369, 385
 Mensheviks, 93, 105ff.
 Messianism, 7, 11-37, 192, 302; and Christianity, 30-35; and Nationalism, 13, 26, 35-37, 180, 329; and Socialism, 13, 35
 Metternich, Klemens W. N. L., Prince, 58, 81, 237
 Mexico, 189, 239
 Middle Ages, 72, 256
 Middle class, ascendancy of, 38f., 74, 77, 91f., 201, 249, 391
 Militarism, 188, 190, 201f., 226, 232, 343f.
 Milton, John, 223
 Miliukov, Paul N., 103f.
 Modernization of backward countries, 85, 98, 135, 165ff., 177, 196, 232, 250, 255
 Moeller van den Bruck, Arthur, 202
 Mohammed, 278
 Mohammed Ameen el Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem, 296f.
 Moscow, 116
 Mosul, 274
 Munzer, Thomas, 33
 Mussolini, Benito, 6, 46, 179ff., 218, 230, 255, 384, 403
 Mustafa, Kemal, 196, 253ff., 262ff., 276f.; as a dictator, 255f.

 Napoleon I, 6, 38-67, 71, 184, 334; and dictatorship, 39, 45f., 63f;

- and the new state, 47f.; and strategy, 60-63
- Napoleon III, 46
- National Minorities, 234, 261, 356, 374f., 395f.
- National self-interest, 346, 350, 382, 407
- National Socialism, 73, 79f., 184, 186, 200ff., 206, 209, 220, 339, 345, 352ff., 360, 371, 374, 376ff., 381, 390, 394ff., 400f. *See also* Fascism
- Nationalism, 6, 35-37, 41, 50, 55, 66, 68-82, 96f., 113, 145ff., 162f., 168, 170, 173ff., 185, 194, 205f., 220, 233f., 239, 240-246, 255, 264, 302f., 396; and militarism, 54, 61, 63
- Natural Rights, 212
- Near East, 43-45, 196, 299, 342
- Negroes, 379ff.
- Nejd, 279ff., 289
- Netherlands, 360, 382, 412f.
- Neutrality, 406f., 412f.
- New Economic Policy, 123f., 127
- Nicholas I, 89
- Nicholas II, 101
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 67, 78, 184
- Nihilism, 88
- Nineteenth century, 187, 194, 196, 212, 224, 227, 362
- Nomads, settlement of, 283, 289
- Optimism, 213
- Orient and Occident, 121, 250ff.
- Oriental question, 43, 52
- Orthodox Church, 90ff.
- Ottoman Empire, 101, 258, 272, 280
- Overpopulation, 367
- Pacifism, 81, 185f., 188, 220, 224, 227, 348, 350, 352, 409
- Pact of Munich, 3, 369f., 371ff., 417ff.
- Palestine, 43, 294, 299, 316, 318ff., 325ff.
- Pan-Arabism, 274, 282, 293, 297, 327
- Pan-Islamism, 259, 285f., 296
- Pan-Turanianism, 259
- Paris, 57
- Paul I, Czar of Russia, 44
- Peace Treaties after the World War, 4, 116, 200, 216, 333, 343, 347, 364, 377, 417; Lausanne, 253f., 272; Sèvres, 254, 316
- Peasantry in Russia, 86, 89f.
- Persia, 44f., 150, 273f.
- Persian Gulf, 43, 281, 288
- Peter the Great, 85f., 89
- Philo, 17
- Pinsker, Leon, 307, 310
- Pius VII, 59
- Pius IX, 80
- Plato, 15
- Plebiscites, 45, 48, 187
- Plekhanov, Georgei V., 111
- Pobedonostsev, Konstantin Petrovich, 306, 389
- Popular Front, 360, 362
- Poland, 36, 189, 318f., 362
- Potsdam, 345
- Power politics, 72, 77ff., 203, 206, 354
- Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, 235
- Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 179, 369
- Progress, 12, 353, 378
- Prussia, 50, 78, 200ff., 206, 337, 343, army in, 62f., 76; reforms in, 54f., 73f.
- Racialism, 67, 79, 153, 207, 220, 329, 388, 401f., 404
- Ranke, Leopold von, 339
- Rationalism, 66, 71, 81, 192, 198, 202, 208f., 211f., 212, 221, 339, 353
- Realpolitik, 77
- Rechtsstaat, 399
- Red Sea, 43, 288
- Regimentation, 218

- Religion, 187, 204, 208, 211f., 243,
252, 262, 313, 395, 401
- Renaissance, 41, 68, 201, 334
- Renner, Karl, 149
- Republican People's Party in Turkey, 196, 256ff., 267f.
- Revision of Peace Treaties, 4
- Revolution, of 1848, 75f., 78, 80, 215, 223; Spanish, 233. *See also* American Revolution, English Revolution, French Revolution, Russian Revolution
- Rhine, 57, 348
- Rhineland, 370
- Rios, Fernando de los, 233
- Risorgimento, 41, 342
- Roman Empire, 40f., 188, 219, 242
- Romanticism, 66f., 69, 75, 79, 200ff., 204ff., 335
- Runciman, Walter, Lord, 374f., 376
- Russia, 35, 43, 51, 55-57, 71, 75, 85, 87, 97, 101, 107, 129, 141ff., 152, 300, 306, 389
- Russian intelligentsia, 97, 99, 107f., 113
- Russian Revolution, 85-175, 194, 340, 367; Revolution of 1905, 92ff., 150; Revolution of February 1917, 101ff., 157; Revolution of October 1917, 110f., 194
- Russo-Japanese War, 92
- Samuel, Sir Herbert, 322
- Saudi Arabia, 288, 327
- Scandinavia, 360, 413
- Scharnhorst, Gerhard J. D. von, 62
- Schmitt, Carl, 186
- Schiller, Friedrich, 224, 306, 397
- Schopenhauer, Arthur, 208f.
- Schuschnigg, Kurt, 206
- Sectarians, religious, 90f.
- Secularization, 12, 35, 170, 194, 196, 212, 256, 262ff., 307
- Self-determination, 111ff., 115, 158, 372ff., 375ff., 379, 417
- Seventeenth century, 212, 220, 243
- Sèvres, 254, 316
- Seyss-Inquart, Arthur, 375
- Shabbethai Zebi, 25
- Simon, Sir John, 365
- Slavophile Movement, 35, 87f., 99, 142, 340, 389
- Social Democratic Party in Russia, 93
- Socialism, 175f., 180, 216, 315, 360, 362, 367
- Socialist Revolutionary Party in Russia, 89, 93, 104ff., 114, 315
- Sokolow, Nahum, 313
- Soviet, 94, 96, 103f., 108ff.
- Spain, 3, 52, 55, 71, 231f., 234f., 237, 366, 369, 371, 384, 386; and Civil War, 230ff., 245
- Spartan attitude, 202
- Spengler, Oswald, 184, 202
- Stab in the back, 344
- Stalin, Josef, 126ff., 137ff., 155ff., 171, 175, 195, 358
- Status quo, 381
- Stein, vom, Heinrich Friedrich Karl, Baron, 54, 58
- Stimson, Henry L., 365, 409
- Stoicism, 212
- Stolipin, Petr A., 98, 132
- Stoyadinovich, Milan, 362, 414
- Sudetenland, 370, 375
- Superman, 64f., 184, 192, 256, 353
- Supernation, 66f., 353
- Switzerland, 382, 384, 413
- Syria, 42, 282
- Tel Aviv, 318, 320
- Terrorism, 88
- Third Reich, *see* National Socialism
- Tilsit, Peace of, 52, 62
- Titanism, 66
- Tolerance, 213, 222
- Tolstoy, Leo, 315

- Totalitarian attitude, 5, 198, 207, 354, 370, 404, 415f.
- Traditionalism, 130, 301
- Trafalgar, Battle of, 49
- Transjordan, 282, 287, 294, 324
- Treaty of Versailles, *see* Peace Treaties
- Treitschke, Heinrich, 339
- Trotsky, Leon, 94, 109ff., 124ff., 138
- Tunisia, 369
- Turkey, 135, 150, 196, 213, 249-277
- Twentieth century, 225, 228, 243, 250
- Uganda, 314
- Ukraine, 111, 115, 118, 159
- U. S. S. R., 120, 128, 157, 159, 172, 198, 252f., 401; foreign policy, 135ff., 273; nationality policy, 139f., 145-178; oriental policy, 121, 135, 272ff., 287
- United States of America, 214f., 217, 231, 244, 342, 347, 350, 357, 365, 383, 386, 402, 409ff., 414f.
- Universalism, 67, 71, 76, 80, 175, 177f., 192, 207, 220, 223f., 225, 346, 351, 408, 415f.
- Vienna, Congress of, 59, 74, 216
- Vitalism, 204f., 207, 209
- Volk, 205
- Volksgeist, 72, 244
- Volksgemeinschaft, 72
- Wagner, Richard, 67
- Wahhabism, 278, 284f., 290f.
- Weizmann, Chaim, 312, 324
- Weltanschauung, 207ff.
- Weltpolitik, 45, 52
- Western Revolution, 80
- William I, 76
- Wilson, Woodrow, 225ff., 340
- Witte, Sergyei Y., Count, 94
- Women, Rights of, 198, 216, 238, 256, 265f., 356
- World Revolution, 120, 128, 137f.
- World War, 4, 80, 99ff., 111, 145, 195, 200, 215, 225, 238, 251, 333, 339f., 351, 356; origins of, 342f.
- Yehya Imam of Yemen, 293, 295f.
- Yemen, 279, 285, 295f.
- Yiddish language, 307
- Young Turks, 259f., 180
- Yugoslavia, 362
- Zangwill, Israel, 314
- Zeitgeist, 244
- Zionism, 7, 24, 26, 299-330; Zionist Congress, 311, 328

12171

